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Constructing the Governance of American Finance: Timing and the Creation of the SEC, OTS, and CFPB

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2017

Kathryn C. Lavelle
Kathryn C. Lavelle*
Affiliation:
Case Western Reserve University
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Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , July 2017 , pp. 321 - 349
Copyright
Copyright © Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2017 

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Footnotes

Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Brock University, May 2014, and the 25th annual conference of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Milan, Italy, 2013. I would like to thank Justin Buchler, Jonathan Entin, Jessica Gerrity, Beth-Anne Schuelke-Leech, Colleen Shogun, James Young, and several anonymous reviewers of JPH for their suggestions and assistance.

References

NOTES

1. The “doctrine of choice” is associated with the dual banking system in the United States, which allows national banks to exist along with state-chartered ones. The accompanying ability to choose a regulator is argued to create a healthy dynamic among regulators and avoid unreasonable regulation.

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29. Eisner, American Political Economy, 182.

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31. Ibid., 3.

32. Peter H. Schuck, ed., Foundations of Administrative Law, 2nd ed. (New York, 2004), 9.

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36. Ibid., 21.

37. Ibid., 50–52.

38. Ibid., 54.

39. Parrish, Securities Regulation, 47.

40. Ibid., 62.

41. Ibid., 108.

42. Ibid., 112–13.

43. Seligman, The Transformation, 72.

44. Ibid., 62.

45. Parrish, Securities Regulation, 121.

46. Seligman, The Transformation, 75.

47. Ibid., 92.

48. Ibid., 93.

49. Ibid., 97.

50. Parrish, Securities Regulation, 131–35.

51. Seligman, The Transformation, 98.

52. Parrish, Securities Regulation, 141–42.

53. Seligman, The Transformation, 99.

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63. Ibid., 1316.

64. Ibid., 1318–19.

65. Eisner, American Political Economy, 183.

66. White, The S&L Debacle, 73; Konings, The Development of American Finance.

67. Seidman, Full Faith and Credit, 178.

68. Seligman, The Transformation, 158; White, The S&L Debacle, 127; Seidman, Full Faith and Credit, 178.

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75. Seidman, Full Faith and Credit, 183.

76. Ibid., 190.

77. Mark K. Cassell and Susan M. Hoffmann, “Managing a $700 Billion Bailout: Lessons from the Homeowners’ Loan Corporation and the Resolution Trust Corporation” (Washington, D.C., 2009), 20.

78. Seidman, Full Faith and Credit, 200.

79. White, The S&L Debacle, 176–78.

80. Robert M. Garsson, “Landmark Bill on S&Ls Awaits Bush Signature,” American Banker, 8 August 1989; Cassell and Hoffman, “Managing a $700 Billion Bailout.”

81. White, The S&L Debacle, 180.

82. Ibid., 182.

83. Barbara A. Rehm, “In Focus: S&L Crisis Law Has Lasting Impact on Housing, Lending, Reinvestment,” American Banker, 9 August 199.

84. Robert M. Garsson, “President’s Pen Ends Era of Deregulation for Thrift Industry,” American Banker, 10 August 1989; Cassell and Hoffman, “Managing a $700 Billion Bailout.”

85. Seidman, Full Faith and Credit, 87–88.

86. Jim McTague, “Plan Will Change Regulatory Landscape for Thrift Executives,” American Banker, 10 August 1989.

87. Garsson, “Twilight of OTS? Lawmakers Light Flame; Thrifts Add Fuel.”

88. “Choice of Ryan Brings OTS Fate into Question,” American Banker, 12 March 1990.

89. Bill Atkinson, “Charter Flipping by Thrifts Brings Cutbacks at OTS,” American Banker, 20 April 1993.

90. Binyamin Appelbaum, “One Time Cop out of Business,” New York Times, 13 July 2010.

91. For some examples, see Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, and Matthew S. Johnson, “The Origins of the Financial Crisis” (Washington, D.C., 2008); Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report; Gorton, Gary B., “Questions About the Financial Crisis,” in NBER Working Papers, ed. National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Mass., 2010)Google Scholar; Phillip Swagel, “The Financial Crisis: An Inside View,” in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Washington, D.C., 2009); Lavelle, Money and Banks.

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95. Wessel, In Fed We Trust, 198; Stewart, “Eight Days,” 73; Lavelle, Money and Banks, 197.

96. Congressional Oversight Panel, “March Oversight Report” (Washington, D.C., 2011), 23.

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99. Ibid., 128.

100. Jennifer Liberto, “Consumer Protection Agency Moves Ahead,” CNNMoney.com, 22 October 2009.

101. Kaiser, Act of Congress, 166.

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104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., 153.

106. Ibid., 175–76.

107. Ibid., 197–98.

108. Barbara Kiviat, “Don’t Kill the Consumer Financial Protection Agency,” Time, 15 January 2010.

109. Bair, Bull by the Horns, 223. See also Kaiser, Act of Congress, 266.

110. Lavelle, Money and Banks, 264.

111. Edward Wyatt and Ben Protess, “Foes Revise Plan to Curb New Agency,” New York Times, 5 May 2011.

112. Suzanna Andrews, “The Woman Who Knew Too Much,” Vanity Fair, 10 October 2011, 231.

113. Lavelle, Money and Banks, 216.