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Introduction: Institutional Analysis and Economic History

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 July 2012

Douglass C. North  and
Barry R. Weingast
Douglass C. North
Affiliation:
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Spencer T. Olin Professor in Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899. E-mail: north@wueconc.wustl.edu.
Barry R. Weingast
Affiliation:
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Stanford, CA 94305-2044. E-mail: weingast@leland.stanford.edu.
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Extract

The three articles that follow this introductory essay reflect a rapidly growing effort in the social sciences to integrate institutional analysis with more traditional theory. In economic history, institutional analysis attempts to expand and enrich our understanding by modeling the ways in which the “rules of the game”–specifically, political and economic institutions–have affected economic behavior. By drawing on the literature of political economy, for example, economic historians can explore how institutions have interacted to affect economic performance over time.

Type
Symposium: High Politics and Low Finance
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 2000 , pp. 414 - 417
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 2000

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References

Bueno, de Mesquita Bruce. “Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony.” World Politics (10 1990): 28–52.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R.. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” this JOURNAL 49, no. 4 (1989): 803–32.Google Scholar
Weingast, Barry R. “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11, no. 1 (1995): 3–31.Google Scholar
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