1. European Union, “Action Plan to Combat Organized Crime,” Official Journal 1997/C 251/01, para. 1; see also Winer, Jonathan, “The US New International Crime Control Strategy,” Trends in Organized Crime 4, no.1 (1998): 63–70Google Scholar; Harfield, Clive, “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance: Political Perspectives on International Law Enforcement Co-operation Treaties,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 27, no. 2 (2003): 221–241.Google Scholar

2. Governor of Gibraltar to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 December 1952, National Archives [NA] CO/968/268.

3. Internal Colonial Office memo, 26 January 1953, in ibid.

4. For instance, state security, criminal investigation, and frontier control: Anderson, Malcolm, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-operation (Oxford, 1989)Google Scholar.

5. Bresler, Fenton, Interpol (London, 1992), 14.Google Scholar

6. Internal Colonial Office memo, 16 March 1953, NA CO/968/268.

7. London comprises two cities (Westminster and the City of London) and thirty-four Boroughs. The Metropolitan Police Service polices the City of Westminster and the thirty-four Boroughs. The square mile of the City of London (governed by the Corporation of London rather than the Greater London Authority) is policed by the City of London Police, the smallest public police force in Britain.

8. This in part contributed to the widely held misconception that New Scotland Yard, the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police Service, is the headquarters of all policing in Britain, an erroneous assumption that persists to this day. During a Fulbright Fellowship in May–August 2001 in Washington, D.C., I encountered in every federal law enforcement agency I met with the perception that New Scotland Yard is responsible for policing throughout Britain. As the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department serves only the District of Columbia, so the MPS serves only London. A few specialist national functions are coordinated through New Scotland Yard, for instance, diplomatic protection and terrorism investigation. At present, there are forty-three provincial police forces in England and Wales, eight in Scotland (which has its own unique jurisdiction and laws), and one in Northern Ireland, where the jurisdiction shares features with that in England and Wales, but that also has its own unique characteristics.

9. File minutes, 27 March 1953, NA CO/968/268.

10. Colonial Office to Assistant Commissioner Howe, 20 March 1953, in ibid.

11. Article 2.1 Interpol Constitution, available at www.interpol.int.

12. Interpol enjoyed a rapid growth in postwar membership as a consequence of European decolonization. Anderson, Policing the World, 43 n. 3.

13. NA CO/1037/93.

14. “Colonel” in Britain signifies an army rank and has no relevance for the British police service other than the fact that, until 1964, it was not uncommon for ex-military senior officers to be appointed as chief officers of police forces and some (as they were entitled to do) retained their military title. Direct entry at chief officer level is a policy no longer pursued in British policing, all officers being eligible to seek promotion, only having first served two years in the rank of Constable.

15. In each member country, Interpol has established a NCB as its base. In Britain, the NCB relocated from the National Criminal Intelligence Service to the Serious Organized Crime Agency on 1 April 2006.

16. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, an extensive program of amalgamation and rationalization reduced over a hundred county and borough police forces to just forty-three, each covering between one and three administrative counties.

17. Home Affairs Committee, Practical Police Co-operation in the European Community, 7th Report, House of Commons Paper 363, Session 1989–90, para. 80–81.

18. The idea of a national police force has historically been anathema to the British public. Not until 1998 were the first national law enforcement agencies established: the National Crime Squad (NCS) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). The former has a closely defined operational remit that addresses specifically organized crime. The latter provided an intelligence support function to all law enforcement agencies and is prohibited from conducting independent operational investigations and bringing prosecutions. On 1 April 2006 the NCS and NCIS merged with the investigation branches of HM Customs and HM Immigration into the Serious Organized Crime Agency. See Anderson, Policing the World, chap. 2, n. 3; Critchley, Thomas, A History of Police in England and Wales, 900–1966 (London, 1967)Google Scholar; Reiner, Robert, The Politics of the Police, 2d ed. (London, 1992)Google Scholar; Harfield, Clive, “SOCA: A Paradigm Shift in British Policing,” British Journal of Criminology 46, no. 4 (2006): 743–771.Google Scholar

19. Brunet, A., “Policing the New Europe,” in Crime and Criminal Justice in Europe (Strasbourg, 2000), 76Google Scholar; Cram, Laura, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” in European Union: Power and Policy-Making, ed. Richardson, J. (London, 1996), 40–58, 40.Google Scholar

20. Brown, Alistair, “Towards a Prosecutorial Model for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,” in Crimes Sans Frontières: International and European Legal Approaches, ed. Cullen, Peter and Gilmore, William (Edinburgh, 1998), 50–57, 50.Google Scholar

21. Minute 20 July 1959, NA FO71/146282:WUC 1651/2.

22. I am grateful to the staff at the House of Commons Information Office for supplying the career details of Sir Samuel Knox Cunningham MP.

23. Report of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly, 10th Ordinary Session, 30th Sitting, NA FO371/146282: WUC 1651/6 (emphasis added).

24. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 600, col. 92W, 19 February 1959.

25. File minute, 12 February 1959, NA FO 371/146282:WUC 1651/7.

26. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 600, col. 92W, 19 February 1959.

27. File minute, 2 March 1959, NA FO371/146282:WUC 1651/9. Again this illustrates apparent misunderstanding of the proposed mechanisms for the provision of assistance.

28. Briefing note, 21 January 1959, NA FO371/146282:WUC 1651/10.

29. Report of the First Meeting of the [ECCP], NA FO371/146282:WUC 1651.

30. Briefing note, 21 January 1959, NA FO371/146282:WUC 1651/10.

31. The ECCP now has a much broader brief and regularly reports on all aspects of criminal law enforcement in Europe.

32. Briefing note, 21 January 1959, NA FO371/146282:WUC 1651/10.

33. Leonard, Dick, Guide to the European Union (London, 1996), 6.Google Scholar

34. Gallagher, Derek, “European Police Co-operation: Its Development and Impact between 1967 and 1997 in an Anglo-French Trans-Frontier Setting” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southampton, 1998)Google Scholar. See also Sheptycki, James, “Police Co-operation in the English Channel Region, 1968–1996,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 6, no. 3 (1998): 216–235Google Scholar, which draws upon the research undertaken by Gallagher and develops the discussion.

35. Soeters, Joseph et al. , “Culture's Consequences and the Police: Cross-Border Cooperation Between Police Forces in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands,” Policing and Society 5 (1995): 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36. Council Act of 26 July drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty of the European Union, on the Establishment of a European Police Office, Official Journal 1995/C 316/1, 27 November 1995; see also Treaty on European Union (1992) as amended at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001), Articles 29–30, Official Journal 1992/C 191/1 29 July 1992; 1997/C 340/1 10 November 1997; and 2001/C 80/1 10 March 2001,

37. Convention of 19 June 1990, applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, International Legal Materials, 1991, 84 (see, in particular, Title III, chaps. 1 and 2). For Britain's developing policy in relation to Schengen, see Select Committee on the European Union, UK Participation in the Schengen Acquis, 5th Report, House of Lords Paper 34, Session 1999–2000.

38. Genson, Roland, “The Schengen Agreements—Police Co-operation and Security Aspects,” in Crimes Sans Frontières: International and European Legal Approaches, ed. Cullen, Peter and Gilmore, William (Edinburgh, 1998), 133–140, 133 n. 32.Google Scholar

39. Neither Britain nor France regards the Channel Tunnel as a land border, therefore cross-border cooperation arrangements in relation to the Tunnel have been addressed separately in a specific bilateral treaty: The Protocol concerning Frontier Controls and Policing, Co-operation in Criminal Justice, Public Safety and Mutual Assistance relating to the Channel Fixed Link, signed 25 November 1991.

40. Select Committee on the European Union, Schengen and the United Kingdom's Border Controls, 7th Report, House of Lords Paper 37, Session 1998–99.

41. Select Committee on the European Union, UK Participation in the Schengen Acquis, 5th Report, House of Lords Paper 34, Session 1999–2000.

42. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, to Harold MacMillan, British Prime Minister, 14 April 1961, NA LCO2/8472. The code introduced in Ghana was one that had previously been rejected by Jamaica, briefing note, 17 April 1961, NA LCO2/8472.

43. Commonwealth Relations Office, London, to Sir Arthur Snelling, British High Commissioner in Ghana, 29 November 1961, LCO2/8472. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah created the radical Convention People's Party in 1949, campaigning for the immediate independence from colonial rule of what was then Britain's Gold Coast Colony. Independence came in 1957, when the colony merged with British Togoland to form Ghana, a name recalling the original Ghana Empire, which lasted from the eighth to the twelfth centuries. In 1960, Ghana became a republic with Nkrumah as executive president, autocratic in style and unsuccessful in economic reform and development.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. To the evident satisfaction of all government officials who annotated the file minute sheets, MacMillan's letter made no mention either of extending Bennion's secondment or replacing him. Nevertheless, a successor was sent.

46. The proposals for such a scheme were drawn up by David McClean. A brief history is recounted, and the resultant Harare Scheme discussed, in McClean, David, International Judicial Assistance (Oxford, 1992), 149–164.Google Scholar

47. Commonwealth Secretariat, Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice: Meeting of Senior Officers to Consider Draft Schemes, 27th January to 7th February 1986, Marlborough House, London (Summary Record), 6.

48. Murray, Christopher and Harris, Lorna, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: International Co-operation in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime (London, 2000), 264.Google Scholar

49. Gilmore, William, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters, Cambridge International Documents Series, vol. 8 (Cambridge, 1995), xvii.Google Scholar

50. Anderson, Malcolm et al. , Policing the European Union: Theory, Law, and Practice (Oxford, 1995), 53Google Scholar; see also Benyon, John, “The Developing System of Police Cooperation in the European Union,” in Crime and Law Enforcement in the Global Village, ed. MacDonald, William (Cincinnati, 1997), 103–121.Google Scholar

51. Gilmore, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters, xx; see Harfield, “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance,” for discussion about the political strategies behind the U.S. preference for bilateral rather than multilateral treaties.

52. International Legal Materials, 1989, 493.

53. International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters: A Discussion Paper, Home Office, 1988. I am grateful to the Home Office for supplying me with a copy of this unpublished paper.

54. The Conclusions of the Tampere Summit, 15–16 October 1999, can be accessed at http://europe.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm). Britain's position leading up to the conference is outlined in Select Committee for the European Communities, Prospects for the Tampere Special European Counsel, 19th Report, House of Lords Paper 101, Session 1998–99.

55. Harfield, “SOCA: A Paradigm Shift in British Policing”; “FBI-style Agency to Target Mr Bigs,” The Independent, 4 April 2006, 14 (although the British media have dubbed SOCA the UK's FBI, there is nothing in the constitutional status, powers, administration, or structure of SOCA that resembles the FBI).

56. Sussman, Michael, “The Critical Challenges from International High-Tech and Computer-Related Crime at the Millennium,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 9, no. 2 <DATE?> 451–489+451–489>Google Scholar. The present author served on the Hi-Tech Crime Sub-Group for G8 2002–3.

57. Wadham, John and Mountfield, Helen, Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act (London, 1999), 4Google Scholar. The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in Britain in October 2000.

58. International Police Review, May/June 2000, 16; see also White, S., Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Communities: The Fight Against Fraud and Corruption (The Hague, 1998).Google Scholar

59. Select Committee on European Communities, Prosecuting Fraud on the Communities' Finances—The Corpus Juris, 9th Report, House of Lords Paper 62, Session 1998–99). For the text of the Corpus Juris proposal, see den Wyngaert, Christine Van, ed., International Criminal Law: A Collection of International and European Instruments, 3d rev. ed. (Leiden, 2005), 339–352.Google Scholar

60. Between 1999 and 2001, the EU conducted a peer evaluation of mutual legal assistance between member states: European Union (Multidisciplinary Group on Organized Crime), Joint Action on Mutual Evaluation, 10972/1/99 CRIMORG 131, 6 October 1999. The evaluation identified a number of key areas for improvement both within individual states and across the EU: European Union, Final Report on the First Evaluation Exercise—Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, 8648/01 CRIMORG 55, 10 May 2001.

61. Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, “Remarks on Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Cases,” at the Justice and Home Affairs seminar, Avignon, France, 16 October 1998, para. 9. I am grateful to the Home Office for supplying a transcript of the speech.

62. Ibid., para. 23.

63. Ibid., para. 24.

64. This principle was repeated many times during parliamentary debates on new mutual legal assistance legislation to update and replace the CJICA provisions: Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 641, col. 973, 2 12 2002Google Scholar; Lords, 5th ser., vol. 643, col. GC210–1, 29 January 2003; Lords, 5th ser., vol. 644, col. GC23, 3 February 2003; Lords, 5th ser., vol. 645, col. 648, 3 March 2003; Lords, 5th ser., vol. 646, col. 44, 17 March 2003; Commons, 5th ser., vol. 402, cols. 802 and 853, 1 April 2003; Commons, Standing Committee A, col. 88, 12 June 2003.

65. European Union, “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and surrender procedures between Member States,” Official Journal 2002/L 190/01 (2002/584/JHA), 18 July 2002; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant for obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, COM (2003) 688 Final, 14 November 2003. For critical review of the EAW, now in force, see “European Arrest Warrant Limps into Force” at http://statewatch.org/news/2004/jan/01euro-arrest-warrant.htm, accessed 5 April 2006; Blekxtoon, Rob and van Ballegooij, Wouter, eds., Handbook of the European Arrest Warrant (Cambridge, 2004).Google Scholar

66. “Pre-accession pact on organized crime between the member states of the European Union and the applicant countries of central and eastern Europe and Cyprus,” Official Journal 1998/C 220/01, 15 July 1998.

67. Harfield, “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance,” 230–33. The consensus and control models of mutual legal assistance were first explored by the author in a seminar delivered to the National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C., 31 July 2001, following research conducted at Georgetown University as a Fulbright Fellow. I am grateful to seminar participants for comments received during and after the seminar.

68. Lance Emory, FBI legal attaché, interview by the author, London, 22 February 2001. Unilateral treaty benefits have even extended to nonreciprocal obligations in favor of the United States: Gilmore, Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory Matters, xxi n. 55.

69. Title VI, “Treaty of the European Union,” Official Journal 1997/C 340/01, 10 November 1997; see also Fijnaut, Cyrille, “Transnational Organised Crime and Institutional Reform in the European Union: The Case for Judicial Co-operation,” Transnational Organised Crime 4 (1998): 276–301Google Scholar. President Clinton proclaimed transnational organized crime to be a national security issue in Presidential Decision Directive 42, 21 October 1995, Executive Order 12978. See White House, International Crime Control Strategy (Washington, D.C., 1998)Google Scholar for a structured response that (at the time of writing, 2005) has yet to be adopted formally by the Bush administration.

70. Michael Sussman, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S. Department of Justice, interview by the author, Washington, D.C., 14 June 2001.

71. EU Member States are divided on the issue of whether Europol should be given autonomous operational authority. Britain is among those states strongly opposed to such a development, preferring Europol to provide a supporting intelligence role for domestic and transnational investigations controlled by national jurisdictions.

72. In international law war can be declared only against a territorial state, and not a political movement; see Shaw, Malcolm, International Law, 5th ed. (Cambridge, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A particular difficulty arising with individuals detained as a result of these interventions is that they have been afforded neither the status of prisoners of war (because not all have been detained during combat), nor have they been afforded the status of criminal suspects. They thus currently reside in various internment camps in legal limbo, unprotected by rights legislation. British detainees in Guantanamo Bay who have been repatriated have been released from custody upon arrival in the UK because their detention and interrogations in Guantanamo Bay were contrary to due process and so no criminal trial could be supported on the basis of information obtained during their detention.

73. Ashworth, Andrew, Human Rights, Serious Crime, and Criminal Procedure (London, 2002), 96–107.Google Scholar

74. “Creation of a Northern Axis?” Statewatch 12 (January–February 2002): 1; “EUUS Secret Agreement in the Making,” Statewatch 12 (March–April 2002): 1–2.

75. “Agreement on Extradition Between the European Union and the USA, Washington, D.C., 25 June 2003,” Official Journal 2003/L 181/27, 19 July 2003; “Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between the European Union and the USA, Washington, D.C., 25 June 2003,” Official Journal 2003/L 181/34, 19 July 2003. Any bilateral treaties between the United States and EU states will take precedence over these multilateral treaties.

76. Britain applies a dualist approach to international treaty obligations. In order for Britain's international obligations to be given effect, domestic primary legislation must be enacted. Attempts to give effect to international obligations through secondary legislation were as unprecedented as they were ultimately unsuccessful. The EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters was negotiated in order to supplement the provisions of the 1959 ECMA by catering for techniques and tactics (such as covert investigation) that were not specifically provided for under the 1959 treaty.

77. Second reading debate on the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 629, cols. 142–62 and 183–290, 27 11 2001.Google Scholar

78. See, for instance, “Creation of a Northern Axis?” Statewatch 12, no. 1 (2002): 1Google Scholar, “How the Northern Axis Is Taking Shape,” Statewatch 12, no. 1 (2002): 13–16Google Scholar; “EU-US Secret Agreement in the Making,” Statewatch 12, no. 2 (2002): 1–2Google Scholar; “G8 Pushing for Preparatory Terrorist Offences, Secret Trials, and Secret Evidence,” Statewatch 14, no. 1 (2004): 1–2Google Scholar; “EU: The Principle of Availability Takes over from the Notion of Privacy—What Price Data Protection?” Statewatch 14, no. 6 (2004): 1–2.Google Scholar

79. Zagaris, Bruce, “U.S. International Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime,” Wayne Law Review 44, no. 3<DATE?>1401–14641401–1464>Google Scholar; Kerry, John, The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens America's Security (New York, 1997).Google Scholar

80. Equally, public support is necessary for mutual legal assistance mechanisms to enjoy legitimacy. So often assumed that it is taken for granted without any consultation, when the public becomes aware of perceived injustice, support for measures taken by government quickly erodes and with it, their legitimacy. A number of suspects have now been extradited from Britain to the United States using this mechanism, sometimes in notorious circumstances that have provoked significant public outcry. The extradition to Texas of David Bermingham, Giles Darby, and Gary Mulgrew (13 July 2006) using the fast-track extradition procedures has aroused particular opposition in Britain, not least because the crime of which they stand accused was allegedly committed contrary to British law against British financial institutions in Britain. A formal extradition procedure may well have refused extradition and insisted on their being tried in a British court. The matter at issue is tangential to the Enron scandal, hence U.S. authorities claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction that was not resisted the by Blair government. “Lords Vote Against Extradition of NatWest 3,” The Independent 12 July 2006, 17; “NatWest 3 Flown to Uncertain Fate in Texas,” The Independent, 14 July 2006, 13. Public mistrust arising from the perceived misuse of mutual recognition mechanisms (possibly for primarily political rather judicial purposes) ultimately will undermine international law enforcement cooperation efforts and mutual legal assistance.

81. Soeters et al., “Culture's Consequences and the Police: Cross-Border Cooperation Between Police Forces in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.”

82. Harfield, “A Review Essay on Models of Mutual Legal Assistance.”