Theories of regional integration are becoming obsolescent because three core assumptions on which these theories have been based are becoming less and less relevant to the behavior patterns actually displayed by governments active in regional organizations. These three assumptions are (1) that a definable institutional pattern must mark the outcome of the process of integration, (2) that conflicts of interests involving trade-offs between ties with regional partners and ties with nonmembers should be resolved in favor of regional partners, and (3) that decisions be made on the basis of disjointed incrementalism. The history of the European Communities since 1968 shows that most governments no longer behave in accordance with these assumptions, although they did earlier. The explanation for the new trend is to be found in awareness of the various novel kinds and dimensions of interdependence between countries, issues, and objectives, particularly with reference to policies involving those aspects of highly industrial societies which do not respond readily to the incentives of a customs union. A new decision-making rationality–labelled “fragmented issue linkage”–seems to be competing with incremental habits, suggesting that efforts are being made to cope with “turbulence” in the industrial environment so as to avoid piecemeal solutions. The effort to cope with turbulence, in turn, is unlikely to lead to any “final” set of regional institutions.

Eighty interviews with bureaucratic and political actors in five national capitals illustrate the Keohane/Nye theoretical argument concerning the importance of transnational and, specifically, transgovernmental factors in world politics. Focusing upon the development and application of integrative techniques between countries which have no formal supemational integrative institutions, the paper reports on the practice of transgovernmental politics within the dyad of Canada and the United States, and the triad of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Dealing both with middlelevel bureaucratic practitioners concerned with horizontal coordination of policy and administration between countries, and with bureaucratic and political actors responsible for the cohesiveness of national policies, the paper explores situations in which the demands of external and domestic harmonization are inconsistent, and sometimes mutually contradictory. The problem of maintaining “dual coherence” in domestic and external policy and administration is identified, and procedures for attempting such coordination are discussed. Of importance are modifications within the traditional institutions of inter-state communication: foreign offices and embassies. Recommendations are made on the basis of the intra-North American and intra Scandinavian experiences. It is suggested that considerable insight into managing policy and administrative areas which are neither purely domestic nor purely external may be gained by the study of bureaucratic experience only infrequently considered by students or governmental managers. Insights which may be gained from such study, it is argued, may be of great relevance in dealing with the challenge which transgovernmental horizontal harmonization now poses for national administrations.

The European Common Market and forty odd African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP) signed a trade and aid Convention in February 1975. The negotiations leading to the Lome Convention and the provisions of the Lomé Convention constitute an instructive vehicle for an examination of North-South bargaining. The organization, tenacity, and skill of the ACP states, as well as some re-thinking regarding their own situation on the part of European states produced some innovative and groundbreaking moves toward more equitable trade and aid relations. But even the most innovative components of the Lome Convention, STAB EX, sugar indexing and focus on industrial development, are perhaps less significant for their short-term economic effects than they are for a general understanding regarding the structure of North-South relations.

Discussions of international commodity organizations often compare the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), yet few researchers have examined CIPEC. A comparison of environmental characteristics of copper and petroleum suggests that although copper producers' collusion is possible, it is problematical and depends on political as well as economic factors. Since its formation in 1967, CIPEC members have been engaged in a gradual process of institution-building, although a lack of institutional leadership has hampered collective policy making. Substantively, CIPEC has dealt primarily with three issues: nationalization, technical pricing arrangements, and market regulatory policies. Until 1974, CIPEC members proved incapable of adopting a regulatory policy; they fostered the illusion of impending action and cooperation. Faced with deteriorating market conditions and stimulated by OPEC's success, CIPEC members have initiated a joint policy. The future of CIPEC will depend on its institutional flexibility as well as on decisions of nonmember producers and developed consumer countries.

There are three main approaches to the observation and measurement of power: 1) control over resources, 2) control over actors, and 3) control over events and outcomes. The control over events and outcomes approach emerges as the best approach to the measurement of power in contemporary international politics because: 1) it is the only approach which takes into account the possibility of interdependence and collective action, 2) it is more general than the other two approaches, and 3) it produces a type of analysis which has both descriptive and normative advantages. I will discuss each of these approaches at length and criticize them. I will argue that the third approach is superior to the other two for the measurement of power in contemporary international politics because it is better suited to situations in which interdependence and collective action can be derived from the third.