Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-xfwgj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-27T11:10:01.989Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The democratic deficit in South Korea: the democratic control of armed forces since 1993

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 November 2021

Kyung-Pil Kim Open the ORCID record for Kyung-Pil Kim [Opens in a new window]
Kyung-Pil Kim*
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Korea University, Seoul02841, Republic of Korea
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: kpkim0713@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper explains how South Korea's democracy has controlled the military since 1993. It reveals why the overpowered military has not faded even after the eradication of Hanahoe and the consolidation of democracy in South Korea in its aftermath. The democratic control over the military is examined focusing on: (1) budget, personnel, organization; (2) the judicial system; (3) security and defense policy; (4) personnel affairs, roles, and responsibilities; and an explanation based on laws and institutions, the strategy of key actors, and historical conditions of military confrontation. Under South Korea's democracy, the military budget, personnel, and organization are only partially controlled, leaving military commanders with jurisdiction over the military's judicial system. This is a result of legal and institutional limitations, as well as resistance from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the military. In matters of security and defense policy, the president has taken the initiative to revitalize obsolete systems through political compromise with the military. The primary means for the president to control the military has been the personnel management of the MND and the military. The military is likely to pledge its allegiance to the regime instead of citizens because the former has control over personnel affairs, which has frequently led to unofficial private groups of military officers and their political interference. This case in South Korea shows that the way society controls the military sows the very seeds of risk and allows us to rethink the challenges in controlling the military in a democracy.

Keywords

Armed forcescivilianizationcivil–military relationsdemocratic controlSouth Korea
Type
Research Article
Information
Japanese Journal of Political Science , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 355 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Avant, D (1993) The institutional sources of military doctrine: hegemons in peripheral wars. International Studies Quarterly 37, 409–430.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bechtol, B (2005) Civil-military relations in the Republic of Korea: background and implications. Korea Observer 36, 603–630.Google Scholar
Born, H (2006) Democratic control of armed forces: relevance, issues, and research agenda. In Cafario, G (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer, pp. 151–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bruneau, T and Goetze, R (2006) Ministries of defense and democratic control. In Bruneau, C and Tollefson, S (eds), Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Texas: The University of Texas Press, pp. 71–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bruneau, C and Tollefson, S (eds) (2006) Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Texas: The University of Texas Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cafario, G (ed.) (2006) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Choe, KW (2008) The study on the abolition of the commander-controlled military justice system: focusing on convening authority and line-officer judge system. Hongik Law Review 9, 191–211, (in Korean).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chung, IJ (2008) The trajectory and current issues in South Korean civil-military relations: consolidating civilian supremacy and democratic governance. The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies 24, 109–136, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Croissant, A (2004) Riding the tiger: civilian control and the military in democratizing Korea. Armed Forces & Society 30, 357–381.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croissant, A and Kuehn, D (2009) Patterns of civilian control of the military in East Asia's new democracies. Journal of East Asian Studies 9, 187–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croissant, A and Kuehn, D (2015) The military's role in politics. In Gandhi, J and Ruiz-Rufino, R (eds), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions. London: Routledge, pp. 258–277.Google Scholar
Croissant, A, Kuehn, D, Chambers, P and Wolf, S (2010) Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies. Democratization 17, 950–975.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croissant, A, Kuehn, D, Chambers, P, Volkel, P and Wolf, S (2011) Theorizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies: agency, structure, and institutional change. Zeitschrift fur Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 5, 75–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croissant, A, Kuehn, D, Lorenz, P and Chambers, P (2013) Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feaver, P (1996) The civil military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control. Armed Forces and Society 23, 149–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finer, S (1985) The retreat to the barracks: notes on the practice and the theory of military withdrawal from the seats of power. Third World Quarterly 7, 16–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fligstein, N and McAdam, D (2012) A Theory of Fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giraldo, J (2006) Legislatures and national defense: global comparison. In Bruneau, C and Tollefson, S (eds), Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Texas: The University of Texas Press, pp. 34–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hall, P (2016) Politics as a process structured in space and time. In Fioretos, O, Falleti, T and Sheingate, A (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 31–50.Google Scholar
Han, SH (2014) A proposal for reformation of Korean court-martial system. Journal of Legislation Studies 11, 27–51, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Horowitz, I (1981) Military origins of third world dictatorship and democracy. Third World Quarterly 3, 37–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huntington, S (1957) The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ilyosisa (2013) April 19. The resurrection of secret private groups of military officers. Retrieved June 10, 2020, from http://www.ilyosisa.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=34667.Google Scholar
Janowitz, M (1960) The Professional Soldier. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Jeon, JG (2010) Reassessing the civilianization of the defense sector. Journal of National Defense Studies 53, 1–29, (in Korean).Google Scholar
JoongAng Ilbo (2017) September 28. ‘The Cyber Command operated internet media companies… even distributed manipulated public opinion.’ Retrieved August 4, 2020, from https://news.joins.com/article/21979066.Google Scholar
Jun, J (2001) South Korea: consolidating democratic civilian control. In Alagappa, M (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 121–142.Google Scholar
Jung, JK, Park, C and Park, SJ (2018) A study on military justice system reform: focusing on defense reform 2.0. Convergence Security Journal 18, 113–121, (in Korean).Google Scholar
KBS News (2018a) February 15. The online public opinion manipulation conducted by the military was reported to the Blue House. Retrieved August 4, 2020, from https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=3606436.Google Scholar
KBS News (2018b) July 30. Military Human Rights Center ‘The DSC conducted surveillance on millions of civilians’, Retrieved May 10, 2020, from http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=k&Seq_Code=310561.Google Scholar
Kim, I (2012) Intra-military divisions and democratization in South Korea. Armed Forces & Society 39, 695–710.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, K-J (2014) The soldier and the state in South Korea: crafting democratic civilian control of the military. Journal of International and Area Studies 21, 119–131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, JD (2015) Secret Files: The Generals in Crisis. Seoul: Medici, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Kim, JD (2018) Initiating a defense civilization bill. The lawmaker Kim, Jong Dae Report Reference. (in Korean).Google Scholar
Kim, JT and Lee, EJ (2015) Direction of advanced armed forces size management. KIDA Defense Issues & Analyses 1568, 5, 25. (in Korean).Google Scholar
Kim, K-P and Lee, S-J (2020) The politics of the military judicial system in Korea. Journal of Social Science 31, 89–106, (in Korean).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, YC, Liddle, RW and Said, S (2006) Political leadership and civilian supremacy in third wave democracies: comparing South Korea and Indonesia. Pacific Affairs 79, 247–268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, JD, Yeo, SJ and Lee, TH (2016) The South Korean armed forces, out of democratic control. Creation & Criticism 44, 309–354, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Kuehn, D (2017) Reforming defense and military policy-making in South Korea, 1987–2012. In Croissant, A and Kuehn, D (eds), Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 151–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kyunghyang (2018) July 5 The DSC's NGO surveillance was reported to the Blue House. Retrieved June 10, 2020, from http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201807050600035.Google Scholar
Lasswell, H (1941) The Garrison state. American Journal of Sociology 46, 455–468.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, JH (1994) The civil-military relations during the MoonMin administration. Hwanghae Review 4, 193–225, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Lee, JH (2011) A study on the civilian control of the military authorities since democratization. Social Science Research Review 27, 53–75, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Maravall, J and Przeworski, A (eds) (2003) Democracy and Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MBC Straight (2018) September 2. Straight episode 19. Retrieved March 3, 2020, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=teuPXloT51o&list=PLEXMEKLrkWJ6FWdy5K0shAHGoUx3SagW0&index=37&t=0s.Google Scholar
Ministry of National Defense (2019) Defense Reform 2.0. Seoul: Ministry of National Defense.Google Scholar
Moon, C and Rhyu, S (2011) Democratic transition, persistent civilian control over the military, and the South Korea anomaly. Asian Journal of Political Science 19, 250–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Narayan, H (2012) Patterns of changes in civil-military relations in South Korea. Journal of History and Culture 44, 35–76.Google Scholar
Park, SH (2009) Created Reality. Seoul: Humanitas, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Pierson, P (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pion-Berlin, D (ed) (2001) Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives. Chapel-Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.Google Scholar
Pion-Berlin, D (2011) The study of civil-military relations in new democracies. Asian Journal of Political Science 19, 222–230.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
PSPD (2018) The evaluation of defense reform 2.0, PSPD Issue Report 2018. 08. 30. (in Korean).Google Scholar
Rukavishnikov, V and Pugh, M (2006) Civil-military relations. In Cafario, G (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military. New York: Springer, pp. 131–150.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saxer, C (2004) Generals and presidents: establishing civilian and democratic control in South Korea. Armed Forces & Society 30, 383–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shindonga (2005) January 24. List of four private groups of military officers. Retrieved June 10, 2020, from http://shindonga.donga.com/3/all/13/104116/1.Google Scholar
Sisajournal (2017) January 3. Do military officers get promoted if they know ‘Aljahoe’? Retrieved February 13, 2020 from https://www.sisapress.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=162884.Google Scholar
Trinkunas, H (2002) The crisis in Venezuelan civil-military relations: from Punto Fijo to the fifth republic. Latin American Research Review 37, 41–76.Google Scholar
Valenzuela, A (1985) A note on the military and social science theory. Third World Quarterly 7, 132–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yang, B-K (1998) Historical evolution of civil-military relations and its lessons in the Republic of Korea. The Korean Journal of International Studies 37, 309–331, (in Korean).Google Scholar
Yonhapnews (2013) January 21. NSC, a permanent diplomatic and security control tower. Retrieved March 21, 2021, from https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20130121190400001.Google Scholar
Yonhapnewstv (2018) July 24. The lawmakers inquired Martial Law document. Retrieved September 4, 2020, from http://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/MYH20180724007800038/.Google Scholar
Young, T-D (2006) Military professionalism in a democracy. In Bruneau, C and Tollefson, S (eds), Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations. Texas: The University of Texas Press, pp. 17–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar