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The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Chris Alden
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Extract

The signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome in October 1992 marked the formal cessation of 17 years of intermittent warfare in the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique.1 The bitter struggle by the guerrilla movement known as the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) to topple the avowedly Marxist–Leninist régime established by the leaders of the Frente de Libertção de Moçambique (Frelimo) was in many respects a regional expression of the cold war politics which dominated the international environment. The transformations in the Soviet Union and South Africa, blunting the ideological and logistical support which had fuelled the conflict, provoked a crisis for the protagonists. With over a million casualties, a greater number of refugees in neighbouring countries, and an economy devastated by war and mismanagement, the Government and Renamo at last sued for peace.2

Type
Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 103 - 128
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 For a review of the negotiations leading up to the signing of the General Peace Agreement, see Vines, Alex, ‘No Democracy Without Money: the road to peace in Mozambique, 1982–1992’, in Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) Briefing Paper (London), 04 1994.Google Scholar

2 See Alden, Chris and Simpson, Mark, ‘Mozambique: a delicate peace’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 31, 1, 03 1993, pp. 109–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 For an outline of the timetable, see General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, 1992 (Amsterdam, African–European Institute, 1992), Protocols 4–6.Google Scholar

4 See Boutros-Ghali, Boutros's address to the Security Council on the prospective United Nations mission to Mozambique, 12 1992, in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Information Notes, 1993. Update No.2 (New York), p. 87.Google Scholar

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6 Ibid. pp. 25–6.

7 Association of European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA), Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (Amsterdam), 3, 05, 1993, p. 2.Google Scholar

8 UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (Unohac), ‘Repatriation of Demobilized Soldiers’, in Mozambique Report (Maputo), 06 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

9 ‘Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effect’, loc. cit. p. 25.

10 Interview with Colonel Pier Segala, Cease-Fire Commission, Maputo, 14 September 1994.

11 Weitz, Richard, ‘Continuities in Soviet Foreign Policy: the case of Mozambique’, in Comparative Strategy (New York), 11, 1, 01–03 1992, pp. 84 and 92.Google Scholar

12 The commencement of negotiations with Renamo and the ending of apartheid in South Africa were cited as additional reasons for embarking on such measures according to Republic of Mozambique, ‘A Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Military Personnel. First Phase, 1991–1992’, Maputo, 25 05 1992, Annex 1, Pp. iii–iv.Google Scholar

13 Ibid. p. 1.

14 Interview with Ton Pardoel, Chief Technical Unit Officer, Maputo, 26 May 1994.

15 Technical Unit for Demobilisation, ‘Demobilisation and Assembly Areas’, Maputo, 05 1994.Google Scholar

16 General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, 1992, p. 30.

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20 Ibid. p. 38, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Mozambique: repatriation and reintegration of Mozambican refugees’, Geneva, 05 1993, p. 1.Google Scholar

21 UN Peace-Keeping Operations… Update No. 2, 1993, p. 74.

22 This UN withdrawal date was confirmed in Security Council Resolution 916 (1994) in May.

23 According to Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 3, 05 1993, p. 1, Renamo sent 45 of its officials to a month-long seminar at its headquarters in Maringue during March 1993.Google Scholar

24 ‘Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort’, loc. cit. p. 26.

25 See General Peace Agreement of Mozambique, 1992, Protocol 5, p. 54.

26 The advisers were only selected in December 1993 and took up their posts in March 1994.

27 Interview with Aldo Ajello, Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General, Maputo, 16 September 1994.

28 ‘Mozambique Accords Aid Relief Effort’, loc. cit. p. 26.

29 According to Africa Confidential (London), 34, 10, 14 01 1993, p. 8, the Government was reluctant both to lose the estimated $1 million a day collected from the UN and to have Onumoz monitor its troop movements.Google Scholar

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32 Colonel Pier Segala, Maputo, 14 September 1994.

33 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 5, August 1993, p. 5.

34 Pardoel, Ton, Maputo, 26 May 1994.Google Scholar

35 Unohac, ‘Demobilization Update’, in Mozambique Report, August 1993, p. 6. For example, the site of the Nhamagua Assembly Area was not near any potable water.Google Scholar

36 Renamo officials were particularly concerned about the Government's expanding Rapid Intervention Force which, like its Angolan counterpart, included numerous ex-soldiers.

37 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 10, July 1994, p. 2.

38 The Sunday Times (London), 6 11 1994. Only 3,632 child soldiers were, in fact, discovered at Renamo bases, although it was clear to UN military observers that many soldiers were only just above the internationally sanctioned age of 15.Google Scholar

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41 Ibid. Interviews with Military Observers on 2 June 1994: Captain Daniel Rodrigues, Major Asaduzzaman, and Major Fernando Ferreira, Nhamagua Assembly Area, Also Military Observer, Catandica Assembly Area, and Antonio Lopes, Technical Unit Co-ordination Officer, Nhamagua Assembly Area.

42 Africa Confidential, 35, 6, 18 03 1994, pp. 6–7,Google Scholar and Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 10, July 1994, p. 2.

43 Africa Confidential, 35, 19, 23 09 1994, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

44 International Organisation for Migration (IOM) press release, Maputo, 24 May 1994.

45 Each Government and Renamo soldier was to receive six months of their regular salary plus bonuses (with a minimum of 75,000 meticais) from the Government, half at the point of official demobilisation and half in the district of resettlement, and thereafter the UNDP was to provide a further 18 months of support.

46 Interview with Sardy, Belrooz, Maputo, 3 June 1993. There was little or no shortage of officers as the Forças Armadas offered them relatively high pay.Google Scholar

47 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 10 July 1994, p. 5.

48 Unohac, , Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme for 1993–1994 (Maputo, 1993), p. 3.Google Scholar

49 UNHCR, op. cit. pp. 1–4.

50 Ibid. p. 1.

51 United Nations, ‘United Nations Operation in Mozambique’, New York, 1994, p. 94.Google Scholar

52 Working in co-operation with Lonrho de Moçambique (Lomaco) and funded by the European Community, Gurkha Security Guards, Ltd, relied on hand clearance techniques so that only 178 kilometres of road were made safe by the time its contract ran out in January 1994. See Watch/Africa, Human Rights, Landmines in Mozambique (Washington, DC, 1994), pp. 80–3;Google ScholarMozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 10, April 1994, p. 7; and Unohac, ‘An Integrated Mine-Clearance Training Programme’, in Mozambique Report, February 1994, p. 6.Google Scholar

53 Landmines in Mozambique, op. cit. p. 99, and Unohac, ‘De-Mining Update’, in Mozambique Report, August 1993, p. 8.Google Scholar

54 Interview with Downes-Thomas, Felix, Director of the Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination, Maputo, 15 September 1994.Google Scholar

55 ‘De-Mining Update’, loc. cit. p. 8. Initially, training of ex-soldiers as de-miners was envisaged by the UN, although the delays in starting the demobilisation process was a factor in bringing in foreign expertise.

56 Aldo Ajello, 27 May 1994.

57 Childers, Erskine and Urquhart, Brian, Renewing the UN System (Uppsala, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994), pp. 142–70.Google Scholar For an early critique, see Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations (New York, 1986).Google Scholar

58 Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction: war, famine and the reform process in Mozambique (Washington, DC, 1992), pp. 158–60.Google Scholar See also, Amnesty International. Annual Report (London), 1987 to 1991.Google Scholar

59 The plan was for 70 per cent of Civpol to be deployed during the registration of voters between April and June 1994, while the rest were to arrive in August.Google Scholar

60 The 12 parties, outsiders to the General Peace Agreement and its elaborate committee system, demanded financial support for themselves. See ‘Dicing with Democracy’, in Africa: South and East (Yeoville, South Africa), 06 1993, p. 11.Google Scholar

61 It should be noted that President Chissano made changes to the ethnic composition of his Frelimo Government, which Renamo had always criticised as dominated by Shangaan, , in order to broaden its appeal. Africa Confidential, 35, 6, 18 03 1994, p. 7.Google Scholar

62 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 5, August 1993, p. 4.Google Scholar

63 Mandela visited Maputo in July 1994 and, reportedly at the request of Boutros-Ghali, tried (and failed) to convince Chissano to accept the formation of a Government of National Unity.Google Scholar

64 Africa Confidential, 35, 19, 23 09 1994, p. 3.Google Scholar

65 Weekly Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 21–2710 1994.Google Scholar

66 The Washington Post, 11 November 1994, and Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, 14, 02 1995, p. 3.Google Scholar

67 Onumoz, , ‘Budget’, Maputo, 09 1994Google Scholar. This breakdown compares favourably with other peace support operations such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Untac) or the United Nations Protection Force (Unprofor) in former Yugoslavia, where 80 and 70 per cent of their respective costs were administrative.