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The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2019

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Abstract

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Type
Addendum
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2019 

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References

Lipscy, P., & Lee, H.. 2019. The IMF As a Biased Global Insurance Mechanism: Asymmetrical Moral Hazard, Reserve Accumulation, and Financial Crises. International Organization 73 (1): 3564.Google Scholar