¹ See Hazard, G.C., Ethics in the Practice of Law (New Haven, London, 1978) 120Google Scholar; especially Thibaut, J. & Walker, L., Procedural Justice. A Psychological Analysis (Hillsdale, N.J., 1975) 28, 117Google Scholar; Patterson, & Cheatham, , The Profession of Law (Mineola, N.Y. 1971) 84, 109Google Scholar; Barrett, , “The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy” (1962) 37 Notre Dame Lawyer 480.Google Scholar

² See generally, and for references, Taruffo, , Il processo civile “adversary” nell'esperienza americana (Padova, 1979) 35, 94.Google Scholar

³ This definition sometimes appears in American writers (see Patterson & Cheatham, supra n. 1, at 36), but it is much discussed, and even when it is accepted, no particular duties for the lawyer are derived.

⁴ This is a well-known definition by Satta, S., Commentario del codice di procedura civile (Milano, 1959) 1Google Scholar, 1, art. 88, that is also valid for the adversary process.

⁵ See Taruffo, supra n. 2, at 3, and especially Rapoport, , “Theories of Conflict Resolution and the Law”, in Courts and Trials. A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. by Friedland, M. L. (Toronto, Buffalo, 1975) 27.Google Scholar

⁶ See Countryman, & Finman, , The Lawyer in Modern Society (Boston, Toronto, 1966) 225, 885.Google Scholar

⁷ See references supra n. 1.

⁸ See e.g. Thibaut & Walker, supra n. 1, at 22.

⁹ See e.g. Adams, , “Towards A Mobilization of the Adversary Process” (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 569, 579Google Scholar: Weiler, , “Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making” (1968) 46 Can. B. R. 406.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See e.g. Aldisert, , “The Role of the Courts in Contemporary Society” (1977) 38 U. Pitt.L. R. 437Google Scholar; Chayes, , “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Hvd.L.R. 1281.Google Scholar

¹¹ See references supra n. 1.

¹² See Freedman, , “Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: the Three Hardest Questions” (1966) 64 Mich.L.R. 1469CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System (Indianapolis, New York, 1975). Freedman's opinions have been sharply criticized (see e.g. Noonan, , “The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality” (1966) 64 Mich.L.R. 1485CrossRefGoogle Scholar, but it seems clear that they express most consistently the adversary conception.

¹³ See Thode, , “Canons 6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship” (1970) 48 Tex. L.R. 371.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Thode, supra n. 13, at 367.

¹⁵ See Kutak, , “Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct” (1980) 66 A.B.A.J. 46, 49.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Frankel, , “The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View” (1975) 123 U.Pa.L.R. 1041.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See also Pye, , “The Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth” (1978) Duke L.J. 921CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Abramson, , “Attorneys, Clients, Ethics” (1977) 52 Notre Dame Lawyer 797.Google Scholar

¹⁸ In this perspective, it has been said that “the adversary character of the system affords the right to argue, not the privilege to conceal”: see Abramson, supra n. 17, at 799. The problem of a duty of truth for the lawyer remains even if Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure admits a wide range of discovery devices. Discovery was introduced, and then broadened, as the chief tool for the search of truth, but “the forty years' experience under the rules has resulted in the development of new, lengthier, and more expensive games”, because of the failure by the judiciary to properly manage and enforce the rules and the failure of the litigation bar to act in good faith to implement the rules” (emphasis added): see Cutner, Stern, “Discovery—Civil Litigation's Fading Light: A Lawyer Looks at the Federal Discovery Rules after Forty Years of Use” (1979) 52 Temp. L. Q. 986.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See generally: “Developments in the Law. Class Actions” (1976) 89 Hvd.L.R. 1373, 1389, 1471, 1536; Miller, , “Problems in Administering Relief in Class Actions under Federal Rule 23 (b) (3)” (1971) 54 F.R.D. 1501Google Scholar; Vigoriti, , Interessi collettivi e processo. La legittimazione ad agire (Milano, 1979) 260 (also for references).Google Scholar

²⁰ See Chayes, supra n. 10, at 1288; Scott, , “Two Models of the Civil Process (1975)Google Scholar

²¹ Stan.L.R. 938; Vigoriti, supra n. 19, at 252.

²¹ See Aldisert, supra n. 10, at 462.

²² See Rabin, , “Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law” (1975) 28 Stan.L.R. 207CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chayes, supra n. 10, at 1310.

²³ See Riley, , “The Challenge of the New Lawyers: Public Interest and Private Clients (1970) 38 Geo.Wash.L.R. 547Google Scholar; Robson, , “Private Lawyers and Public Interests” (1970) 56 A.B.A.J. 332Google Scholar; Dorsen, , “The Role of the Lawyer in America's Ghetto Society” (1970) 49 Tex-L.R. 367Google Scholar; Meltsner, & Schrag, ; Public Interest Advocacy: Materials for Clinical Legal Education (Boston, Toronto, 1974) 1Google Scholar: Dawson, , “Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation” (1975) 88 Hvd.L.R. 849Google Scholar; Arena, , “Gli avvocati per il “public interest” negli Stati Uniti” (1976) Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. 707Google Scholar; Denti, , L'avvocato e la difesa di interessi collettivi, Foro It. (1978) vol. 5, p. 112.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Payen, & Duveau, , Les règles de la profession d'avocat et les usages du barreau de Paris (Paris, 3rd ed., 1975) 323.Google Scholar See also Kohl, , Procès civil et sincérité (La Haye, 1971) 125Google Scholar, 140. No change was introduced by the 1976 code.

²⁵ See especially art. 421 cod. proc. civ. as to labor disputes.

²⁶ See e.g. arts. 118, 191, 213, 240, 257 cod proc. civ., and generally Grasso, , “Dei poteri del giudice” in Commentario del Codice di Procedura Civile, ed. by Allorio, E., (Torino, 1972) vol. I, sub-art. 115.Google Scholar

²⁷ For the affirmative see e.g. Cappelletti, , La testimonianza della parte nel sistema dell'oralità (Milano, 1962) 377, 389Google Scholar; Grasso, , “La collaborazione nel processo civile” (1966) Riv. dir. proc. 600.Google Scholar For the negative see Satta, supra n. 4; Calamandrei, , “Il processo come gioco”, now in Opere giuridiche (Napoli, 1965) vol. I, p. 558Google Scholar, and especially Calogero, , “Probità, lealtà, veridicità nel processo” (1939) Riv. dir. proc. civ. pt. I, p. 129.Google Scholar

²⁸ For the former definition see Calamandrei, supra n. 27, at 537; for the latter see Satta, supra n. 4.

²⁹ See Orlandi, Giovannucci, “Sul dovere di lealtà e probità dei difensori (1974) Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ. 263.Google Scholar

³⁰ See, also for the restraining construction that prevails about § 178, Cappelletti, supra n. 27, at 503.

³¹ See Schima, , “Les Garanties Fondamentales dans le Procès Civil en Autriche”, in Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation, ed. by Cappelletti, M. & Talion, D. (Milan, New York, 1973) 185.Google Scholar

³² On the subject see the broad essay by Stürner, , Die aufklärungspflicht der Parteien des Zivilprozesses (Tübingen, 1976)Google Scholar especially at 9, 134, 234, and Cohn, , “Zur Wahrheitspflicht und Aufklärungspflicht der Parteien im deutschen und englischen Zivilprozessrecht”, in Festschr. für von Hippel (Tübingen, 1967) 41.Google Scholar See also Trocker, , Processo civile e Costituzione (Milano, 1974) 56Google Scholar, on the reasons of the introduction of § 138 al. 1 in 1933.

³³ See e.g. Goldschmidt, , Der Prozess als Rechtslage (Berlin, 1925) 127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ In the German system there is no doubt that the lawyer has a duty of truth, and the prohibition against making false statements, both in consequence of § 138 ZPO, and of §§ 18 n. 2 and 59 of the Richtlinien für die Ausübung des Rechtsanwaltsberufs. See Kalsbach, , Bundesrechtsanwaltsordung Kommentar (Köln, 1960) 233, 397.Google Scholar

³⁵ It must be underlined that the duty of truth and completeness stated by § 138 is commonly construed in a much restraining way: it is said, viz., that parties must state the truth about facts that they voluntarily allege, but they are not obliged to disclose all relevant facts (see, with wide references, Stürner, supra n. 32, at 9). Therefore, a limited duty of truth remains, but the duty of completeness disappears.

³⁶ See Baur, “Les Garanties Fondamentales des Parties dans le Procès Civil en République Fédérale d'Allemagne” in Fundamental Guarantees, supra n. 31, at 29.

³⁷ See especially Ginsburg, , “Objective Truth and the Judicial Process in Post-Stalinist Jurisprudence (1961) 10 Am. J. Comp. L. 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Troussov, , Introduction à la théorie de la preuve judiciaire, fr. trans., (Moscow, 1965) 13, 189Google Scholar; Cerroni, , Il pensiero giuridico sovietico (Rome, 1969) 192.Google Scholar

³⁸ See generally, also for the other socialist countries, Stalev, , “Fundamental Guarantees of Litigants in Civil Proceedings: A Survey of the Laws of the European People's Democracies” in Fundamental Guarantees, supra n. 31, at 381.Google Scholar

³⁹ Only in the Bulgarian process (art. 3, I, cod. proc. civ.) the duty of truth exists for parties: therefore, it is a real duty to cooperate for the search of material truth on the facts in issue: see Stalev, supra n. 38, at 403.

⁴⁰ See Gutsenko, , “New Legislation in the Union Republics with Respect to the Legal Profession” (1962) 1 Soviet Law & Gov. 57Google Scholar; Kucherov, , The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice. Their History and Operation (Leyden, 1970) 468.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See, for references also, Kucherov, supra n. 40, at 520; Sukharev, , “Pressing Problems Facing the Soviet Legal Profession” (1965) 3 Soviet Law & Gov. 41.Google Scholar

⁴² See especially Strogovich, , “Adversary Proceedings and Trial Functions in Soviet Criminal Procedure” (1962) 1 Soviet Law & Gov. 12.Google Scholar A very interesting debate on the counsel's role in the criminal proceeding, where these principles are discussed, is published in (1971) 9 Soviet Law & Gov. n. 4, 292. See especially the essays by Anashkin, Strogovich and Giganov.

⁴³ In the English system there are no rules stating such a duty, but parties and attorneys are actually obliged to state the truth, according to the judicial practice, as a consequence of the oral and concentrated structure of trial and pre-trial, and because several procedural tools (as e.g. the notice to admit, the discovery devices and the judge's power to order “further and better particulars”) tend to reach this outcome. See Cohn, supra n. 32, at 49 and 53; Stürner, supra 32, at 17; Stafford, , “Trial by Jury. The English Way” (1980) 66 A.B.A.J. 334.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Cohn, supra n. 32, at 60; Abramson, supra n. 17, at 799.

⁴⁵ In this sense, with reference to the American system, see Taruffo, supra n. 2, at 51. See also Perry, , “Constitutional ‘Fairness’; Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process” (1977) 63 Va.L.R. 383CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and, with special reference to the lawyer's role, Auerbach, , Unequal Justice. Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America (New York, 1976) 263, 308.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ The distinction between client-centered and court-centered lawyer, sometimes used to describe the lawyer's role in the different procedural systems (see e.g. Thibaut & Walker, supra n. 1, at 22), is then completely unreliable. Particularly, it is not useful to describe the lawyer's role in systems that, as the civil law ones, are labelled as non-adversary or inquisitorial.

⁴⁷ This, in fact, is the conception on which the adversary theory is grounded: see Auerbach, supra n. 45, at 280; Taruffo, supra n. 2, at 48, 110; Rapoport, supra n. 5, at 28, 30.

⁴⁸ For Germany, see Cohn, supra n. 32, at 41; for Italy, see Giovannucci Orlandi, supra n. 29, at 266.

⁴⁹ The reference is to public interest lawyers, and to the trend towards the streng thening of the lawyer's duties, see supra, n. 2.