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CONSERVATIVITY FOR THEORIES OF COMPOSITIONAL TRUTH VIA CUT ELIMINATION

  • GRAHAM E. LEIGH (a1)

Abstract

We present a cut elimination argument that witnesses the conservativity of the compositional axioms for truth (without the extended induction axiom) over any theory interpreting a weak subsystem of arithmetic. In doing so we also fix a critical error in Halbach’s original presentation. Our methods show that the admission of these axioms determines a hyper-exponential reduction in the size of derivations of truth-free statements.

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