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Mutations, perturbations and evolutionarily stable strategies

  • W. G. S. Hines (a1)


The changes in diversity of competitive strategies in a Maynard Smith population model with mixed strategies are related to the changes in population mean strategy. The effects of slight mutations in strategy frequencies, and of slight perturbations of the contest payoff rules are then investigated, and found to increase and decrease diversity respectively (to a third-order approximation). A relation among mutational effects, payoff perturbation effects and stable population diversity is suggested.


Corresponding author

Postal address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1.


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Research supported by a National Science and Engineering Research Council Grant A6187.



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Mutations, perturbations and evolutionarily stable strategies

  • W. G. S. Hines (a1)


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