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Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Extract

We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.

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Symposium Articles
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2018

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References

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