1 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 (1988).

2 See Comment, , “Exclusion of Foreign Goods under American Trade Marks” (1929) 24 T.M. Bull. 265 Google Scholar.

3 It is estimated that $7 billion to $10 billion worth of products are sold every year in the United States outside manufacturers' authorized distribution channels: Cespedes, Corey and Rangan, , “Gray Markets: Causes and Cures” (1988) Harv. Bus. R. 75 Google Scholar [hereinafter cited as Gray Markets: Causes and Cures]. See also Kersner, S. and Stein, D., “Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the Importation of Gray Market Goods: From Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry” (1986) 11 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 251 Google Scholar.

4 See recently Comment, , “Preventing the Importation and Sale of Genuine Goods Bearing American Owned Trademarks: Protecting an American Goodwill” (1983) 35 Maine L.R. 315 Google Scholar; Katz, A. and Cohen, E., “Effective Remedies Against the Importation of Knock-Offs: A Comparison of Remedies Available from the ITC, Customs and Federal Courts” (1984) 66 J.P.O.S. 660 Google Scholar; Lipner, S., “The Legality of Parallel Imports: Trademark, Antitrust, or Equity” (1984) 19 Texas Inter. L. J. 553 Google Scholar; Supnik, P., “The Bell and Howell: Mamiya Case — Where Now Parallel Imports?” (1984) 74 T.M.R. 1 Google Scholar; Victor, P., “Preventing Importation of Products in Violation of Property Rights” (1984) 53 Antitrust L.J. 783 Google Scholar; Cogglo, B., Gordon, J. and Coruzzl, L., “The History and Present Status of Gray Goods” (1985) 75 T.M.R. 433 Google Scholar; Beyers, M., “The Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation” (1985) 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21, 54 Ford L.R. 83 Google Scholar; O'Connor, F., “Customs — Gray Market Importation — The Continuing Controversy (case note)” (1986) 10 Suff. Trans. L.J. 255 Google Scholar; Cohen, B., “Grey Market Imports and the International Location of Manufacturing” (1986) 11 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 171 Google Scholar; Donohue, J., “The Use of Copyright Laws to Prevent the Importation of ‘Genuine Goods’” (1986) 11 N.C.J. Int'lL. & Com. Reg. 183 Google Scholar; Gorelick, J. & Little, R., “The Case for Parallel Importation” (1986) 11 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 205 Google Scholar; Kelly, R., “An Overview of the Influx of Grey Market Goods into the United States” (1986) 11 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 231 Google Scholar; S. Kersner & D. Stein, supra n. 3; Mackintosh, J., “Grey Market Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging Policy” (1986) 11 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 293 Google Scholar; Clarke, P., “Customs — Gray Market Importation — The Necessity for Legislative Clarification of Import Restrictions (case note)” (1987) 11 Suff. Trans. L.J. 195 Google Scholar; Michael, S., “Customs — Gray Market Importation — The Latest Word (case note)” (1987) 11 Suff. Trans. L.J. 209 Google Scholar; MacGray, D., “Customs — Gray Market Importation — The Gray Areas in Gray Market Trade Law (case note)” (1987) 11 Suff. Trans. L.J. 223 Google Scholar; Larkin, C., “Recent Developments in the Law of Parallel Imports: Nothing is Black and White in the Gray Market” (1987) 11 Col. J. Law & Arts 505 Google Scholar; Note, “NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco: Continued Support for the Universality of Trademarks” (1988) 13 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 373; Kane, S., “The Gray Market and Trademark Infringement: Are Genuine Goods Created Equal!?” (1988) 70 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 677 Google Scholar; Symposium: “Piracy and Gray Market Imports: Knocking Out of the Knock-Offs” (1988) 10 Comm/Ent. L.J. 1045 Google Scholar; Note, “ Trademark Law: The Wacky World of Grey Market Goods: Untangling the Knot the Customs Regulations Tie Around Section 526 of the Tariff Act” (1988) 40 U. Fla. L.R. 433 Google Scholar; J. Gorelick & J. Guttman, “Parallel Importation after KMart v. Cartier (“COPLAT”)” (1988) 70 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 696; Allen, W., “The Supreme Court's Gray Market Decision” (1988) 70 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 688 Google Scholar.

5 See Takamatsu, K., “Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis” (1982) 57 Wash. L.R. 433 Google Scholar; Kortiz, B., “The Problem of Parallel Importation — A Comparative Study of Trademark Law in the U.S. and Sweden” (1977) 9 J. Int'l. Law & Pol. 389 Google Scholar; Kitchin, L., “The Revlon Case: Trade Marks and Parallel Imports (UK)” (1980) Eur. Intell. Prop. R. 86 Google Scholar; Gorelick & Little, supra n. 4, at 227–8; Kelly, supra n. 4, at 238–9; Kersten, H., “Gray Market Exports and Imports under the Competition Law of the European Economic Community” (1988) 78 T.M.R. 479 Google Scholar.

6 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., supra n. 1, at 1814–1815.

7 E.g., Seiko-Japan controls distribution of its goods in the U.S. through its subsidiary Seiko Time Corporation; see Gray Market Imports, 1986, Hearing on S.2614 before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 72-78 (1986) [hereinafter: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee]. The hearings were held on a Senate bill introduced in the summer of 1986 (S.2614 — “Price Competitive Products Act of 1986”, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 132 Cong. Rec. S8742-43, (daily ed. June 26, 1986)). The bill would have amended sec. 526 of the Tariff Act and sec. 42 of the Lanham Act to codify the existing Customs regulations. No further action was taken on the bill and no similar legislation has progressed ever since.

8 E.g., Johnson & Johnson U.S.A. authorized a baby powder manufacturer in Brazil to use the Johnson & Johnson trademark in Brazil; see Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee, 63-70.

9 See, e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 435 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), affd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 791 (1986).

10 See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167, (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

11 See, e.g., Osawa, supra n. 10, at 1166. See also J. Gorelick and R. Little, “The Case for Parallel Importation”, supra n. 4, at 208.

12 See, e.g., J. Donohue, supra n. 4 at 184; see also B. Cogglo, J. Gordon and L. Coruzzi, supra n. 4, at 434.

13 19 U.S.C. sec. 1526(a) (1982).

14 See 19 U.S.C. sec. 1526(b) (1982); see also 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21 (1988).

15 See, e.g., M. Beyers, supra n. 4, at 110-111.

16 The full text of sec. 526(a) is as follows:

“(a) Importation prohibited

Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section it shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the provisions of sections 81 to 109 of title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in the manner provided in section 106 of said title 15, unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry”.

17 See 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21 (1988).

18 See 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21(c)(1) (1988).

19 See 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21(c)(2) (1988). “Common Ownership” is defined as ownership of more than fity percent of the stock of the American Company by. the foreign manufacturer. “Common Control” is defined as effective control of the policy and operations of the American Company by the foreign manufacturer, and is not necessarily synonymous with “common ownership”. See 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.2(d)(1)(2) (1988).

20 See 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21(c)(3) (1988).

21 See Osawa, supra n. 10, at 1177-78: “Equally questionable are the wisdom and necessity for such regulation. Antitrust questions are far too complex to be reasonably decided by reference to a short questionnaire on corporate ownership …. The Customs regulations presume antitrust violation without reference to market considerations, from the sole fact of common control of foreign and domestic trademark owners. I consider this unsound both as antitrust policy and as trademark law”.

22 The antitrust justification apparently is founded upon the theory that exclusion of gray market goods in a situation described in the regulation may enforce international discriminatory pricing or reduce domestic intra-brand competition. See, e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1567-70; NEC Elecs. v. Cal. Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506,1511 (9th Cir., 1987), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 436 (1987). United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) dealt most directly with the antitrust issue. Here the Government brought suit against U.S. distributors of French perfume. The Government contended that they had violated the Sherman Act by attempting to monopolize importation and sale of the foreign-made goods by using section 526 of the Tariff Act to exclude competitive imports. The Southern District Court for New York held that defendants had violated the antitrust laws. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Government requested a remand for dismissal, stating that the litigation involved policy issues best handled by legislation. The Government anticipated enactment of legislation validating its claim that section 526 did not enable a U.S. company to exclude goods produced by its foreign affiliate from domestic markets. The Supreme Court complied with the Government's request for remand, and the District Court dismissed the Guerlain action: 172 F. Supp. at 107. See also Gorelick & Little, supra n. 4, at 228-229; R. Kelly, supra n. 4, at 244-248; J. Mackintosh, supra n. 4, at 309-312.

23 The administrative difficulties justification holds that in the absence of the specific regulations, Customs would be unable to enforce the antitrust policies because it cannot make an evaluation of the impact upon competition of each importation of gray market goods; see Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315,320 (2nd Cir. 1986) (citing the District Court's opinion), 627 F. Supp. 911, 921(E.D.N.Y. 1985); Lever Bros. v. United States, 652 F.Supp. 403, 405-406 (D.D.C. 1987).

24 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., supra n. 1.

25 Vivitar, supra n. 9 and Olympus, supra n. 23. See also F. O'Connor, supra n. 4; S. Michael, supra n. 4.

26 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (hereinafter COPIAT). See also P. Clarke, supra n. 4. For the history of judicial construction of section 526, see Kersner and Stein, supra n. 3, at 264-290.

27 K Mart, supra n. 1, at 1814 and 1817 (Justice Kennedy).

28 Id. at 1818.

29 See Justice Kennedy's opinion at 1817-1818 (with whom Justice White joined) and Justice Brennan's opinion at 1822-1828 (with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens joined). The minority opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia, with whom Rehnquist C.J., Blackmun and O'Connor JJ., joined.

30 Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Marshall, Stevens and White joined, dissenting.

31 19 U.S.C. sec. 1337 (1982).

32 5 U.S.C. sec. 551 (1982).

33 19 C.F.R. sec. 201.07-.71 (1988).

34 See, e.g., A. Katz and E. Cohen, supra n. 4, at 684.

35 See In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 USPQ 823 (USITC 1984); Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, 721 F.2d 1305, 219 USPQ 1142 (CAFC 1983).

36 In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, ibid.

37 Id. at 824.

38 50 Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862 appeal dismissed sub. nom., Duracell Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See Mackintosh, supra n. 4, at 305-309; Cogglo, Gordon & Coruzzl, supra n. 4 at 475-486.

39 See section 1342(a) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 - 4/8, 102 Stat. 1212-13.

40 The amendment is based on one of the six alternative recommendations of The Working Group on Intellectual Property of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade (hereinafter — The Working Group). The Working Group was appointed in 1984 by the U.S. Administration and was composed of officials from the Office of Management and Budget, Council of Economic Advisors, U.S. Trade Representative Office, Justice Department and the Departments of Commerce, State and Treasury. See Inside U.S. Trade, April 26, 1985, Annex.

41 The original recommendation of the Working Group was to amend section 337 so that in investigations involving parallel imports, after a showing of trademark infringement, the complainant would be required only to show substantial injury to itself as the owner of the trademark in the U.S., rather than substantial injury to “an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the U.S.” See ibid.

42 See 15 U.S.C. sec. 1117 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

43 Supra n. 23. See also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 143 (1987).

44 Supra n. 9.

45 794 F.2d 850 (3rd Cir. 1986) cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 436 (1987).

46 See C. Larkin, supra n. 4, at 552.

47 Impregum was manufactured by a West German corporation unrelated to Premier Dental, a U.S. corporation. Premier Dental was the exclusive distributor of Impregum in the U.S. for 10 years before the foreign manufacturer assigned to Premier Dental its rights in the U.S. trademark. The assignment was made explicitly for the purpose of giving the distributor standing to sue under section 526 and the foreign manufacturer reserved the right to compel reassignment of the mark on thirty days notice or if certain minimum sales levels were not achieved.

48 Premier Dental, supra n. 45, at 854.

49 Id. at 858. See also D. MacGray, supra n. 4.

50 See J. Gorelick and J. Guttman, supra n. 4, at 699; Compare W. Allen, supra n. 4, at 692-693.

51 15 U.S.C. sec. 1124 (1982).

52 By their terms, the exceptions in Customs' regulations (sec. 133.21(c)) limit not only Customs' implementation of sec. 526(a) of the Tariff Act but also its implementation of sec. 42 of the Lanham Act.

53 15 U.S.C. sec. 1114 (1982). Sec. 32(1) provides:

“(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant —

(a)use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or

(b)reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods, or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided”.

54 K Mart, supra n. 1, at 1817.

55 For cases holding that the importation and sale of gray market goods can constitute trademark infringement, see, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., supra n. 43, (affirming injunction preventing Spanish made “Cabbage Patch” dolls from being sold in U.S.); El Greco Leather Prods, v. Shoe World, Inc. 806 F.2d 392 (2nd Cir. 1986) (reversing dismissal of infringement action and finding owner of shoe trademark entitled to permanent injunction); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (denying motion to dismiss complaint in gray market case brought under Lanham and Tariff Acts); Weil Ceramics & Glass Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985) (enjoining sale of gray market ceramics); Selchow & Rïghter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (enjoining sale of gray market “Trivial Pursuit” games included for sale in Canada); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, supra n. 10 (enjoining, sale of gray market “Mamiya” cameras); Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l Inc. 220 U.S.P.Q. 508 (CD. Cal. 1982) (enjoining sales of gray market “Tamiya” radio-controlled model cars), affd 221 U.S.P.Q. 502 (9th Cir. 1983).

For similar cases which arrive at a different conclusion, see Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. 719 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir. 1983) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction in gray market camera case for failure to establish irreparable injury); Ballet Makers, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 633 F.Supp 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing infringement claim in gray market dance shoe case); Sasson Jeans Inc. v. Sasson Jeans, L.A. Inc., 632 F.Supp. 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction in gray market jeans case for failure to establish irreparable injury); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Serv., 575 F.Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (denying preliminary injunction in gray market perfume case). See also Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp. 707, F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming grant of summary judgment in common law trademark infringement action involving gray market shirts).

56 NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, supra n. 22. See Note, “NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco: Continued Support for the Universality of Trademarks”, supra n. 4.

57 Prior appellate decisions regarding the application of trademark law to gray market goods, with the exception of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l, Inc., supra n. 55, have all been decided on issues other than likelihood of confusion. See El Greco Leather Prods, v. Shoe World, Inc., supra n. 55 (reversing judgment for defendant on grounds that products at issue were not “genuine” for Lanham Act purposes); Bell and Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., supra n. 55 (reversing preliminary injunction against sale of gray market goods on ground that the District Court failed to find irreparable injury); Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., supra n. 55, (finding no likelihood of confusion under California law); DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 624 (2nd Cir. 1980) (denying injunction against sale of gray market goods on basis of lack of standing to sue on mark).

58 Supra n. 22.

59 Section 43(a) prohibits the use of false designation or origin, including a trademark that is likely to be confused with the plaintiffs trademark (whether or not registered).

60 Cal Abco, supra n. 22, at 1509.

61 Id.

62 260 U.S. 689 (1923). Katzel has been cited by many courts BB establishing the “territoriality” principle of trademark law that has provided the doctrinal basis for finding that the importation and sale of gray market goods may give rise to trademark infringement: Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc., supra n. 55, at 704-706; Osawa & Co., supra n. 10, at 1171-74. Section 526 was passed in part to overrule the decision of the Second Circuit in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2nd Cir. 1921). See K Mart, supra n. 1 at 1815. After the enactment of sec. 526, the Supreme Court itself reversed the Second Circuit decision.

63 The court found that there were two rationales for the Katzel holding: first, the American company that acquired the mark had made an arm's length contract with the manufacturer — it had paid a large sum for the trademarks and the goodwill associated with them — which was clearly intended to prohibit the manufacturer from selling its goods directly in the U.S. (Cal Abco, supra n. 22, at 1509). Justice Brennan in K Mart, supra n. 1, at 1822-23 and at 1830, emphasized this point. The second rationale for the Katzel holding was that because the manufacturer had forgone all its rights to its trademark in the U.S., the American owner of that mark now had complete control over and responsibility for the quality of goods sold under that mark (Cal Abco, supra n. 22, at 1509).

64 Id. at 1511.

65 See, e.g., Premier Dental, supra n. 45. In the case of an assignment to an unaffiliated distributor, one could argue that there may exist the American owner's real independence from the foreign manufacturer. In addition, the distributor may have paid at least some consideration to the foreign manufacturer in the form of a commitment to achieve a minimum level of domestic sales, or simply a promise to exert best efforts in distributing the manufacturer's products in the United States.

66 Such as automobiles and electrical equipment. This point was emphasized by opponents to S.2614 — the Price Competitive Products Act of 1986, during the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee. See, e.g., at 353-355.

67 See Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee, at 353-355. The same apply to purchases of imported liquors on the gray market, while these products were never intended for sale in the U.S. and may not meet U.S. regulations for ingredients, additives or labeling. See Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee, at 188-197. Importation of such products under the manufacturer's “true mark” may lead an American consumer of a gray market version of the product to believe that he or she is actually buying the “genuine” item — a product manufactured and adapted for sale and legal use in the U.S.

As to a post-sales warranty servicing, it appears at least some gray market importers provide the same service and warranties which are provided by the exclusive distributors. See Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee, at 113-117.

68 Larkin, supra n. 4, at 521.

69 See El Greco Leather Products, supra n. 55 at 395 (2nd Cir. 1986).

70 See Original Appalachian Artworks, supra n. 43 (finding confusion of purchases of Cabbage Patch Dolls sold with “adoption papers” in Spanish). See also the following District Court cases: Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, supra n. 10, at 1170; Weil Ceramics & Glass, supra n. 55.

71 See Cogglo, Gordon & Coruzzl, supra n. 4, at 486-492.

72 Id. at 488 (applying the rationale of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)).

73 Id. at 490-1 (applying Maisan Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F.Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y, 1984)).

74 Id. at 491-2.

75 Id. at 491.

76 51 Fed. Reg. 22005 (1986).

77 Id. at 22006. Note that under the current Customs regulation (sec. 133.21(c)(4)) importation is allowed where “the objectionable mark is removed or obliterated prior to importation in such a manner as to be illegible and incapable of being reconstituted …”

78 See Larkin, supra n. 4, at 526.

79 Proponents of gray market goods argue that most gray market goods are mass merchandised products which have the warranty of the distributor with conditions equal to or greater than the comparable manufacturer warranty. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee, at 113-117 and at 376. See also the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 2302, which requires manufacturers of consumer products sold in the U.S. to honour the written warranties they provide with their products unless they explicitly disclaim those warranties in writing.

80 See e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee, at 275.

81 See Gorelick & Guttman, supra n. 4, at 704.

82 N.Y. Gen Bus. Law sec. 218-aa (McKinney, 1988).

83 Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1797.81 (West Supp. 1989).

84 Id. sec. 1797.82.

85 The first Supreme Court case in Israel which discussed the problem was decided in 1956: Hagramaphone B.M. London v. Simphonia B.M. (1956) 29 P.E. 31.

86 See Trade Marks Ordinance (New Version), 1972 (2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 292) (hereinafter Trade Marks Ordinance).

87 Sec. 1(1) of the Trade Marks Ordinance.

88 1 L.S.I. [N.V.] 51 (hereinafter Customs Ordinance).

89 J.R. Geigy SA. v. Pazchem B.M. (1970) 24(ii) P.D. 705.

90 The Supreme Court's decision was criticized by some commentators. See e.g., Blum, A., “Can the Trademark on Genuine Goods Constitute an Infringement?” (1971) 6 Is.L.R. 421 Google Scholar; Seligsohn, E., Trademark Law and Associated Laws (Tel Aviv, Schocken, 1972, in Hebrew) 69–70 Google Scholar.

91 33 L.S.I. 44.

92 See United Sport (1984) Ltd. v. Frida, District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (unpublished opinion) (hereinafter: United Sport case) (granting preliminary injuction in gray market sport shoes case in Israel); motion no. 8757/89 (c.c. 843/89) in the District Court of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (unpublished opinion) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of gray market Belgian coffee in Israel); A&Y Eliyahu Ltd. v. Leibovitz, in the District Court of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (unpublished opinion) (hereinafter: A&Y Eliyahu Ltd. case) (granting preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of Parker and Cross pens in Israel).

93 See Nike International Ltd. v. Yoel Srad Ltd. in the District Court of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (unpublished opinion) (hereinafter: Nike case) (denying preliminary and permanent injunctions in gray market sport shoes case); I.P.E. International Pereferial Equipment Ltd. v. Hashai Communication Ltd. in the District Court of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (unpublished opinion) (denying preliminary injunction in gray market software case); A.C.N. Marketing Ltd. v. Jamily, in the District Court of Haifa (1989)(i) P.M. 33 (denying preliminary injunction of gray market jewelry case); Eldary Import & Distribution Ltd. v Invest Impax Ltd. in District Court of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (1989)(i) P.M. 158 (denying permanent injunction in gray market tampon case); United Sport (1984) Ltd. v. Shirazi Sport Ltd., in the District Court of Jerusalem (1990) (ii) P.M. 397 (denying preliminary injunction in gray market sport shoes case). Here, the same exclusive distributor who obtained an injunction in the United Sport case, supra n. 92, failed against another parallel importer).

94 See United Sport case, supra n. 92, at 9; A&Y Eliyahu Ltd. case, supra n. 92, at 4, 5 and 6.

95 See Nike case, supra n. 93, at 3.

96 Ibid.

97 (1990) 44(ii) P.D. 309.

98 A&Y Eliyahu Ltd. case, supra n. 92.

99 For such an argument, see Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, supra n. 10.

100 K.T., vol. 2, no. 4823, p. 1519.

101 Salon Tokyo and others v. The State of Israel, District Court Tel-Aviv-Jaffa judgment of June 3, 1988 (not published). The author represented the plaintiffs in that case.

102 See also sec. 133A.

103 The State of Israel appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Israel.

104 See Affu v. Commander of the I.D.F. Forces in the West Bank (1988) 42(ii) P.D. 4, at 36-37.

105 Control of Commodities and Services Order (television receivers, remote control, and video recording and reproducing apparatus), 1972, K.T. no. 2809, p. 653, as amended in 1987 by K.T. no. 5031, p. 933.

106 Control of Commodities and Services Order (household washing machines), 1973, K.T. no. 2984, p. 979, as amended in 1987 by K.T. no. 5031, p. 933.

107 Control of Commodities and Services Order (household heaters), 1974, K.T. no. 3172, p. 1199, as amended in 1987 by K.T. no. 5031, p. 933.

108 Control of Commodities and Services Order (household refrigerators and deep-freezers), 1975, K.T. no. 3346, p. 1865, as amended in 1987 by K.T. no. 5038, p. 1029.

109 Control of Commodities and Services Order (cash registers), 1975, K.T. no. 3386, p. 2483, as amended in 1987 by K.T. no. 5035, p. 977.

110 (1990)44(i) P.D. 456.

111 3 L.S.I. [N.V.] 116.

112 12 L.S.I. 24.

113 35 L.S.I. 298.

114 See sec. 2(b)(17).

115 See sec. 2(b)(12).

116 See sec. 2(b)(16).

117 The 1988 amendment was published in S.H. no. 1250, p. 82.

118 Sec. 31(a).

119 Sec. 23.

120 A court may extend the two week period. See sec. 32.

121 The Working Group on Intellectual Property of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade produced six different policy options and was unable to recommend any single alternative to the U.S. Administration. See Inside U.S. Trade, supra n. 40.

122 19 C.F.R. sec. 133.21(c)(1) and (2).

123 Customs regulation 2B, supra n. 100.