In connection with section 27 of the Contracts (General Part) Law of 1973, Prof. D. Friedmann has dealt with the nature of the conditional contract. In his view a conditional contract is complete, valid and effective, and only differs from an absolute binding contract in its contents.

One reason for that he finds in the fact that section 27 does not appear in Chapter One of the Law, which treats of the making of a contract, or in Chapter Two, that deals with avoidance of a contract because of a defect in its making, but in Chapter Three, that is concerned with the form and contents of a contract.

To make a contract subject to a condition is certainly not a defect in its making. But the location of section 27 does not of itself yield any of Prof. Friedmann's conclusions. Chapter Three covers contracts which are illegal and therefore invalid (section 30, a propos illegal or immoral contracts, or contracts contrary to public policy) or are at all events void (contracts lacking form ad substantiam, falling within section 23) or contracts that are not enforceable by specific performance or actionable in damages (gaming, betting and lottery contracts, under section 32) or are unjusticiable (contracts for giving marks and the like, regulated by section 33).

It is known to lawyers in this country, and no news to those who deal with public law or are concerned with the drafting of legislation, that the legislative and the judicial branches of government are engaged in a continuous dialogue. The role of the courts in the dialogue consists of interpreting statutes to be applied by them, while the legislator at times enters into discussion with the Judiciary by reacting to a court decision through legislative action. It is these phenomena in the field of legislation, occurring as reactions to decisions of the courts, which will be briefly considered in the present article.

The determination of the legislative power to act in reply to a judgment of a court may be based on a number of different reasons. One possible reason is that the court expressed an unfavorable opinion upon the contents of a statute and the legislator, in response to the criticism of the judges, amends the statute in order to do away with the imperfections revealed by the court.

The English Bills of Exchange Act—which is the source of legislation on negotiable instruments in most of the countries formerly connected with the British Commonwealth of Nations, including Israel's Bills of Exchange Ordinance—has been described as “the best drafted Act of Parliament ever passed. That explains why most of the problems which have come before the courts have been resolved within the strict framework of the law, through the application of one or another of the provisions of that Act. Those provisions can be regarded as amply covering the common commercial situations with which the world of finance is today familiar. This state of affairs has clear advantages; but, at the same time, it has its negative consequences too. Since the enactment of the Act in 1882, the courts—and, following in their footsteps, a majority of legal scholars—in the common law countries have ceased to give any thought to the theoretical nature of the negotiable instrument.

In the Spring of 1977, Prof. Shalev Ginossar published a brief but highly important article, “The Law's Delay”, in which he advocated, inter alia, simplifying the Israeli judicial structure by combining the various courts into one.

In July 1979, the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Shmuel Tamir, appointed a select committee headed by Justice Moshe Landau, then Deputy President of the Israeli Supreme Court, and soon to become its President, which was charged with studying the structure and jurisdictions of the Israeli court system, with the aim of recommending significant changes. Among the witnesses who appeared before this Committee was Prof. Ginossar, himself, and there was reason to believe that the Committee might recommend adopting some of the basic changes in the Israeli court structure that Prof. Ginossar advovcated.