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Hard Luck Stories: The Problem of the Uninsured in a Laissez-Faire Society

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2009

Robert Sugden
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Abstract

Liberal economists argue that in general the market system promotes social welfare; but they usually accept that governments should relieve extreme poverty, even where this arises out of individuals' failure to insure themselves. A particularly common argument is that income maintenance is justified because more fortunate people feel compassion or obligation towards the poor. But this position is inconsistent. Given the assumptions necessary to support the claim that markets promote social welfare, there is no reason for anyone to suppose that the uninsured, however poor, are in special need; and so neither compassion nor obligation can arise.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Social Policy , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , April 1982 , pp. 201 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1982

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