This article will explore the travaux préparatoires of the key legal instruments on the laws of war and international humanitarian law (IHL) with a view to obtaining crucial insight into the ‘original’ understandings of their drafters as to the provisional nature and the temporal length of occupation. The findings of the travaux show the general premise of the framers of the ‘classic’ instruments on the laws of war that the legal regime of occupation should be provisional. In the concurrent doctrinal discourses this premise was endorsed by most scholars. Examination of the records of the negotiations on the drafting of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 reveals that even the proponents of ‘transformative occupation’ did not seem to envisage occupation that would endure for decades. Nevertheless, by the time the 1977 Additional Protocol I was drafted, several instances of protracted occupation already existed, which seems to have led to a decisive shift in the argumentative structure. There is no disputing the applicability of IHL to any occupied territory, irrespective of the length of the occupation. Yet the suggestion that nothing under IHL would forestall an occupying power from engaging in protracted occupation departs from the traditional premise that occupation ought to be provisional. This also seems to be paradoxical in historical perspectives.

Since the end of the Cold War, international law has increasingly been challenged by states and other actors. Specific norms have also been challenged in their application by new realities and obstacles. This article focuses on these challenges as they arise from the development of cyberspace and cyber operations, and offers an overview of the main questions arising with regard to the application of international law to cyber operations. By analysing the application of the existing norms of international law to cyber operations as well as identifying their limits, the article offers an accurate lens through which to study the contestation or process of reinterpretation of some norms of international law. The objective of the article is not to deliver a comprehensive analysis of how the norms of international law apply to cyber operations but to provide an overview of the key points and issues linked to the applicability and application of the norms as well as elements of contextualisation, notably after the failure of the 2016–17 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The article comprises three parts. The first part focuses on the applicability of international law to cyber operations. The second part identifies challenges that affect the applicability and application of international law in general, while the third part analyses challenges that affect specific norms of international law, highlighting their limits in dealing with cyber threats.

In two recent cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the General Court (at first instance), the High Court of Justice of England and Wales and the Grand Chamber of the CJEU found that a trade agreement and a fisheries agreement between Morocco and the European Union cannot be applied to occupied Western Sahara without the consent of its people. In spite of the fact that it is the general view that Western Sahara is under belligerent occupation, none of the three courts invoked the law of occupation but based themselves instead on the principle of self-determination and the law governing the administration of non-self-governing territories, including the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A possible implication of these judgments is that that law and the law of occupation are converging in certain respects, in particular as regards long-term occupation. This pertains not only to the substantive rules on the exercise of authority, which seem to require that the people are heard, but also to the basis for the establishment of that authority, namely bare control.

The rise of neoliberal agendas of political actors and a wave of privatisation in the globalisation era have often been followed by anti-privatisation strikes. These are union strikes against the privatisation process and against contracting out and opening markets to competition. The article presents the distinction between different versions of constitutionalism regarding anti-privatisation strikes. It discusses two approaches to constitutionalism – the economic approach and the collective approach – and their manifestation in the case law of Israel and the United Kingdom.

The collective approach suggests the recognition of a constitutional status of collective rights as a basis for counter-balancing the neoliberal practices of regulators and political actors. Following the effects of liberalisation on the labour market – both in influencing union organisational capacity and in weakening job security of individual employees, the collective approach is aimed at protecting employees’ rights in a globalised-privatised era. Within the collective approach, constitutionalism is used as a basis for recognising anti-privatisation strikes. In contrast, the economic approach denies the existence of a constitutional right to strike against privatisation.

The article presents an eclectic model which merges the two approaches, and advocates its adoption. Drawing on New Institutional Economics, the eclectic model offers a theory for moderating the constitutionalism practice and developing partial and restrained constitutionalism. It proposes the adoption of a constitutional right to strike against privatisation, when its application reduces transaction costs and advances efficiency and economic goals for the benefit of the public.

The digital age has brought new possibilities and potency to state surveillance activities. Of significance has been the advent of bulk communications data monitoring, which involves the large-scale collection, retention and subsequent analysis of communications data. The scale and invasiveness of these techniques generate key questions regarding their ‘necessity’ from a human rights law perspective and they are the subject of ongoing human rights-based litigation. This article examines bulk communications data surveillance through the lens of human rights law, undertaking critical examination of both the potential utility of bulk communications surveillance and – drawing on social science analysis – the potential human rights-related harm. It argues that utility and harm calculations can conceal the complex nature of contemporary digital surveillance practices, rendering current approaches to the ‘necessity’ test problematic. The article argues that (i) the distinction between content and communications data be removed; (ii) analysis of surveillance-related harm must extend beyond privacy implications and incorporate society-wide effects; and (iii) a more nuanced approach to bulk communications data be developed. Suggestions are provided as to how the ‘necessity’ of bulk surveillance measures may be evaluated, with an emphasis on understanding the type of activity that may qualify as ‘serious crime’.

The European human rights system has long been seen as one of the greatest European achievements, with its European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as the world's leading human rights court. Current turbulent times, however, pose serious challenges to the European system, which is increasingly being contested by the deepening ‘implementation crisis’. The absolute obligation of member states of the Council of Europe (CoE) to abide by ECtHR judgments under Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been increasingly compromised by the selective approach of states, often resulting in minimal, dilatory, lengthy or even contested compliance with ECtHR judgments. As the implementation backlog has grown largely after the accession to the CoE of the newly emerged states, as aspiring democracies, in the late 1990s and early 2000s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this article analyses the compliance behaviour of these states by looking at the South Caucasus states: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The research findings suggest that partial compliance is a very likely form of compliance in the South Caucasus states as democratising states, and that some of the factors that explain such behaviour discussed in the article may be distinctive of states that joined the CoE as emerging democracies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These states continue to display various vulnerabilities in the areas of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. This, in turn, has serious implications for the whole European human rights system and its ability to ensure that states’ commitments to the CoE are duly respected in the longer term.

The Russian Federation joins a list of countries where violence and terrorism often have a religious and an ethnic basis, and where the authorities seek ways to deal with the issue of online hate speech. In this context, in May 2014 the Russian Parliament enacted Federal Law No 97-FZ (the Bloggers’ Law). This legislation required the compulsory registration of all popular bloggers with the country's internet regulatory agency, Roskomnadzor, thereby forcing the disclosure of their real identities. The Bloggers’ Law has been widely criticised, however, and although the internet community is still engaged in a heated discussion over whether there exists a legal right to online anonymity, the law made anonymous blogging in Russia a daunting undertaking. The Bloggers’ Law was repealed in the second half of 2017, and updating of the ‘Bloggers’ Register’ ceased. This article attempts to (i) analyse the context and the reasoning behind the introduction of the Bloggers’ Register; (ii) disentangle the relevant legal provisions; and (iii) assess its effectiveness, drawing conclusions based on events in the Russian blogosphere during the period 2014–17.

The absence of control of a territorial state over part of its physical territory is closely associated with online human rights violations, on the one hand, and the state's restricted (but not necessarily absent) control over the cyberspace, on the other. Notwithstanding the lack of its effective territorial control, the territorial state continues to be entitled to exercise its sovereignty over both territory and cyberspace. The consequence of sovereignty in international human rights law is the territorial state's presumed jurisdiction over its entire national territory. The article claims that the territorial state, while lacking the effective means to control its cyberspace fully as it does in the government-controlled areas, has continuing jurisdiction, and consequently obligations, to protect human rights online from wrongful acts that originate, occur or have effect in the area outside its effective control. Treaty monitoring bodies have recommended various positive measures that any territorial state is required to take while seeking to restore its ‘internet sovereignty’ in the separatist region, depending on the means in its power that are feasible in the particular situation.

It is a great happiness to be with you today, and I am deeply honoured to be delivering the Lionel Cohen Lecture. That we should come together at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which I have had the great pleasure to visit on several occasions, stretching back many years, adds to the sense of personal significance.

Article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights protects the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (REBSPA). While the interpretation of this provision has not really been a focus of attention in the past, this is changing. A danger lies in construing this provision as entitling states to comprehensively regulate the field of science, at the expense of scientific and academic freedom. Scientific or academic freedom, rather than state regulation, guarantees creativity and innovation in the field of science for the benefit of society at large. This article raises four caveats to guide all those tasked with interpreting Article 15(1)(b) – specifically, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, right now preparing a General Comment on Article 15(1)(b). Firstly, it is crucial to have conceptual clarity of, and understand the differences between, the REBSPA, freedom of science, academic freedom, freedom of expression, and the right to education. Secondly, science, by its very nature, is not susceptible to being managed. An ‘adequate’ framework for science should limit state intervention and empower the scientific fraternity. Thirdly, regulation has lately often entailed the adoption of a corporatist approach to science in universities and research institutions. This damages science. Fourthly and finally, UNESCO's recent Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers of 2017 constitutes only an imperfect blueprint to guide interpretation of the REBSPA. It fails to address various threats (impact agenda science, peer review, ethical regulation, entrepreneurialisation, accountability excess, absence of rights of participation in governance, and so on) to scientific and academic freedom. Relying throughout on the notion that a science system must be ‘adequate for science’, the article concludes with a set of 22 recommendations on how the REBSPA should be construed so as to duly respect scientific and academic freedom. The current science regime needs to be fundamentally rethought in the light of such freedom. Otherwise – and many experts concur – we shall soon witness the fatal collapse and disintegration of modern science. Freedom as a pillar of science, and of the REBSPA, is in danger of being lost.

We are faced with a new reality where our reliance on internet access to fulfil basic civil tasks is threatened by increasing personal and societal cyber vulnerability. This dichotomy of dependence and vulnerability requires a new framework for understanding the legal and human rights status of this evolving technological reality. A number of theories have sought to explain how internet access could attain the status of a human right. These include reliance on the freedom of expression protection offered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More recent approaches have suggested that international customary law could apply, or that internet access could attain the status of an auxiliary human right. Despite repeated demands by international institutions to address modern cyber challenges through a human rights lens, this assortment of legal approaches has failed to garner a consensus view in the international community. The article reviews the merits of each of these arguments, and grounds the debate in the lens of this reality of dependence and vulnerability. Of the four options surveyed, we find that auxiliary righthood is the most promising approach, but that additional research is required to substantiate the claims.

This review essay challenges three main claims about originalism in American legal thought. While it affirms that originalism could be the Law of a legal system, it first challenges the mainstream idea that American originalism is the paradigmatic case in theory and in practice. Second, the essay confronts the normative justification that originalism ensures democracy based on the rule of law. Third, it interrogates the dichotomy between living constitutionalism and originalism regarding the use of history by arguing that originalism is a form of hegemony. The case study analysed in this article is Israeli legal thought and practice after the enactment of the 1992 Basic Laws, with the focus on the right of equality.

These words come at what I see as an important historic juncture. It is 70 years since Israel was born, 70 years since the values in the declaration of independence were articulated. It is also the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Conventions, and the 80th anniversary of Kristallnacht. All of these, and the fact that we observe Holocaust Remembrance Day on Thursday, form the backdrop to this lecture on judicial independence.

It is a pleasure and an honour to give a masterclass on treaty withdrawal. This is an especially appropriate topic for an ESIL Research Forum focused on international law in times of disorder and contestation. I am grateful to Professor Yuval Shany and the other organisers for inviting me to share with you my long-standing interest in exit in international law and politics.