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Legislative Production in Comparative Perspective: Cross-Sectional Study of 42 Countries and Time-Series Analysis of the Japan Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2008

KENTARO FUKUMOTO
KENTARO FUKUMOTO*
Affiliation:
Gakushuin University, 1-5-1 Mejiro Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588, JapanKentaro.Fukumoto@gakushuin.ac.jp
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Abstract

Legislative scholars have debated what factors (e.g. divided government) account for the number of important laws a legislative body passes per year. This paper presents a monopoly model for explaining legislative production. It assumes that a legislature adjusts its law production so as to maximize its utility. The model predicts that socio-economic and political changes increase the marginal benefit of law production, whereas low negotiation costs and ample legislative resources decrease the marginal cost of law production. The model is tested in two ways. The first approach compares the legislatures of 42 developed and developing countries. The second analyzes Japanese lawmaking from 1949 to 1990, using an appropriate method for event count time series data. Both empirical investigations support the model's predictions for legislative production.

Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , April 2008 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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