1 For present purposes we do not have to enter into the distinction between (a) “absolute” or “purely” political offences which consist of direct attacks upon the existence of the State (such as high treason, sedition or espionage); (b) “complex” or “mixed” political offences which are a combination of an absolute political offence with an ordinary offence (such as the attempt on the life of the chief of State and his family); (c) “connex” political offences which are crimes perpetrated in order to prepare or facilitate an absolute or complex political offence or in order to protect its perpetrators; and (d) “relative” political offences which are ordinary crimes committed under such circumstances that their political character is dominant.

On the meaning of political offences in general and for the critical evaluation of this concept, see Bedi, , Extradition in International Law and Practice (1966) 179–192Google Scholar; Shearer, , Extradition in International Law (1971) 166–193Google Scholar; Bassiouni, , International Extradition and World Public Order (1974)Google Scholar (hereinafter referred to as “Bassiouni, Extradition”) 370–429; Schultz, , “The Classic Law of Extradition and Contemporary Needs” in Bassiouni, and Nanda, (eds.), A Treatise on International Criminal Law (1973) (hereinafter referred to as “Bassiouni and Nanda”) vol. II, pp. 309, 314–316.Google Scholar

On the bearing of the “political crime” concept in relation to crimes of terrorism, see Bassiouni, , ed., International Terrorism and Political Crimes (1975).Google Scholar

2 See e.g., Art. 6 of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty of 1931 (reproduced in Shearer, op. cit., 230), Art. 4 of the Israel-Austria Extradition Treaty of 1961 (reproduced ibid., 233–234) and Art. 3 of the European Convention on Extradition (reproduced ibid., 240).

3 This principle is also reflected in Art. 3(3) of the European Convention on Extradition (reproduced ibid.) which provides that “the taking or attempted taking of the life of a Head of State or a member of his family shall not be deemed to be a political offence…” The attentat clause is also commonly referred to as the “Belgian clause”, for it has its origin in Art. 6 of the Belgian Law on Extradition of 1856, as subsequently amended, which provides that “an attempt on the life of the head of a foreign government or on that of the members of his family shall not be considered a political offence or an act connected therewith when such attempt constitutes murder in the second degree, murder in the first degree, or poisoning”. (English translation quoted after Whiteman, , Digest of International Law [1968] vol. 6, p. 855).Google Scholar

4 Lauterpacht, , “The Law of Nations and Punishment of War Crimes” (1944) 21 British Year Book of International Law 58, 90.Google Scholar

5 See e.g., Art. IV of the Colombia-Panama Extradition Treaty of 1927 which provides that “acts defined as anarchical under the laws of both States shall not be deemed to be political offences”. 87 League of Nations Treaty Series, 409, 415.

6 “In order to constitute an offence of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their own choice on the other, and … if the offence is committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that object, it is a political offence, otherwise not. In the present case there are not two parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their own choice on the other; for the party with whom the accused is identified by the evidence, and by his own voluntary statement, namely, the party of anarchy, is the enemy of all Governments”. In re Meunier [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419.

7 European Treaty Series No. 90.

8 (1972) United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1970, 131.

9 (1973) United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1971, 143.

10 See Art. 36(2) (iv) of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 (520 United Nations Treaty Series 204) which went into effect on 13 December 1964.

11 Tran-Tam, “Crimes of Terrorism and International Criminal Law” in Bassiouni and Nanda, vol. 1, p. 490.

12 Bassiouni, “The International Narcotics Control System” ibid., 533, 549.

13 Bassiouni, , Extradition 262–263.Google Scholar

In its commentary on Art. 19 (“International Crimes and International Delicts”) of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the International Law Commission has pointed out that “today international law imposes upon States the obligation to punish crimes known as ‘crimes under international law’”: (Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 28th Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1976, vol. II, part. 2, p. 103, para. 19).Google Scholar The Commission further states that “the right-duty to punish the perpetrators of these crimes is generally recognised as resting with the State in whose territory the crimes were committed”, but “in certain cases the perpetrators of international crimes may be punished by any State having jurisdiction over them under its own international law”. (Ibid., n. 468). The Commission also emphasises that in respect of the perpetrators of international crimes, there is also excluded “the possibility of a refusal to extradite such persons on the ground of the ‘political’ nature of the crimes they have committed”. (Ibid., para. 20).

14 “Piracy constitutes a further instance of the necessity of common action by all States for its repression. The act of piracy, being one against the whole body of civilised States, is often described as an ‘international crime’, whilst the pirate is generally referred to as hostis humant generis, the enemy of the human race”. Colombos, , The International Law of the Sea (6th ed., 1968) 443–444.Google Scholar On piracy in general, including its definition under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, see Whiteman, op. cit., (1965) vol. 4, pp. 648–667.

15 Bassiouni and Nanda, vol. 1, pp. 504–522.

16 Ibid., 523–529.

17 Ibid., 578–586.

18 Ibid., 482–488.

19 Bassiouni, , Extradition, 306, n. 146Google Scholar; Bassiouni and Nanda, vol. 1, p. 549.

20 This view would seem to be supported also by Grotius who states: “Since as a matter of fact states are not accustomed to permit other states to cross their borders with an armed force for the purpose of exacting punishment, and since such a course is inexpedient, it follows that the state in which he who has been found guilty dwells ought to do one of two things. When appealed to it should either punish the guilty person as he deserves, or it should entrust him to the discretion of the party making the appeal”. (The Law of War and Peace, Book II, Chapter XXI, para. IV(1)).

21 Shearer, op. cit., 21.

22 Bassiouni and Nanda, vol. 1, p. 549.

23 On the extradition or otherwise of nationals, see Bedi, op. cit., 94–100; Shearer, op. cit., 94–131; Bassiouni, , Extradition 435–442.Google Scholar Of the 163 extradition treaties printed in the League of Nations Treaty Series and in the first 550 volumes of the United Nations Treaty Series, as surveyed by Shearer (op. cit., 219–223), 98 except the nationals of the requested State absolutely, 57 give to the requested State a discretionary right to refuse to surrender its nationals, while only eight provide for extradition regardless of the nationality of the fugitive. (Ibid., 96).

24 For a discussion of the international narcotics control system, see Bassiouni and Nanda, vol. 1, pp. 540–549.

25 For the meaning of this principle, see Shearer, op. cit., 137–141; Bassiouni, , Extradition 322–326.Google Scholar

26 Shearer, op. cit., 137.

27 Ibid., 138.

28 Bedi, op. cit., 165–171.

29 Shearer, op. cit., 140.

30 See e.g., Art. VI of the U.S.-Israel Extradition Convention of 1962 which provides that extradition shall not be granted “when the prosecution or the enforcement of the penalty for the offence has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the requesting Party or would be barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the requested Party had the offence been committed in its territory”. (K.A. vol. 13, p. 795 at 798; Whiteman, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 859). Likewise, Art. 10 of the European Convention on Extradition provides that “extradition shall not be granted when the person claimed has, according to the law of either the requesting or the requested Party, become immune by reason of lapse of time from prosecution or punishment”. (Shearer, op. cit., 241).

31 General Assembly Resolution 2391 (XXIII).