Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
What accounts for the development of the Arab states system from the explosive mix of Arab nationalism and sovereignty to their simultaneous existence? To understand this development, one must first examine how institutions can shape the very interests and roles of states in such a manner as to encourage the development of relatively stable expectations and shared norms; that is, regional order. This approach illuminates how inter-Arab interactions and state formation processes led to the consolidation of sovereignty and a meaning of Arab nationalism that is consistent with sovereignty. Consequently, this region highlights how sovereignty—and its lack thereof—is consequential for understanding interstate dynamics, and how different meanings of the nation have different implications for security.
The following individuals commented on earlier drafts of this article and the ideas that produced this version: Emanuel Adler, Gehad Auda, Raymond Duvall, Peter Katzenstein, F. Gregory Gause, Ellis Goldberg, Moshe Maoz, Robert McCalla, Joel Migdal, Craig Murphy, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Malik Mufti, John Odell, Avraham Sela, Janice Thomson, Cindy Weber, Jutta Weldes, Alexander Wendt, Crawford Young, many others at the Social Sciences Research Council-sponsored workshop at Brown University, 26–28 February, 1993, and the anonymous referees at International Organization. I also thank the research assistance of Ashshraf Rady in Cairo, Avi Muallen in Tel-Aviv, and Michael Malley in Madison, Wisconsin. This research was supported by the MacArthur Program in International Peace and Security and the Global Studies and Research Program at the University of Wisconsin. An earlier version of this article will appear in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
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90. The decline of pan-Arabism also encouraged more regional affiliations and loyalties: “A North African (maghribi) or a Gulf Arab (khaliji) identity, which had once been an anathema, was no longer so, and the ‘Egypt-first’ slogan that had once been held in check gradually became acceptable.” See Salame, , “Inter-Arab Politics,” p. 322Google Scholar.
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108. While Islamic movements may or may not be compatible with juridical sovereignty, they do challenge the internal sovereignty of many Arab states. For an argument concerning the compatibility between Islam and juridical sovereignty, see Piscatori, James, Islam in a World of Nation-States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.For the opposing claim, see Bassam Tibi, “Religious Fundamentalism and Ethnicity in the Crisis of the Nation-State in the Middle East,” working paper 5.4, Center for German and European Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1992. For a discussion of the relationship between Islam and Arabism, see Tibi, , Arab Nationalism, pp. 17–20Google Scholar.On subnational identities, see Khoury, Philip and Kostiner, Joseph, “Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East,” in Khoury, Philip and Kostiner, Joseph, eds. Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 1–22Google Scholar.
109. For examples of statements that do not equate nationalism with the creation and maintenance of a territorial state, see Smith, Anthony, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), chap. 1Google Scholar; and Hall, John, “Nationalisms: Classified and Explained,” Daedulus 122 (Summer 1993), pp. 1–28Google Scholar.
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