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Multilateralism and Democracy: A Dissent Regarding Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2011

Erik Gartzke  and
Megumi Naoi
Erik Gartzke
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego. E-mail: egartzke@ucsd.edu
Megumi Naoi
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego. E-mail: megumi.naoi@gmail.com
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Abstract

In an article printed last year in International Organization, Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik argued that multilateral organizations (MLO) could actually be good for democracy. We argue that KMM discount the prospect that MLO influence can be detrimental to democracies not because MLOs are “distant, elitist, and technocratic” but precisely because MLOs are highly political. International organizations have much to offer in improving the welfare of citizens and facilitating coordinations among states. They are not likely to improve procedural functions of democracies without a cost that itself is problematic for democracy.

Type
Dissent and Response
Information
International Organization , Volume 65 , Issue 3 , July 2011 , pp. 589 - 598
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2011

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