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Theory contraction and base contraction unified

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Sven Ove Hansson
Sven Ove Hansson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, S-752 36 Uppsala, Sweden, E-mail: filsoh@strix.udac.uu.se
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Abstract

One way to construct a contraction operator for a theory (belief set) is to assign to it a base (belief base) and an operator of partial meet contraction for that base. Axiomatic characterizations are given of the theory contractions that are generated in this way by (various types of) partial meet base contractions.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , June 1993 , pp. 602 - 625
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1993

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References

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