^{Page 390 note 1} See Ali Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth, especially chs. 1 and 7. My summary of his views comes mainly from Mazrui, , ‘The English Language and Political Consciousness in British Colonial Africa’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), IV, 3, 11 1966.Google Scholar That article's argument is to be found condensed in ‘The English Language and the Origins of African Nationalism’, in Mawazo (Kampala), I, 1, 06 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 391 note 1} The Anglo-African Commonwealth, pp. 116–17. Mazrui does not forget to give the classics their due place of honour, and argues the important contribution of Greek and Latin to the regeneration and development of African languages in the face of the ‘deadly encroachment’ of English and French. See his ‘Ancient Greece in African Political Thought’, in Présence africaine (Paris), LXI, first quarter 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 391 note 2} Reprinted in Kautsky, John H. (ed.), Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York, 1962).Google Scholar Shils derives much of his argument from the experience of the new states of Asia, particularly in the light of his own well-known work on Indian intellectuals, so that his conclusions generally apply more to Asia than to Africa.

^{Page 396 note 1} Immediately preceding this quotation (Pax Africana, pp. 183–4), Mazrui states that ‘the leadership of French-speaking Africa was more directly exposed to Marxism in the colonial period than British Africa ever was’, and refers to the much closer association of French African leaders with French Communists. Is the subsequent pro-western orientation of those leaders so common and obvious a deduction from Marxist ideas and Communist contacts as to need no explanation? How does he imagine the chemistry of intellectual transplantation to work?

^{Page 399 note 1} For Mazrui's discussion of U.D.I., see The Anglo-African Commonwealth, intro. and ch. 3. He bases his argument regarding Africa's great influence in the Commonwealth in part on the supposed ‘toughness’ of Prime Minister Harold Wilson's response to the U.D.I., and of course disapproves of the decision of certain African states to break off diplomatic relations with Britain in December 1965, in protest against the want of toughness in her policy towards Rhodesia.

^{Page 400 note 1} Mazrui himself mentions some of these facts, but sotto voce, as it were, and in the comparative obscurity of footnotes.

^{Page 401 note 1} Cf. Mazrui, Ali, ‘Tanzaphilia’, in Transition (Kampala), XXXI, 06–07 1967.Google Scholar See also Colin Leys, ‘Inter alia—or Tanzaphilia and all that’, in ibid. XXXIV, December [1967]–January 1968.

^{Page 401 note 2} To say this is in no way to prejudge the separate question of how well suited those policies were to their purported objectives, or of the very choice indeed of those objectives.

^{Page 405 note 1} An excellent analysis of the movement of African unity has recently been offered by Wallerstein, Immanuel, Africa: the politics of unity (New York, 1967).Google Scholar

^{Page 406 note 1} Which is not to claim that there is always full correspondence between ideology and policy, or between theory and practice: politicians can afford the luxury of consistency rather less well than academics.

^{Page 408 note 1} Crick, Bernard, In Defence of Politics (London, 1964).Google Scholar

^{Page 408 note 2} Lewis, Arthur, Politics in West Africa (London, 1965).Google ScholarThe Proposals of the Constitutional Commission for a Constitution for Ghana (Accra, 1968),Google Scholar published recently, may be read as the first detailed application, or example, of the Lewis ‘model’.

^{Page 409 note 1} A propos of the intellectuals in the old states, however, Richard L. Sklar has recently remarked that ‘the “new school” of political science in America, now so influential the world over, has, for all its scientific refinement, largely failed to grapple with the deepening social and political problems of American society’. See his ‘Political Science and National Integration—a radical approach’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, V, 1, 05 1967.Google Scholar Might not this failure be due to the infiltration into the structure and functioning of the ‘new school’, of the ruling assumptions of the Great Society? Cf. Charles, Moskos, C. and Bell, Wendell, ‘Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists,’ in The American Sociologist (Washington, D.C.), II, 2, 05 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 409 note 1} Valuable data for such analysis are, of course, to be found in the work of African writers, few of whom are academically oriented, however. It is hardly necessary to add, moreover, that the inevitable increase in the size of the intelligentsia in African states is bound to produce greater differentiation within its structure. This will probably substantially alter their social position and, in consequence, diversify their ideological and political alignments. This has already occurred in large parts of Asia, and is beginning to occur in parts of Africa, among the ‘lower’, sub-university intelligentsia.