Domestic political conflict has been a constant companion to international trade, but the nature of that conflict has varied greatly in Western democracies over the last two centuries. Political battles over trade policy appear to have sometimes divided societies along broad class lines and at other times split them into narrow industry-based coalitions. I argue that this diversity stems from historical and cross-national variation in inter-industry factor mobility. Class coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, whereas narrow, industry-based coalitions are more likely where mobility is low. Evidence from six Western economies for the last two centuries indicates that levels of factor mobility have varied historically and cross-nationally in accord with industrialization and regulation. This variation corresponds broadly with observable differences in the formation of trade policy coalitions.

The decision of the European Union to expand to Central and Eastern Europe is a puzzle for rationalist intergovernmentalism. This approach to the study of European integration accounts for most of the preferences of the state actors and many characteristics of the intergovernmental bargaining process but fails to explain why it resulted in the opening of accession negotiations. I introduce the mechanism of rhetorical action in order to show how the supporters of enlargement succeeded in overcoming the superior material bargaining power of their opponents. Through the strategic use of arguments based on the liberal norms of the European international community, the “drivers” caught the “brakemen” in the community trap and, step by step, shamed them into acquiescing in Eastern enlargement.

I develop a systematic argument about the politics of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. I focus on institutions—specifically, the connection linking the institutional framework of national politics, the policy environment, and investment. I seek to resolve the tension between the literatures on credible policy commitment and policy flexibility, arguing that if either is severely undersupplied, the risk associated with the policy environment rises rapidly for investors. Building on a veto player framework, I develop a simple model of a U-shaped relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and policy risk to investors. Institutional vetoes on executive authority lower policy risk for investors but only up to a point, after which additional veto players promote unwelcome policy rigidity. I illustrate this using four cases: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the four main Southeast Asian countries involved in the financial crisis. I argue that the institutional framework of national politics had a powerful and predictable influence on policy responses and investor reactions.

Has foreign aid destroyed state institutions in Africa? African states depend on development assistance to conduct basic government operations, yet few of these states are well governed or effective at providing public goods. The two trends, mounting foreign aid and static or diminishing state performance, raise an obvious question: Is aid dependency contributing to misrule and state failure in Africa? Many critics argue the two phenomena are related. I find they are not. My analysis fails to show a negative association between aid receipts and two measures of democracy and economic freedom. Instead, the evidence is consistent with a small, positive relationship between aid and these indicators of state performance. Since the international community seems bent on reducing foreign aid, an important issue is how African states can maintain and improve their performance with less foreign assistance.

The international community, in its efforts to overcome the security dilemmas that inhibit conflict resolution, need not always offer forceful security guarantees to combatants in civil wars. We argue that noncoercive, liberal international intervention can end civil wars. As suggested by a constructivist perspective and the insights of the democratic peace, the promotion of liberal democracy can successfully resolve civil wars by transforming the identities and institutions of the combatants. We develop this argument by examining the resolution of civil wars in Central America during the 1990s. Of the Central American cases, Nicaragua, the country subject to the strongest security guarantees, has been the least stable of the three. El Salvador and Guatemala, in contrast, have experienced more successful conflict resolution despite the lack of any forceful security guarantees by the international community. The termination of these civil wars can be best explained by the adherence of local actors to liberal democratic norms and institutions in response to a variety of international pressures and opportunities.

In the wake of negotiated settlements to civil wars, one critical problem involves reassuring people who have been killing one another that conflict is not about to break out again, endangering people's lives. Those concerned with the success of negotiated settlements have debated how best to enhance the prospects of a stable peace. We address this question by exploring variables that may explain the longevity of negotiated peace settlements. These variables are divided into two categories—one tapping into the potential effects of the environment in which settlements are negotiated and another focusing on the impact of settlement arrangements. On the basis of our analysis of thirty-eight civil war settlements negotiated between 1945 and 1998 we identify the environmental factors and institutional choices that affect the short-term stability of the peace following civil war.