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Corporate governance and information transparency in Taiwan’s public firms: The moderating effect of family ownership

  • Yunshi Liu (a1), Alix Valenti (a2) and Yi-Jung Chen (a3)


This study incorporates insights from both institutional and family socioemotional wealth perspectives with agency theory to examine the relationships among governance practices, family ownership, and information disclosure quality. Employing a sample of 516 publicly listed firms in Taiwan over a period of 5 years (2006–2010), we found that high levels of board independence and board activity have a significant positive effect on disclosure quality. Further, family ownership positively moderated the relationship between board independence and disclosure quality. This relationship is stronger with a higher level of family ownership. The results support the institutional proposition that family-owned firms that pursue socioemotional wealth are more likely to promote information transparency to gain legitimacy and enhance their reputations with outside stakeholders.

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