The dramatic transformation of the climate surrounding relations between rich and poor nations since the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 has raised new hopes that MNCs may be made to energize development in the Third World. Improved information about the vulnerability of the rich nations and about techniques for dealing with MNCs, some writers argue, will enable underdeveloped countries to ensure that foreign investment serves as an “engine of development.” This view exaggerates the strengths of Third World states. A lack of information about opportunities and techniques is a small part of the burden which underdevelopment imposes on poor countries in their dealings with MNCs. A case study of Japanese MNCs in Southeast Asia raises doubts concerning the likelihood that the poor countries will be able to harness MNCs for their development. Southeast Asia's growing dependence on Japan in the fields of trade, official development aid, and private investment tends to impose constraints on efforts to influence the behavior of MNCs. A more basic problem resides in the “softness” of underdeveloped states, which renders ineffectual regulations intended to control MNCs. Because MNCs in certain important respects inhibit the process of building viable indigenous institutions and even contribute to the perpetuation of soft states, they may do more to impede than to stimulate development, at least in the softer Third World states. It may well be that more serious attention should be paid to studies of how Third World states might develop if the role of MNCs were circumscribed.

Many agencies of the United States Government with nominally “domestic” mandates play important roles in international affairs, and collaborate extensively with other governments and international organizations in the performance of their tasks. In some areas, these agencies rather than intergovernmental organizations play key management roles. Data gathered from a variety of sources indicate the extensiveness of this involvement, and suggest that it continues to expand, although not in linear fashion. Certain trends in governmental reorganization, such as those in the Agriculture Department, suggest similar patterns to those observed in business firms as they become more heavily involved abroad. More attention needs to be paid to international networks involving “domestic” governmental bureaucracies and governmental agencies traditionally oriented toward international affairs. From a conceptual point of view, we should think of “international organization” as including not only formally intergovernmental organizations, but all officials who participate significantly in these networks.

In view of recent proposals to grant the International Monetary Fund new instruments to press countries to adjust balance of payments disequilibria, the question arises of the efficacy of such means of pressure. An analysis of the Fund's power shows, inter alia, that conditions attached to currency purchases by deficit countries can only influence the techniques of adjustment but not the length of the adjustment period, that it is normally not possible for the Fund to expose individual surplus countries to inflationary or expansionary pressures, that the scarce currency clause is unworkable in present monetary conditions, and that the Fund's system of charges and remunerations cannot be used to exert financial pressure on countries in imbalance. The general avoidance of sanctions by the Fund's Executive Directors suggests that it would only be useful to make additional pressures available to the Fund, as contemplated by the Committee of Twenty, if the authority to take decisions on sanctions were transferred to a separate judicial or quasi-judicial body.

Cultural expansion has been a major component of postwar French foreign policy. The creation and operation of UNESCO afforded opportunities for pursuit of French cultural relations. French authorities determined to secure the location of UNESCO in Paris, the privileged use of the French language, and to direct the organization towards activities with appeal to an international intellectual clientele. France also endeavored to divert UNESCO from paths detrimental to French cultural policy. These dangers included the creation of international norms and mandatory reports on bilateral cultural relations, adherence by UNESCO to a philosophy inimical to French cultural policy, and penetration by multilateral organs into areas of French cultural predominance. At the same time, France availed itself of UNESCO to supplement its independent actions, to infiltrate a French presence into new areas, to facilitate the operational conduct of cultural relations, and to diversify the conventional instruments of cultural action. Additionally, the French National Commission for UNESCO emerged as an agent for the conduct of French cultural diplomacy.

Because of France's traditional use of culture and language as an instrument of foreign policy, it would be easy to dismiss any movement involving French as serving her national interests. Francophonie, whose purpose is to strengthen the French language and serve the interests of those who use it, depends on nongovernmental organizations and subunits of government in about 26 countries. Its leaders claim it serves the purposes of all French-speaking peoples and that it is transnational or outside the control of governments. In fact, however, some French elites do try to control directly and indirectly the formal organizations of Francophonie, and, thus, it may fail to become a transnational force in world politics. On the other hand, the work done by professionals and language specialists to strengthen French, to extend it to the masses and to build a closed circuit for the communication of vital information responds to needs for protection against so-called “Americanization” and for access to modernization. Therefore, despite its intangible nature, a new cultural force might emerge, and it then could affect the way states interact with each other.

Our understanding of the roles of Secretaries-General of regional international organizations can be enhanced by the use of a four-part framework, derived from studies of the secretariats of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization. This framework emphasizes the legal-institutional authority granted the office; the material and non-material resources available to the incumbent; the effects of splits among the organization's members; and the personal qualities and beliefs of the officeholder. Use of it helps to provide an up-to-date assessment of the role of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and an analysis of some of the reasons for the powerlessness of the position. All four of the above-mentioned factors have contributed to the continued weakness of the OAU's head.