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The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises

  • Phillip Y. Lipscy and Haillie Na-Kyung Lee

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Lipscy, P., & Lee, H.. 2019. The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises. International Organization 73 (1): 3564.

The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises

  • Phillip Y. Lipscy and Haillie Na-Kyung Lee

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