In their introduction to this terrific anthology, Thornton Lockwood and Thanassis Samaras suggest that this volume can be thought of as divided into three parts: (1) four initial essays on the pre-political analysis of Politics I–II, (2) four essays in the middle of the volume wrestling with the meaning of politeia in Pol. III–IV and (3) a final group of four essays dealing with Aristotle’s recommendations for classifying and improving constitutions in Pol. IV–VIII. That is a perfectly reasonable way of thinking about this collection, and instructors and scholars will not go wrong by picking readings based on those divisions. However, by way of review, let me offer a complementary way of conceptualizing the contents of this book.

First, there are four essays whose main point is to show what Aristotle does not commit himself to in the Politics, despite common suggestions to the contrary. Jill Frank (‘On logos and politics in Aristotle’) emphasizes that Aristotelian political theory does not always revert to hierarchies featuring a ruling element exercising top-down control: it frequently recognizes and promotes two-way, interdependent communication. In ‘The “mixed regime” in Aristotle’s Politics’, Ryan Balot argues that while the constitution described in Pol. IV.11 is a version of politeia (the type of regime that Aristotle classifies as correct rule by many), it is not based on a specific principle like other constitutions. Instead, it promotes an ethos of ‘wholesome collective amnesia’ about types (115), along with a readiness to enter open-minded discussions that transcends the accessible militaristic virtue that initially seems to characterize its citizens. In ‘Little to do with justice: Aristotle on distributing political power’, Eckart Schütrumpf argues that when Aristotle is making normative claims about how constitutions should be organized, what justice recommends is but one factor among many other practical considerations, rather than some decisive claim. In particular, none of his advocacy for including ‘the many’ in constitutions is grounded in claims of justice or, for that matter, civil rights. Christopher Bobonich’s chapter (‘Aristotle, political decision making, and the many’) also emphasizes a negative point, but here the aim is critical: none of the famous Pol. III.11 arguments for the claim that ‘the many’ can be, or judge, better than virtuous people are strong. ‘The many’ are deeply mistaken about happiness and the value of virtue, and analogizing its collective capacity with, for example, a feast or a human with improved senses, cannot fully explain how such profound error is overcome.

Another group of essays is devoted to showing that apparently inconsistent claims in the Politics are not problematic once proper distinctions are made. Pierre Pellegrin (‘Is politics a natural science?’) explains how human beings can be political both in the biological sense of inheriting natural traits that ensure living in groups, but also in a distinct way by deliberating and choosing human organizations with ethical and pragmatical values. In ‘Political rule over women in Politics I’, Marguerite Deslauriers shows how Aristotle’s belief that the rule of men over women is natural can be reconciled with his claims that such rule is also political and aristocratic. It is natural because both male and female are parts of a whole (the household), and the male is a superior part that aims to benefit the whole. However, because the female part does not metaphysically belong to the male part, but is rather ruled by it on the basis of merit, the relationship is aristocratic. J.J. Mulhern, in ‘Politeia in Greek literature, inscriptions, and in Aristotle’s Politics’, documents how Aristotle uses politeia in four distinct ways, showing how translators are doing readers a disservice by always rendering it as ‘constitution’. We avoid much confusion by recognizing that Aristotle uses politeia to discuss citizenship (the right to hold office), the citizen body (the group of human beings who are citizens), constitution (the structure or arrangement of offices) and the regime (those who occupy the offices).

A final group of essays offers an interpretive key that explains what might otherwise seem to be Aristotle’s disjointed thoughts. Thornton Lockwood (‘Politics II: Political critique, political theorizing, political innovation’) argues that Politics II is not a jumble of disconnected criticisms, or a survey of reputable opinions, but rather a sustained philosophical reflection on the benefits of political theorizing and the perils of innovation. In ‘Aristotle and the question of citizenship’, Thanassis Samaras shows that while Aristotle describes the regime-type politeia in four different ways (including as a ‘first kind of democracy’), it is always rule by sociological upper-middles that Aristotle has in mind when characterizing this regime. Arlene Saxonhouse’s ‘Aristotle on the corruption of regimes: Resentment and justice’ argues that because cities can never accomplish justice in any precise way that perfectly suits any given group, there is inevitably resentment among inhabitants. As a result, Aristotle’s recommendations for cities should be understood as attempts to manage resentment enough to prevent outright war. Finally, both Pierre Destrée’s ‘Aristotle on improving imperfect cities’ and Josiah Ober’s ‘Nature, history, and Aristotle’s best possible regime’ argue that Aristotle’s ‘polis of our prayers’ holds the key to explaining the overarching argument of the entire Politics (Ober, 224). Destrée sees all of Aristotle’s analyses and recommendations as a united attempt to show how any regime, even a tyrannical regime, can better approximate an ideal city insofar as the circumstances allow. Ober argues that the ‘polis of our prayers’ is, for Aristotle, both the historical and teleological end of the natural development of the polis. Moreover, because this constitution avoids restricting active citizenship to a subset within a larger class of inhabitants who, by nature and with proper education, could fully participate in the polis, there’s an important sense in which the teleological end of political life is democratic.

This anthology is a worthy addition to the literature on Aristotle’s Politics and is certainly a resource for both scholars and students of ancient political philosophy.