Today's wars are commonly called “new conflicts”. They seem new because they are unstructured, because their victims are mainly civilians and because they are waged with unconventional weapons and methods, including terrorism. A brief look at history shows that such techniques have been used in Europe since Antiquity. It is true that the Treaties of Westphalia (1648) changed the nature of warfare by ushering in the era of nation-States, which made efforts to spare unarmed civilians while steadily perfecting their weapons. Quickly, however, this model degenerated, unleashing an undreamt of destructive potential that, since 1945, has checked traditional conflicts by making wars between developed States so dangerous that they could annihilate mankind. As a result, we have seen a return to more ancient forms of warfare, of which the new conflicts typical of today's “post-bipolar” world are the most recent example. The name given to these conflicts simply reflects the fact that, after two generations of relative peace, people in the West have forgotten what war is: for them, all conflicts seem new.

This article, based on existing studies and on newly available documents from the former Soviet archives, relates one of the most controversial missions in ICRC history, the one entrusted to Woldemar Wehrlin in the Soviet Union between the two world wars. In the absence of diplomatic ties between Switzerland and the Soviet Union, the ICRC's permanent delegate in Moscow — in addition to carrying out activities such as representing the ICRC in its dealings with the Soviet Red Cross, liaising with the Nansen mission, ensuring the repatriation of the remaining German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war and tracing those gone missing — was also led to defend the interests of his country of origin and fellow countrymen. Although the result of this exceptionally long mission, often called a “quasi-consular” one, was very positive for Switzerland and the Swiss community in Russia, it was more ambiguous for the ICRC, whose image was considerably tarnished by the issue of the organization's relations with the Swiss Confederation.

Owing to widespread atrocities witnessed in the last decade of the twentieth century, and in particular those associated with the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the issue of humanitarian intervention has been thrust into the political and doctrinal limelight. In the legal sense, humanitarian intervention is one form of foreign forcible intervention.2 It may be defined as the use of force in order to stop or oppose massive violations of the most fundamental human rights (especially mass murder and genocide) in a third State, provided that the victims are not nationals of the intervening State and there is no legal authorization given by a competent international organization, such as, in particular, the United Nations by means of the Security Council. Such humanitarian intervention need not take the form of action by a single intervening State; but it must be unilateral. Thus, if several States pool their military resources together to intervene in a foreign territory, that constitutes a collective intervention. However, the intervention is unilateral, in that it is coercive action taken by some States acting as would do a single subject. Moreover, humanitarian intervention takes place only insofar as no consent is given by the third State. If consent is given, there is no need legally to invoke the concept of humanitarian intervention; rather, it will be intervention by invitation.

The 1899 Hague Declaration (the Declaration) is a treaty prohibition based on particular technical specifications about a weapon system, namely, the construction of bullets. The Declaration has been widely adhered to and has assumed the status of customary law. Although there have been allegations of violations of this treaty, to our knowledge none have been proven. From this point of view, the Declaration could be regarded as an effective treaty.

Le 8 juin 1977, la Conférence diplomatique sur la réaffirmation et le développement du droit international humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés (Genève 1974–1977) adoptait deux Protocoles additionnels aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatifs à la protection des victimes de la guerre. Si ces instruments n'ont point encore atteint la portée universelle acquise par les Conventions de Genève, le Protocole additionnel relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I) compte néanmoins 160 États parties, tandis que le Protocole additionnel relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II) en dénombre 153.

The objective of the Working Group was to have an overview of the Observations and Recommendations, to share considerations on this document's relationship to the process launched by the ICRC on The Missing, and to comment upon and clarify its text. The Working Group was not intended to be a forum for negotiations, nor the Observations and Recommendations to be a legally binding document. There was a common understanding that the Observations and Recommendations should not be interpreted in any way as undermining existing legal standards. The Observations and Recommendations should be seen as an operational tool containing practical measures.

Le Groupe de travail avait pour objectif d'obtenir un aperçu général des Observations et Recommandations, d'échanger un certain nombre de considérations sur la relation entre ce document et le processus engagé par le CICR sur les personnes portées disparues, de commenter ce texte et d'en preciser certains aspects. Le Groupe n'a pas été constitué dans l'intention d'en faire une enceinte au sein de laquelle auraient lieu des négociations, le document discuté n'est pas juridiquement contraignant. Il était entendu que les Observations et Recommandations ne devraient pas être interprétées comme diminuant les normes juridiques existantes. Celles-ci doivent être considérées comme un instrument opérationnel comportant des mesures pratiques.

The International Criminal Court Act 2002 was assented to on 27 June 2002 and entered into force on 26 September 2002. The object of this Act is to facilitate compliance with Australia's obligations under the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC, which the Act contains as a schedule to it. The Act determines the procedure to be followed in case of request by the Court, including requests for arrest and surrender of persons (Part III) and other requests, such as identifying, locating or questioning persons, taking evidence or producing documents or articles, or facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts before the ICC (Part IV). It further contains provisions dealing with investigations or sittings of the ICC in Australia (Part V), search, seizure and powers of arrest (Part VI), information provided in confidence by third parties (Part VII), protection of Australia's national security interests (Part VIII), enforcement in Australia of reparation orders made and fines imposed by the ICC (Part X) and forfeiture of proceeds of international crimes (Part XI), as well as enforcement in Australia of sentences imposed by the ICC (Part XII).