The relatively peaceful decolonisation of British and French Africa in the 1950s and led, for the most part, to the capturing of state power by a new political élite rather than a throughgoing transformation of the state structures inherited at independence. Instead of refashioning institution in ways that might increase political participation and social justice, existing state capacities tended to be marshalled for exclusionary and, in many cases, authoritarian purposes.

This article attempts to situate the recent power struggle between President Daniel arap Moi and the ex-Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Charles Njonjo, in the context of class antagonisms in the Kenyan state. Over the past few years, Moi survived a number of crises partly as a result of the consistent support he has received from Njonjo. During the run-up to the general election of 26 September 1983, however, Moi was hoping that he could mobilise sufficient support amongst Kenya's political élite to be able to dispense with Njonjo, and thereby remove the only politician powerful enough to pose any threat to his leadership. SinceJomo Kenyatta's death in 1978, Njonjo had been regarded as the third member of a ruling triumvirate, with Moi and Vice-President Mwai Kibaki. In the following analysis, we examine the class context for conflict with the figure most closely associated with the conservative, capitalistic, and pro-British tendency in Kenyan nationalism.

There are unwritten rules for the distribution of money in all societies, notably about from and to whom it is appropriate to give and receive money, and when. These rules differ from one society to another, and we err in assuming otherwise. This article examines some reported practices in the redistribution of earnings and other cash in Swaziland. It arises out of a reading of transcriptions of 118 recorded interviews, 49 with wage-earners conducted at their place of work, and 69 with earners or their dependents in the rural areas. These wide-ranging interviews covered many topics besides the giving and receiving of sums of money between kinsmen. From this evidence I attempt to spell out the detailed nature of these rules. To ignore or to be ignorant of their strength and complexity is to fail to recognise a powerful mechanism for redistribution, which goes some way to modify alleged inequalities between town and country, and between one homestead and another within Swaziland. Similar rules probably affect income distribution elsewhere in Africa.

This article discusses the relationship of missionaries and anthropologists in South Africa. Due to such important factors as ethnicity, linguistic group membership, denominationalism, and party political affiliation, it is essential to present historical perspectives on these and related matters. The vocation of missionary is almost exclusively a white enterprise as is that of professional anthropologist. Blacks have however had significant influences in both realms and are today entering these vocations.

The August 1983 overthrow of Major Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo by Captain Thomas Sankara in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), the New Year's Eve abrupt termination in Nigeria of Black Africa's largest multi-party democracy, and the decision by the Guinean army in April 1984 to remove their party leaders after the death of President Sékou Touré, illustrate two of the most salient realities of contemporary African politics: (1) military coups d'état are the principal form of régime change, and (2) they can happen under any type of political system–a functioning democracy, a personalistic civilian dictatorship, or an already existing military junta.1