The worldwide spread of modern economic growth has depended chiefly on the diffusion of a body of knowledge concerning new production techniques. The acquisition and application of this knowledge by different countries has been governed largely by whether their populations have acquired traits and motivations associated with formal schooling. To judge from the historical experience of the world's twenty-five largest nations, the establishment and expansion of formal schooling has depended in large part on political conditions and ideological influences. The limited spread of modern economic growth before World War II has thus been due, at bottom, to important political and ideological differences throughout the world that affected the timing of the establishment and expansion of mass schooling. Since World War II there has been growing uniformity among the nations of the world, modern education systems have been established almost everywhere, and the spread of modern economic growth has noticeably accelerated.

Problems persist despite efforts to solve them because those efforts are irrelevant, inadequate, or unsupported. A behavioral structure consisting of the philosophy of the system in which the problem resides, its institutions, administration, and the operation that implements its policies is devised to analyze persistent problems such as inequality, underdevelopment, and inflation. As a chronic problem in the United States and other capitalist economies, inflation reflects a contradiction within the behavioral structure. Its resolution requires reinstatement of perfect competition, which is improbable, or change of the philosophy, which is revolutionary and equally improbable; hence, inflation will persist regardless of the measures taken against it.

The technological backwardness of the British cotton industry in the first six decades of this century was due primarily to the structure of industrial organization, characterized by intense competition and specialization, that had developed in the nineteenth century when the industry had no serious international competitors. But with the rise of corporate economies, particularly in Japan and the United States, this structure of industrial organization rendered British cotton managers powerless to create the corporate structures required to meet this challenge. Britain's decline was due to the failure of its managers to create conditions for new profitable opportunities by altering the constraints that they faced.

The role of white servitude evolved in a similar way during the American colonial period in those West Indian and southern mainland colonies where slavery became quantitatively important. The change from primary reliance on bound white labor to the use of slaves occurred in two steps, with an initial transition from servants to slaves in unskilled field work, followed some time later by widespread training of blacks and substitution of slaves for servants in skilled occupations. The timing of the two steps can be explained as a function of the changing relative costs of indentured and slave labor in the markets for unskilled and skilled labor.

Between 1870 and 1930 production methods in American offices changed substantially as mechanical devices were introduced and work was subdivided and routinized. This paper explores connections between these technological advances and changes in clerical emplyment, particularly the employment of women in offices. A close correspondence is found between the timing of changes in the sex composition of clerical employment and the adoption of new techniques. It is argued that the new technology led to increased hiring of female clerical workers by reducing the form-specific skill requirements for clerical jobs.

Between 1852 and 1883 the nature and organization of work in the American shoe industry changed due to the introduction of machinery and the factory system. For generations before 1852 shoes had been made by hand in small workshops organized through a putting out system. Each artisan possessed the skill and tools to make an entire shoe by hand, and work was intertwined with family life. With the introduction of machinery, making a shoe was divided into many distinct tasks, each performed by a different worker, and work was moved into a factory where it came under closer supervision.

This paper offers the hypothesis that the development of the textile industry in the South was shaped by the fact that by 1870 most experienced workers lived in the Piedmont. Thus, a firm which wished to hire experienced workers would have been led to choose the Piedmont; similarly, mills producing more difficult finer count cloth would have chosen the Piedmont in order to hire experienced workers. Finally, the persistence of a virtually all white workforce may be explained by the fact that most experienced workers were white and would have resisted working in integrated mills.

What were the economic costs of the disamenities that the British worker incurred when migrating to the city in the last century? How important were these costs in accounting for the higher nominal wages for unskilled work in the cities? How much of the rise in wages during the Industrial Revolution might therefore be spurious mismeasurement? This paper supplies some answers. Like the results on mid-twentieth-century growth by contemporary economists, the nineteenth-century estimates also suggest the disamenities' effects to be trivial.

Little is known about the distribution of wealth in the allegedly egalitarian society of the rural North on the eve of the Civil War. This paper investigates the role of the age structure of the heads of household and a life-cycle pattern of accumulation in determining the wealth distribution within that society and among the various groups that comprised it. The results suggest a need for caution in making cross-group or inter-temporal comparisons in wealth distributions without taking account of such factors.

The unemployment relief programs introduced by the federal government in the 1930s were the largest single factor in the growth of the federal budget over the decade. We develop a model that enables us to estimate the effects of the relief programs on private employment. Cross-sectional data bearing on the operation of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration rejects the hypothesis that the federal relief programs reduced private employment. Individuals did respond to the incentives of relief benefits, but only by moving between relief and non-relief unemployment.

This article identifies four problems in the recent interdisciplinary studies of property rights, law, and economic development in the nineteenth-century United States. First, recent studies stress too exclusively the positive functions of law in either the “release of entrepreneurial energy” or the exploitative allocation of advantages (by courts and legislatures) to the business interests leading industrialization. Second, the dichotomy between alleged “instrumentalism” as the prevailing judicial style before 1860 and “formalism” after 1865 has been exaggerated. Third, generalizations have been based too much on the eastern states and Wisconsin. Fourth, there has been a failure to identify accurately the winners and losers in the struggle over regulation and the definition of property rights. Thus, although rediscovery of the importance of institutions by economists and the renaissance of legal history among historians and legal scholars constitute welcome (converging) developments in recent scholarship, much more research is needed on these main themes in the literature.

Economic growth occurs when individuals of a society engage in productive, positive-sum games. Conventional measures of growth, however, include measures of positive- and negative-sum games. This paper establishes a framework for distinguishing between productive (positive-sum) and transfer (negative-sum) activity. The role of the Constitution in promoting productive activity is discussed.