In his insightful book On the Law of Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan states that international law “is not higher law or better law; it is existing law. It is not a law that eschews force; such a view is alien to the very idea of law. Often as not it is the law of the victor; but it is law withal and does evolve” (Moynihan 1990, 19).

The 1994 presidential election presents a paradox for students of Mexican politics in particular and democratization in general. The year witnessed many numerous and far-reaching changes, both planned and unplanned. An uprising in the state of Chiapas; the assassination of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio; a sweeping electoral reform; and a hotly contested presidential race marked the unprecedented year in Mexican politics. The election results, however, were the same as in every previous presidential election for more than sixty years: a victory by the PRI candidate, in this case Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León. How to explain this? What significance does the outcome have for understanding the process of regime democratization?

The long-drawn-out military conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala have finally ended. Following the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance in 1990, the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrilla forces signed peace accords in 1992 (El Salvador) and 1996 (Guatemala) with their respective governments. In the wake of these agreements, Central America presents a new reality. The focus has shifted from war strategies to the consolidation of emerging democratic structures. The revolutionary Left, one of the main protagonists in the conflict that ravaged the region during the 1980s, now confronts a new challenge: it must demonstrate to its supporters and the general public that it indeed presents a viable political alternative.

For thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Domínguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union’s sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba’s international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries.