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Aspects of the Lemons Problem as Treated in Jewish Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2015

Aaron Levine
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Commercial transactions are often characterized by asymmetric information between the buyer and seller: one side of the market, usually the seller, knows more about the quality of the product or service offered than the other side. In his 1970 seminal article, George Akerlof predicted that unless counteracting forces are in place, this asymmetric information phenomenon will cause the volume of transactions in this marketplace to shrink to the point where only the most inferior version of the product, called a lemon, will be traded.

Practically speaking, numerous institutions mitigate the asymmetrical information problem so that the marketplace does not deteriorate into a lemons market. These countervailing forces include seller guarantees, brand names, product liability laws, consumer screening, third-party comparisons, and the institution of standards and certification by the government or consumer and industry groups.

My purpose here will be to analyze one aspect of the lemons problem from the perspective of an imagined society governed entirely by Jewish law and ethics. I will refer to this society as a Torah society. Specifically, I will show how Jewish warranty law counteracts the lemons problem and compare its solutions to those of American warranty law as well as state lemon laws in the U.S.

Warranty law works best to counteract the lemon problem if it operates in an environment of trust. As I will show, Jewish law puts the task of moral education in the hands of parents and teachers with the goal of producing the character trait of trustworthiness.

Type
AALS Jewish Law Section Papers
Information
Journal of Law and Religion , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , 2008 , pp. 379 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University 2008

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References

1. Akerlof, George A., The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. Perloff, Jeffrey M., Microeconomics 666–670 (3d ed., Pearson Addison Wesley 2004)Google Scholar. Perloff's list is standard. All the factors he mentions, with the exception of government product liability law, are listed by Akerlof in his 1970 article, supra n. 1.

3. Browning, Edgar K. & Zupan, Mark A., Microeconomics: Theory and Applications 415 (9th ed., John Wiley & Sons 2006)Google Scholar; Besanko, David & Braeutignam, Ronald R., Microeconomics 566–569 (2d ed., John Wiley & Sons 2005)Google Scholar; Landsburg, Steven E., Price Theory and Applications 313–315 (6th ed., Thomson South-Western 2005)Google Scholar; Perloff, supra n. 2, at 665-670.

4. Akerlof, supra n. 1, at 489.

5. Browning, supra n. 4, at 415-416 ($9,000 = ½ ($12,000) + ½ (6,000)).

6. Id. ($7,500 = ¼ ($12,000) + (6,000)).

7. Id. at 416.

8. The first draft of the U.C.C. was published in the Fall of 1951 by an editorial board consisting of representatives from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. In 1953, Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt the draft as law. Today, all the states (except Louisiana, which has adopted only certain parts, and the District of Columbia) have adopted the U.C.C. Cindy Rhodes Victor, Encyclopedia of Management: Uniform Commercial Code, http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/management/TrZ/Uniform-Commercial-Code.html (accessed Jan. 24, 2008).

9. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2006).

10. Vogel, Joan, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, Ariz. St. L.J. 589, 615–644 (1985)Google Scholar; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann § 42-179 (West 2007) (originally enacted as 1982 Conn. Pub. Act 82-287).

11. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c), 1AU.L.A. 669 (2004).

12. Fed. Trade Commn., A Businessperson's Guide to Federal Warranty Law, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/warranty.htm (last modified June 8, 2007) [hereinafter Businessperson's Guide].

13. Id. Another example is shoes which are usually used simply for walking. If a seller knows that a particular pair are to be used for mountain climbing, the seller warrants the fitness for that particular purpose. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (comment 2), IB U.L.A. 8 (2004).

14. See Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 588 P.2d 233 (Wash. 1978).

15. U.C.C. § 2-315, IB U.L.A. 8 (2004). Whether this warranty arises is to be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the contracting. Seller does not have to have actual knowledge of the particular purpose that goods will be used for if the circumstances of sale would indicate that the goods are to be used for a particular purpose. The buyer must also be relying on the seller's advice. U.C.C. § 2-315 (comment 1), IB U.L.A. 8 (2004).

16. Businessperson's Guide, supra n. 12.

17. Maimonides (Egypt, 1135-1204), Yad, Mekhirah 15:6; R. Vidal Yom Tov of Tolosa (fl. 14th cent.), Maggid Mishneh, Yad; R. Jacob b. Asher (Spain, 1270-1343), Tur, Hoshen Mishpat 232; R. Joseph Caro (Israel, 1488-1575), Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 232:7; R. Jehiel Michel Epstein (Belarus, 1829-1908), Arukh ha-Shulhan, Hoshen Mishpat 232:11.

18. Itah, R. Yehuda, Netiv Yosher 136 (Y. Itah 1992)Google Scholar. B's right to cancel the transaction proceeds from the presumption that had he only known of the defect (mum) in advance, he would not have entered into the transaction. When the above presumption is operative, the transaction is dubbed mekah ta'ut (a transaction entered into by error). R. Itah identifies two different understandings of how mekah ta'ut works in the mum case. In the first understanding, advanced by R. Akiva Eiger (Hungary, 1761-1837), we treat the transaction as if B had made a stipulation with S that discovery of the mum will allow him to cancel the transaction. In R. Akiva Eiger's understanding, an implicit stipulation of what triggers mekah ta'ut is no different than any other advance explicit stipulation made by B. In both cases, the transaction takes legal effect and only becomes invalid later when B discovers that the condition was not fulfilled and B calls for the cancellation of the deal because of the non-fulfillment of his condition. If B is reconciled to accepting the purchase item despite his discovery of the defect, the original symbolic act (kinyan) remains intact and there is no need to perform a new kinyan to make the transaction binding. A different understanding of how mekah ta'ut works proceeds, however, was described by R. Ephraim b. Aaron Navon (Constantinople, 1677-1735). In his understanding, once B discovers a mekah ta'ut type defect, the original kinyan becomes null and void. Consequently, if B desires to accept the item of sale as is, a new kinyan will be necessary.

It would appear that all opinions agree that in a mekah ta'ut transaction, B's right to cancel the transaction is not predicated on any explicit stipulation he had to have made in advance. In R. Eiger's understanding, B's rescission right is based on his implicit stipulation with S regarding the merchantability of the item he bought. In R. Navon's understanding, B's rescission right is more fundamental. Since the rescission right can be invoked only if the mum is such that the typical buyer would want to cancel the transaction, it is the mindset of the typical buyer and not B's implicit condition that cancels the original transaction. Accordingly, B's declaration that he wants the transaction to remain intact and that his mind was closed lacks credibility; it goes against a presumption of human nature. Consequently, a mekah ta'ut mum renders the original kinyan null and void. If B wants to keep the transaction intact, a new kinyan must be performed.

19. bHullin 94a; R. Isaac b. Jacob Alfasi (Algeria, 1013-1103), Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Hullin 94a; Yad, Mekhirah, supra n. 17, at 18:1; R. Asher b. Jehiel (Germany, ca. 1250-1327), Rabbenu Asher, Hullin 7:18; Tur, supra n. 17, at 228; ShAr., supra n. 17, at 228:6; Ar.haSh,, supra n. 17, at 228:3.

20. bBava Metzia 80a; Sefer Halakhot, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19, at 80a; Yad, supra n. 19, at 15:7-10; Rabbenu Asher, supra n. 19, at 6:14; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:8-9; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:12-15.

21. Rabbenu Asher, Hullin, supra n. 19, at 3:34.

22. R. Joshua b. Alexander ha-Kohen Falk (Poland, 1555-1614), Perishah, Tur, Hoshen Mishpat 228, n. 5.

23. Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:11, Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:17.

24. Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19, quoting the authority of Rabbenu Hai Gaon, at 49b; Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:3; Tur, supra, n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:3.

25. Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:3; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:3.

26. Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:5; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; ShAr., supra n. 17, at 232:6; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:7.

27. Tur, supra n. 17, at 233; ShAr., supra n. 17, at 233:1; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 233:1.

28. Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:4; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; ShAr., supra n. 17, at 232:6; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:6.

29. Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:4; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:6; Ar.haS., supra n. 17, at 232:6.

30. Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:7.

31. R. Asher b. Jehiel, quoted in Tur, supra n. 17, at 232.

32. Tux, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:5; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:10.

33. R. Mosheh Isserles (Poland, 1525 or 1530), Rema at Sh.Ar. 232:5.

34. Netiv Yosher, supra n. 18, at 146.

35. Kiddushin 11a; Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:12; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:10; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:16.

36. Rabbenu Asher, Hullin, supra n. 19, at 3:34.

37. Nahmanides (Ramban, Spain, 1194-1270), quoted in Rabbenu Asher, Hullin, supra n. 19, at 3:34.

38. Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:18.

39. R. Joshua ha-Kohen Falk (Poland, 1555-1614), Sma, at Sh.Ar, Hoshen Mishpat. 232 n. 57.

40. Rav, bBava Batra 92b.

41. Samuel, bBava Batra 92b; Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 92b; Rabbennu Asher, supra n. 19, at 6:2; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232:23; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:23; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:36.

42. Tur, supra n. 17; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17.

43. Mishna, Bava Batra 5:6; Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 5:6; Yad, Mekhirah, supra n. 17, at 16:1; Rabbenu Asher, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 5:13; Tur, supra n. 17, at 233; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 233:1; Ar.haSk, supra n. 17, at 233:1.

44. Yad, supra n. 17; Tur, supra n. 17; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17.

45. bPesahim 38a.

46. R. Shelomo Kluger (Poland, 1783-1869), Hokhmat Shelomoh, gloss at Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 233:1.

47. Rabbenu Asher, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19, at 3:24; Tur, supra n. 19, at 232; Rema, supra n. 33, at Sh. Ar. 232:18; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:26-29. The specific case entails the following elements: S 2 sold an animal to B. S 2, in turn, had bought the animal from S 1. Relying on S 2 having properly inspected the animal for defects before the sale, B put his newly acquired animal together with the rest of his herd and placed food in front of all the animals. Unbeknown to B, the new animal had no molars and because it could not chew the food placed before it, the animal starved to death. The law of implied warranty for merchantability makes S 2 responsible for B's loss. On the basis of this same principle, S 2 has a claim against S 1 for failing to inspect the animal when he sold the animal without molars to him. In opposition to these authorities, Maimonides, Yad, Mekhirah, supra n. 17, at 16:11, and R. Joseph Caro (Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:18) hold that S 2 bears no liability here. B has no one but himself to blame for the misfortune, as he should have made sure that the animal he just bought had molars before setting food in front of it. In the opinion of R. Jehiel Michel Epstein, Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:27, Maimonides and R. Joseph Caro are in basic agreement with the principle that any S, irrespective of his position in the commercial distribution chain, operates under an implied warranty of merchantability responsibility. Holding S not liable is restricted to cases analogous to the molar case. The salient feature of the molar case is that S 2 was a trader that held on to his inventory for only a very brief time period and therefore never inspected his stock of animals for defects. B should have known this and inspect the animal himself to make sure it had molars before giving it food to eat. For sellers whose inventory cycle is longer than the trader in the molar case, the warranty of merchantability fully applies, irrespective of the position of S in the commercial distribution chain.

48. Whenever the U.C.C. uses the language “merchant” it only applies to merchants. Other times the U.C.C. provides a rule for non merchants as well. For a discussion how the U.C.C. treats merchants and non-merchants differently, see Hillinger, Ingrid Michelson, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 Geo. L.J. 1141 (1985)Google Scholar.

49. U.C.C. § 2-104(1), 1 U.L.A. 653 (2004).

50. For instance, a deal between two friends, where the seller does not hold himself out as having knowledge or skills in the wares that he is selling, would not be considered a bargain with a merchant. This could be the case at a garage sale or if a lay person is selling her car.

51. In a store, we would assume that the person doing business is an agent of an employer and therefore has special knowledge about the goods or services he is selling. This holds true for a circumstance such as a car dealership. Anyone who works at the dealership is an agent who by his occupation is putting himself out as having skill or knowledge about cars.

52. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2000).

53. See U.C.C. § 2-313, 1A U.L.A. 482 (2004) (indicating an oral guarantee can be considered an express warranty).

54. By displaying a sample model, the merchant is basically saying: “This is what it looks like.”

55. U.C.C. § 2-313 (comment 3), 1A U.L.A. 483 (2004): “In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement.”

56. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(e), 2303(d).

57. “When you make a sale to your fellow or when you buy from the hand of your fellow, do not victimize one another” Lev 25:14 (The Stone Edition, The Humash, Art Scroll Series 699 (2d ed., Mesorah Publication 1994)).

58. Baraita, Bava Metzia 51a; Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19 at 51a; Yad, supra n. 19, at 12:1; Rabbenum Asher, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19, at 4:17; Tur, supra n. 17, at 227:1; ShAr., supra n. 17, at 227:1; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 227:1.

59. Bava Metzia, supra n. 20, at 61a; Tur, supra n. 17, at 227:1; Sma, supra n. 39, at Sh.Ar. 227 n. 1.

60. Yad, supra n. 17; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 227:4; Sma, supra n. 39, at 227:4 notes 6-7. Expressing a minority opinion in this matter is R. Jonah b. Abraham Gerondi (Spain, ca. 1200-63). In his view, as long as the plaintiff does not agree to the transaction, the offender is also given the prerogative of voiding it. The offender's rights in this matter proceed from the magnitude of the price discrimination involved. Because the concluded price diverged more than one-sixth from the market norm, the offender may insist that the original transaction be treated as an agreement consummated in error (mekah ta'ut). Once the transaction is, however, agreed to by the plaintiff, the offender loses his right to void the sale. Denying the offender full nullification rights here follows from the fact that the offender enjoys no such rights when his offense consists of the less severe violation of contracting for a sales price involving second-degree ona'ah. Conferring full nullification rights on him when his offense is graver seems counter to all canons of equity. R. Jonah b. Abraham Gerondi, quoted in Tur, supra n. 17, at 227 and in Rema, supra n. 33, at Sh. Ar. 227:4 and in Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 227:4. Ruling in accordance with R. Jonah is Rabbenu Asher, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 5:14.

61. Bava Metzia, supra n. 20, at 50b; Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19, at 50b; Yad, supra n. 17, at 12:2; Rabbenu Asher, supra n. 19, at Bava Metzia 4:15; Tur, supra n. 17, at 227; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 227:2; Ar.haSh. supra n. 17, at 227:2-3.

62. Bava Metzia, supra n. 20, at 50b; Sefer Ha- Halakhot, Bava Metzia, supra n. 19, at 50b; Yad, supra n. 17, at 12:3; Tur, supra n. 17, at 227:4; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17.

63. Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at. 227:7.

64. bBava Batra, at 78a; R. Solomon b. Isaac (France, 1040-1105), Rashi, Bava Batra 78a; Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 78a; Yad, supra n. 17, at 27:5; Rabbenu Asher, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 5:7; Tur, supra n. 17, at 220:5; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 220:8; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 220:7.

65. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3).

66. Id. at §§ 2304(a), (b), (e) (2000).

67. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), IB U.L.A. 142 (2004). Further U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a), allows for the exclusion of all implied warranties with the use of expressions “as is,” “with all faults,” or “other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties [and] makes plain that there is no implied warranty.”

68. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b).

69. Yad, supra n. 17, at 15:6; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:7; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 232:11.

70. Yad, supra n. 17, at 13:3-4; Tur, supra n. 17, at 227; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 227:21; Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 227:22.

71. Yad, supra n. 17, at 13:6.

72. Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 227:28. R. Epstein notes a dispute regarding the exact circumstances of the nosei ve-noten be-emunah case. Id. at 227:19. Some authorities limit the case to the instance where S discloses his cost base and proposed mark-up before the transaction is entered into. But if B agrees only to give S a specified mark-up above cost, without being told what the cost amounted to before the transaction is entered into, B retains his right to modify or overturn the transaction on the basis of price fraud (ona'ah). Other authorities regard the case of nosei ve-noten be-emunah to apply in both situations. A case where all authorities agree that nosei ve-noten does not apply is when S is aware all along that his cost price entailed ona'ah but did not reveal that fact to B. Id. at 227:28.

73. Yad, supra, n. 17, at 5, 6; Tur, supra n. 17, at 232; Sh. Ar., supra n. 17, at 232:7; Ar.ha-Sh., supra n. 17, at 232:11.

74. Businessperson's Guide, supra n. 12.

75. The model case here is R. Nahman's ruling at Bava Batra, 41a: A fence marked the boundary between the land of R. Anan and his neighbor. Subsequently, a flood washed away the fence. R. Anan rebuilt the fence and the neighbor assisted him. Soon, however, the neighbor realized that the fence was inadvertently built inside his own property and lodged a protest. R. Nahman ruled in favor of the neighbor. The neighbor assisted by mistake and did not constitute a relinquishment of his land. Jewish law follows R. Nahman's ruling. Codifiers who follow R. Nahman's ruling include Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 41a; Rabbenu Asher, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 3:36; Tur, Hoshen Mishpat, supra n. 17, at 142; Sh.Ar., Hoshen Mishpat, supra n. 17, at 142:2; Ar.haSh., Hoshen Mishpat, supra n. 17, at 142:3.

In his treatment of mehila be-ta'ut, R. Yom Tov Ishbili (Spain, 1270-1342), in his writings on Bava Metzia 66b, points out that R. Nahman at Bava Metzia 66b apparently contradicts his own ruling. The elements of the second case are as follows: By means of a formal act of acquisition (kinyan), S sells B the future produce of his date tree. Since the produce was non-existent at the time of the kinyan, B does not legally acquire the dates, even after they come into existence. The rule here is that a man cannot effect a transfer of something that has not yet come into existence (ein adam makneh davar shelo ba le'olam). If, however, B removes the produce and eats it with S's consent, S's consent effects a waiver of his rights to withdraw from the deal and keep the produce for himself. Notwithstanding that S's waiver is in error, based on the presumption that the sale was valid, R. Nahman regards the waiver as valid.

In the opinion of R. Ishbili, R. Nahman's rulings do no contradict each other. In the latter case, S's intention is clearly to confer on B the ownership of the future produce of his date tree. S's intention does not, however, become legally binding on account of the technicality of ein adam makneh davar she lo ba le'olam. Even if S subsequently learns that the original kinyan was invalid, that does nothing to change his original intention to confer on B ownership of the future produce of his date tree. Given that S's mistaken waiver does not frustrate his original intention, B's subsequent kinyan on the produce is valid and the original terms of the deal remain operative. In sharp contrast, R. Anan's neighbor rendered him assistance to rebuild the boundary fence only because he mistakenly believed that the fence was not being constructed inside his own property. Subsequent awareness that the fence was inadvertently built inside his own property makes the neighbor's original waiver mehila ba-ta'ut.

The warranty case dealt with in the text is analogous to R. Anan's case.

76. For the tenai kaful condition, see Yad, Ishut, supra n. 17, at 6:1-7; Rabbenu Asher, Gittin, supra n. 19, at 6:9; Tur, Even ha-Ezer, supra n. 17, at 38:2; Sh.Ar., Even ha-Ezer, supra n. 17, at 38:2; Ar.haSh., Even ha-Ezer, supra n. 17, at 38:26-7.

77. For a development of Talmudic and Rishnoic sources dealing with both the gemirat da'at and the semikhat da'at conditions, see Albeck, Shalom, Dinei Mamanot be-Talmud 112–143 (Dvir 1976)Google Scholar.

78. Bava Batra, supra n. 64, at 168a; Sefer Ha-Halakhot, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 168a; Yad, Mekhirah, supra n. 17, at 11:5; Rabbenu Asher, Bava Batra, supra n. 19, at 10:19; Tur, Hoshen Mishpat, supra n. 17, at 207:12; ShAr., Hoshen Mishpat, supra n. 17, at 207:9-13; Ar.haSh., Hoshen Mishpat, supra n. 17, at 207:22-53.

79. Rashi, Sanhadrin 24b.

80. This is the designation of scholars who were active in the period from the eleventh to the middle of the fifteenth century.

81. For a presentation of these views, see Levine, Aaron, Case Studies in Jewish Business Ethics 271–274 (Ktav Publg. House Inc., Yeshiva U. Press 2000)Google Scholar.

82. Rashi, Sanhedrin, supra n. 78, at 24b (interpreting Tosafot (12th-14th cent-French commentators on the Talmud); Tosafot, Bava Metzia, 73b, 74a; Nahmanides (Spain, 1194-1270), Hiddushei haRamban, Bava Batra 168a; Rema, supra n. 33, at Sh. Ar. 207:13.

83. Maggid Mishneh, Yad, Mekhirahat 11:18.

84. Kegby, Mary B. & Hiller, Janine S., “Emerging” Lemon Car Laws, 24 Am. Bus. L.J. 91 (1986)Google Scholar.

85. Id. at 91-96.

86. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2000).

87. Ostas, Daniel & Shaffer, Brian, Exploring the Political Economy of Consumer Legislation: The Development of Automobile Lemon Laws, 3 Bus. & Pol. 65–76 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88. Id. at 70-75.

89. Lemon, Car, Lemon Law Summaries, http://www.carlemon.com/lemons.html (accessed 05 30, 2008)Google Scholar.

90. Netiv Yosher, supra n. 18, at 140.

91. Bava Batra, supra n. 64, at 92b.

92. R. Samuel b. Meir, Rashbam, Bava Batra 92b.

93. Netiv Yosher, supra n. 18, at 144-145.

94. Not all states extend coverage of the lemon laws to used cars. For a tabular comparison of the states on this issue, see Car Lemon, http://www.carlemon.com (accessed May 30, 2008). For specific details of how the used car lemon case is treated in state law, see N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 198(b) (McKinney 2004).

95. Megna, Vince, Bring on Goliath: Lemon Law Justice in America 177 (Ken Press 2004)Google Scholar.

96. Id. at 178-181, 183-185.

97. R. Nissim b. Reuben Gerondi, Ran, Kiddushin 48b.

98. See e.g. N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 198-a(g)-(1).

99. Vince Megna, quoted in Oldenburg, Don, Recourse When That Sweet Ride Turns Sour, Car Buyers Who Get Clunkers Can Use Lemons Laws Against Automakers, Wash. Post F5 (02 26, 2006)Google Scholar.

100. Megna, Bring on Goliath, supra n. 95, at 94.

101. Id. at 95. The nine states are Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas—and Washington D.C.

102. Lemon Law Summaries, supra n. 88.

103. Rabbenu Asher, Sanhedrin, supra n. 19, at 3:40; Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 14:5.

104. R. Moshe Sternbuch (Israel, contem.), Teshuvot Ve'Hanhagot 4:303.

105. In a commercial transaction, not all information must be shared. For a treatment of this topic from the perspective of Jewish law, see Levine, supra n. 81, at 153-177.

106. Lev 19:14; Torat Kohanim, Lev 19:14; Yad, Rozeah, supra n. 17, at 12:14.

107. Rashi, Lev 19:14. The Torah makes use of the phrase “And you shall fear your God” in connection with the following moral imperatives: (1) the prohibition against offering ill-suited advice, Lev 19:14; (2) the duty to bestow honor upon a Talmudic scholar, Lev 19:32; (3) the injunction against causing someone needless mental anguish, Lev 25:36; (4) the interdict against charging interest, Lev 25:36; and (5) the prohibition against working an Israelite bondman oppressively, Lev 25:43.

108. The father's moral educational role proceeds most directly from the mitzvah of hinnukh. This rabbinically mandated mitzvah requires the father to train his children in the performance of mizvot that they will be subject to when they reach adulthood. Hagigah 4a. Relatedly, this mitzvah assigns the father an interventionist role whenever he observes his children engaged in wrongdoing, with the additional duty to remonstrate them for their misconduct. Cf. ShAr., supra n. 17, at Orah Hayyim 343:1. The father's role of remonstrator continues, of course, even after his children reach adulthood by dint of the pentateuchal mitzvah of tokhahah (reproof). Lev 19:17.

The hinnukh a son receives in normative conduct is potentially reinforced by dint of the father's pentateuchal obligation to teach him Torah. Kiddushin, supra n. 35, at 29a. This obligation requires the father to teach his son the entire Torah She-biktav (Written Law); Sh.Ar., Yoreh De'ah, supra n. 17, at 245:6 and comments ad loc. of R. Samuel ha-Levi (Poland, 1586-1667), Turei Zahav at Sh.Ar., Yoreh De'ah 245:6 n. 2 and R. Shabbetai b. Meir ha-Kohen (Poland, 1621-62), Siftei Kohen, at Sh.Ar., Yoreh De'ah 245:6 n. 5.

For a glimpse at how the moral educational role of the father worked itself out in practice, see Al-Nakawa, R. Israel Ibn (Spain, 14th cent.), Menorat ha-Maor vol. 4, 145 (Enelow, H.G. ed., Bloch 1932)Google Scholar.

For the mother's role as enabler in connection with the mitzvah of Talmud Torah, see Berakhot 17a. For the mother's obligation to transmit the experience of Sinai to her children, see Soloveichik, R. Aharon, The Fire of Sinai, in Building Jewish Ethical Character 12 (Kaminetsky, Joseph & Friedman, Murray I. eds.. Fryer Found. 1975)Google Scholar.

Authorities dispute whether the Sages imposed the mitzvah of hinnukh on the mother. For opposing views, cf. R. Abraham Abele b. Hayyim ha-Levi Gombiner (Poland, ca. 1637-83), Magen Avraham, Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 343, no. 1; R. Samuel b. Nathan ha-Levi Kolin (Bohemia, 1720-1806), Mahazit ha-Shekel, Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayyim 343, n. 1. In any case, Halakhah assigns a vital role to the mother as a moral educator of her children. One manifestation of this role is the mother's responsibility to remonstrate with her children for wrongdoing. In this regard, many authorities assign greater responsibility to the mother than the father. Cf. R. Isaiah ha-Levi Horowitz (Poland, 1565-1630), Shelah, Sh'ar ha-Otiot, ot Derekh Eretz.

For a description of the vital role mothers historically assumed in the moral education of their daughters, see R. Moses b. Hanoch, Sefer Brontshpiegel, quoted and translated by Schimmel, Solomon, in Ethical Dimensions of Traditional Jewish Education, in Studies in Jewish Education, vol. 1, 94–95 (Chazen, Barry ed., Magnes Press 1983)Google Scholar.

109. Bava Batra, supra n. 40, at 21a.

110. Ar.haSh., Yoreh De'ah, supra n. 17, at 245 ¶¶ 9 & 27.

111. Levine, supra n. 81, at 1-32.

112. Levine, Aaron, Economic Public Policy and Jewish Law (Ktav Publg. House, Inc. & Yeshiva U. Press 1993)Google Scholar.

113. Sifrei, Deut 10:12.

114. Rashi, Exod 34:6.

115. Yad, Teshuvah, supra n. 17, at 5:1-5.

116. Let us take note that in various places, the Torah does promise that adherence to the Divine commandments will be rewarded with physical and material recompense and disobedience of the Torah will be followed by punishment in this world. Addressing this issue, Maimonides, id. at 9:1, avers that the material and physical rewards and punishments mentioned are not for compliance and disobedience. Rather, if we desire with gladness to perform God's will, God will remove all obstacles to the performance of mitzvot. These obstacles include war, disease and poverty. If we fail to perform mitzvot with alacrity, we may not merit having these obstacles removed. But the reward for performing God's will and the punishment for disobedience are infinite in nature and therefore reserved for the world of the infinite.

117. The exception to this rule is that the person who is called “God's enemy” is given a reward for his good deeds in this world: “And He pays His enemy to his face to destroy him. He does not delay for his enemy-to his face does He pay him.” Deut 7:11. See Rashi, Deut 7:11.

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120. Yad, Gezeilah ve-Aveidah, supra n. 17, at 1:4.

121. Tur, supra n. 17, at 359.

122. Sh.Ar., supra n. 17, at 359:8.

123. Ar.haSh., supra n. 17, at 359:7.

124. Rav Yosef, Bava Metzia 110b.

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