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Parliamentarians Against Ministers: The Case of Western European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Ernst B. Haas  and
Peter H. Merkl
Ernst B. Haas
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. His work on the integrative impact of regional organizations has enjoyed the support of the Rockefeller Foundation.
Peter H. Merkl
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He is the author of several studies on German political and administrative problems and has a special interest in the behavioral study of federalism.
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Extract

Western European Union (WEU) is unique in the family of European organizations. Its membership comprises Great Britain in addition to the inner circle of the six nations of Little Europe. As such it was hailed as a big step forward from the continental limitations of European integration. Its special task, besides residuary powers in the cultural, social, and economic field, has been defense and the control of armaments. Western European Union was erected on the ruins of the European Defense Community (EDC) by the Paris Agreements of October 1954. Its legal basis was the Brussels Treaty Organization of 1948, a defensive alliance against future German aggression which over the years had left its military functions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and had concentrated on its cultural and social role.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , Winter 1960 , pp. 37 - 59
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1960

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References

1 The origins of WEU, the terms of the agreements, and the negotiations leading to their conclusion are described in detail in Britain in Western Europe (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956)Google Scholar. For a succinct summary of the agreements see Robertson, A. H., “The Creation of Western European Union,” The European Yearbook, Vol. 2 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1956), p. 125–138Google Scholar. The activities and structure of WEU are described in detail in Robertson, A. H., European Institutions (New York, Praeger, 1959), p. 126–147Google Scholar; and Ball, M. Margaret, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York, Praeger, 1959), p. 356–399.Google Scholar

2 Brussels Treaty, as amended in 1954, Protocols II, III, IV. The arms maxima specified are identical with the limits provided in the abortive EDC Treaty and conform to NATO decisions. These forces—except for the British quota which is considered a minimum level—need not be maintained at the maximal level.

3 Britain in Western Europe, op, cit., p. 118–120. Had the plebiscite of October 1955 resulted in a popular majority for Europeanization, the government of the Saar would have become the responsibility of the WEU Council. As it was, the WEU role was confined to conducting the referendum and providing for interim measures of public order and the protection of Saarlanders who had voted for the Statute, pending the transfer of the Saar to Germany. These responsibilities came to an end on January 10, 1956.

4 On the EDC crisis in French politics, see Lerner, Daniel and Aron, Raymond (eds.), France Defeats EDC (New York, Praeger, 1957)Google Scholar, and Leites, N. and de la Malène, C., “Paris from EDC to WEU,” World Politics, 01 1957 (Vol. 9, No. 2), p. 193–219.Google Scholar

5 For a full institutional definition of supranationality see Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958), Chap. 2Google Scholar. Attention in the present piece is focused on behavioral consequences of institutional ambiguity which may work themselves out in a supranational direction. For a full discussion of this process see ibid., Chaps. 8 and 13; also Haas, Ernst B., “The Challenge of Regionalism,” International Organization, Autumn 1958 (Vol. 12, No. 4), p. 440–458Google Scholar, in which this process is described as a generalized proposition.

6 See especially Ball, op. cit., and Robertson, op. cit. For the major conceptual points to be raised in the study of the integrative impact of international organizations devoted to military matters see Haas, Ernst B., “Regional Integration and National Policy,” International Conciliation, 05 1957 (No. 513)Google Scholar. The same piece also contains an analysis of NATO from this viewpoint.

7 Brussels Treaty, as amended, Protocol III, Arts. 2, 3; Protocol II, Art. 6.

8 Britain in Western Europe, op. cit., p. 64.

9 Western European Union, Assembly Documents, First Annual Report (1955), p. 199, 208–209.Google Scholar

10 Ibid., Second Annual Report (1957), p. 23–25.

11 Ibid., p. 23–34.

12 Ibid., First Annual Report, p. 200–203; Supplementary Report to the first Annual Report (1956), p. 54–56Google Scholar; Second Annual Report, p. 37–54.Google Scholar

13 Ibid., Second Annual Report, p. 10.

14 Ibid., p. 14–20; Supplementary Report to the First Annual Report, p. 49Google Scholar; Proceedings, op. cit., 4th Ordinary Session, and Part (December 1958), Vol. III. p. 79–80, Vol. IV, p. 118 ff. For a description of the Armaments Control Agency by its Director, see Ferreri, Admiral E., “L'Agence de L'UEO pour le Contrô1e des Armements,” The European Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 1959).Google Scholar

15 Le Monde, July 22–23, 1956, p. 8. We surmise that Bonn turned to the WEU Council rather than to NATO because it hoped to find a majority among the continental Six in support of its position. It could not be reasonably expected that such a majority could be found in the NATO Council. It should also be stressed that Adenauer and De Gaulle are interested in establishing the separate identity of Western Europe in the military realm.

16 Ibid., July 24, 1956, p. 4.

17 The New York Times, 07 27, 1956, 3:4.Google Scholar

18 Le Monde, 09 14, 1956, p. 16Google Scholar; and ibid., September 16–17, 1956, p. 4.

19 Documents, Third Session, 1st Part (05 1957), Document 51, p. 114–116.Google Scholar

20 Supplementary Report to the Second Annual Report (1957), P. 114.Google Scholar

21 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02 13, 26, 1957. P. 1.Google Scholar

22 The New York Times, 02 27, 1957, 2:3–4Google Scholar, and Le Monde, 02 28, 1957, p. 3.Google Scholar

23 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03 11, 12, 19, 1957.Google Scholar

24 Le Monde, 03 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 1957Google Scholar; Germany, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Deutichland im Wiederaufbau (1957), p. 98Google Scholar; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 03 21, 1957, p. 1Google Scholar; and Supplementary Report to the Second Annual Report, p. 114–116.Google Scholar

25 The New York Times, 04 5, 1957, 1:4, 8Google Scholar; Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124 (London, HMSO, 04 1957).Google Scholar

26 Le Monde, 05, 3, 4, and 5, 1957.Google Scholar

27 Report of the Debates, Third Session, 1st Part, 1st Sitting (05 6, 1957), p. 84, 90–97.Google Scholar

28 The New York Times, 11 15, 1957Google Scholar. It must be noted that in April 1958 the Bundestag passed a measure authorizing the government to equip the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons; Adenauer had broached the arms pool matter already in October of 1956 at the time of the crisis over British conversion to nuclear weapons.

29 First Annual Report, p. 204.

30 Supplementary Report to the First Annual Report, p. 50.

31 The Times (London), 03 21 and April 18, 1958Google ScholarPubMed. See the statement of van der Goes van Naters in the Dutch Second Chamber, as reported in Proceedings, op. cit., 4th Ordinary Session, 1st Part (July 1958), Vol. i, p. 180.

32 The report of the Assembly's Committee on Defense eight months after the conclusion of the agreement suggests very plainly that no actual progress had been made and that the British government's agreement in principle was accompanied by numerous reservations of detail. Ibid., 2nd Part (December 1958), Vol. IV, p. 120 ff. Like the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee was not kept informed of American and Canadian arms aid under NATO auspices; even some members of the Assembly seemed to feel that the WEU pooling arrangements were “redundant”.

33 Western European Union, Assembly, Report of the Debates, 3rd Session, 1st Part, 5th Sitting (05 8, 1957), P. 158–159.Google Scholar

34 See the remarks of Council members Spaak and Beyen, ibid., 1st Session, 1st Part, 1st Sitting (July 5, 1955), P. 25–26; and 2nd Part, 4th Sitting (October 5. 1955). P. 53. 169–171.

35 The New York Times, 03 7, 1958.Google Scholar

36 Second Annual Report, p. 6–8, II; Council of Europe News (01 1958), p. 8.Google Scholar

37 Ibid.

38 In the organization of political groups it is noteworthy that—with the exception of the British Parliament—prominent party leaders and committed “Europeans” tend to be elected to the national delegations to all European assemblies, that the same personalities tend to be chosen year after year, and that therefore an inner core of professional “European parliamentarians” has come into existence. One-fourth to one-third of those members of the Council of Europe who represent the nations of Little Europe have concurrently served as members of the Common Assembly and now of the European Parliamentary Assembly. The presidents and secretaries-general of the three political groups in the Council of Europe function in precisely the same capacity for the same groups in the WEU Assembly. In the case of the Liberals, the same officers also serve the group functioning in the European Parliamentary Assembly, while the Socialists make use of the same secretariat for ill three assemblies.

39 For the text of the resolutions, see Western European Union, Assembly, Documents, 3rd Session, 1st Part (05 1957), Document 53, p. 119Google Scholar; Report of the Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Part, 9th Sitting (10 12, 1956), p. 116Google Scholar; Documents, 3rd Session, 1st Part (05 1957), P. 27–28Google Scholar; and ibid., Document 41, p. 66–67.

40 The record of absenteesim in this Assembly is perhaps even greater than in other European assemblies. Commonly less than fifty of the eighty-nine statutory members are present.

41 Report of the Debates, 3rd Session, 1st Part, 5th Sitting (05 8, 1957), p. 177–178.Google Scholar

42 lbid., 6th Sitting (May 8, 1957), p. 188–189.

43 The texts and votes are to be found in Western European Union, Assembly, Proceedings, 3rd Session, 2nd Part, p. 28–33Google Scholar, and ibid., 4th Session, 1st Part, p. 24–32.

44 On this point, see Haas, E. B., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Camps, Miriam, The free Trade Area Negotiations (Political and Economic Planning, Occasional Papers No. 2, London, 04 6, 1959)Google Scholar; Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, “L'Association Economique Européenne du 15 décembre 1958 au 20 mars 1959,” Document D.co/p, APE 1694.

45 Teitgen's criticism of the Council turned in particular upon the fact that the latter expressly recognized this matter as a common concern of Western European Union before leaving its determination to Great Britain. Report of the Debates, 3rd Session, 1st Part, 3rd Sitting (05 7, 1957), p. 119–123Google Scholar; and 5th Sitting (May 8, 1957), p. 167–168, 177–178.