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Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor (SCSL)

  • Erin Louise Palmer (a1)

Extract

On September 26, 2013, the Appeals Chamber for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court) unanimously upheld the Trial Chamber’s conviction of Charles Ghankay Taylor, the former President of Liberia, and affirmed his fifty-year sentence for aiding and abetting rebel forces in Sierra Leone that perpetrated brutal crimes during the civil war in Sierra Leone. The Appeals Chamber’s judgment followed an almost four-year trial that included testimony from 115 witnesses, including Taylor himself—who testified in his defense for seven months—and celebrities such as British model Naomi Campbell and U.S. actress Mia Farrow, who the Prosecution called to show that Taylor knowingly handled blood diamonds. Taylor is the first head of state that an international or hybrid tribunal has convicted since the Nuremberg trials.

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* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the Special Court for Sierra Leone website (visited March 31, 2014), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=t14fjFP4jJ8%3d&tabid=53.

1 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Judgment (Sept. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Judgment], http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_t14fjFP4jJ8%3d&tabid_107.

2 Marlise, Simons & Goodman, J.David , Ex-Liberian Leader Gets 50 Years for War Crimes , N.Y. Times (May 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/africa/charlestaylor-sentenced-to-50-years-for-war-crimes.html.

3 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Second Amended Indictment (May 29, 2007), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_lrn0bAAMvYM%3d&tabid_107.

4 Id. at 9.

5 The Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor (2014), http://www.sc-sl.org/CASES/ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx .

6 The Prosecution later reopened its case to present three additional witnesses.

7 See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Judgement Summary (Apr. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Judgement Summary], http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_86r0nQUtK08_; Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Judgement (May 18, 2012), http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_k%2b03KREEPCQ%3d&tabid_107.

8 Judgement Summary, supra note 7, at 35-40, 42-43.

9 Id. at 34-35.

10 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Sentencing Judgement, 39-40 (May 30, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_U6xCITNg4tY%3d&tabid_107.

11 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Prosecution’s Notice of Appeal (July 19, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_SW1ZhnY1yvM%3d&tabid_107; Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Notice of Appeal of Charles Ghankay Taylor(July 19, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_eXdZQ%2bQcRos%3d&tabid_107.

12 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Public Prosecution Appellant’s Submissions, 6-44 (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_RKV2Z8dIRLI%3d&tabid_107.

13 Id. at 45-81.

14 Id. at 85.

15 See generally Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor Appeal Judgement Scheduled for 26 September 2013 (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_1nGfGDPkd8s%3D&tabid_235.

16 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-PT, Appellant’s Submissions of Charles Ghankay Taylor, 95-99 (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_R5js%2fPiBejc%3d&tabid_107.

17 Press Release, supra note 15.

18 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber Upholds Charles Taylor’s Conviction, 50 Year Sentence (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_gEJ2L%2b5%2frBo%3d&tabid_235.

19 Judgment, supra note 1, at 213-19.

20 Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić , Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgement, 28-29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf.

21 Judgment, supra note 1, at 303-04.

22 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Government of Sierra Leone Hosts Closing Ceremony for the Special Court (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket_4mOKc8GexYk%3D&tabid_235.

23 Liberian Charles Taylor Moved to British Prison to Serve War Crimes Conviction , The Telegraph (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian ocean/liberia/10380401/Liberian-Charles-Taylor-moved-to-British-prison-to-serve-war-crimes-conviction.html .

24 Marlise, Simons & Alan, Cowell, 50-Year Sentence Upheld for Ex-President of Liberia , N.Y. Times (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/world/africa/charlestaylor-sierra-leone-war-crimes-case.html?[lowem]r_0.

1 S.C. Res. 1315 (2000).

2 Statute, Art. 2-5.

3 Trial Judgment, para. 3.

4 Trial Judgment, para. 4.

5 Trial Judgment, para. 7.

6 Trial Judgment, para. 7.

7 Trial Judgment, para. 8.

8 Taylor Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-Disclosure; Taylor Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention.

9 Taylor Order for Disclosure and Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-Disclosure.

10 Trial Judgment, para. 9.

11 Trial Judgment, paras 9, 10.

12 Taylor Decision on Prosecution’s Application to Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment.

13 Taylor Second Amended Indictment.

14 Transcript, 3 April 2006, p. 14; Transcript, 3 July 2007, pp. 401, 402.

15 Trial Judgment, para. 573.

16 Trial Judgment, para. 559. See also Trial Judgment, paras 552, 558.

17 Trial Judgment, para. 6994. Article 6(1) provides: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.”

18 Trial Judgment, para. 6994.

19 Trial Judgment, para. 6986. Article 6(3) provides: “The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”

20 Sentencing Judgment, Disposition.

21 Taylor Notice of Appeal; Prosecution Notice of Appeal.

22 Taylor Appeal, para. 318, fn. 642.

23 See Taylor Appeal Brief, Table of Contents.

24 Grounds 1-5.

25 Grounds 6-15. Ground 6 is labeled a “general” error, Grounds 7-13 are labeled errors related to the actus reus, and Grounds 14 and 15 are labeled errors related to the mens rea.

26 Grounds 16-34. Grounds 16-20 are labeled errors related to the mens rea. Grounds 21-34 are labeled errors related to the actus reus.

27 Grounds 36-39.

28 Ground 40.

29 Ground 41, which relates to “impermissible cumulative convictions for rape and sexual slavery.”

30 Grounds 42-45.

31 Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40. These challenges are addressed in Section IV of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “The Evaluation of Evidence”.

32 This challenge is addressed in Section v of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “The RUF/AFRC’s Operational Strategy”.

33 These challenges are addressed in Section VII of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “The Law of Individual Criminal Liability”.

34 These challenges are addressed in Section VIII of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “Taylor’s Criminal Liability”.

35 These challenges are addressed in Section IX of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “Fair Trial Rights and the Judicial Process”.

36 These challenges are addressed in Section X of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “The Sentence”.

37 These challenges are addressed in Section VIII of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “Taylor’s Criminal Liability”.

38 This challenge is addressed in Section III of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “The Indictment”.

39 These challenges are addressed in Section X of this Appeal Judgment, entitled “The Sentence”.

40 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 31. See also Practice Direction on Structure of Grounds of Appeal, para. 3.

41 Norman et al. Subpoena Decision, para. 7; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 31.

42 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 345, citing Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, para. 139, Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 25.

43 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 33.

44 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 33.

45 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32, quoting Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 30; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 34.

46 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 33.

47 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32. See also Strugar Appeal Judgment, para. 13; Orić Appeal Judgment, para. 10; Hadžihasanović and Kubura Appeal Judgment, para. 10; Limaj et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 12; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 226; Brđanin Appeal Judgment, para. 13; Galić Appeal Judgment, para. 9; Stakić Appeal Judgment, para. 220;Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 458.

48 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 33. Considering that it is the Prosecution that bears the burden at trial of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the significance of an error of fact occasioning a miscarriage of justice is somewhat different for a Prosecution appeal against acquittal than for a Defence appeal against conviction. A convicted person must show that the Trial Chamber’s factualerrors create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The Prosecution must show that, when account is taken of the errors of fact committed by the Trial Chamber, all reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt has been eliminated. Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 33, citing Muvunyi Appeal Judgment, para. 10, Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment para. 16, Martić Appeal Judgment, para. 12.

49 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 33.

50 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32. See also Practice Direction on Structure of Grounds of Appeal, para. 4.

51 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32, quoting Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 29.

52 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32, quoting Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 29.

53 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 34; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 35. See also Practice Direction on Structure of Grounds of Appeal, para. 2.

54 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 34; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 35.

55 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 35; Norman et al. Subpoena Decision, para. 5.

56 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 35; Norman et al. Subpoena Decision, paras 5, 6. See also Practice Direction on Structure of Grounds of Appeal, para. 5.

57 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 1202; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 466.

58 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 1202; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 466; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 309.

59 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 1202, 1203; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 466, 467; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 309.

60 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 36. The Appeals Chamber has previously discussed in detail many of the types of deficient submissions that may be summarily dismissed without reasoning. Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 37-44.

61 Prosecution Appeal, Ground 3.

62 Trial Judgment, paras 114-119.

63 Bombali, Kailahun, Kenema, Kono and Port Loko Districts.

64 Sexual slavery, enslavement and the enlistment, conscription and use of child soldiers in Counts 5, 9 and 10.

65 Trial Judgment, paras 117, 119. The Trial Chamber noted, however, that the Prosecution had not been consistent with regard to its pleading of the locations of crimes in Freetown and the Western Area and crimes of a continuous nature.

66 Trial Judgment, para. 112.

67 Trial Judgment, para. 115, citing Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 37, Kamara Decision on Form of Indictment, para. 42, Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 397; Brđanin Decision on Motion for Acquittal, para. 88, Stakić Trial Judgment, para. 772.

68 Trial Judgment, paras 114, 115, citing Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 64, Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 37.

69 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 631, 642, 702, 748, 934, 1202, 1234, 1263, 1880, 1911, 1918 and 2054.

70 Prosecution Appeal, para. 103.

71 Prosecution Appeal, paras 103, 109, 110, 113, 114, citing Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 48, 52, 830, 831, 883-887, 901-904, 938, 939.

72 Prosecution Appeal, paras 112, 115-117.

73 Prosecution Appeal, para. 108.

74 Prosecution Appeal, paras 105 and 119-121. The Prosecution argues that any defects were cured in paras 124-173 of its Appeal.

75 Prosecution Appeal, para. 103.

76 Prosecution Appeal, paras 104, 174 and 182.

77 Taylor Response, para. 82.

78 Taylor Response, para. 80, quoting Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 213.

79 Taylor Response, para. 80, quoting Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 92.

80 Taylor Response, para. 84, citing Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 52.

81 Taylor Response, para. 85.

82 Taylor Response, para. 86.

83 Taylor Response, paras 98, 99, quoting Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 44, 50, 64.

84 Taylor Response, paras 93-116.

85 Prosecution Reply, para. 57.

86 Prosecution Reply, paras 59, 66.

87 Prosecution Reply, paras 62, 63.

88 Prosecution Appeal, paras 103, 114.

89 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 832 (“This distinction between the specificity requirements for the pleading of locations in relation to different [forms of criminal participation] is consistent with our holding in the Brima et al. Appeal Judgment.”). Compare Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 60 (“In the Trial Chamber’s view, it had to ‘balance practical considerations relating to the nature of the evidence against the need to ensure that an Indictment is sufficiently specific to allow an accused to fully present his defence.’ Sesay has not shown an error in the Trial Chamber’s application of the law in this regard.”) and Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 64 (“The Trial Chamber’s limited treatment of the evidence of crimes committed in such locations was a proper exercise of its discretion in the interest of justice, taking into account that it is the Prosecution’s obligation to plead clearly material facts it intends to prove, so as to afford the [accused] a fair trial.”).

90 The Trial Chamber reasonably considered that pleading locations “throughout” a district does not plead a specific location; it distinguished in this respect between districts and Freetown and the Western Area. Trial Judgment, para. 117. Contra Prosecution Appeal, para. 108.

91 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 52; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 41 (both holding, “In some cases, the widespread nature and sheer scale of crimes make it unnecessary and impracticable to require a high degree of specificity.”) (emphasis added). See also Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 887, 904, 939 (affirming the Trial Chamber’s findings that non-exhaustive pleadings of acts of burning, acts of physical violence and acts of pillage were adequate).

92 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 64. See also Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 836 (finding that non-exhaustive pleading of murder in Kono District was defective).

93 See Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 60; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 64. See also Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 887, 904, 939 (recalling that there was no error in the Trial Chamber’s general approach to applying the “sheer scale” exception).

94 Article 17 of the Statute; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 60; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 64.

95 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 47; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 37, citing Kvočka et al. Form of the Indictment Decision, para. 14.

96 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 48, 830; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 37, citing Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 89.

97 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 64.

98 While the Prosecution submits that the Defence did not specifically object to the pleading of locations during trial, the Appeals Chamber held in Brima et al. that a Trial Chamber may safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and assess the sufficiency of the pleadings in the indictment, regardless of whether the accused specifically objected to the pleading. Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 62-64. See also Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 53, 56. In this regard, it should be recalled that failure to object to the form of an indictment during the trial or challenge to the admissibility of evidence of material facts not pleaded in the indictment does not necessarily waive the right to make such challenges on appeal. Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 54; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 43.

99 Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 30. See also Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para. 74 (“The Prosecution cannot simultaneously argue that the accused killed a named individual yet claim that the ‘sheer scale’ of the crime made it impossible to identify that individual in the Indictment.”); Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 90 (“In such a case the Prosecution need not specify every single victim that has been killed or expelled in order to meet its obligation of specifying the material facts of the case in the indictment. Nevertheless, since the identity of the victim is information that is valuable to the preparation of the defence case, if the Prosecution is in a position to name the victims, it should do so.”), 92 (“It is of course possible that an indictment may not plead the material facts with the requisite degree of specificity because the necessary information is not in the Prosecution’s possession. However, in such a situation, doubt must arise as to whether it is fair to the accused for the trial to proceed.”).

100 See Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 92. See also Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, para. 331; Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 80.

101 The Prosecution amended the initial Indictment twice, on 16 March 2006 and 29 May 2007. The Prosecution closed its case in Brima et al. on 21 November 2005.

102 Prosecution Appeal, paras 105 and 119-121.

103 Rules 47-53; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 149.

104 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 47; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 37.

105 Statute, Article 17(4)(a), (b).

106 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 55; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 44.

107 But cf. Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 50-65. The specific circumstances of a proceeding may be such that the interests of justice strongly favour an assessment of whether defective pleadings were cured.

108 Taylor Notice of Appeal, Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, as well as Ground 40 in Section V of the Notice of Appeal.

109 Taylor Appeal, Ground 6.

110 Taylor Appeal, Grounds 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.

111 See supra paras 15-17.

112 Taylor Appeal, Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 40.

113 Taylor Appeal, Ground 1 (“The Trial Chamber erred in law by relying on uncorroborated hearsay evidence as the sole basis for specific incriminating findings of fact.”). See also Taylor Appeal, para. 32 (“The Chamber frequently applies an erroneous notion of ‘corroboration.’”).

114 Taylor Appeal, Grounds 6 (part), 7, 8 (part), 9, 10 (part), 12 (part), 13 (part) and 15 (part).

115 Taylor Appeal, Grounds 23 (part), 24 (part), 25 (part), 26 (part), 27 (part), 28 (part), 29 (part) and 30 (part).

116 Taylor Appeal, Ground 6.

117 Taylor Appeal, paras 179 (Ground 8), 160, 164-168 (Ground 9), 236 (Ground 12), 264-266 (Ground 13), 303, 310-311 (Ground 15).

118 Prosecution Response, para. 5.

119 Prosecution Response, para. 5.

120 Prosecution Response, para. 11.

121 Prosecution Response, para. 14.

122 Prosecution Response, para. 22.

123 Prosecution Response, paras 27, 38, 39, 700, 701.

124 Prosecution Response, para. 32.

125 Prosecution Response, paras 57, 272.

126 Prosecution Response, para. 58.

127 Prosecution Response, para. 273.

128 Prosecution Response, para. 273.

129 Prosecution Response, para. 59.

130 Prosecution Response, para. 4.

131 Prosecution Response, para. 4.

132 Prosecution Response, para. 58.

133 Taylor Appeal, Grounds 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.

134 See, e.g., Ground 23, where the Defence challenges in one Ground: (i) the Trial Chamber’s factual findings as to Taylor’s acts and conduct; (ii) the Trial Chamber’s finding as to the criminal use of materiel supplied by Taylor: (iii) the Trial Chamber’s application of the law on the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability to the provision of arms and ammunition; and (iv) the Trial Chamber’s ultimate conclusion that the facts found establish the actus reus elements of aiding and abetting liability beyond a reasonable doubt.

135 Practice Direction on the Structure of Grounds of Appeal, paras 7 (“The Appellant shall not group disparate arguments, each pertaining to a substantial issue, under a single ground of appeal.”) and 8 (“The Appellant shall not group allegations of error or misdirection relating to disparate issues under a single ground of appeal.”).

136 Practice Direction on the Structure of Grounds of Appeal, para. 29.

137 Prosecution Response, para. 4.

138 Practice Direction on the Structure of Grounds of Appeal, paras 9 (“The Appellant shall not repeat in a disproportionate manner, the same arguments in numerous grounds of appeal.”) and 10 (“The Appellant shall present a holistic and comprehensive ground of appeal.”). These challenges could be summarily dismissed on this basis alone. Practice Direction on the Structure of Grounds of Appeal, para. 29.

139 Prosecution Response, paras 383, 620.

140 That is, the Grounds in which evidentiary challenges are made but for which there was nothing in the Notice of Appeal or in the wording of the title of the Ground that would suggest that there were multiple challenges in each Ground, including challenges to the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the evidence. Taylor Appeal, Grounds 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.

141 See Trial Judgment, para. 162. The Trial Chamber considered five categories of evidence: (i) oral evidence, (ii) documentary evidence, including such evidence provided in lieu of oral testimony pursuant to Rule 92 bis, and evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92quater, (iii) testimony of expert witnesses, (iv) facts of which judicial notice was taken and (v) facts agreed upon by the Parties.

142 Taylor Appeal, para. 34.

143 Prosecution Response, para. 4.

144 See, e.g., Prosecution Response, paras 76 (“[a]ll of the arguments Taylor advances are simply inappropriate attempts to relitigate arguments reasonably rejected at trial. At no time does Taylor address the standard for appellate review and identify why the Trial Chamber’s findings are unreasonable or wholly erroneous.”), 162 (challenges are “without merit because they fail to establish that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion. Indeed, many of his arguments are simply inappropriate attempts to relitigate arguments made and reasonably rejected at trial. Further, the reference in the Taylor Notice of Appeal that ‘[t]he Trial Chamber’s error arises from an improper evaluation of the evidence’ is not developed in his appeal brief.”), 169 (“Taylor’s first example, which relies on Gullit’s failure to follow Bockarie’s instruction and wait for reinforcements, should be dismissed as it fails to address in any way why the Trial Chamber was unreasonable to conclude that Gullit’s act was borne of military necessity rather than insubordination.”), 172 (the “fourth example relied on by Taylor concerning Exhibit P-067 is again a rehash of an argument rejected by the Trial Chamber. It should be dismissed because no argument is advanced as to why the Trial Chamber’s approach was unreasonable.”), 207 (the submissions “simply attempt to relitigate the unsuccessful position he put forward at trial.”), 222 (arguments “should . . . be dismissed because they fail to explain why no reasonable trier of fact, based on the evidence, could have evaluated the evidence as the Trial Chamber did.”), 227 (argument “is effectively an attempt to substitute alternative interpretations of the evidence. As this Chamber observed in RUF, ‘claims that the Trial Chamber . . . should have interpreted evidence in a particular manner, are liable to be summarily dismissed.’”), 230 (“submissions are, in large part, inappropriate attempts to relitigate arguments made and rejected at trial and to substitute alternative interpretations of the evidence . . . [A]t no time does Taylor address the standard for appellate review and identify why the Trial Chamber’s findings are unreasonable or wholly erroneous.”), 232 (submissions “simply argue that various witnesses’ testimony should have been interpreted in a different manner. The appellate standards of review are not satisfied as Taylor does not address why no reasonable trier of fact, based on the evidence, could have reached the conclusion the Trial Chamber did.”), 369 (“Taylor merely seeks to relitigate issues decided against him and to substitute his characterisation of the facts for that of the Trial Chamber. He fails to establish any error warranting Appellate intervention.”), 383 (“the submissions fail to identify the challenged factual finding/s and the prejudice caused.”), 620 (“the submissions contain irrelevant comments and self-serving mischaracterisations of the Chamber’s findings, attempt to relitigate facts, fail to identify the challenged factual finding/s and the prejudice caused, and disproportionately repeat other Defence submissions.”).

145 See, e.g., Taylor Appeal, paras 133, 138, 145, 146-148 (Ground 7), 173, 177, 178, 180 (Ground 8), 187, 188 (Ground 10), 223, 249-251 (Ground 12), 486, 491, 492, 493, 504, 505, 506, 510, 522, 524, 526, 529, 541, 544, 550, 556, 575, 578 (Ground 23), 592, 597 (Ground 24), 626, 627, 628, 629, 631, 635, 637, 638 (Ground 26) , 670-672 (Ground 29).

146 The Defence on appeal does not raise any issue regarding the admission by the Trial Chamber of any evidence. Indeed, as has already been established by this Court, “[t]he Appeals Chamber is of the view that the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 17 of the Statute cannot be violated by the introduction of evidence relevant to any allegation in the trial proceedings, regardless of the nature or severity of the evidence.” Rather, the Defence challenges the evaluation of evidence by the Trial Chamber on several grounds set out below.

147 But cf. ICTY RoPE, Rule 89(C); ICTR RoPE, Rule 89(C); STL RoPE, Rule 149(C) (requiring that evidence must be relevant and have probative value to be admitted).

148 Accord Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 19 (“[T]here is no reason to import such [elaborate national] rules into the practice of the Tribunal, which is not bound by national rules of evidence. The purpose of the Rules is to promote a fair and expeditious trial, and Trial Chambers must have the flexibility to achieve this goal.”); Boškoski and Tarčulovski Appeal Judgment, para. 193 (“the Tribunal’s jurisprudence confirms that evidence inadmissible under domestic law is not necessarily inadmissible in proceedings before the Tribunal”). See also UNWCC Law Reports, The Procedure of the Courts, pp 190, 197 (“In general the rules of evidence applied in War Crime trials are less technical than those governing the proceedings of courts conducting trials in accordance with the ordinary criminal laws of states. This is not to say that any unfairness is done to the accused; the aim has been to ensure that no guilty person will escape punishment by exploiting technical rules. The circumstances in which war crime trials are often held make it necessary to dispense with certain such rules. For instance many eye witnesses whose evidence was needed in trials in Europe had in the meantime returned to their homes overseas and been demobilized. To transport them to the scene of trial would not have been practicable, and it was for that reason that affidavit evidence was Prosecutor pointed out that although the trial was held under British law, the Regulations had made certain alterations in the laws of evidence for the obvious reason that otherwise many people would be bound to escape justice because of movements of witnesses.”). The UNWCC Law Reports The Procedure of the Courts extensively discusses the law of evidence applied consistent with the fair trial rights of the accused.

149 Taylor Appeal, para. 23.

150 Taylor Appeal, para. 24.

151 Taylor Appeal, para. 34.

152 Taylor Appeal, paras 30, 34, 35, citing Trial Judgment, paras 166 and 199.

153 Prosecution Response, para. 19.

154 Prosecution Response, para. 11.

155 Taylor Appeal, paras 30, 32, 34, 35, citing Trial Judgment, paras 166 and 199.

156 See, for example, the United Kingdom, in which s 34(2) of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 and s 32(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 abolished the technical definition of corroboration and need for corroboration for certain classes of witnesses. Previously, the testimony of children, accomplices and victims of sexual assault needed corroboration, by which was meant evidence from an independent source that implicated the accused in the specific offense. After 1994, “corroboration” merely referred to evidentiary support of any kind and was no longer a requirement for any particular class of witness.

157 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 522, citing Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 147; ICC RoPE, Rule 64(4) (providing that there shall be no legal requirement for corroboration to prove any crime over which it exercises jurisdiction); Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 65 (“The Appeals Chamber notes that it has been the practice of this Tribunal and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to accept as evidence the testimony of a single witness on a material fact without need for corroboration.”); Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, para. 154 (“the Appeals Chamber concurs with the opinion of ICTY Appeals Chamber that the testimony of a witness on a material fact may be accepted as evidence without the need for corroboration.”).

158 Testis unus testis nullus.

159 Rohde Case, p. 58. In the Stalag Luft III Case, both the Prosecutor and the Judge Advocate “warned the court of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but added that the court could convict on such evidence if they were satisfied that the evidence given was true.” Stalag Luft III Case, p. 51 (emphasis added). As the UNWCC Law Reports noted: “The material here referred to often illustrates further the policy of leaving wide discretionary powers in the hands of the Courts, as does also for instance the rule generally followed as regards the pleas of superior orders and of alleged legality or compulsion under municipal law. This provision of a wide discretion to the courts is an aspect of the attempt to exclude from war crime trial proceedings such unnecessary technicalities as might lead to a miscarriage of justice in favour of the accused; this tendency has been demonstrated also in certain provisions that a trial cannot be invalidated after its completion merely because of technical faults of procedure which caused no injustice to the accused. It need hardly be added that the courts have often worked upon circumstantial evidence as well as upon direct evidence; this has been of particular interest in connection with questions turning upon an accused’s knowledge of certain activities or of the criminality of certain activities or organizations.” UNWCC Law Reports, The Procedure of the Courts, p. 199 , n. 2.

160 General Tomoyuki Yamashita Case, pp. 23, 61.

161 General Tomoyuki Yamashita Case, pp. 23, 61.

162 Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 199. See also, Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 219 and the references cited therein; D. Milošević Appeal Judgment, para. 215 and the references cited therein; Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 264 and the references cited therein; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 274 and references cited therein; Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 268; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 33 and the references given therein; Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, para. 62; Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, para. 493; Bagilishema Appeal Judgment, para. 79; Rohde Case, pp. 58–59.

163 Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 65.

164 Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 57.

165 Tadić Appeal Judgment, paras 65, 66.

166 Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 64.

167 Furundžija Appeal Judgment, paras 100-108. See also Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 66 (“The Prosecution case against the accused turns on the evidence of Witness A, and to a lesser extent, Witness D.”).

168 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 221.

169 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 128.

170 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 522, citing Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 147.

171 The Defence faults the Trial Chamber for failing to define “corroboration” as a matter of law. Taylor Appeal, para. 34. However, its only reference to any legal definition is taken without context from the ICTR Appeals Chamber and is unsupported by other jurisprudence. The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Nahimana et al. itself did not support its definition by reference to any authorities. See Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 428.

172 See, e.g., Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 941, 942; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 813 and fn. 2132; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 756-758 and Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, paras 2226, 2227; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 156-159 and Brima et al. Trial Judgment, paras 584, 907-910; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 132-136 and Brima et al. Trial Judgment, paras 356-371; Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 845.

173 “Corroboration” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as: “1. Confirmation or support by additional evidence or authority.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.), p. 397.

174 Simba Appeal Judgment, para. 24, quoting Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para. 132.

175 Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgment, para. 21, citing Karera Appeal Judgment, para. 45; Renzaho Appeal Judgment, para. 556; Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, para. 42; Muvunyi Appeal Judgment, para. 128.

176 Taylor Appeal, paras 26 (“the trier of fact’s reliance on . . . hearsay evidence to make a directly incriminating finding is an error law.”), 29 (asserting that as a matter of law, when the evidence is based on hearsay, the testimony of a single witness on a material fact requires corroboration). See also Taylor Notice of Appeal, Ground 1 (“The Chamber erred in law by relying on uncorroborated hearsay evidence as the sole basis for specific incriminating findings of fact.”). But compare Taylor Appeal, para. 24 (“The Chamber failed to recognize . . . that it is legally impermissible to base a particular conviction only on uncorroborated hearsay.”) (emphasis added).

177 Prosecution Response, para. 18.

178 Taylor Appeal, para. 24. But compare Taylor Notice of Appeal, Ground 1 (“The Chamber erred in law by relying on uncorroborated hearsay evidence as the sole basis for specific incriminating findings of fact.”) (emphasis added).

179 Taylor Appeal, para. 24, citing Prlić et al. Decision Relating to Admitting Transcript, para. 53 (emphasis added).

180 Taylor Appeal, para. 30.

181 Although the Defence has characterised its argument in terms of a prohibition against convictions based solely on uncorroborated hearsay, the Defence admits that in this case, no single piece of hearsay was the basis of any conviction, but rather it alleges that uncorroborated hearsay was the basis of “incriminating findings” which when taken together amounted to a conviction. The Defence further concedes that, “[s]tanding alone, it is difficult to pinpoint or it’s difficult to expressly state that [the challenged hearsay statements] were the sole or decisive factors for a conviction . . .” Appeal transcript, 23 January 2013, p. 49994. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber has addressed the broader contention, because it encompasses the assertion regarding “incriminating findings”. See Prlić et al. Decision Relating to Admitting Transcript, para. 53 (“when a conviction is based solely or in a decisive manner”) (emphasis added); Unterpertinger v. Austria, para. 33 (“However, it is clear from the judgment of 4 June 1980 that the Court of Appeal based the applicant’s conviction mainly on the statements made by Mrs. Unterpertinger and Miss Tappeiner to the police.”) (emphasis added); Lucàv. Italy, para. 40 (finding a violation of Art. 6 “where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree on depositions that have been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined”) (emphasis added).

182 Taylor Appeal, para. 25. The Defence also cited in its oral submissions to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 51 US 36 (2004). However, not only is that a decision of a domestic court applying its domestic constitution, but it is expressly not on point to the issue raised by the Defence here. To the contrary, Crawford only addressed the use of ex parte examinations and inquisitorial practices, not hearsay generally. The Supreme Court rejected the admission of ex parte evidence, even if reliable, on the ground that it contravenes the intention of the drafters of the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1789. The Court considered that the 6th Amendment was directed to prevent the use of inquisitorial practices in light of historical abuses in 16th and 17th century England, such as the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. As the Court subsequently clearly held in Davis v. Washington, Crawford only applies to testimonial evidence, as “[i]t is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, [which] while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the [6th Amendment].” Davis v. Washington, 547 US 813, 821 (2006). Needless to say, the Statute of the Special Court embodies the principle articulated in Crawford and Davis, as the accused under Article 17(4)(e) has the right “to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her”. Furthermore, under Article 17(2) the accused has the right to “a fair and public hearing”, which ensures that an accused before the Special Court is protected from Star Chamber-like proceedings as took place in 16th and 17th century England. Finally, Rule 92bis provides that written statements and transcripts admitted in lieu of oral testimony may not go to proof of the acts and conduct of the accused. Further, as discussed further below in para. 85, fn. 189, Crawford detracts from the Defence’s submission at para. 25 of its Appeal Brief that the principle articulated in the Prlić et al. Decision applies equally to all hearsay evidence, as Crawford distinguishes between “testimonial” evidence and other hearsay evidence. See further Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008) (noting that admission of hearsay evidence from a co-conspirator does not violate the 6th Amendment because it is not “testimonial”).

183 The ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the ECtHR had “authoritatively” stated the relevant principle and relied exclusively on ECtHR jurisprudence to articulate the scope of that principle. Prlić et al. Decision Relating to Admitting Transcript, para. 53, fns 91, 92.

184 See, e.g., Prlić et al. Decision Relating to Admitting Transcript, para. 53; Martić Decision on Evidence, paras 18-20.

185 Compare Statute, Article 17(4)(e) (“To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her . . . ”) and European Convention, Article 6(3)(d) (“To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her . . .”). While the Appeals Chamber is not bound by the decisions of the ECtHR, it is notable that in interpreting identical language, the ECtHR has concluded that sole or decisive reliance on hearsay evidence does not abridge the accused’s right to “examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her.”

186 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 51 US 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).

187 The term “right of confrontation” as used in some discussions and submissions is derived from the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is described as the “Confrontation Clause”. The Appeals Chamber recalls and emphasises that the Defence submission concerns international law, not domestic law.

188 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, para. 126. See A.M v. Italy, para. 25; Saı¨di v. France, paras 43, 44; Unterpertinger v. Austria, paras 31-33.

189 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, para. 147. More particularly, the ECtHR only considered a particular specie of hearsay: “The Court notes that the present cases concern only absent witnesses whose statements were read at trial. It is not the Court’s task to consider the operation of the common law rule against hearsay in abstracto nor to consider generally whether the exceptions to that rule which now exist in English criminal law are compatible with the Convention.” Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, para. 126 (emphasis added). This limited treatment is similar to the distinction drawn in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). While the Appeals Chamber has accepted arguendo the Defence submission that the principle involved applies equally to all hearsay, the Defence has not demonstrated that the jurisprudence demands a uniform approach. Indeed, the decisions of the US Supreme Court have long-held that hearsay evidence generally does not implicate the accused’s right to confront witnesses against him or her. See California v. Green, 399 US 149, 155-156 (1970) (“While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete, and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception. The converse is equally true: merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (confirmed by Dutton v. Evans, 400 US 74 (1970)). More recently, following Crawford, the US Supreme Court confirmed that the constitutional right to confront witnesses applies only to a limited category of hearsay evidence. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1153 (2011) (holding that in Crawford, “We therefore limited the Confrontation Clause’s reach to testimonial statements and held that in order for testimonial evidence to be admissible, the Sixth Amendment ‘demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.’”) (emphasis added). See also Dutton v. Evans, 400 US 74 (1970) (J. Harlan, concurring) (“Regardless of the interpretation one puts on the words of the Confrontation Clause, the clause is simply not well designed for taking into account the numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence. . . . The task is far more appropriately performed under the aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ commands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due process of law. It is by this standard that I would test federal and state rules of evidence.”).

190 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, para. 147.

191 Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 198.

192 See Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, para. 147.

193 The Defence does suggest that the use of the alleged uncorroborated hearsay resulted from or led to any violation of Taylor’s rights to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, to defend himself in person or through legal counsel of his choosing, to examine or have examined the witnesses against him, to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as the Prosecution and to not be compelled to testify against himself or confess guilt. Statute, Article 17(4)(b), (d), (e) and (g). The substantial evidentiary record in these proceedings discloses a vigorous adversarial process, protected by the letter and spirit of the Statute, which balances the rights of the Parties consistent with the presumption of innocence of the accused . See Matthew, Hale Sir, History and Analysis of the Common Law of England , p. 164 (“[B]y this Course of personal and open Examination, there is an opportunity for all Persons concerned, viz. The Judge, or any of the Jury, or the Parties, or their Council or Attornies, to propound occasional Questions, which beats and boults out the Truth . . . .”).

194 See, e.g., Taylor Appeal, paras 25 (“This discussion concerned ‘depositions’ elicited by a judicial officer or lawyer, under oath, and recorded by stenographers. The rationale for this prohibition is that no matter how accurate the recording, the reliability of the source cannot be adequately tested so as to justify relying on it to determine a directly incriminating fact. The presence of three, five or ten stenographers does not enhance reliability . . . .”) (emphasis added); 28 (“The fact that eight witnesses reported the same hearsay does not entitle it to any greater weight than if Sam Bockarie had made this allegation in a room with eight stenographers.”), 36 (“A review of the Judgment as a whole suggests that the Chamber systematically failed to exercise due caution in respect of hearsay evidence.”).

195 As the Appeals Chamber held, corroboration is simply one of many potential factors in the Trial Chamber’s assessment. Supra para. 78.

196 See infra paras 123-125, 134, 135, 143-145, 150-152, 165-167, 172-176, 182, 183, 195, 196, 219, 236, 241, 242, 250-252.

197 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, para. 151.

198 See infra paras 149-152.

199 Taylor Appeal, Ground 6.

200 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice.

201 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice, para. 4.

202 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice, para. 8.

203 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice, para. 8.

204 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice, para. 8.

205 Prosecution Response to Application for Judicial Notice, para. 3.

206 Prosecution Response to Application for Judicial Notice, para. 12.

207 Prosecution Response to Application for Judicial Notice, para. 12.

208 Taylor Reply on Judicial Notice, para. 7.

209 Taylor Reply on Judicial Notice, para. 8 (emphasis added).

210 Taylor Reply on Judicial Notice, para. 14

211 Taylor Decision on Adjudicated Facts.

212 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 515, 528.

213 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 515. See also Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 528 (“The first group of RUF were radio operators Alfred Brown and King Perry and their bodyguards. The second group were RUF fi ghters released from Pademba Road prison. The third group were RUF and Liberian fighters in the Northern Jungle who were formed into the Red Lion battalion under the command of ‘05.’ The fourth group of RUF manpower inside Freetown was a predominantly RUF force sent into Freetown by Issa Sesay.”).

214 Trial Judgment, para. 3435.

216 Taylor Appeal, para. 101.

217 Taylor Appeal, para. 101.

218 Prosecution Response, para. 66, citing Krajišnik Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 17 (emphasis in original).

219 Prosecution Response, paras, 62, 63, 67, 68.

220 Taylor Reply, para. 8.

221 Taylor Reply, para. 8.

222 Taylor Decision on Adjudicated Facts, Annex A, page. 24.

223 Taylor Appeal, para. 85.

224 Trial Judgment, para. 3378.

225 Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 31. See Trial Judgment, para. 3374.

226 Trial Judgment, para. 3435.

227 Rule 94.

228 Sesay et al. Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 17. Accord Karemera Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 42; Krajišnik Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 16; Mladić Fourth Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 11.

229 There is no prohibition against introducing adjudicated facts at any stage in the trial. See, e.g., Sesay et al. Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 35; Hadžihasanović and Kubura Decision of Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts. However, the cases cited by the Defence which describe a process by which challenges to adjudicated facts might be made are predominantly those in which adjudicated facts have been accepted prior to the presentation of evidence , and in which the issues confronted in this Ground were not present.

230 See supra paras 93-99.

231 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice, para. 10.

232 Taylor Application for Judicial Notice, para. 10.

233 Taylor Reply on Judicial Notice, para. 8. The Defence asserts on Appeal that when the Trial Chamber stated in paragraph 32 of the Taylor Decision on Adjudicated Facts that “the Prosecution may have the option to challenge [the adjudicated facts] by cross-examining Defence witnesses or by calling rebuttal evidence,” it excluded the possibility that the Prosecution could rely on evidence already introduced in its case in chief. However, when that phrase is read in context, including the reference to paragraph 2 of the Defence’s submission in its request for acceptance of adjudicated facts, it is clear that the Trial Court, in allowing that the Prosecution may produce additional evidence, in no way limited the Prosecution’s challenge of adjudicated facts to evidence newly adduced.

234 Sesay et al. Decision on Adjudicated Facts.

235 Sesay et al. Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 35.

236 This view is in line with the well-recognised theory of the effect of rebuttable presumptions which goes by the name Morgan-McCormick after the scholars who promoted it. McCormick on Evidence, § 336-345, pp. 973-980.

237 Mladić Fourth Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 15.

238 Mladić Fourth Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 15.

239 Mladić Fourth Decision on Adjudicated Facts, para. 15. This position is in line with the rival theory of rebuttable presumptions, named after two of its proponents, the Thayer-Wigmore, theory, which views the presumption as a “bursting bubble” that disappears after the opponent to it presents any evidence that would challenge it . Thayer, J., A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 313-352 ; Wigmore, , Evidence §§ 2490-2493; Helman, Presumptions, 22 CAN. B. REV. 118 (1944).

240 Taylor Appeal, paras 43-53.

241 Taylor Appeal, para. 45.

242 Taylor Appeal, para. 45.

243 Taylor Appeal, para. 45.

244 Taylor Appeal, para. 47.

245 Taylor Appeal, paras 49, 50-52.

246 Taylor Appeal, para. 44.

247 Prosecution Response, para. 28.

248 Prosecution Response, para. 28.

249 Prosecution Response, para. 28.

250 Prosecution Response, para. 30.

251 Prosecution Response, para. 30.

252 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 200. Accord Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 194.

253 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 219.

254 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 1137.

255 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 146.

256 Trial Judgment, paras 212-380.

257 Trial Judgment, para. 165, citing Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 23.

258 Trial Judgment, para. 165, citing Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 108, Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 194, Halilović Trial Judgment, para. 17.

259 Trial Judgment, para. 212.

260 Of the 115 witnesses who testified viva voce, 94 were Prosecution witnesses.

261 During closing arguments, Defence Counsel stated: “I would invite the Court to take on board my approach to the witnesses listed in the final section of the brief, together with 338.” Transcript, Taylor Closing Arguments, 10 March 2011, pp. 49518-49519. In its Final Trial Brief, the Defence challenged the credibility of 18 Prosecution witnesses that the Trial Chamber addressed in detail: paras 891-898 (Perry Kamara), 1287 (TF1-362), 1214-1225 (TF1-338), 1377-1556 (Abu Keita, TF1-371, Foday Lansana, Mustapha M. Mansaray, Joseph “Zigzag” Marzah, Isaac Mongor, TF1-516, TF1-539, Alice Pyne, TF1-375, TF1-567, TF1-585, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1-579 and Dauda Aruna Fornie).

262 In its Final Trial Brief, the Prosecution identified Issa Sesay and DCT-008 as critical witnesses to the Defence’s claim that Benjamin Yeaten supplied the RUF/AFRC with arms and ammunition without Taylor’s knowledge, and argued that their testimony on this issue was implausible. Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 1254. Otherwise, the Prosecution did not specifically challenge the credibility of Defence witnesses in its Final Trial Brief, as it was the Prosecution’s position that the testimonies of Defence witnesses supported the Prosecution’s case. Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 1222-1274.

263 Trial Judgment, paras 213-219 (Abu Keita), 220-226 (TF1-371), 227-236 (Perry Kamara), 237-243 (Foday Lansana), 244-253 (TF1-362), 254-262 (Mustapha M. Mansaray), 267-274 (Isaac Mongor), 275-284 (TF1-516), 285-289 (Alimamy Bobson Sesay), 290-295 (Samuel Kargbo), 304-307 (Alice Pyne), 313-317 (TF1-567), 318-329 (TF1-338), 330-333 (TF1-585), 334-338 (Mohamed Kabbah) and 346-358 (Dauda Aruna Fornie).

264 Trial Judgment, paras 263-268 (Joseph “Zigzag” Marzah), 296-303 (TF1-539), 308-312 (TF1-375), 359-372 (Issa Sesay) and 373-380 (DCT-008).

265 See Trial Judgment, paras 167, 212.

266 Taylor Appeal, paras 115-117 (Ground 7), 304, 309 (Ground 15), 489, 490 (Ground 23), 816 (Ground 40).

267 See, e.g., Taylor Appeal, para. 115.

268 Taylor Appeal, paras 115-117 (Ground 7: referring to witnesses TF1-371, Karmoh Kanneh and Isaac Mongor), 304, 309 (Ground 15: referring to witnesses Isaac Mongor and TF1-371), 489, 490 (Ground 23: referring to witness TF1-371), 816 (Ground 40: referring to witnesses TF1-276, TF1-334, TF1-532, TF1-548 and TF1-274).

269 Prosecution Response, para. 86.

270 Prosecution Response, para. 86.

271 Prosecution Response, para. 87.

272 Prosecution Response, paras 254, 264 (referring specifically to the evidence of Isaac Mongor and TF1-371).

273 Prosecution Response, para. 203 (referring specifically to the evidence of Mohamed Kabbah).

274 In Brima et al., the Appeals Chamber, favoring an inclusive, practical approach, held that there is no requirement that in order to qualify as an accomplice, a witness must have been charged with a specific offence. The Appeals Chamber considered that weighing the testimony of an accomplice relates primarily to the assessment of the credibility and reliability of the witness-whether or not he or she had an ulterior motive to testify as he or she did. The Appeals Chamber confirmed that as with any other witness, a Trial Chamber may convict on the basis of a single accomplice witness if the Trial Chamber finds the witness credible and his or her evidence reliable. The Appeals Chamber further affirmed that the Trial Chamber is in a far better position than the Appeals Chamber to decide whether alleged participation in the commission of crimes affects the credibility and the reliability of the witness’s testimony. Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 127, 128, 238.

275 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 128.

276 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 238.

277 Trial Judgment, para. 183.

278 See Trial Judgment, paras 213-217 (Abu Keita), 220-224 (TF1-371), 227, 229-233 (Perry Kamara), 237-239 (Foday Lansana), 244-246, 252 (TF1-362), 254 (Mustapha M. Mansaray), 263-268 (Joseph “Zigzag” Marzah), 269, 270 (Isaac Mongor), 275, 279, 283 (TF1-516), 285, 286, 288, 289 (Alimamy Bobson Sesay), 290, 292 (Samuel Kargbo), 308, 311 (TF1-375), 318, 321-327 (TF1-338), 330, 331 (TF1-585), 334, 337 (Mohamed Kabbah), 339, 340 (TF1-579), 346, 352, 356 (Dauda Aruna Fornie).

279 For the Trial Chamber’s assessment of accomplice witnesses whom it found did not have ulterior motives to testify as they did, see Trial Judgment, paras 220-226, and in particular para. 220 (TF1-371); 244-253 and in particular para. 245 (TF1-362); 269-274, and in particular para. 270 (Isaac Mongor); 285-289, and in particular paras 288-289 (Alimamy Bobson Sesay). For Trial Chamber’s assessment of accomplice witnesses whom it found had ulterior motives to testify as they did, see Trial Judgment, paras 263-268 (Joseph “Zigzag” Marzah), 362 (Issa Sesay).

280 Taylor Appeal, 111-151. These submissions are repeated and relied on in Ground 15. Taylor Appeal, paras 304, 308, 309.

281 Taylor Appeal, paras 115-117.

282 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 244-253, 285-289, 263-268, 362. The Appeals Chamber has considered the Defence submissions and reviewed the Trial Chamber’s reasoning as to each of the Defence challenges to the Trial Chamber’s assessment of the credibilty of accomplice witnesses. It is satisfied that the Trial Chamber properly assessed whether these accomplices, including TF1-371, Kanneh and Mongor, had ulterior motives to testify as they did, and reasonably found that they did or did not.

283 Taylor Appeal, para. 117.

284 TF1-371, Kanneh and Mongor were all senior RUF commanders whom the Trial Chamber found generally credible after assessing their potential ulterior motives to lie. TF1-371 was stationed in Buedu with Bockarie at the relevant time, and was in a position to know sensitive and confidential information. Kanneh was an RUF commander closely associated with Sam Bockarie. Mongor was one of the most senior RUF commanders, overseeing several operations and being privy to operational orders. Each witness testified that following his return from Monrovia with arms and ammunition facilitated by Taylor, Sam Bockarie convened small or private meetings with the senior RUF/AFRC commanders in Buedu to discuss the Bockarie/Taylor Plan to attack Freetown. Each witness further testified that during these meetings, Bockarie stated that he and Taylor had drawn up the Plan to attack Freetown. TF1-371 and Kanneh testified that they attended the same meeting. The Trial Chamber specifically considered inconsistencies between their accounts, and concluded that any inconsistencies were minor as their testimonies were consistent as to the subject matter of the discussions (the plan to attack Freetown), who attended the meeting (senior commanders as well as Daniel Tamba), where it was (Bockarie’s house) and that during the meeting Bockarie called Taylor via satellite phone to report. Mongor met with Bockarie privately, and his testimony as to the origin and details of the plan to attack Freetown was consistent with TF1-371’s and Mongor’s testimonies. Further, their testimonies were supported by independent evidence, including direct evidence that Sam Bockarie and Benjamin Yeaten discussed an attack in Monrovia, and that Bockarie had been contemplating a major offensive before he travelled to Monrovia to meet with Taylor. See Trial Judgment, paras 183, 226, 274, 623, 658, 1269, 2236, 2704, 2876, 2881, 2896, 3100-3102, 3104, 3106-3109, 3892, 4843, 5089, 5975.

285 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 129.

286 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 128.

287 Taylor Appeal, paras 62-76 (Ground 5), 245 (Ground 12), 796-818 (Ground 40).

288 TF1-360, TF1-362, TF1-337, TF1-532, TF1-334, TF1-579, and TF1-275.

289 Taylor Appeal, para. 245 (Dauda Aruna Fornie).

290 TF1-276, TF1-334, and TF1-548.

291 Taylor Appeal, paras 69, 70.

292 Taylor Appeal, para. 802 (referring specifically to TF1-276, TF1-334, TF1-532, TF1-548, TF1-274).

293 Taylor Appeal, para. 801.

294 Taylor Appeal, para. 63.

295 Taylor Appeal, para. 72.

296 Prosecution Response, para. 39.

297 Prosecution Response, paras 40-41.

298 Prosecution Response, para. 42.

299 Prosecution Response, para. 42.

300 Prosecution Response, para. 52.

301 Prosecution Response, paras 700, 703.

302 Prosecution Response, para. 704.

303 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 199. See also Karemera et al. Decision on Abuse of Process, para. 7.

304 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 200. See also Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 130.

305 Trial Judgment, para. 190.

306 Trial Judgment, para. 190.

307 Trial Judgment, para. 191, citing Exhibit P-048, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-276”; Exhibit P-120, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-561”; Exhibit P-200, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-304”; Exhibit D-064, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-197”; Exhibit D-069, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-034”; Exhibit D-071, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-023”; Exhibit P-501, “Report from WVS”; Exhibit P-517, “Inter-office Memo WVS dated 22 March 2010, Expenses Incurred on DCT-146, Dated 22 March 2010”; Exhibit P-554, “Record of Expenses Incurred on DCT-190 Dated 04 June-2010.”

308 Trial Judgment, para. 191, citing Transcripts, Alex, Tamba Teh, 9 January 2008, pp 780-782 , Varmuyan, Sherif, 14 January 2008, pp 1162-1169 , Dennis, Koker, 16 January 2008, pp 1389-1398 , Karmoh, Kanneh, 4 May 2008, pp 9763-9771 , Charles, Ngebeh, 12 April 2010, pp 38726-38733, DCT-190, 28 June 2010, pp 43437-43443 .

309 Trial Judgment, para. 193, quoting Rule 39(ii).

310 Trial Judgment, para. 192, citing Exhibit P-048, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-276”, Exhibit P-120, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-561”, Exhibit P-200, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-304”, Exhibit D-075, “Schedule of Interviews and Payments for TF1-579”, Exhibit D-064, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-197”, Exhibit D-069, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-034”, Exhibit D-071, “All Disbursements for Witness TF1-023”, Exhibit D-073, “All Disbursements for Witness SCSL P0298”, Exhibit D-479, “Index of Disbursements for Witness DCT-032.”

311 Trial Judgment, para. 192, citing Transcripts, Abu, Keita, 24 January 2008, pp 2154, 2155 , Perry, Kamara, 7 February 2008, pp 3396-3402 , Suwandi, Camara, 13 February 2008, pp 3766-3808 , Foday, Lansana, 26 February 2008, pp. 4754-61 , Isaac, Mongor, 7 April 2008, pp 6702-6711 , Dauda, Aruna Fornie, 11 December 2008, p. 22251 .

312 Trial Judgment, para. 196.

313 Trial Judgment, para. 198, citing Transcripts, Defence Closing Arguments, 10 March 2011, p. 49481, Isaac, Mongor, 31 March 2007, p. 6240, 7 April 2008 , pp 6718-6719, 6739, 6743, Moses, Blah, 19 May 2008, pp 10114, 10115 , Exhibit P-119, “Memo from James, Johnson, Acting Prosecutor, SCSL to Moses Blah, 30 October 2006 .”

314 Trial Judgment, para. 198, citing Transcripts, Foday Lansana, 5 February 2008, pp 4612-4614, TF1-375, 22 August 2008, p. 14340.

315 Trial Judgment, para. 195.

316 Trial Judgment, para. 195, citing Taylor Decision on Payments to DCT-097, para. 21; Taylor Decision on Exculpatory Information, para. 30, citing Karemera et al. Decision on Disclosure of Payments, para. 6.

317 Trial Judgment, para. 195.

318 Trial Judgment, para. 197.

319 Trial Judgment, para. 197.

320 Trial Judgment, paras 190-198.

321 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 218 (Abu Keita), 234 (Perry Kamara), 240 (Foday Lansana), 250 (TF1-362), 260 (Mustapha M. Mansaray), 271 (Isaac Mongor), 287 (Alimamy Bobson Sesay), 344 (TF1-579), 357 (Dauda Aruna Fornie).

322 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 1058, citing Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32.

323 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 519. See Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, para. 353. See also Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 120, 121.

324 Trial Judgment, para. 165, citing Brima et al. Trial Judgement, para. 108; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 194; Halilović Trial Judgment, para. 17.

325 Taylor Appeal, paras 24-37, 38-42.

326 Taylor Appeal, paras 24-37 (Ground 1), 175, 179 (Ground 8), 235-237, 238-239, 244-245 (Ground 12), 264-266 (Ground 13), 301-307, 308-309 (Ground 15), 519, 524, 529, 560, 569, 573, 575, 578 (Ground 23), 592, 594-595 (Ground 24), 626, 627-628, 635, 639 (Ground 26), Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp. 49942-49949.

327 Taylor Appeal, paras 38-42 (Ground 2), 175, 179 (Ground 8), 235-239, 243-245 (Ground 12), 264-269 (Ground 13), 301-309 (Ground 15), 491, 492, 504, 519, 524, 545, 573, 575 (Ground 23), 627, 629-631, 637-639 (Ground 26), 672 (Ground 29).

328 Taylor Appeal, paras 169-171, 174-178 (Ground 8), 203, 205 (Ground 10), 276 (Ground 13), 311 (Ground 15), 485, 486, 493, 494, 500, 503, 509, 511, 539, 542, 556, 559 (Ground 23), 638 (Ground 26), 664 (Ground 28).

329 Taylor Appeal, para. 29.

330 Prosecution Response, para. 15.

331 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 518, citing Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Decision Refusing Bail, para. 29; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 198, citing Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 115. Accord Kamuhanda Appeal Judgment, para. 241; Kupreškić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 303.

332 UNWCC Law Reports Vol. XV, pp. 198, 199 ; See also British Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals by Military Courts , p. 108 ; Ordinance No. 7, Art. I; Peleus Case, p. 14 ; Dreierwalde Case, p. 85 ; Belsen Case, pp 130, 135-138, 142; Albert Bury and Wilhelm Hafner Case, p. 63 ; Eric Killinger and Four Others Case, pp 70-72 ; General Tomoyuki Yamashita Case, pp 23, 45, 61, 79-81 ; Flick Case, p. 6 ; Hans, Renoth Case, p. 78 ; Eberhard, Schoengrath and Six Others Case, p. 83 ; UNWCC Law Reports, Vol. IX, Annex, p. 108 .

333 Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 509, citing Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, paras. 115 and 133; Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgment, para. 217; Semanza Appeal Judgment, para. 159; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 281; Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, para. 34; Akayesu Appeal Judgment, paras. 284-287; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15; Blaškić Decision on Hearsay; Tadić Decision on Hearsay.

334 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 518. Accord Muvunyi Appeal Judgment, para. 70; Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgment, para. 115; Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, para. 34.

335 Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 198, citing Kordić andČerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 281, citing Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15.

336 See Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15 (“The fact that the evidence is hearsay does not necessarily deprive it of probative value, but it is acknowledged that the weight or probative value to be afforded to that evidence will usually be less than that given to the testimony of a witness who has given it under a form of oath and who has been cross-examined, although even this will depend upon the infinitely variable circumstances which surround hearsay evidence.”), citing Tadić Decision on Hearsay, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen (Judge Stephen further noted that “[t]he fact that evidence is hearsay does not, of course, affect its relevance nor will it necessarily deprive it of probative value; the fact that in common law systems there exist many exceptions to the exclusion of hearsay evidence is in itself testimony to this.”).

337 Trial Judgment, para. 168.

338 Trial Judgment, para. 168, citing Brima et al. Decision on Motion to Exclude Evidence, para. 24. See also Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 21; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 14.

339 Trial Judgment, para. 168, citing Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Decision on Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence, Separate Opinion of Justice Robertson, para. 6. See also Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 518; Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, paras 495, 496; Krnojelać Trial Judgment, para. 70; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15.

340 Trial Judgment, para. 168, citing Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, para. 495, citing Krnojelać Trial Judgment, para. 70; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15. See also Delić Trial Judgment, para. 27; Tadić Decision on Hearsay, para. 16.

341 Trial Judgment, para. 169, citing Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, para. 496; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, para. 78.

342 Trial Judgment, para. 169, citing Rukundo Trial Judgment, para. 89; Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges, para. 140; Rukundo Appeal Judgment, paras 194, 196.

343 Trial Judgment, para. 169, citing Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, para. 496; Aleksovski Appeal Decision on Admissibility of Evidence, para. 15.

344 Trial Judgment, para. 169, citing Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 199.

345 Trial Judgment, para. 169, citing Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, para. 496; Delić Trial Judgment, para. 27.

346 Trial Judgment, para. 165.

347 Taylor Appeal, paras 175, 179 (Ground 8), 235-237, 238-239, 244-245 (Ground 12), 264-266 (Ground 13), 301-307, 308-309 (Ground 15), 519, 524, 529, 560, 569, 573, 575, 578 (Ground 23), 592, 594-595 (Ground 24), 626, 627-628, 635, 639 (Ground 26).

348 Taylor Appeal, paras 175, 179 (Ground 8), 235-237, 238-239, 244-245 (Ground 12), 264-266 (Ground 13), 301-307, 308-309 (Ground 15), 519, 524, 529, 560, 569, 573, 575, 578 (Ground 23), 592, 594-595 (Ground 24), 626, 627-628, 635, 639 (Ground 26).

349 Prosecution Response, para. 18, citing Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 198; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 518; Karera Appeal Judgment, para. 39; Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgment, para. 115.

350 Prosecution Response, para. 14.

351 Furthermore, this Chamber has concluded that the letter and spirit of the Statute, the Rules, which implement it, and the jurisprudence, which interprets it, protect the Parties’ rights to challenge hearsay evidence and provide safeguards to protect the accused’s rights to defend himself. See supra paras 81-91.

352 Taylor Appeal, paras 175, 179 (Ground 8), 235-237, 238-239, 244-245 (Ground 12), 264-266 (Ground 13), 301-307, 308-309 (Ground 15), 519, 524, 529, 560, 569, 573, 575, 578 (Ground 23), 592, 594-595 (Ground 24), 626, 627-628, 635, 639 (Ground 26).

353 The Defence submissions repeatedly assume that evidence regarding the acts and conduct of Benjamin Yeaten, Daniel Tamba and Ibrahim Bah is not evidence of Taylor’s involvement in, inter alia, the provision of materiel and advice to the RUF/AFRC. On this premise, the Defence asserts that the sole or decisive evidence for particular findings of Taylor’s involvement is hearsay, as the direct evidence on the record related to Yeaten, Tamba, Bah or others. The Defence’s premise is flawed and does not account for the Trial Chamber’s extensive findings on those individuals’ roles as intermediaries between Taylor and the RUF/AFRC, which the Defence does not address at any point in its submissions. See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2570-2753.

354 Contra Taylor Appeal, para. 524 (“In finding that Taylor was aware of and was, in effect, the ultimate source of the shipments delivered by Tamba, Marzah and Weah, the Chamber recognised that the evidence was largely hearsay.”). The Trial Chamber first recalled that four Prosecution witnesses (Joseph Marzah, TF1-579, Varmuyan Sherif and Abu Keita) testified to being directly involved in transporting military equipment from Liberia to the RUF/AFRC in Buedu. Sherif and Marzah stated that they took direct instructions from Taylor when they transported those supplies to the RUF/AFRC, while the testimonies of TF1-579 and Keita provided evidence of Taylor’s involvement through the involvement of Yeaten. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber recalled that thirteen other Prosecution witnesses provided corroborating evidence indicating that Taylor was the source of the materiel supplied by inter alia Tamba, Marzah and Weah. In this context, the Trial Chamber noted that “an important part of the Prosecution’s evidence as to [Taylor’s] involvement is hearsay.” However, “the hearsay evidence of Prosecution witnesses is corroborated by other evidence from the remaining Prosecution witnesses which also points to [Taylor] as the source of the supplies.” TF1-516, a radio operator based in Buedu, testified that Bockarie would request ammunition via radio, usually to Base One, and that Base One would then reply that the shipment would be delivered. TF1-516 further testified that the request would be transmitted to “020,” the radio station at the Executive Mansion, which would then reply to the RUF radio station in Buedu when the shipment arrived and instruct Bockarie topick it up. Likewise, Exhibits P-066 and P-067 document that the RUF/AFRC leadership approached and received materiel from Taylor during the relevant period. TF1-375 and TF1-567 testified that the intermediaries who delivered the supplies were Taylor’s subordinates, while Jaward, TF1-585, TF1-567 and Dennis Koker testified that the shipments were accompanied by Liberian military or police escorts. In addition, Yanks Smythe testified that at the arms and ammunition warehouse next to White Flower, it was not possible for the Yeaten, as SSS Director, to obtain any significant quantity of supplies without the approval of the President, and it was staffed 24 hours a day by SSS personnel. This was corroborated by Varmuyan Sherif, and other witnesses testified that the arms and ammunition delivered to the RUF/AFRC originated from the warehouse near or next to White Flower. Trial Judgment, paras 4943-4958.

355 Contra Taylor Appeal, para. 519 (“Almost all of the evidence concerning Taylor’s knowledge of, or involvement in, Bockarie obtaining supplies in Liberia is based on hearsay from a single source: Bockarie himself. . . . The Chamber simply accepted the evidence as true, because many witnesses heard Bockarie say the same thing.”). The Trial Chamber expressly recognised that “much of the evidence relied on by the Prosecution to support its allegation that Bockarie received [this] arms or ammunition from [Taylor] while in Liberia [was] hearsay and circumstantial.” (emphasis added). A number of witnesses testified that Bockarie made regular trips to Liberia in 1998 and returned with materiel, or that Bockarie made specific trips to Liberia in 1998 during which he obtained materiel, including Witnesses Augustine Mallah, TF1-371, Mohamed Kabbah, TF1-585, Dauda Aruna Fornie, Karmoh Kanneh, Samuel Kargbo, Alice Pyne, Albert Saidu and Jabaty Jaward. The Trial Chamber also noted several other pieces of evidence indicating that Taylor knew of and sanctioned the supply of materiel to Bockarie. This evidence was not hearsay and did not rely on Bockarie as its source. Fornie testified that on three separate occasions in 1998, he travelled to Monrovia with or on behalf of Bockarie to collect materiel with the assistance of Benjamin Yeaten and Daniel Tamba. Fornie’s testimony regarding each of these trips evinced clear links with Taylor, particularly insofar as both Yeaten and Tamba were involved and as Fornie testified that Yeaten sent a message to Bockarie that Bockarie was to travel to Monrovia “on Taylor’s orders.” Furthermore, Karmoh Kanneh testified that in 1998 he and Bockarie travelled to Foya, Liberia, where they picked up materiel delivered by a helicopter flown in from Monrovia. TF1-371 testified that on his return from these trips to Liberia, Bockarie was always escorted by members of Taylor’s SSS. Kabbah noted that Bockarie never required travel documents or exemptions from the travel ban to cross the border. Taylor himself testified that Bockarie could not travel to Liberia without his knowledge. Trial Judgment, paras 5008-5026.

356 Contra Taylor Appeal, para. 573 (“This finding was based impermissibly on the uncorroborated hearsay evidence of TF1-567.”). TF1-567 testified that in October 1999, he went with Bockarie and Yeaten to Spriggs Field, Monrovia, where Bockarie and TF1-567 boarded a helicopter painted in camouflage colours. The helicopter was loaded with up to 15 “sardine” tins of AK rounds and an “RPG bomb with the TNT.” The Trial Chamber noted other evidence that Bockarie made trips to Monrovia during 1999 from which he returned with ammunition, and that helicopters were used to transport materiel to the RUF/AFRC. This evidence was supported by the substantial direct, circumstantial and hearsay evidence on the record that Yeaten was representing, and was perceived to be representing Taylor. TF1-567 further testified that before he and Bockarie left Spriggs Field in the helicopter, Yeaten explained to Bockarie that the materiel in the helicopter had been given to him “by my dad, Charles Taylor” to take to Buedu for the purpose of “keeping security” while Sankoh was in Freetown. Trial Judgment, paras 5099, 5102-5109. See also para. 172, fn. 393.

357 Contra Taylor Appeal, para. 578 (“That Sesay requested and was provided with materiel by Yeaten thus relies on TF1-516’s uncorroborated hearsay evidence . . . .”). TF1-516 testified that from mid-1999 to January 2001, he worked for Yeaten as a radio operator in Monrovia, and in that capacity he facilitated direct conversations between Sesay and Yeaten in which Sesay requested materiel. The Trial Chamber considered that this assignment, combined with living in Yeaten’s compound, made TF1-516 a reliable witness “as to whether requests for materiel were made and satisfied, how they were satisfied and Yeaten’s daily activities in general.” Exhibit P-099A documented a radio message from Yeaten to Issa Sesay in September 2001 stating that he had despatched ammunition via Colonel Gbovay and one of Sesay’s men. The Trial Chamber considered this contemporary documentary evidence “to be particularly valuable corroboration of the oral evidence concerning continued delivery of materiel during Sesay’s administration as leader.” While TF1-516 did not explicitly link Taylor to the shipments of materiel in 2000 and 2001, he did link Yeaten to these shipments via Roland Duoh (a.k.a. Amphibian Father). Witnesses Varmuyan Sherif and TF1-567 corroborated TF1-516’s account that Roland Duoh was involved in the delivery of arms and ammunition to the RUF on the instructions of Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 5152-5159.

358 Taylor Appeal, para. 544.

359 Taylor Appeal, para. 548.

360 See Trial Judgment, paras 5416-5506.

361 See Trial Judgment, paras 5507-5526.

362 Trial Judgment, para. 5507.

363 Trial Judgment, para. 5507.

364 Trial Judgment, para. 5507 and fn. 12266.

365 Trial Judgment, para. 5507.

366 Trial Judgment, para. 5514.

367 Trial Judgment, paras 5432, 5511. Issac Mongor was a former NPFL member who remained in Sierra Leone and assumed the role of one the most senior RUF commanders, overseeing several operations and being privy to operational orders. During the Junta period he became a member of the Supreme Council and attended several meetings of this council. He also attended other meetings with high-level officials such as Johnny Paul Koroma and Ibrahim Bah. Trial Judgment, paras 32, 274, 658, 1987, 2727, 2819, 2896, 3892, 5850, 6948.

368 Trial Judgment, para. 5432.

369 Trial Judgment, para. 5432.

370 Trial Judgment, paras 5444, 5511. Augustine Mallah was a member of the RUF, and a security officer for Mike Lamin (a senior RUF commander) from 1996 to disarmament. Trial Judgment, paras 752, 1623, 2533, 2647, 2811, 3811, 3929, 4160, 4878.

371 Trial Judgment, para. 5442. TF1-567 was an RUF member who was a Black Guard trained by Foday Sankoh, and held various positions in the RUF until 2001. He went with Sam Bockarie to Monrovia for the Lomé peace talks. Trial Judgment, paras 313, 384, 388, 5731.

372 Trial Judgment, para. 5511, fn 12280. Albert Saidu was an RUF adjunct from 1991 to 2001. He was promoted in November 1998. Trial Judgment, paras 2384, 2467, 5441.

373 Trial Judgment, para. 5507.

374 Trial Judgment, para. 5515.

375 Trial Judgment, paras 5424-5431, 5515. Dauda Aruna Fornie was an RUF radio operator who in 1998, relocated to Buedu, where he travelled with Sam Bockarie on a number of trips to Liberia. In 1999, Fornie accompanied the RUF/AFRC delegation to the Peace Talks in Lomé and other cities. He was imprisoned and tortured by Bockarie for his allegiance to Sankoh, and by the end of the war, Fornie was in Pendembu. Trial Judgment, para. 346.

376 Trial Judgment, para. 5467. Jabaty Jaward was a member of the RUF and Taylor’s Special Security Services (SSS). He was a clerk for Issa Sesay and Sam Bockarie’s storekeeper until 2000, and a member of the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) from early 2000. Trial Judgment, paras 2487, 2644, 2708.

377 Trial Judgment, para. 5416. TF1-371 was a senior RUF commander, and in a position to know sensitive and confidential information. For instance, he was in a position to know of requests for and arrival of shipments of arms and ammunition. Likewise, he was privy to first hand information regarding the exchange of diamonds between the RUF and Taylor’s intermediaries. The Trial Chamber also noted that this witness was stationed in Buedu with Sam Bockarie after the fall of the Junta regime from March 1998 to April 1999. While there he attended senior officers’ meetings at Bockarie’s residence. Trial Judgment, paras 226, 2236, 2876, 3698, 4843, 5089, 5975.

378 Trial Judgment, paras 5437 (Marzah), 5447 (Sherif). Joseph Marzah was Taylor’s SSS Chief of Operations at the Executive Mansion. The Trial Chamber found that supplies of arms and ammunition were sent to the RUF/AFRC in Buedu between February 1998 and December 1999 by Taylor, through, inter alia, Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle), Sampson Weah and Marzah. Trial Judgment, paras 263, 3915, 4958, 4965, 5722(a), 5835(v), 5837, 5838. Varmuyan Sherif was a former ULIMO-K fighter who was the Assistant Director of Operations for Taylor’s SSS at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia from 1997 until the end of 1999. Trial Judgment, paras 2590, 3674, 5447.

379 Trial Judgment, para. 5447.

380 Trial Judgment, para. 5447.

381 Trial Judgment, para. 5513. Karmoh Kanneh was a former civilian captured and enlisted as a fighter by the RUF in 1991. He was later put “under the direct command of Foday Sankoh.” He was a senior RUF commander who was closely associated with Sam Bockarie. Trial Judgment, paras 607, 623, 2704, 2881, 3689.

382 Trial Judgment, para. 5514.

383 See Trial Judgment, paras 393-397, 5489-5497. Exhibit P-063 “RUF Headquarters Forum with the External Delegates Led by the RUF Defence Staff, 2nd December 1998.”

384 See Trial Judgment, paras 382-392, 5498-5499. Exhibit P-067 “RUF Situation Report.”

385 Trial Judgment, para. 5524.

386 Compare Taylor Appeal, paras. 175,179 (Ground 8) and Trial Judgment, paras 3118-3120. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 235-237 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 3555-3564. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 238-239 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 3555-3564. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 244-245 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 3587-3590. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 264-266 (Ground 13) and Trial Judgment, para. 3462. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 301-307 (Ground 15) and Trial Judgment, paras 3113-3116. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 308-309 (Ground 15) and Trial Judgment, paras 3113-3116. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 524 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 4943-4957. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 529 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 5582-5592. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 560 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 5706-5708. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 569 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 5089-5094. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 573, 575 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 5102-5109. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 578 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 5153-5158. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 592, 594-595 (Ground 24) and Trial Judgment, paras 4365-4393. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 626 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 2831-2854. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 627-628 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 2856-2862. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 635 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 4105-4108. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 639 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 4144-4150.

387 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 591, 609 (rejecting uncorroborated hearsay evidence of Witness Bao), 1497, 1573 (rejecting uncorroborated hearsay evidence of Witness TF1-174), 1794 (rejecting uncorroborated hearsay evidence of Witness Gbonda), 3942 (rejecting hearsay evidence of Witness Sherif on Taylor giving an instruction to Marzah, the allegation to which Marzah did not testify), 3981 (rejecting uncorroborated hearsay evidence of Witness TF1-567), 4853 (rejecting uncorroborated hearsay evidence of Witness Fornie), 6746 (rejecting uncorroborated hearsay evidence of Witness Jaward).

388 Grounds 2, 8, 12, 13, 15, 23, 26, 29.

389 Taylor Appeal, paras 38-42.

390 In addition to the general submissions made in Ground 2 (Taylor Appeal, paras 38-42), the Defence makes individual challenges in other grounds. Sam Bockarie (seven grounds): Taylor Appeal, paras 175, 179 (Ground 8), 235-239, 244-245 (Ground 12), 264-269 (Ground 13), 301-309 (Ground 15), 519, 524, 545 (Ground 23), 627, 629-630, 637, 639 (Ground 26), 672 (Ground 29). Benjamin Yeaten (two grounds): Taylor Appeal, paras 243-245 (Ground 12), 573, 575 (Ground 26). Daniel Tamba (two grounds): Taylor Appeal paras 504 (Ground 23), 631, 638 (Ground 26). Ibrahim Bah (one ground): Taylor Appeal paras 491, 492 (Ground 23).

391 Prosecution Response, para. 23.

392 The Trial Chamber accordingly devoted significant discussion to the evidence that Yeaten, Tamba and Bah acted as “intermediaries” on behalf of Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 2570-2753.

393 Trial Judgment, paras 3498, 3588, 3589 (Dauda Aruna Fornie testified that Bockarie called Yeaten on the satellite phone and Yeaten told Bockarie that Taylor wanted him to ensure that the prisoners released were transferred to Buedu for their protection); 5099, 5103, 5108 (TF1-567 testified that Yeaten explained to Bockarie that this materiel wasgiven to him “by my dad, Charles Taylor”). See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2621-2629, 2710, 4953, 4954. The Trial Chamber expressly “considered and rejected the Defence contention that the movement of arms and ammunitions, and diamonds, between Sierra Leone and Liberia was undertaken in the context of a ‘private enterprise’ under Benjamin Yeaten, unbeknownst to [Taylor].” In making this finding, the Trial Chamber recalled the testimony of several witnesses that Yeaten was extremely powerful but still subject to Taylor’s authority. The Trial Chamber found that it was “clear from the evidence that Yeaten had a close relationship with [Taylor], which bypassed the line of reporting to the Minister of State referred to by [Taylor] in his testimony and emboldened Yeaten to take action without prior direction from [Taylor].” There was also evidence that Yeaten did certain things on Taylor’s behalf that were kept from others, but not from Taylor. Varmuyan Sherif and Yanks Smythe testified that Taylor himself controlled access to the arms and ammunition warehouse at White Flower. The Trial Chamber further considered the Defence’s submission . . . “incompatible with the consistent evidence of Prosecution witnesses that it was open knowledge amongst the Sierra Leonean rebels that [the intermediaries] were bringing arms and ammunition on behalf of [Taylor].” In its submissions, the Defence fails to address the Trial Chamber’s findings as set out above, restates its general contention from trial that Yeaten was acting without Taylor’s authorisation and suggests that this was a reasonable alternative interpretation of the evidence. See, e.g., Taylor Appeal, para. 556. The Trial Chamber noted that there was “substantial evidence that Yeaten was representing, and was perceived to be representing [Taylor].” It considered Taylor’s argument that Yeaten was acting independently, but rejected it. As well, the Trial Chamber accepted the evidence of Moses Blah, Vice-President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003, that “[o]nly Taylor could give Yeaten orders”, that Yeaten was “a crucial man and a most powerful man working with the President” and that “‘[n]obody could disobey an order from Taylor. You would be punished severely, including myself. We could not disobey his orders.’” Trial Judgment, paras 2626, 2629,2577, 2578. Having considered the entirety of the evidence, the Trial Chamber found that Yeaten was deeply involved in the conflict and that he had an important role in: (i) facilitating the exchange of diamonds between the RUF/AFRC and Taylor (paras 2726, 3845, 4041, 4204, 4218, 5880, 5881, 6000); (ii) facilitating arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC (paras 373-380, 2587, 2589, 2611, 2612, 2625-2628, 4046, 4205); (iii) facilitating military supplies and military personnel to the RUF (paras 2585, 4052, 4218, 4406, 4429, 4458, 4470, 6005); (iv) facilitating meetings and communications between Taylor and the RUF/AFRC (paras 2584, 2587, 2594, 3809, 3880, 4410, 4458, 6425, 6930); (v) relaying instructions and advice from Taylor to the RUF/AFRC (paras 3498, 4102, 4107, 4109); (vi) transferring funds from Taylor to the RUF/AFRC (paras 4221, 5207); (vii) being responsible for the RUF Guesthouse (paras 2587, 2602-2603, 4247); and (viii) updating Taylor in relation to the situation of the Sierra Leonean conflict (para. 2593).

394 The Trial Chamber set out the considerable evidence regarding Tamba’s role as an intermediary between Taylor and the RUF/AFRC, and concluded that “Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) worked for the SSS as a subordinate of Benjamin Yeaten and [Taylor] and served as a courier of arms, diamonds and messages back and forth between the AFRC/RUF and [Taylor] throughout the Indictment period.” Trial Judgment, para. 2718. See also Trial Judgment, paras 2702-2717 (deliberations on Tamba’s role). Witnesses described Tamba as not a member of Taylor’s SSS and the RUF, and the Trial Chamber found this indicative of the witnesses’ perception that Tamba was tied closely to both the RUF and Taylor as almost all of the accounts described Tamba constantly travelling back and forth from Sierra Leone to Liberia. Trial Judgment, para. 2705. The Trial Chamber found that Tamba performed duties for both the RUF/AFRC and Taylor. Tamba represented Taylor and took messages from Taylor to the RUF/AFRC. For instance, in 1998, Tamba spoke at a meeting with the leaders of the RUF/AFRC prior to the Fitti-Fatta Operation and told them that Taylor recognised the relationship between the RUF and AFRC and that Taylor wanted them to try and get hold of Kono so that they could get resources in order to purchase arms and ammunition. Trial Judgment, paras 2940, 2948, 2949. Witnesses also testified that Tamba was present at the inner-circle meeting that was held at Bockarie’s house after Bockarie returned from Monrovia with the Bockarie/Taylor Plan, where Bockarie informed his commanders of Taylor’s involvement in designing the Plan and where Bockarie spoke to Taylor on the satellite phone and received the instruction to “use all means” to capture Freetown. At this meeting, Tamba also spoke to Taylor on the satellite phone to brief him on the meeting. Trial Judgment, para. 3102. Tamba was responsible for transporting shipments of arms and ammunition from Taylor to the RUF/AFRC from 1997 up until 2001 using vehicles provided by Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 3915, 4065, 4845, 4958, 5163. Whenever the RUF/AFRC was short of supplies, Bockarie would radio requests through to Liberia, and Tamba would be one of Taylor’s intermediaries responsible for taking the materiel to Sierra Leone. Trial Judgment, para. 4943. Tamba also provided security escort to Bockarie and Sesay when they went to Liberia to obtain materiel from Taylor and to give diamonds to Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 3915, 63 41. He was also responsible for providing security escort to Abu Keita, a commander with military expertise sent by Taylor to Sierra Leone. Trial Judgment, paras 4459, 4475. Tamba later authorised, on Taylor’s behalf, the RUF/AFRC to use the entire Scorpion Unit, which had been sent to Sierra Leone by Taylor, to assist the RUF/AFRC forces in the implementation of the Bockarie/Taylor Plan. Trial Judgment, paras 4481, 4618(iv). Tamba was responsible for transporting diamonds to Taylor on several occasions. Trial Judgment, para. 5948.

395 The Trial Chamber made considerable findings regarding Bah’s role as an intermediary between Taylor and the RUF/AFRC, and concluded that “Ibrahim Bah was a trusted emissary who represented the RUF at times and the Accused at times, and served as a liaison between them at times.” Trial Judgment, para. 2752. See also Trial Judgment, paras 2743-2752 (deliberations on Bah’s role). The Trial Chamber found that the evidence did not clearly indicate any affiliation for Bah to a particular person or group, and that it showed that he instead acted as an intermediary. Trial Judgment, para. 2748. He was a businessman who helped arrange arms and diamond transactions and who did not maintain an ongoing affiliation as a subordinate or agent with either the RUF or Taylor. He nevertheless represented the RUF and Taylor in specific transactions or on specific missions. Trial Judgment, para. 2752. For instance, Bah delivered a message from Taylor at a meeting at Bocakrie’s residence in Freetown urging the RUF to “work together with the AFRC,” and also facilitated the MagburakaShipment of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC on Taylor’s behalf at the time. Trial Judgment, paras 5389, 5390, 5394, 5840. Furthermore, in the end of 1998, Bah was part of the delegation that met with Bocakrie in Monrovia and then headed to Burkina Faso, where they obtained a large shipment of arms and ammunition with Taylor’s assistance. Trial Judgment, paras 5507, 5840, 5841. Moreover, Bah delivered money from Taylor and Bockarie to Sankoh in Lomé in 1999. Trial Judgment, paras 3961, 6280. Bah was also involved in diamond transactions between the RUF/AFRC and Taylor and provided mining equipment to the RUF/AFRC on Taylor’s behalf. Trial Judgment, paras 5975, 6042, 6129. Finally, Bah relayed important advice from Taylor to the RUF/AFRC, particularly preceding the Fitti-Fatta Operation, which Taylor had been discussing with Bockarie. Trial Judgment, paras 2949, 3611(v).

396 Trial Judgment, paras 2884, 2886, 4811 (Tamba), 5355 (Bah).

397 Trial Judgment, paras 2927-2949, 4831-4844 (Tamba), 5390-5394 (Bah).

398 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 599, 600, 602, 603, 610, 622, 635, 767, 768, 785, 1596(xviii).

399 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2573, 2603, 2626, 3831, 3855, 5025, 6461, 6476, 6477, 6480, 6658, 6663, 6746. These findings show that after Foday Sankoh was arrested, he told Bockarie to follow Taylor’s instructions and that, while Bockarie was the leader of the RUF/AFRC, he met with Taylor’s intermediaries and also directly with Taylor when he received instructions and advice from Taylor. He also received instructions from Taylor through the radio network or during satellite phone conversations. These findings further show that Bockarie cooperated with Taylor and sent the RUF/AFRC troops under his command to fight Taylor’s enemies.

400 Trial Judgment, para. 6461 et seq, 2626, 2629, 2752, 4107. The Defence does not challenge the findings that Bockarie was deferential to Taylor and generally followed his instructions, or that before Foday Sankoh left Sierra Leone on a political tour, and following his arrest in Nigeria in March 1997, he instructed Bockarie to take orders from Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 6480, 6767(i), 6774, 6775. Nor does it dispute the historical relationship between the two, including the finding that Taylor instructed Bockarie to send RUF/AFRC forces to assist the AFL in fighting Mosquito Spray’s LURD forces in Liberia and Guinea, instructions that Bockarie obeyed. Trial Judgment, paras 6658, 6661. Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Trial Chamber found that Taylor “provided ongoing advice and guidance to the RUF leadership [including Bockarie] and had significant influence over the RUF and AFRC.” Trial Judgment, para. 6787.

401 Trial Judgment, paras 2864, 3130, 3564, 3591.

402 Trial Judgment, paras 5030, 5096.

403 Trial Judgment, paras 3120, 3129, 3463, 3485.

404 Trial Judgment, paras 2864, 2951, 3591, 4094, 4109, 4152, 4965, 5030, 5096, 5527, 5593.

405 See supra paras 157-167.

406 Trial Judgment, paras 2253, 2254, 2450, 2530, 2556-2557, 2870, 2929, 3912, 4112, 4124, 4501, 4566, 6133, 6285.

407 Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 175, 179 (Ground 8) and Trial Judgment, paras 3118, 3119. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 235-237 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 3515, 3555. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 238-239 (Ground 12) and Taylor Judgment, para. 3505. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 244-245 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, para. 3588. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 301-307 (Ground 15) and Trial Judgment, para. 3116. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 308-309 (Ground 15) and Trial Judgment, para. 3114. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 524 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 4872, 4948. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 529 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 5567, 5582. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 569 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, paras 5048, 5089. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 573, 575 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, para. 5099. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 578 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, para. 5099. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 592, 594-595 (Ground 24) and Trial Judgment, paras 4269, 4379. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 626 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 2832-2834. Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 627-628 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 2856-2857. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 635 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, para. 4106. Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 639 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, para. 4148.

408 Trial Judgment, paras 2815-2816, 2851 (Taylor’s instruction to capture Kono), 2861 (Taylor’s advice to hold Kono), 2946 (Taylor’s knowledge of the Fitti-Fatta Operation), 3045, 3046 (Taylor and Bockarie’s plan to invade Freetown), 3111 (Taylor and Bockarie’s plan to attack Kono), 3113 (Taylor told Bockarie that the invasion of Freetown should be “fearful” and “use all means”), 3536 (Taylor ordered Bockarie via Yeaten to release prisoners from Padema Road Prison), 3532, 3563, 3564 (Taylor communicated directly with Bockarie), 4089 (Taylor provided herbalists), 4140, 4149 (Taylor’s advice to construct an airfield), 4355 (Taylor provided military personnel), 4827 (Taylor provided Tamba with delivery of ammunition during Junta period), 4923 (Taylor sent supplies of materiel via intermediaries in 1998 and 1999), 5016, 5023 (Taylor involved in the supply of military equipment to Bockarie on Bockarie’s trips to Liberia in 1998), 5068 (Taylor’s knowledge of Bockarie’s trip to Monrovia for large shipment of materiel around March 1999), 5103 (Helicopter of materiel supplied by Taylor which Bockarie returned with to Sierra Leone in or around September to October 1999), 5143 (Taylor transported ammunition from Liberia to Sierra Leone via, inter alia, Dopoe Menkarzon, Christopher Varmoh and Roland Duoh), 5372-5373 (Taylor and the Magburaka Shipment), 5514, 5516, 5522 (Taylor and the Burkina Faso Shipment), 5579 (Materiel supplied by Taylor was used in operations in Kono in early 1998).

409 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 4104, 4108 (Taylor’s instruction to open Bunumbu training camp), 5145, 5154, 5158 (Taylor’s supply of materiel via intermediaries to the RUF in 2000 and 2001), 6323 (Taylor used his influence to facilitate the release of UN Peacekeepers in 1999), 6380, 6381, 6382, (Taylor had significant influence over Issa Sesay’s decision to release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers in 2000), 6434, 6435, 6436, 6439, 6440 (Taylor’s communications with Issa Sesay on disarmament).

410 Trial Judgment, paras 2851 (Taylor’s instruction to capture Kono), 2861 (Taylor’s advice to hold Kono), 2946 (Taylor’s knowledge of the Fitti-Fatta Operation), 3111 (Taylor and Bockarie’s plan to attack Kono), 3113 (Taylor told Bockarie that the invasion of Freetown should be “fearful” and “useall means”), 3563, 3564 (Taylor communicated directly with Bockarie), 4089 (Taylor provided herbalists), 4149 (Taylor’s advice to construct an airfield), 5016, 5023 (Taylor involved in the supply of military equipment to Bockarie on Bockarie’s trips to Liberia in 1998), 5103 (Helicopter of materiel supplied by Taylor which Bockarie returned with to Sierra Leone in or around September to October 1999), 5143 (Taylor transported ammunition from Liberia to Sierra Leone via Dopoe Menkarzon, Christopher Varmoh and Roland Duoh), 5514, 5516, 5522 (Taylor and the Burkina Faso Shipment).

411 Trial Judgment, paras 2819, 2824, 2825, 2848 (Taylor’s instruction to capture Kono), 2945 (Taylor’s knowledge of the Fitti-Fatta Operation), 3060, 3105 (Taylor’s and Bockarie’s plan to invade Freetown ), 3060 (Taylor and Bockarie plan’s to attack Kono), 3542 (Taylor ordered Bockarie via Yeaten to release prisoners fr om Pademba Road Prison), 3543 (Taylor communicated directly with Bockarie), 4088-4089 (Taylor provided of herbalists), 4104, 4108 (Taylor instructed Bockarie to open a training base in Bunumbu, Kailahun District), 4356 (Taylor provided military personnel), 4828-4829 (Taylor provided Tamba with delivery of ammunition during Junta period), 4955 (Taylor sent supplies of materiel via intermediaries in 1998 and 1999), 5007, 5024-5025 (Taylor involved in the supply of military equipment to Bockarie on Bockarie’s trips to Liberia in 1998), 5145 (Taylor transported ammunition from Liberia to Sierra Leone via, inter alia, Dopoe Menkarzon, Christopher Varmoh and Roland Duoh), 5374 (Taylor and the Magburaka Shipment), 5518-5519 (Taylor and the Burkina Faso Shipment), 5692, 5699 (Part of the materiel from the Burkina Faso shipment was taken by Rambo Red Goat to reinforce troops in Freetown).

412 Taylor Appeal, paras 169-171, 174-178 (Ground 8), 203, 205 (Ground 10), 276 (Ground 13), 311 (Ground 15), 485, 486, 493, 494, 500, 503, 509, 511, 539, 542, 556, 559 (Ground 23), 638 (Ground 26), 664 (Ground 28).

413 Taylor Appeal, para. 60.

414 Taylor Appeal, para. 500, citing Nahimana Appeal Judgment, para. 896, Seromba Appeal Judgment, para. 221.

415 Trial Judgment, paras 3120 (SAJ Musa contemplated as part of Bockarie/Taylor Plan), 3130 (Taylor told Bockarie to use “all means” to get Freetown), 3485 (Bockarie exercised effective command and control over Gullit during Freetown Invasion), 3486 (SAJ Musa’s original plan was abandoned).

416 Trial Judgment, paras 4845 (Tamba delivery of ammunition during Junta period came from Taylor), 5406 (Bah acting on behalf of Taylor to meet with Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma to make arrangements for Magburaka Shipment), 5666 (materiel supplied by Taylor were used in the commission of crimes shortly after Operation Fitti-Fatta in mid-1998), 5126, 5130 (materiel from White Flower and was facilitated by Yeaten came from Taylor), 5559 (Taylor and the Magburaka Shipment), 5721 (materiel brought by Issa Sesay when Gullit’s forces retreated from Freetown).

417 Trial Judgment, para. 4152 (Taylor told Bockarie that the RUF/AFRC should construct or re-prepare the airfield in Buedu).

418 Trial Judgment, para. 4247.

419 See, e.g., Prosecution Response, paras 143, citing Trial Judgment, paras 3480-3482, 6965; 145-146; 152, quoting Trial Judgment, para. 3118 (SAJ Musa contemplated as part of Bockarie/Taylor Plan); 430, 431 (Bah acting on behalf of Taylor for the Magburaka shipment), 474, 476 (Materiel from White Flower and was facilitated by Yeaten came from Taylor), 551 (Taylor told Bockarie that the RUF/AFRC should construct or re-prepare the airfield in Buedu), 574, 575 (Taylor provided the RUF Guesthouse).

420 Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 198, 200. Accord Kupreskić Appeal Judgment, para. 303 (The Appeals Chamber first notes that there is nothing to prevent a conviction being based upon [circumstantial] evidence. Circumstantial evidence can often be sufficient to satisfy a fact finder beyond reasonable doubt.”); Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 834 (rejecting challenge that finding on an element of the crime must have been based on direct evidence).

421 Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 200. Accord Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 458 (“[I]f there is another conclusion which is also reasonably open from that evidence, and which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, he must be acquitted.”).

422 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32, fn. 68. Accord Galić Appeal Judgment, para. 9, fn. 21; Stakić Appeal Judgment, para. 219; Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 458; Kupreskić Appeal Judgment, para. 303; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 834.

423 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32, fn. 68.

424 See Stakić Appeal Judgment, para. 219 (“If no reasonable Trial Chamber could have ignored an inference which favours the accused, the Appeals Chamber will vacate the Trial Chamber’s factual inference and reverse any conviction that is dependent on it.”).

425 D. Milošević Appeal Judgment, para. 20, citing Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 174-175 and Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgement, para. 217. See also Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 325; Halilović Appeal Judgment, para. 130, citing Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, paras 2, 88, 124, 131 (“[a] specific factual finding may or may not be necessary to reach a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt as to the element of a crime, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and on the way the case was pleaded.”).

426 Rule 89(B).

427 Taylor Appeal, paras 103-107 (Ground 6), 118-145 (Ground 7), 172, 173 (Ground 8), 153-161 (Ground 9), 185-193, 205-206 (Ground 10), 226-230, 238-242, 243, 248-251 (Ground 12), 264-268 (Ground 13), 308 (Ground 15), 570 (Ground 23), 619 (Ground 25), 637-640 (Ground 26), 659 (Ground 27).

428 Taylor Appeal, paras 185-193, 205-206 (Ground 10), 238-242, 243, 248-251 (Ground 12), 264-268 (Ground 13), 619 (Ground 25), 637-640 (Ground 26).

429 Taylor Appeal, paras 185-193, 205-206 (Ground 10).

430 Taylor Appeal, paras 238-242, 243, 248-251 (Ground 12).

431 Taylor Appeal, paras 264-268 (Ground 13).

432 Taylor Appeal, paras 637-640 (Ground 26).

433 Prosecution Response, para. 162 (Ground 10).

434 Prosecution Response, paras 164, 166 (Ground 10).

435 Prosecution Response, para. 207, 208 (Ground 12); in paras 549-550 (Ground 26) the Prosecution argues that the Trial Chamber provided a cogent basis for making its findings.

436 Prosecution Response, para. 207 (Ground 12), 549-550 (Ground 26).

437 Prosecution Response, para. 222 (Ground 13).

438 Taylor Appeal, paras 103-107 (Ground 6), 118-145 (Ground 7), 172, 173 (Ground 8), 153-161 (Ground 9), 226-230 (Ground 12), 308 (Ground 15), 570 (Ground 23), 659 (Ground 27).

439 Taylor Appeal, paras 103-107 (Ground 6).

440 Taylor Appeal, paras 118-145 (Ground 7), 153-161 (Ground 9).

441 Taylor Appeal, paras 172, 173 (Ground 8).

442 Taylor Appeal, paras 226-230 (Ground 12).

443 Taylor Appeal, para. 308 (Ground 15).

444 Taylor Appeal, para. 570 (Ground 23).

445 See infra paras 326, 332.

446 Taylor Appeal, para. 659 (Ground 27).

447 See, e.g., Prosecution Response, paras 78 (Ground 6), 92, 103 (Ground 7), 483, 484 (Ground 23).

448 See, e.g., Prosecution Response, para. 77 (Ground 6).

449 See, e.g., Prosecution Response, paras 80 (Ground 6), 93, 95, 97, 99, 100-101, 105, 106, 107, 110, 113 (Ground 7), 154 (Ground 8), 123-127, 129-130, 135 (Ground 9), 255-256 (Ground 15), 571 (Ground 27).

450 Prosecution Response, para. 85.

451 Taylor Appeal, paras 123-124, 136 (Ground 7).

452 Taylor Appeal, paras 123-124 (Ground 7).

453 Taylor Appeal, para. 136 (Ground 7).

454 Prosecution Response, para. 93.

455 Prosecution Response, para. 93.

456 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 200, citing Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 194, Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 659.

457 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 758. Accord Kupreskić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 31 (“As the primary trier of fact, it is the Trial Chamber that has the main responsibility to resolve any inconsistencies that may arise within and/or amongst witnesses’ testimonies. It is certainly within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to evaluate any inconsistencies, to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole is reliable and credible and to accept or reject the ‘fundamental features’ of the evidence.”).

458 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 32; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 34. Accord Kupreskić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 30.

459 Supra paras 24-31.

460 Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 185-193, 205-206 (Ground 10) and Trial Judgment, paras 3486, 3611(xiii) (SAJ Musa’s original plan was abandoned and Gullit’s movements incorporated into the Bockarie/Taylor Plan, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3118-3128 & 3373-3480). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 238-242, 243, 248-251 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 3606, 3611(xiv) (Bockarie was in frequent and daily contact via radio or satellite phone with Taylor in December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin Yeaten, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3555-3567). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 264-268 (Ground 13) and Trial Judgment, para. 3463 (Bockarie gave Gullit orders to execute Martin Moinama, and a group of captured ECOMOG soldiers near the State House, and both orders were carried out by Gullit, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3458-3463). Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 619 (Ground 25) and Trial Judgment, paras 4175 & 4248(xxxvii) (Taylor provided safe haven to RUF combatants who fled to Liberia from Zogada, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 40, 4155, 4156, 4160-4162). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 637-640 (Ground 26) and Trial Judgment, paras 4152 & 4248(xxxvi) (In 1998 Taylor told Bockarie that the RUF should construct or re-prepare the airfield in Buedu, based on the evidence in particular in paras 4144-4150).

461 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 42.

462 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 40.

463 See Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 498 (“The Trial Chamber is not obliged in its Judgement to recount and justify its findings in relation to every submission made during trial. It was within its discretion to evaluate the inconsistencies highlighted and to consider whether the witness, when the testimony is taken as a whole, was reliable and whether the evidence was credible. Small inconsistencies cannot suffice to render the whole testimony unreliable.”).

464 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 154. See also Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 249, 250; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 264.

465 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 264. See also Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 155; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 259. See further Kupreskić et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 31 (“The presence of inconsistencies in the evidence does not, per se, require a reasonable Trial Chamber to reject it as being unreliable.”).

466 Trial Judgment, paras 172-177, citing Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 121, Brima et al. Trial Judgment, paras 110-113, 362, Sesay et al. Trial Judgement, para. 490, Rutaganda Appeal Judgment, para. 29, Kupreškić Appeal Judgment, para. 31, Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 496, Limaj Trial Judgment, para. 15, Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 26, Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 69.

467 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 1050 citing Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, para. 139 and Musema Appeal Judgment, para. 20. See also Muhimana Appeal Judgment, paras 72, 99; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 554; Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeal Judgment, para. 269, citing Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, para. 165; Krajišnik Appeal Judgement, para. 139; Musema Appeal Judgement, paras 18, 20.

468 Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 103-107 (Ground 6) and Trial Judgment, para. 3435 (Rambo Red Goat was able to join Gullit’s troops in Freetown some time after Gullit’s forces had captured the State House, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3419-3420, 3429, 3426, 3431-3433, 3434). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 118-145 (Ground 7), paras 153-161 (Ground 9) and Trial Judgment, para. 3129 (Sam Bockarie and Taylor jointly designed a twopronged attack on Kono, Kenema and Freetown as the ultimate destination, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3094, 3095-3098, 3101, 3103, 3104, 3105, 3110, 3111, 3114-3115, 3119, 3123, 3125). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 172, 173 and Trial Judgment, para. 3120 (The possibility that SAJ Musa would participate in the executionof the Bockarie/Taylor Plan was contemplated by Bockarie and Taylor at the time they designed the Plan, based on the evidence assessed in particular in para. 3119). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 226-230 (Ground 12) and Trial Judgment, paras 3606, 3611(xiv) (Bockarie was in frequent and even daily contact via radio or satellite phone with Taylor in December 1998 and January 1999, either directly or through Benjamin Yeaten and that Yeaten travelled to Sierra Leone to meet with Bockarie in Buedu during this period, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3557, 3558, 3559-3561, 3563, 3564). Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 305, 308, 309 (Ground 15) and Trial Judgment, para. 3117 (Taylor told Bockarie that the operation should be “fearful” and that the RUF/AFRC should use “all means” in order to pressure the Government into negotiations for the release of Foday Sankoh, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3113, 3115). Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 570 (Ground 23) and Trial Judgment, para 5096 (On Bockarie’s trip to Monrovia around March 1999, he brought back a large shipment of materiel supplied by Taylor, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 5082, 5085, 5089, 5090, 5092). Compare Taylor Appeal, para. 659 (Ground 27) and Trial Judgment, paras 3914, 6930 (“448 messages” were sent by subordinates of Taylor in Liberia with Taylor’s knowledge alerting the RUF when ECOMOG jets left Monrovia to attack AFRC/RUF forces in Sierra Leone, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3907, 3908, 3909, 3912).

469 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 761; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 268. Accord Rukundo Appeal Judgment, paras 102, 105, citing Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, para. 121; Karera Appeal Judgment, para. 20; Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgment, para. 152, citing Nchamihigo Appeal Judgment, para. 165; Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, para. 139; Musema Appeal Judgment, paras. 18, 20.

470 Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 123-124 (Ground 7) and Trial Judgment, para. 3129 (In November/December 1998 Taylor and Sam Bockarie jointly designed a two-pronged attack on Kono, Kenema and Freetown as the ultimate destination, based on the evidence assessed in particular in paras 3089-3128).

471 The Defence argues the Trial Chamber failed to address Kabbah’s testimony that one had to go to “the Hill” to get satellite phone reception, asserting that this testimony was contrary to evidence the Trial Chamber accepted that Bockarie was able to speak to Taylor by satellite phone “on the veranda.” Taylor Appeal, para. 136. However, as the Prosecution points out in their response the witness did not testify that the only place which had satellite coverage was “the Hill.” Prosecution Response, para. 107. See Transcript, Mohamed Kabbah, 15 September 2008, pp. 16176-16177. In addition, the Defence fails to note that Kabbah testified that network coverage depended on the weather, and whether a house would have coverage changed from one day to the next. See Transcript, Mohamed Kabbah, 16 September 2008, p. 16333.

472 Taylor Appeal, paras 57, 58 (Ground 4), 229 (Ground 12), 500, 501, 539 (Ground 23).

473 Taylor Appeal, paras 54, 61, 56.

474 Taylor Appeal, para. 55, quoting Musema Appeal Judgment, para. 209, Zigiranyirazo Appeal Judgment, para. 19.

475 Taylor Appeal, fns 85-91, 93 and 94 (Ground 4), citing Trial Judgment, paras 3833 (Evidence that Sankoh used forms of communication other than the NPFL radio network “does not exclude the possibility that he also used the NPFL radio network to pass messages on to Bockarie.”), 4091 (Evidence of prior use of “herbalists” by the RUF “does not preclude and is not inconsistent with assistance by the Accused in the provision of this support.”), 4466 (Contrary evidence by other witnesses deemed insufficient to “raise[] a reasonable doubt as to the possibility that Taylor sent Keita to Sierra Leone.”), 4467 (“The Trial Chamber does not find that this negates the possibility that the Accused sent Keita to Sierra Leone.”), 4835 (“neither TF1-585’s failure to personally see Jungle bring ammunition during 1997 nor the lack of reference in Exhibits D-009 or P-067 to Tamba supplying the RUF is conclusive of the non-occurrence of this event.”), 4956 (“The Trial Chamber does not consider the lack of cooperation amongst the intermediaries engaged in supply to be dispositive of the Accused’s non-involvement or nonawareness.”), 5523 (“The fact that Sankoh met with Diendre in no way precludes the possibility that the Accused made arrangements for this particular arms transaction,” referring to the Burkina Faso shipment.), 5663 (“While evidence suggests that Mingo did capture materiel from the Fitti-Fatta operation, this would not have precluded him from also taking the materiel given to him by Bockarie for the Fittia-Fatta mission.”).

476 Taylor Appeal, para. 56.

477 Taylor Appeal, paras 229 (Ground 12), 500, 501, 539 (Ground 23).

478 Prosecution Response, para. 34.

479 Prosecution Response, para. 35, citing Musema Appeal Judgment, para. 209.

480 This provision is in accordance with all major human rights instruments. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(2); African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 7(1)(b).

481 Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 174; Halilović Appeal Judgment, para. 125; Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 325. See also D. Milošeć Appeal Judgment, para. 21; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 226.

482 Trial Judgment, paras 158, 159, 180, 181.

483 Trial Judgment, para. 159.

484 Trial Judgment, para. 181.

485 Taylor Appeal, para. 55.

486 Taylor Appeal, paras 55-60.

487 Who testified to learning of a plan to attack Kono and other mining areas, but did not mention Freetown as an ultimate target of the plan. See Trial Judgment, para. 3097.

488 Who testified to learning of a plan to attack Kono and Makeni, but did not mention Freetown as an ultimate target of the plan. Trial Judgment, para. 3098.

489 Trial Judgment, paras 3096, 3097.

490 Taylor Appeal, para. 57 (“The ‘negate the possibility’ standard—applied to two witnesses whom the Chamber itself deemed credible sets a far higher threshold than ‘raise a reasonable doubt.’ The approach to these two witnesses led directly to the Chamber’s finding that the ‘Bockarie/Taylor plan’ included ‘Freetown as the ultimate destination.’”).

491 Trial Judgment, para. 3099 (emphasis added).

492 Trial Judgment, paras 3091-3098.

493 Trial Judgment, paras 3097 (TF1-567), 3098 (Mohamed Kabbah).

494 Trial Judgment, para. 3099.

495 Taylor Appeal, para. 58 fn. 85 (Ground 4), citing Trial Judgment, para. 3833 (The Defence states that “evidence that Sankoh used forms of communication other than the NPFL radio network [sic] ‘does not exclude the possibility that he also used the NPFL radio network to pass messages on to Bockarie.’”), Taylor Appeal, para. 58 fn. 86, citing Trial Judgment, para. 4091 (The Defence states that “evidence of prior use of ‘herbalists’ by the RUF ‘does not preclude and is not inconsistent with assistance by the Accused in the provision of this support.’”), Taylor Appeal, para. 58 fn. 93, citing Trial Judgment, para. 5523 (The Defence states that “‘[t]he fact that Sankoh met with Diendre in no way precludes the possibility that the Accused made arrangements for this particular arms transaction,’ referring to the Burkina Faso shipment on which the Chamber placed heavy reliance to convict Mr. Taylor of aiding and abetting.”). Taylor Appeal, para. 58 fn. 94, citing Trial Judgment, para. 5663 (The Defence states that “[w]hile evidence suggests that Mingo did capture materiel from the Fitti-Fatta operation, this would not have precluded him from also taking the materiel given to him by Bockarie for the Fittia-Fatta mission.”).

496 Evidence that Sankoh used forms of communication other than the NPFL radio network “does not exclude the possibility that he also used the NPFL radio network to pass messages on to Bockarie.” Trial Judgment, para. 3833. Evidence of prior use of “herbalists” by the RUF “does not preclude and is not inconsistent with assistance by [Taylor] in the provision of this support.” Trial Judgment, para. 4091. “The fact that Sankoh met with Diendre in no way precludes the possibility that [Taylor] made arrangements for [the Burkina Faso shipment].” Trial Judgment, para. 5523. “While evidence suggests that Mingo did capture materiel from the Fitti-Fatta operation, this would not have precluded him from also taking the materiel given to him by Bockarie for the Fittia-Fatta mission.” Trial Judgment, para. 5663.

497 Taylor Appeal, para. 58, fn. 87, citing Trial Judgment, para. 4466 (the Defence states that “contrary evidence by other witnesses deemed insufficient to ‘raise[] [sic] a reasonable doubt as to the possibility that Taylor sent Keita to Sierra Leone.’”).

498 Trial Judgment, para. 4466 (emphasis added).

499 Taylor Appeal, para. 58, fn. 88, citing Trial Judgment, para. 4467 (the Defence states that “[t]he Trial Chamber does not find that this negates the possibility that the Accused sent Keita to Sierra Leone.”).

500 Trial Judgment, para. 4467 (“The Trial Chamber notes that Isaac Mongor confirmed his prior statement upon crossexamination that Keita was not sent to Sierra Leone by the Accused, but that he did so in response to questioning about the other half of the statement put to him, relating to whether Keita was working for the Prosecution. He was more specifically asked about that part of the statement, which was the focus of inquiry by counsel. The Trial Chamber does not, for this reason, consider his response to have evidentiary weight, particularly as he was not further examined on this issue or was questioned as to how he received this information. Prosecution Witness TF1-367 testified that Keita was a ULIMO fighter who came from Liberia to the RUF ‘as a friend’, stating that Keita fought on the front lines with the RUF. The Trial Chamber does not find that this negates the possibility that the Accused sent Keita to Sierra Leone.”) (emphasis added).

501 Taylor Appeal, para. 58, fn. 89, citing Trial Judgment, para. 4835 (the Defence states that “neither TF1-585’s failure to personally see Jungle bring ammunition during 1997 nor the lack of reference in Exhibits D-009 or P-067 to Tamba supplying the RUF is conclusive of the non-occurrence of this event.”). Taylor Appeal, para. 58, fn. 91, citing Trial Judgment, para. 4956 (the Defence states that “[t]he Trial Chamber does not consider the lack of co-operation amongst the intermediaries engaged in supply to be dispositive of the Accused’s non-involvement or non-awareness.”).

502 Trial Judgment, para. 4834.

503 Trial Judgment, para. 4835 (emphasis added).

504 Trial Judgment, para. 4955.

505 Trial Judgment, para. 4956 (emphasis added).

506 Taylor Appeal, para. 229 (Ground 12).

507 Taylor Appeal, para. 229 (Ground 12).

508 Taylor Appeal, para. 229, quoting Trial Judgment, para. 3564.

509 Taylor Appeal, para. 229.

510 Trial Judgment, para. 3564.

511 Taylor Appeal, para. 229.

512 Trial Judgment, para. 3564.

513 Trial Judgment, paras 3554-3564.

514 Trial Judgment, paras 3555-3557.

515 Trial Judgment, paras 3557-3561, 3563.

516 Trial Judgment, para. 3562.

517 Trial Judgment, para. 3564.

518 Trial Judgment, para. 3564.

519 Taylor Appeal, para. 538, quoting Trial Judgment, para. 5655.

520 Taylor Appeal, para. 501, citing Trial Judgment, para. 6913.

521 Trial Judgment, paras 5653-5659.

522 Trial Judgment, paras 5654-5657.

523 Trial Judgment, para. 5654.

524 Trial Judgment, para. 5656.

525 Trial Judgment, para. 180.

526 Taylor Appeal, paras 59, 60 (Ground 4), 165-167 (Ground 8), 500-503, 539 (Ground 23).

527 Taylor Appeal, para. 59, citing Trial Judgment, paras 3120, 3480, 3486, 3617, 5551, 5710.

528 Taylor Appeal, para. 59.

529 Taylor Appeal, paras 59, 60 (Ground 4), 165-167 (Ground 8), 500-503, 539 (Ground 23).

530 Prosecution Response, paras 32-37.

531 Taylor Appeal, para. 501 (Ground 23).

532 Taylor Appeal, para. 501 (Ground 23).

533 Trial Judgment, para. 5559 (emphasis added).

534 Trial Judgment, para. 5551 (emphasis added).

535 It was in fact a Defence witness, Issa Sesay, whose testimony supported the likelihood of exclusivity. The Trial Chamber summarised his testimony as follows: “[Defence] Witness Issa Sesay testified that the only arms and ammunition that came to Sierra Leone during the Junta regime was the flight that landed in Magburaka. This was also the only stock of ammunition Sesay was aware of that the RUF would have had access to.” Trial Judgment, para. 5541.

536 Trial Judgment, paras 5546-5552.

537 Trial Judgment, paras 5406-5409.

538 What was critical to the conviction for aiding and abetting were the findings, which the Trial Chamber did make beyond a reasonable doubt: (i) that Taylor was responsible for the delivery of the Magburaka shipment to the RUF/AFRC (Trial Judgment, paras 5406-5409); and (ii) that the materiel provided or facilitated by Taylor, including the Magburaka shipment in October 1997, was critical in enabling the RUF/AFRC’s Operational Strategy to commit crimes (Trial Judgment, para. 6914). As the Trial Chamber concluded, and as this Chamber affirms, “the applicable law for aiding and abetting does not require that the Accused be the only source of assistance in order for his contribution to be substantial.” See infra paras 518-521.

539 See supra para. 200.

540 Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 174; Halilović Appeal Judgement, para. 125; Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 325. Accord D. Milošević Appeal Judgment, para. 21; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 226.

541 D. Milošević Appeal Judgment, para. 20 citing Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgement, paras 174-175 and Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgement. para. 217. Accord Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 325; Halilović Appeal Judment, para. 130, citing Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, paras 2, 88, 124, 131 (“[a] specific factual finding may or may not be necessary to reach a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt as to the element of a crime, depending on the specific circumstances of the case and on the way the case was pleaded”).

542 Taylor Appeal, para. 59 (Ground 4).

543 Trial Judgment, para. 5721.

544 Trial Judgment, para. 5710 (emphasis added).

545 Trial Judgment, para. 5709.

546 See Trial Judgment, paras 3481-3486.

547 See Trial Judgment, paras 285-289 (Bobson Sesay), 359-372 (Issa Sesay).

548 Trial Judgment, para. 5711.

549 Taylor Appeal, para. 165 (Ground 8).

550 Trial Judgment, para. 3120.

551 Trial Judgment, paras 3481-3483.

552 Trial Judgment, paras 3484-3486.

553 Halilović Appeal Judgment, para. 128.

554 See supra paras 105-118.

555 Taylor Appeal, paras 100-102 (Ground 6).

556 Taylor Appeal, para. 101.

557 Prosecution Response, paras, 62-63, 67-68.

558 See supra para. 118.

559 Trial Judgment, para. 3378.

560 Taylor Reply on Judicial Notice, para. 7.

561 Taylor Reply on Judicial Notice, para. 8.

562 Contra Taylor Appeal, para. 101.

563 Taylor Appeal, paras 52 (Ground 3), 160 (Ground 9), 264-266 (Ground 13), 303, 310-311(Ground 15), 496, 549, 578 (Ground 23).

564 Taylor Appeal, paras 179 (Ground 8) (The Trial Chamber erred because it relied on circumstantial evidence of Karmoh Kanneh and Isaac Mongor which is uncorroborated hearsay to find that the possibility that SAJ Musa would participate in the execution of the Plan was contemplated by Bockarie and Taylor in the absence of providing a fully reasoned opinion and being especially rigorous in its assessment of the evidence.), 236 (Ground 12) (The Trial Chamber erred because it relied on TF1-516’s hearsay evidence that Taylor was in direct contact with Bockarie during the Freetown invasion in the absence of providing a fully reasoned opinion and being especially rigorous in its assessment of such evidence.), 303 (Ground 15) (The Trial Chamber erred because it relied on the hearsay statement of Issac Mongor that Taylor told Bockarie to make the operation “fearful” in the absence of providing a fully reasoned opinion and being especially rigorous in its assessment of the evidence.).

565 Taylor Appeal, paras 264-266 (Ground 13) (The Trial Chamber erred because it based the finding that Bockarie ordered Gullit to execute captured ECOMOG soldiers on the misrepresented the testimony of Perry Kamara.), 310-311 (Ground 15) (The Trial Chamber erred because it based the finding that Taylor said to “use all means” to get Freetown on the mischaracterization of the testimony of TF1-371.).

566 Taylor Appeal, para. 160 (Ground 9) (The Trial Chamber erred because it found that the Bockarie/Taylor Plan included an advance on Freetown having accepted evidence it did not.).

567 Prosecution Response, para. 227, citing Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 40.

568 Prosecution Response, para. 265.

569 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 344, quoting Krajisnik Appeal Judgment, para. 139.

570 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 345, quoting Krajisnik Appeal Judgment, para. 139 (internal quotes omitted).

571 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2571-2576, 2754-2755, 3619-3621, 4266-4267.

572 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2577-2620, 2756-2830, 3622-3653, 4268-4364.

573 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2621-2628, 2831-2862, 3654-3664, 4365-4393.

574 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 2629, 2863-2864, 3665-3666, 4394-4396.

575 Compare Taylor Appeal, paras 179, 236, 264-266, 303, 310-311 and Trial Judgment, paras 3089-3128, 3553-3605, 3458-3463.

576 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 345. See also Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, para. 139; Kvočka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 25 (reference omitted).

577 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 345; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 268.

578 Trial Judgment, para. 6905 (“including murders, rapes, sexual slavery, looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription of child soldiers, amputations and other forms of physical violence and acts of terror”).

579 See Trial Judgment, paras 6790, 6793, 6905.

580 Trial Judgment, paras 6914, 6924, 6936, 6937, 6944, 6946, 6959.

581 Trial Judgment, paras 6885, 6949, 6950, 6969.

582 Taylor Appeal, para. 400, citing Trial Judgment, para. 6905.

583 Taylor Appeal, paras 402, 405, 406.

584 Taylor Appeal, paras 402, 419-424.

585 Taylor Appeal, paras 402, 430.

586 Taylor Appeal, paras 403, 459. See also paras 403, 406, 407, 415, 419, 459.

587 Taylor Appeal, para. 419.

588 Taylor Appeal, paras 403, 415, 420-422.

589 Taylor Appeal, paras 403, 406, 422, 430. See also Taylor Appeal, para. 417, citing Perišić Trial Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moloto, para. 49 (“[I]t is important to recognize that situations during a war can change dramatically over time. What Perišić knew or thought he knew about the activities and propensities of the VRS during the initial break-up of the SFRY cannot be equated with his understanding of circumstances during later stages of the war.”).

590 Prosecution Response, para. 323.

591 Prosecution Response, para. 369.

592 Prosecution Response, para. 328.

593 Prosecution Response, para. 328, citing Trial Judgment, paras 1979, 2005, 2006, 2017, 2021, 2025, 2026, 2031, 2032, 2038-2046, 2048, 2049, 2050-2053, 2055, 2056, 2068, 2082, 2088, 2122, 2132, 2138, 2139, 2151, 2162, 2172-2181, 2185, 2188-2192.

594 Prosecution Response, para. 328, citing Trial Judgment, paras 1657-1659, 1660, 1738, 1747, 1752-1754, 1764-1766, 1769, 1771, 1778, 1779, 1788, 1789, 1800, 1803, 1807, 1808, 1812, 1813, 1822, 1823, 1829, 1833, 1843, 1844, 1857-1864, 1870, 1873-1876.

595 Prosecution Response, para. 328, citing Trial Judgment, paras 931, 932, 971, 972, 999, 1015, 1016, 1144-1146, 1073-1075, 1189-1191, 1199-1201, 1202-1204, 1205-1207.

596 Prosecution Response, para. 328, citing Trial Judgment, paras 1596-1607.

597 Prosecution Response, para. 329, citing Sentencing Judgment, paras 70, 71, 75.

598 Trial Judgment, para. 511; Sesay et al. Trial Judgment, para. 79; Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 215. See also Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 98 (“Contrary to the Appellants’ submissions, neither the attack nor the acts of the accused needs to be supported by any form of ‘policy’ or ‘plan’. There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes.”). Compare ICC Statute, Article 7(2)(a) (“‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack”) (emphasis added). The Appeals Chamber has not previously addressed this issue, and as the Parties have not raised it in this appeal, declines to do so now.

599 A policy, plan or strategy may be a relevant factual consideration in determining the context in which the crimes were committed, the manner in which the crimes were committed and the effect of an accused’s acts and conduct on the crimes committed, issues which may in turn be relevant to the individual criminal liability of an accused. See Statute, Article 6(1) (“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.”). See also Limaj et al. Trial Judgment, para. 212 (“[E]vidence of a policy or plan is an important indication that the acts in question are not merely the workings of individuals acting pursuant to haphazard or individual design, but instead have a level of organisational coherence and support of a magnitude sufficient to elevate them into the realm of crimes against humanity.”). See further paras 362-385.

600 Trial Judgment, paras 6790, 6791. Compare Trial Judgment, para. 6789 with Trial Judgment, para. 6790. See also Trial Judgment, paras 547, 548 (“the pattern of crimes by the RUF and AFRC which were directed against civilians persisted and intensified during this period”), 549 (“the pattern of conduct of the attacks”), 550 (“the evidence shows that the RUF and AFRC continued to commit crimes against civilians”), 551 (“The mistreatment of civilians continued into the later stages of the conflict.”), 553 (“The pattern of mistreatment shows that crimes were not isolated or random, but rather formed part of a continuous campaign directed against civilians in communities that the RUF controlled. This pattern of mistreatment remained a feature of the RUF regime throughout the conflict”), 554-557, 558 (“Moreover, based on the pattern and organisation of the violence the evidence demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that the attack was also systematic.”).

601 Trial Judgment, paras 6790-6793. See also Trial Judgment, paras 549 (“AFRC and/or RUF fighters were explicitly ordered to kill civilians by commanders, burn their settlements and take their property”), 553 (“The RUF’s use of forced civilian labour and physical violence in Kailahun District from 1996 until 2000 was continuous, organised and structured.”).

602 Trial Judgment, paras 6789, 6793. See also Trial Judgment, paras 548 (“This mistreatment of civilians during junta rule demonstrates that the RUF and AFRC specifically targeted the civilian population in order to minimise resistance or opposition to the regime.”), 549 (“the pattern of conduct of the attacks that were conducted with the aim of spreading fear amongst the population in order to control them and with the aim to call on the attention of the international community”), 551 (“Civilians continued to be intentionally targeted as sources of labour and fighters.”).

603 Trial Judgment, para. 6905.

604 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 520-525, 531, 538, 544, 546, 553, 557.

605 Trial Judgment, para. 553.

606 Trial Judgment, para. 551.

607 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 1597-1607.

608 The Defence does not address these crimes as part of its submissions and adopts a narrow view of the relevant crimes. See Taylor Appeal, paras 406, 407, 411, 415, 419, 430.

609 See Trial Judgment, para. 1970 (“The Trial Chamber has found that widespread and large scale abductions of civilians were carried out by the RUF and AFRC in Kenema District, Kono District, Kailahun District and in Freetown and the Western Area. In all of those areas civilians were used as forced labour.”). From November 1996 until 2000 civilians were subjected to forced labour in Kailahun District. Trial Judgment, paras 547, 553.

610 See paras 531, 538, 546, 551, 557 for the Trial Chamber’s general findings. The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved in the locations below:

Kenema District: In Tongo Fields between August 1997 and January 1998 a large but unknown number of civilians were forced to mine for diamonds (paras 1615-1657).

Kono District: In many locations in Kono District from at least January 1998 through to the end of the Indictment Period a large but unknown number of civilians were forced to work in the diamond mines (paras 1720-1738). In Tombodu from about June 1998 and throughout 1999/2000 a large but unknown number of civilians were forced to work in mines (paras 1740-1747). In various locations in and around Koidu Town, including Masingbi Rd, Five Five Spot and Superman Ground, from February 1998 onwards civilians were forced to mine diamonds (paras 1749-1752).

611 See paras 521-523, 538, 544, 547, 551, 553, 557 for the Trial Chamber’s general findings. The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved:

Forced Farming and Food Finding: In Buedu from March 1998 to April 1999 civilians who owned cocoa and coffee farms were forced to farm. The RUF/AFRC took the produce and kept the sale proceeds (paras 1760-1766). In Buedu civilians were forced to go on food finding missions (paras 1760-1766). From 30 November 1996 to 2000 at least 50 civilians were forced to farm in or near Talia and an unknown number of women were forced to fish (paras 1796-1803). From 30 November 1996 to 2000 an unknown number of civilians were forced to work on swamp farms outside Giema (paras 1805-1808). In 1997 civilians were forced to work on a large swamp farm for Issa Sesay (paras 1805-1808). From about mid-March 1998 civilians were captured by the RUF/AFRC in Kono District and forced to go on food finding missions (paras 1662-1663). In Wondedu in about April 1998 civilians were forced to go on food finding missions (paras 1690-1691). In about April/May 1998 a civilian was forced to go on food finding missions in Kissi Town, Banya Ground and PC Ground (paras 1697-1710).

Carrying Loads: From about mid-March 1998 civilians captured by the RUF/AFRC in Kono District were forced to carry looted food and loads (paras 1662-1663). In Koidu in early 1998 civilians were forced to carry loads (paras 1665-1678). In March 1998 four civilians were forced to carry loads from Giema to Tombodu (paras 1683-1688). In Tombodu between February and April 1998 civilians were forced to carry loads (paras 1683-1688). In Tombodu in February/March 1999 civilians were forced to carry loads (paras 1683-1688). At PC Ground from about February 1998 civilians were forced to carry loads of looted property (paras 1697-1710). Civilians were forced to carry loads in Kono District (paras 1711-1718). In Buedu from about February 1998 until 1999 civilians were forced to carry loads (paras 1760-1766). In about November/December 1998 about 150 civilians were forced to carry arms and ammunition from Dawa to Sam Bockarie’s house in Buedu, then to Superman Ground in Kono (paras 1767-1769). After March 1998 civilians were forced to carry arms and ammunition from Kailahun Town to Jokibu (paras 1817-1823). In August 1998 civilians were made to carry ammunition and wounded rebels from Koidu to Kailahun (paras 1817-1823).

Military Training: From February 1998 until the end of 1998 an unknown number of civilians, including children, were abducted and trained at Bunumbu Training Camp (paras 1368-1378, 1596(iv), 1782-1789). From about December 1998 onwards civilians were forced to undergo military training at Yengema Training Base (paras 1693-1694). At Masingbi Road in Koidu Town from mid-March until April 1998 civilians were forced to undergo military training (paras 1680-1681). Between Woama and Baima in Kono District 17 to 21 civilians were forced to undergo military training (paras 1711-1718). In Buedu from about February to July 1999 at least 19 civilians were forcibly trained (paras 1770-1771).

Domestic Chores: In Koidu in about March/April 1998 a civilian was forced to do domestic chores (paras 1665-1678). In Wondedu in about April 1998 civilians were forced to carry out domestic chores (paras 1690-1691). In Koidu Town, Superman Ground and Giema from about April until at least December 1998 a civilian was forced to perform domestic chores (paras 1697-1710). In Kissi Town, Banya Ground and PC Ground in about April/May 1998 a civilian was forced to do domestic chores (paras 1697-1710). In Buedu from about February 1998 until 1999 civilians were forced to do domestic chores (paras 1760-1766). In late 1998 a civilian was forced to perform domestic chores for Sergeant Foday’s mother in Giema and did other work in Giema and Ngeigor (paras 1810-1813). In Mamboma from September 1998 to July 1999 civilians were forced to perform domestic and other duties (paras 1810-1813). In Kailahun Town from August to September 1998 civilians were forced to do domestic chores (paras 1825-1830). In Pendembu between May 1999 and July 2000 up to 500 abducted civilians were assigned to fighters and made to perform domestic duties (paras 1832, 1833).

612 Trial Judgment, para. 1654.

613 The Trial Chamber concluded that “members of the AFRC/RUF forces engaged in widespread and large scale abductions of civilians in Freetown and the Western Area and used them as forced labour to carry loads, perform domestic chores and destroy a bridge” (para. 1875). The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved (see Trial Judgment, paras 1849-1874):

On the way to Benguema on 25 December 1998 RUF/AFRC forces forced over 1000 civilians to carry loads. On about 30 December four captured civilians, one of them injured, were forced to process palm fruits in Mabureh Town. On 6 January 1999 RUF/AFRC forces forced over 50 civilians to carry bags of looted property from Calaba Town to Waterloo. The rebels told the civilians they would be shot if they tried to escape and killed one civilian who tried to run away. In January 1999 a civilian was locked in a kitchen at State House in Freetown under armed guards with about 50 other civilians for about four days without food and water. He was then chained and forced to carry a heavy bomb to Calaba Town after not having eaten for four days. In the third week of January 1999 civilians captured in Freetown moved with the rebels through Kissy carrying loads of lootedgoods. The civilians were guarded so that they would not escape. On about 22 January 1999 captured civilians were forced to cook and perform domestic chores. A civilian was threatened with death if he tried to escape. On 23 January 1999 during the retreat from Freetown RUF/AFRC members forced a civilian to carry goods that had been looted from the civilian’s house to a camp at Kola Tree where other captured civilians were being held captive. On about 28 January 1999 this civilian, along with other civilians, was forced to carry loads to Regent. During the journey he was beaten and threatened with death if he tried to escape. On 22 January nine civilians were abducted by RUF/AFRC members in Calaba Town and one of the civilians was told to carry a bag. The civilians moved with the rebels to Allen Town and were held there for three days with 100 other captured civilians guarded by armed SBUs to prevent them escaping. In late January 1999 civilians were forced by RUF/AFRC members to carry heavy boxes of ammunition from Wellington to Allen Town. Some civilians were killed for refusing to carry the boxes. In Allen Town the civilians refused to carry the boxes any further and the rebels ordered them to strip naked and told them they would be killed. In about February to March 1999 RUF/AFRC commanders used a group of about 400 civilians to perform various duties including domestic chores such as cooking, laundry and pounding rice, as well as destroying a bridge.

614 Trial Judgment, para. 522. See also Trial Judgment, paras 1258, 1259.

615 Trial Judgment, para. 1654.

616 Trial Judgment, paras 1652, 1694. See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 673-675, 717-722.

617 Trial Judgment, para. 1657.

618 Trial Judgment, para. 1694.

619 Trial Judgment, paras 520-522, 538, 546, 551, 553.

620 Trial Judgment, para. 553.

621 Bockarie and Issa Sesay were leaders of the RUF/AFRC during the Indictment Period. Bockarie led the RUF from March 1997, when Sankoh was arrested, until December 1999, when he left Sierra Leone after falling out with Sankoh. Evidence suggests that Bockarie was killed in May 2003. Trial Judgment, para. 154.

622 Issa Sesay was promoted to Battle Group Commander by Bockarie in March 1997, and promoted again by Bockarie to Acting Battlefield Commander in March 1998. During the Junta regime, he was a member of the Junta governing body. After Bockarie left Sierra Leone, Sankoh appointed Issa Sesay to be Battlefield Commander. When Sankoh was arrested in May 2000, Issa Sesay became interim leader of the RUF, and served as leader until the formal cessation of hostilities in January 2002. Issa Sesay was convicted by the SCSL and sentenced to 52 years imprisonment. Trial Judgment, paras 359, 360.

623 Trial Judgment, paras 520-523.

624 Trial Judgment, para. 522.

625 Trial Judgment, paras 531, 538, 546, 551, 557.

626 Trial Judgment, para. 1778.

627 Trial Judgment, paras 1368-1378, 1596(iv), 1782-1789. Between February and December 1998 children from Bunumbu were sent to the frontlines. Trial Judgment, paras 1473-1482, 1596(xix).

628 Trial Judgment, para. 1694.

629 See para. 555 for the Trial Chamber’s general findings. In addition, the Trial Chamber found that rape was committed on a widespread and systematic basis in Kailahun District and on a widespread basis in Kono District, including in Koidu Town (paras 879-885, 887-888, 939). The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved:

Kailahun District: In Buedu and Kailahun Town beginning in February 1998 women were abducted in Kenema and raped in Buedu and Kailahun Town (paras 957-961). In Buedu from March 1998 to December 1999 captured women were raped (paras 963-966). In Kailahun Town from August to September 1998 a civilian was raped (paras 967-970). The Trial Chamber concluded that in Kailahun District between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002 an unknown number of women were raped (paras 971-972).

Kono District: In Koidu Town and Superman Ground in 1998 Sergeant Foday raped a civilian during the time she stayed in his house (paras 889-894, 931(ii)). In Koidu Town in February 1998 an RUF/AFRC member raped a civilian (paras 889-894, 931(i)). In Koidu Town between March to August 1998 several RUF/AFRC members raped a civilian (paras 895-898, 931(iii)). In Tombodu between March and June 1998 RUF/AFRC commanders including Alimamy Bobson Sesay raped an unknown number of women and girls (paras 900-905, 931(iv)). In Tombodu in about April 1998 commander Alhaji raped a civilian (paras 900-905, 931(v)). In Wondedu men under the command of Rocky raped an unknown number of other women (paras 907-908, 931(vi)). At Superman Ground in April 1998 rebels raped an unknown number of women (paras 911-914, 931(vii)). At PC Ground in or about April 1998 rebels, including Mongor, raped an unknown number of women (paras 916-919, 931(viii)). In March/April 1998 RUF/AFRC members engaged in repeated rape with a civilian (paras 920-930, 931(ix)).

630 See paras 547, 553 for the Trial Chamber’s general findings. The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved:

Kailahun District: In Pendembu from November 1996 to July 2001 civilians were used as sexual slaves (paras 1039-1043). In Buedu and Kailahun Town from February to April 1998 an unknown number of women and girls that had been captured in Kenema District were used as sexual slaves (paras 1056-1060, 1074(i)). In Buedu from March 1998 to December 1999 an unknown number of women and girls were used as sexual slaves (paras 1062-1066, 1074(ii)). In Kailahun Town between August and September 1998 a civilian was used as a sexual slave (paras 1067-1072, 1074(iii)).

Kono District: In Wondedu in April 1998 an unknown number of women and girls were used as sexual slaves (paras 1093-1094, 1145(v)). In Koidu Town in February 1998 an unknown number of women were used as sexual slaves (paras 1095-1098, 1145(i)). In Koidu Town in March to June 1998 an unknown number of women and girls were used as sexual slaves (paras 1099-1102, 1145(ii)). Throughout Kono District, and in particular at PC Ground and Superman Ground, in about April 1998 an unknown number of women were used as sexual slaves (paras 1103-1108, 1145(iii)). In Koidu Town between March and August 1998 a civilian was used as a sexual slave (paras 1110-1118, 1145(iv)). In Koidu Town between about March and August 1998 a civilian was used as a sexual slave (paras 1120-1127, 1145(vi)). At Superman Ground between about April and October 1998 a civilian was used as a sexual slave (paras 1129-1132, 1145(vii)). Near Yegbema and Sawoa in March/April 1998 a civilian was used as a sexual slave (paras 1133-1143, 1145(viii)).

Freetown and Western Area: In Benguema until about March 1999 an unknown number of women and girls were used as sexual slaves (paras 1157-1163, 1189(i)). In Wellington, Calaba Town and Benguema between 22 January and 10 March 1999 members of the RUF/AFRC used an unknown number of civilians as sexual slaves (paras 1165-1169, 1189(ii)). In Allen Town between about late January and early April 1999 a rebel used a civilian as a sexual slave (paras 1171-1179, 1189(iii)). In Calaba Town, Benguema and Four Mile between 22 January and about March 1999 a civilian was used as a sexual slave (paras 1181-1187, 1189(iv)).

631 Trial Judgment, para. 524. See also Trial Judgment, para. 1043.

632 Trial Judgment, para. 2052.

633 Trial Judgment, para. 524.

634 Trial Judgment, para. 2052.

635 Trial Judgment, paras 1089, 1902.

636 Trial Judgment, para. 1108.

637 Trial Judgment, paras 1155-1156. See also the Trial Chamber’s further findings of specific crimes proved in paras 1157-1163, 1165-1169, 1171-1179, 1181-1187.

638 Trial Judgment, para. 2035.

639 Trial Judgment, para. 2036.

640 Trial Judgment, para. 2036.

641 Trial Judgment, para. 2035.

642 Trial Judgment, para. 2052. Witness Koker testified that in Buedu, CO Victor Kallon brought a woman who had been subjected to sexual slavery to his office saying that she had disrespected him. He then stripped her to her underwear and beat her.

643 Trial Judgment, para. 2053.

644 Trial Judgment, paras 2035, 2037, 2052, 2053.

645 Trial Judgment, paras 2033-2038, 2052, 2053.

646 Trial Judgment, paras 901, 1041, 1043.

647 Trial Judgment, para 1089. In about February/March 1998, following the retreat from Freetown after the Intervention, JPK was unable to pay his fighters, and thus ordered “Operation Pay Yourself”, in which RUF/AFRC fighters engaged in extensive looting. Trial Judgment, para. 49.

648 Trial Judgment, para 1083.

649 Alimamy Bobson Sesay provided clear and reliable evidence of how commanders captured women, forced them to have sex with commanders and of the coercive environment in which such acts took place. In Tombodu between March and June 1998 commanders, including Bobson Sesay, raped an unknown number of women. (Trial Judgment, para. 904). Isaac Mongor testified that RUF/AFRC fighters and commanders, including himself, captured women, who were under the sole control of the fighters, and forced them to engage in sexual intercourse and made them their “wives.” (Trial Judgment, paras 1104-1106). See also the following findings made by the Trial Chamber: the rape of girls by rebels led by Captain Blood (paras 991, 992), sexual slavery perpetrated by commander Rocky (para. 1093), the use of a civilian as a sexual slave by Major Arif (para. 1169), a civilian being kept as a sexual slave by Colonel B (para. 1187).

650 Trial Judgment, para. 2175.

651 Trial Judgment, para. 1040.

652 Trial Judgment, paras 1041, 1043.

653 Trial Judgment, para. 1605. The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved:

Tonkilili District: At Kangari Hills continuously and throughout the period from early 1996 until May 1997 an unknown number of children were abducted and conscripted into the RUF/AFRC (paras 1366-1367, 1596i).

Kailahun District: In Bunumbu from about February until the end of 1998 an unknown number of children were abducted and trained by the RUF/AFRC. Children were first screened into SBUs and SGUs based on age and health. After military training they were sent to the front lines to fight or were assigned as bodyguards (paras 1368-1378, 1596iv). In about April/May until about July/August 1998 a child was abducted from outside of Koidu Town in Kono and trained in Bunumbu in Kailahun District (paras 1379-1393, 1596ii). From February/March through until about November/December 1999 a child was abducted in Wellington in Freetown and then forced to train as a child soldier in Kailahun District, as well as sent to Makeni in Bombali District, to do house chores for Issa Sesay and his wife (paras 1403-1411, 1596iii). In Bunumbu between February and December 1998 children were sent to the frontlines and forced to participate in food finding missions armed with knives and sticks, and on one occasion a gun. The children beat and killed civilians if they met with resistance (paras 1473-1482, 1596xix, xx). In Kailahun District from 1996 to 2000 children were abducted and then trained. They carried guns and followed commanders (paras 1483-1486, 1596xxi).

Kono District: In and around Koidu Town after 14 February 1998 an unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC and forcefully used as reinforcements (paras 1412-1422, 1596vii). At Superman Ground during March 1998 an unknown number of children that had been abducted from villages near PC Ground were trained and subsequently distributed to commanders (paras 1412-1422, 1596vi). On Masingbi Road between mid-March and April 1998 an unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC (paras 1412-1422, 1596ix). After April 1998 an unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC. Trainees were sent on food finding missions accompanied by gunmen (paras 1412-1422, 1596viii). In Yengema in December 1998 onwards an unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC (para. 1423-1424, 1596v). In Sawoa in February/March 1998 a child was used to amputate the hands of five men and to chop a civilian’s arm (paras 1488-1490, 1596xxiii). In Tombodu in December 1999 an unknown number of children were used to guard mining (paras 1494-1495, 1596xxiv). In Tombodu, Yomandu and Masingbi Road in mid-1998 children were used by commanders Alimamy Bobson Sesay and Bomb Blast to amputate the limbs of civilians and to capture girls to detain for sexual purposes (paras 1498-1505, 1596xxv). At Igbaleh/Kamachende and Wondedu in about April 1998, on the orders of Rocky, SBUs decapitated men Rocky had just killed. SBUs set five houses on fire after Captain Banya instructed them to “go and light candles” (paras 1498-1505, 1596xxvi). In Tongbodu in mid-April 1998 a boy was ordered to kill a civilian (paras 1498-1505, 1596xxvii). In Bombafoidu in mid-April 1998 a boy ordered a civilian to undress (paras 1498-1505, 1596xxviii).

Bombali District: From about August to December 1998 anSBU carried a gun and marched together with other troops from Kailahun to Kono District. The SBU fought during attacks in Koinadugu and Bombali Districts and acted as a bodyguard to a rebel named “Blood”. Gbundema passed an order for a house to be burned down and the SBU did it together with Blood (paras 1530-1541, 1596xxxvi). An unspecified number of months before 6 January 1999 a child was abducted in Bonoya and forcibly conscripted into the RUF/AFRC under the command of SAJ Musa and forced to carry items looted from civilians (paras 1440-1446, 1596xiv). In about July to August 1999 a child that had escaped the RUF/AFRC was again abducted in Kamayusufu and then conscripted into the RUF/AFRC (paras 1447-1450, 1596xv). At Camp Rosos in July 1998 an unknown number of children that had been abducted during an attack on Karina were trained, and small boys were assigned to the wives of commanders to do “small works” (paras 1433-1434, 1596xi). In Makeni in May 2000 approximately 145 children were abducted from a care centre and conscripted into the RUF/AFRC (paras 1435-1439, 1596xii, xiii). In or about July 1998 an unknown number of children were used to perform “small works” for commanders’ wives before being trained. After training SBUs took part in patrols, food finding missions, ambushes and participated in attacks on armed forces. In or about August/September 1998 an unknown number of children were trained at Camp Rosos. SAJ Musa sent SBUs led by Major O-Five as reinforcements for the Freetown Invasion (paras 1520-1524, 1596xxxiv). At Teko Barracks in Makeni during February 1998 an unknown number of children were used as bodyguards for commanders and committed crimes during Operation Pay Yourself (paras 1525-1526, 1596xxxv). At Rosos between July and October 1998 an unknown number of children participated in burnings and amputations (paras 1527-1529). In Rosos after September 1998 Alhaji assembled civilians, including a child, to go on an armed food-finding mission to loot food from civilians (paras 1542-1547, 1596xxxvii). At an unknown date after 7 July 1999 a child soldier was used in an attack on Kabala by members of the RUF/AFRC under the command of Issa Sesay and Superman (paras 1548-1553, 1596xxxviii). From September to December 1998 a child carried ammunition and a gun for commander Kabila during a journey. The child also killed civilians on Kabila’s orders, set fire to a deserted house in a village after SAJ Musa ordered it burned, and partook in the capture of a girl who was then raped by Kabila (1554-1565, 1596xxxix).

Port Loko District: From January until at least April/May 1999 a child was abducted and conscripted as a child soldier (1451-1456, 1596xvi). In April/May 1999 a child was sent on a food-finding mission during which she looted civilian property, used a weapon and killed a civilian woman (1506-1509, 1596xxix).

Freetown and Western Area: In Freetown in January 1999 a child attempted to amputate the hands of a civilian (paras 1566-1575, 1596xliii). In Benguema from the end of January until March 1999 an unknown number of children were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC. The children wore military uniforms, carried guns and followed commanders. Every commander had a small boy and commanders were ordered to train them to help repel enemy attacks. The small boys were trained individually and taken on patrols. Children attached to commanders such as Gunboot, Tina Musa and Five-Five were sent to flog civilians who had committed crimes (paras 1576-1582, 1596xlii). In Freetown in January 1999 a child carried ammunition and looted a store. The child held a gun to facilitate Adama Cut Hand amputating two civilian men, and with another child amputated the arms of two civilian men and looted their store (paras 1583-1594, 1596xliv).

Kenema District: Between May 1997 and February 1998 an unknown number of children were used by the RUF/AFRC Junta to guard mining sites in Tongo Fields to ensure that civilians worked hard and did not escape. Sam Bockarie ordered SBUs to shoot and kill people who took “gravel” without permission (paras 1465-1468, 1596xvii). Bockarie was accompanied by a convoy of adult and child combatants aged between 12 and 14 years who safeguarded his physical safety and collected diamonds (paras 1465-1468, 1596xviii).

Koinadugu District: In April or May 1999 a child was sent on a food finding mission in which she looted property, and killed a civilian woman (paras 1506-1509). In Kondembaia between March and May 1998 children with guns followed the boss’s command to burn down houses in the village (paras 1510-1512, 1596xxxii). In Koinadugu District after April or May 1999 a child was sent to fight, to kill civilians and to loot property (paras 1513-1516).

654 Trial Judgment, para. 1364.

655 Trial Judgment, para. 1602.

656 Trial Judgment, para. 1600.

657 Trial Judgment, para. 1600.

658 Trial Judgment, para. 1601.

659 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 1458, 1459, 1465-1468, 1494, 1495.

660 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 1460, 1461, 1463, 1464, 1368-1378, 1403-1411, 1412-1422, 1433, 1434, 1465-1468, 1483-1486, 1520-1524, 1525, 1526, 1530-1541.

661 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras, 1213-1216, 1368-1378, 1412-1422, 1440-1446, 1462, 1465-1468, 1473-1482, 1488-1490, 1498-1505, 1506-1509, 1510-1512, 1513-1516, 1520-1524, 1525-1526, 1527-1529, 1530-1541, 1542-1547, 1548-1553, 1554-1565, 1566-1575, 1576-1582, 1583-1594.

662 Trial Judgment, para. 1598.

663 Trial Judgment, para. 1253.

664 Trial Judgment, para. 1387.

665 Trial Judgment, para. 1242.

666 Trial Judgment, para. 1599.

667 Trial Judgment, paras 1242, 1369, 1599.

668 Trial Judgment, para. 1603.

669 Trial Judgment, para. 1597.

670 Trial Judgment, paras 1603.

671 Trial Judgment, paras 1969 (the primary purpose of conscripting and using child soldiers was military), 1971 (the primary purpose behind the commission of abductions and forced labour was utilitarian or military in nature).

672 See infra paras 310-314, 319-323, 327, 340, 342, 343.

673 Trial Judgment, paras. 2033-2038, 2052, 2053.

674 Trial Judgment, paras 1969, 1971.

675 See supra para. 267, fn. 653.

676 Trial Judgment, para. 518.

677 Trial Judgment, para. 518.

678 Trial Judgment, para. 6790.

679 Trial Judgment, para. 2553.

680 Trial Judgment, para. 2560.

681 Foday Sankoh was leader of the RUF by 1991 and remained leader throughout the Sierra Leonean Civil War, even during periods in which he was detained. See Trial Judgment, paras 2320, 6772, 6774, 6784.

682 Trial Judgment, para. 2553.

683 Trial Judgment, para. 2554.

684 Trial Judgment, para. 39.

685 Trial Judgment, para. 2554.

686 Trial Judgment, para. 2534.

687 Trial Judgment, para. 2539.

688 Trial Judgment, para. 2531.

689 Trial Judgment, para. 2541.

690 Trial Judgment, para. 42.

691 Trial Judgment, para. 42.

692 Trial Judgment, para. 6749. Johnny Paul Koroma remained leader of the AFRC through much of the Indictment Period, although he was detained by Sam Bockarie in late February/early March 1998. At that time, he was arrested, and his wife was sexually assaulted. Bockarie placed JPK under house arrest in Kangama village near Buedu where he remained until mid-1999. Trial Judgment, para. 6754.

693 Trial Judgment, para. 44.

694 Foday Sankoh was arrested and detained in Nigeria in March 1997. Sam Bockarie was appointed the acting leader in his absence, and continued to serve as leader of the RUF until 1999. See Trial Judgment, paras 6480, 6751.

695 Trial Judgment, para. 6749.

696 Trial Judgment, para. 43. The executive body of the Junta Government was the Supreme Council, in which JPK and Sankoh were appointed Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively. As Sankoh was in custody in Nigeria, Lieutenant Colonel SAJ Musa served as Acting Vice-Chairman in Sankoh’s absence. Although the AFRC and RUF had an integrated organisational structure for the government, they did not integrate their military command structures at this point. (Trial Judgment, para. 6750).

697 Trial Judgment, paras 6871, 6880.

698 Trial Judgment, para. 548.

699 Trial Judgment, para. 548.

700 Trial Judgment, para. 527.

701 Trial Judgment, para. 527.

702 Trial Judgment, para. 554.

703 Trial Judgment, para. 548.

704 Trial Judgment, para. 530.

705 The Trial Chamber found that after the 25 May 1997 overthrow of the Kabbah Government by the Junta forces, a large contingent of RUF/AFRC forces were based in Kenema Town until the Intervention in mid-February 1998 when they were forced to flee the area. The RUF forces were led by Bockarie and the AFRC by Eddie Kanneh. Notwithstanding separate command structures the two groups worked in collaboration with each other during this period. From May 1997 to February 1998 many civilians in the District suspected of supporting or cooperating with the CDF were murdered, and/or had their property looted or destroyed by the RUF/AFRC forces. On 11 August 1997, under the command of Issa Sesay, Akim and Bockarie, the RUF/AFRC attacked and took control of Tongo Fields, looting property and capturing civilians to forcibly mine diamonds for them, in the process killing civilians who refused to cooperate. The Trial Chamber concluded that in Kenema District between about 25 May 1997 and about 31 March 1998 RUF/AFRC members murdered an unknown number of civilians (paras 585, 586, 643, 1649).

706 Trial Judgment, para. 617.

707 The Trial Chamber found the following specific crimes proved in the locations below:

Kenema Town: In front of the NIC building in about September 1997 Bockarie shot and killed a farmer accused of being a Kamajor in full view of the public, announcing that he would do the same to all Kamajors, thereby sending a clear and unequivocal message to the civilian population not to associate with the Junta’s enemies (paras 598-600). On Hangha Street in December 1997 RUF/AFRC fighters killed a civilian suspected of being a member of the CDF. The civilian’s body was disembowelled, his entrails used as a checkpoint and his body left on display for three days (paras 604-606). In early February 1998 RUF/AFRC forces led by Bockarie detained, tortured and then killed a number of prominent civilians suspected of being Kamajor supporters (paras 611-624).

Tongo Fields: In August 1997 in Tongo Fields RUF/AFRC fighters led by Bockarie killed three civilians accused of being Kamajors at a time when the RUF/AFRC forces were under threat of attack from ECOMOG and the Kamajors, the murders done with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population by making an example of would be enemies of the Junta forces, thereby guaranteeing civilian loyalty (paras 625-627).

Bumpe: On the outskirts of Tongo Fields on about 8 September 1997 RUF/AFRC fighters killed 17 civilians as revenge killings following military losses and justified the killings by branding the innocent civilians “Kamajors” or “Kamajor collaborators” (paras 628-632).

Panguma: In September 1997 RUF/AFRC fighters killed two civilians as revenge killings following military losses and justified the killings by branding the innocent civilians “Kamajors” or “Kamajor collaborators” (paras 628-632).

708 The Trial Chamber found the following specific crimes proved in the locations below:

Kenema Town: The RUF/AFRC killed a civilian to steal his property and to terrorise other civilians who would similarly attempt to resist looting (paras 588-589). At the Police Station in late May or June 1997 RUF/AFRC fighters acting under Bockarie’s orders, and in the presence of senior commander Eddie Kanneh, killed three suspected burglars who had not been charged in a court of law. The killings were in full view of the police personnel and members of the public, and the bodies were left on display for the rest of the day to serve as an example to the residents of Kenema Town (paras 592-597). In front of Capital Cinema in November 1997 Bockarie shot and killed two suspected thieves who had not been properly tried by a court of law, leaving their bodies in full view of the public for three days before taking them away (paras 601-603). In Sombo Street a few months before the Intervention, Bockarie killed a suspected thief and publicly exhibited the corpse on the street to instil terror (paras 607-610).

Tongo Fields area: During the Junta’s occupation of Tongo Fields RUF/AFRC child soldiers under the command ofBockarie killed eight civilian miners to guarantee the continuing servitude of other miners (paras 633-636). At Cyborg Pit between 11 August 1997 and January 1998 RUF/AFRC guards killed an unknown number of civilian miners, including a child, to guarantee the continuing servitude of other miners (paras 637-641).

709 Trial Judgment, paras 596, 597, 602, 603, 605, 606, 607-610.

710 Trial Judgment, paras 635, 636, 640, 641.

711 Trial Judgment, para. 1979.

712 Trial Judgment, para. 548.

713 Trial Judgment, para. 48. See also Trial Judgment, para. 5550.

714 Trial Judgment, para. 48.

715 Buedu in Kailahun District was Bockarie’s headquarters following the Intervention.

716 Trial Judgment, para. 49. Around this time, Johnny Paul Koroma appointed Sam Bockarie as Chief of Defence Staff, which gave Bockarie the overall authority over the RUF/AFRC forces. At this point, the alliance was restructured, and the command structure became unified; each group led by an RUF commander was to have an AFRC deputy, and each group commanded by an AFRC commander was to have an RUF deputy. This resulted in the RUF assumption of command over the RUF/AFRC forces. Trial Judgment, para. 6753.

717 Trial Judgment, para. 5550.

718 Trial Judgment, para. 2863. See also Trial Judgment, para. 3611(ii).

719 Trial Judgment, para. 52. Following the capture of Koidu Town, JPK travelled to Buedu to meet with Sam Bockarie. Bockarie then arrested him on suspicion of attempting to leave Sierra Leone with a large quantity of diamonds. Bockarie then assumed complete control over the RUF/AFRC forces. Trial Judgment, para. 53. See also Trial Judgment, paras 2847-2850.

720 Trial Judgment, para. 48.

721 Trial Judgment, para. 48.

722 Trial Judgment, para. 54. See also Trial Judgment, para. 2927.

723 Trial Judgment, paras 534, 555.

724 Trial Judgment, paras 534, 539.

725 Trial Judgment, para. 539.

726 For the Trial Chamber’s findings of specific acts of terror proved in Kono District see paras 1980-2049. For the Trial Chamber’s general findings on crimes in Kono District, see paras 534, 555.

727 The Trial Chamber concluded that between about 1 February 1998 and about 31 January 2000, in various locations in Kono District members of the RUF/AFRC murdered an unknown number of civilians and committed acts of cruel treatment and other inhumane acts against an unknown number of civilians (paras 749, 1231). The Trial Chamber further found the following specific killings, mutilations and burnings proved in the locations below:

Koidu Town: At Yardo Road in early March 1998 RUF/AFRC forces acting on the orders of SAJ Musa, JPK and Issa Sesay, shot and killed an unknown number of civilians (paras 649-663). At Hill Station in early March 1998 commander Superman shot and killed 13 civilians including men, women and children with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 649-663). At Superman Compound in early March 1998 RUF/AFRC forces acting under the orders of Superman shot and killed a woman, tortured to death an elderly man and executed an unknown number of abducted civilians with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 649-663). Between April and May 1998 during an attack on Koidu Town the following incidents took place: commander Rocky, acting under the orders of a commander called Rambo, executed 101 captured men and had their bodies decapitated; SBUs acting under the orders of Rocky dismembered then killed a young boy and threw his body into a pit latrine; and at Sunna Mosque RUF/AFRC forces shot and killed a civilian. These crimes were committed for the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 664-672). In late February/March and late April/May 1998 burnings were intentionally directed against civilians or their properties with the primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the civilian population (paras 1991-2006).

Bumpe: Between March and June 1998 RUF/AFRC forces acting under the orders of several commanders including Kallay, Bomb Blast, Superman, Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon, Rocky and others, killed an unknown number of civilians with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 676-684). Civilian houses were burnt with the primary purpose of spreading terror amongst civilian population (paras 2028-2031).

Tombodu: In about March or April 1998 RUF/AFRC forces massacred more than 20 civilians with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 685-687). In about April 1998 RUF/AFRC forces led by Savage and with the approval of commanders Superman and Bomb Blast, killed 63 civilians with primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 688-692). In April 1998 RUF/AFRC forces under the orders of Alhaji killed 56 civilians with the purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 693-698). In about March to June 1998 Alimamy Bobson Sesay and other RUF/AFRC commanders commanded SBUs to amputate the hands of civilians. Commander Savage amputated the hands of civilians helped by SBUs (paras 1213-1217). In February/March 1998 civilian houses were burnt with the primary purpose of spreading terror (paras 2008-2017).

Kayima: In mid 1998 an unknown number of people “starting at Kayima” were mutilated by having “RUF” carved onto them, and in July 1998 18 people had the words “RUF” and/or “AFRC” carved into them (paras 1219-1222).

Foendor near Tombodu and Tombodu: Between April to May 1998 RUF/AFRC fighters pretending to be ECOMOG beheaded an unknown number of civilians including two children, and soon thereafter, an RUF/AFRC fighter killed a man by slitting his throat. RUF/AFRC forces under the command of Alhaji also killed three civilians. These crimes were committed for the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 699-704).

Koidu Gieya: In about May/June 1998 RUF/AFRC fighters killed an unknown number of civilians including children and one Kamajor to instill terror in the civilian population (paras 705-710).

Koidu Buma: In May/June 1998 RUF Rambo killed 15 civilians with the approval of commanders Bomb Blast, Bazzy and Superman with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 711-713).

Yengema : In March or April 1998 RUF/AFRC forces underthe command of Tito, and with the approval of patrol commander Bomb Blast, killed an unknown number of civilians with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 714-716).

Paema or Peyima: In around March/April 1998 RUF/AFRC members killed a number of civilians with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 723-730).

Bomboa Fuidu: In April 1998 RUF/AFRC rebels killed several civilians with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 731-736).

Njaima Nimikoro or Nimikoro: In April 1998 RUF/AFRC members, acting in accordance with the orders of commanders including Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon, Rocky, Cobra and Bobby killed an unknown number of civilians, including seven senior citizens, with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 739-740).

Mortema: On about 12 June 1998 RUF/AFRC rebels led by “Fixo Bio” executed 17-25 civilians at the Bull residence in Mortema with the primary purpose of instilling terror in the civilian population (paras 737-747).

Sewafe: Civilian houses were burnt for the primary purpose of terrorising the civilian population (paras 2019-2021).

Wondedu: Between April and November 1998 “RUF” and “AFRC” were carved into the bodies of an unknown number of captive civilians and commander Banya knocked out the teeth of a captive (paras 1225-1230). After April 1998 at least 5 houses were burnt to spread terror among the civilian population (paras 2023-2026).

Various locations: Credible evidence of the murder of civilians in a number of locations within Kono District including Baima, Goldtown, Yekeyor, Kondeya, Mambona, and others (para. 748).

728 For the Trial Chamber’s findings on acts of terror proved in Kailahun District see paras 2050-2056. For the Trial Chamber’s findings on crimes committed in Kailahun District, see paras 547, 553, 768, 955-961, 962-966, 967-970, 1039-1043, 1056-1060, 1067-1072, 1368-1378, 1473-1482.

729 Following the retreat of the RUF/AFRC fighters from Freetown and their regrouping at Masiaka, JPK announced “Operation Pay Yourself”, resulting in a campaign of extensive looting which continued throughout the movement of the RUF/AFRC troops during this period. In around May 1998, fighters burnt homes, looted and killed civilians as part of “Operation No Living Thing” in Kenema. In mid-1998 fighters raped, killed and/or mutilated and rebels burned houses and looted property as they specifically targeted civilians en route from Kono District to Bombali and Kambia District. In late-1998, the RUF/AFRC instituted a campaign called “Operation Spare No Soul” in which fighters were encouraged to kill civilians. Trial Judgment, paras 533-537, 549.

730 Trial Judgment, para. 549. See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 649-663, 683, 712-713, 715, 739 (killings committed or ordered by commanders).

731 Trial Judgment, para. 646.

732 Trial Judgment, para. 646.

733 Trial Judgment, para. 651.

734 Trial Judgment, para. 646.

735 Trial Judgment, para. 647.

736 Trial Judgment, para. 646.

737 The Trial Chamber found that in mid-to-late February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces massacred 60-65 civilians in Kailahun Town in accordance with Bockarie’s order. Many civilians had fled their villages before the 25 May 1997 coup, but then returned to their homes after having being encouraged by Bockarie to do so. However, after the Intervention, 60-65 unarmed male civilians who had fled and returned to the town were then arrested on Bockarie’s orders on suspicion of being Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators, and interrogated by Augustine Gbao. Gbao’s verdict condemning the civilians was based on mere suspicion or speculation, and was not the result of due process. The RUF/AFRC then executed these civilians at the roundabout and military police prison in Kailahun Town. The executions were clearly reprisal killings by Bockarie and RUF/AFRC forces acting under his orders against unarmed civilians perceived to be enemies of the RUF/AFRC. Several human heads and skulls were displayed on sticks on both sides of the road to Pendembu, and on the orders of Bockarie the corpses of the victims were not buried, leaving a stench in the air. The primary purpose of the massacre including the bizarre display of human heads and rotting corpses was to instil terror in the civilian population of Kailahun. Trial Judgment, paras 752-769.

738 Trial Judgment, para. 549.

739 Trial Judgment, para 663. The Trial Chamber also made similar findings regarding the RUF/AFRC strategy for the following killings: in Koidu Town between April and May 1998 (para. 672), in Bumpe between March and June (para. 684), in Tombodu in about March or April 1998 (para. 687), in Tombodu in about in about April 1998 (para. 692), in Koidu Buma in about May/June 1998 (para. 713), in Paema in about March/April 1998 (para. 730).

740 Trial Judgment, paras 534, 555. See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 1991-2006, 2008-2017, 2019, 2021, 2023-2026, 2028-2031 (burnings in Kono District committed as acts of terror).

741 Trial Judgment, para. 646.

742 Trial Judgment, para. 768.

743 Trial Judgment, paras 663, 672, 684, 687, 692, 713, 730.

744 Trial Judgment, paras 650 (Koidu Town), 684 (Bumpe), 713 (Koidu Buma), 716 (Yengema).

745 Trial Judgment, paras 683, 684.

746 Trial Judgment, paras 712, 713.

747 Trial Judgment, para. 2044.

748 Trial Judgment, paras 52-55.

749 SAJ Musa was a senior AFRC commander and served as Acting Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Council in Sankoh’s absence. Trial Judgment, para. 6750. After Johnny Paul Koroma appointed Sam Bockarie as Chief of Defence Staff, giving Bockarie overall authority over the combined and restructured RUF/AFRC forces, SAJ Musa disputed Bockarie’s command and eventually led a breakaway group of predominantly AFRC troops to Koinadugu District. Trial Judgment, para. 54. On 23 December 1998, SAJ Musa died at Benguema outside Freetown. Trial Judgment, para. 57.

750 Gullit was a senior AFRC commander and member of the AFRC Supreme Council. Trial Judgment, para. 54.

751 Superman was a senior RUF commander and Battlefield Commander for Kono District. Evidence suggests that he was killed in 2001. Trial Judgment, paras 55, 154.

752 Trial Judgment, paras 52-55.

753 Trial Judgment, para. 3107.

754 Trial Judgment, para. 3106.

755 Trial Judgment, paras 3109, 6958.

756 Trial Judgment, para. 3615.

757 Trial Judgment, para. 3112.

758 Trial Judgment, para. 540.

759 Trial Judgment, para. 56.

760 Trial Judgment, para. 3369.

761 Trial Judgment, para. 3371.

762 Trial Judgment, para. 57.

763 Trial Judgment, para. 3370.

764 Trial Judgment, para. 61.

765 Trial Judgment, paras 3394, 3464.

766 Trial Judgment, para. 3435.

767 Trial Judgment, para. 6792.

768 Trial Judgment, paras 3445-3449, 3611(xii). For example: Bockarie told Gullit that if ECOMOG forced them out of Freetown, they should burn the fucking place and that they should not spare anything. (Trial Judgment, para. 2062). Bockarie ordered Gullit to make Freetown more “fearful” than before. (Trial Judgment, para. 3445). Bockarie ordered over the radio that the Nigerian Embassy should be burnt. (Trial Judgment, para. 3447). Bockarie passed a direct instruction that if it was possible, if they had the chance, they should set the Kissy Terminal oil refinery on fire. (Trial Judgment, para. 2113). Bockarie ordered Gullit that before they withdrew, they should kill many people and burn down many houses. (Trial Judgment, para. 3448). When instructing Gullit to leave Freetown, Bockarie told him that he should make the area “fearful” until they reorganised themselves to regain Freetown. (Trial Judgment, para. 3445).

769 Trial Judgment, para. 3445.

770 Trial Judgment, para. 2067.

771 Trial Judgment, para. 3449.

772 Trial Judgment, para. 3452.

773 Trial Judgment, paras 3450-3452. For example: While in the hills around Kissy Mental Home, Gullit observed the civilians in Kissy dancing and welcoming the Guinean soldiers and ECOMOG forces, and taking this as a sign of betrayal, he then ordered a group to move towards Ferry Junction and to amputate and kill civilians and burn all the remaining houses. (Trial Judgment, para. 2108). Gullit ordered Bomb Blast to go to Calaba Town and burn down the area so that Freetown would be ungovernable. (Trial Judgment, para. 2155). Gullit declared Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill a killing zone wherein anybody who came around that area was considered an enemy and that person should die. (Trial Judgment, paras 841, 2180). Gullit instructed rebels to go to Ferry Junction, Low Cost Area and Kissy and burn all the remaining houses and kill all the civilians. (Trial Judgment, para. 794). Gullit ordered other killings such the killing of over 60 civilians suspected of harbouring ECOMOG forces who had taken refuge in a mosque and the killing of four white nuns. (Trial Judgment, paras 806, 807). Gullit incited the rebel forces to burn all the houses and kill all the remaining civilians in Kissy. (Trial Judgment, para. 808). In Calaba Town commanders Gullit, Bazzy and Five-Five ordered atrocities such as the intentional massacre of hundreds of civilians by shooting, burning or hacking them to death. (Trial Judgment, para. 830). Gullit appointed one squad to move to the Low Cost Housing area, and to be sure to amputate people and burn houses in that area. (Trial Judgment, para. 1294).

774 Trial Judgment, para. 831.

775 Trial Judgment, para. 3450.

776 Trial Judgment, para. 788. See Trial Judgment, para. 2068 (burnings done for the primary purpose of spreading terror), 2172 (killings done for the purpose of spreading terror).

777 Trial Judgment para. 975. See also the Trial Chamber’s further findings of the specific crime of rape and sexual violence proved in Freetown and the Western Area, in paras 977-980, 981-984, 985-989, 991-992, 993-999, 1001-1007, 1008-1015.

778 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 981-984 (the testimony of Alimamy Bobson Sesay), 991, 992 (the rape of girls by rebels led by Captain Blood), 1169 (a civilian was used as a sexual slave by Major Arif), 1187 (a civilian was kept as a sexual slave by Colonel B).

779 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 1155-1156, 1157-1163, 1165-1169, 1171-1179, 1181-1187.

780 Trial Judgment, para. 3451.

781 Trial Judgment, para. 61.

782 Trial Judgment, para. 61.

783 Trial Judgment, para. 3476.

784 Trial Judgment, para. 61.

785 See para. 542 for the Trial Chamber’s general findings and para. 975 for the Trial Chamber’s finding that rape was widespread throughout Freetown. The Trial Chamber found that killings, sexual violence, physical violence and burning were perpetrated as acts of terror (paras 2172-2191, 2068). The Trial Chamber further found the following specific crimes proved in the locations below (for child soldiers see supra para. 267, fn. 653, for enslavement see supra para. 261 fn. 613 and for sexual slavery see supra para. 264 fn. 630):

Freetown and Western Area in general: On 8 January a hospital in Freetown was overwhelmed with patients, 90% of whom were suffering war related injuries including mutilations and amputations of the hands, tongue and eyeballs (paras 1267-1273). On Waterloo St in January 1999 a civilian was abducted by rebels and beaten before being locked in a kitchen without food or water with other captives for four days (paras 1267-1273). Members of the RUF/AFRC burned civilian property with the primary purpose of spreading terror in the civilian population. Sam Bockarie told Gullit that if ECOMOG forced them put of Freetown “they should burn the fucking place and that they should not spare anything.” Civilians suffered raping, hard labour, execution, amputation, burning of property (paras 2057-2068). RUF/AFRC members looted property from civilians (paras 1921-1926).

State House and surrounding area: At State House between 6 and 8 January 1999 rebel forces killed at least 35 Nigerian soldiers who were hors de combat and at least 55 civilians. The perpetrators were acting in accordance with the orders of Gullit to carry out indiscriminate killings, mass abductions, raping of civilians and burning and destruction of civilian and public property in Freetown as part of the campaign of terror waged against the civilian population (paras 781-788). In Freetown, including at State House andPademba Rd, in January 1999 RUF/AFRC forces burned down houses and other property with the primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the civilian population. Sam Bockarie announced on the international media that he was giving orders to his commander Gullit to start burning strategic locations and capturing civilians in Freetown. He later confirmed such orders with Gullit “so that there would be no government and there will be nobody for the government to rule.” As the rebels retreated they burned down houses (paras 2124-2139). RUF/AFRC members looted vehicles from civilians which they brought back to State House, as well as other civilian property including a car, items from the Vice President’s office and clothing from a civilian (1928-1930). Over a period of three nights in January 1999 rebels under Gullit’s command raped women and girls on the grounds of the State House in a public area (paras 977-980, 1016i). After the Junta captured the State House commanders captured young girls mostly aged between 14 to 16 and forced them to have sexual intercourse inside the State house. SBUs also captured girls aged about eight to nine to use for sex (paras 981-984, 1016ii, iii). In January 1999 a civilian was locked in a kitchen at State House in Freetown under armed guards with about 50 other civilians for about four days without food and water. He was then chained and forced to carry a heavy bomb to Calaba Town after not having eaten for four days (paras 1849-1864).

Kissy area: Near Ferry Junction on about 12 January two civilian men were killed in a ritualistic murder by the invading rebel forces. On Falcon St on about 15 January an old woman was killed as part of Operation No Living Thing. On about 18 January 8 civilians seeking refuge in a house were shot and killed after refusing to surrender their hands for amputation. On the same occasion rebels under the orders of “Commando” hacked to death five other civilian men who had similarly refused to surrender their hands for amputation. At Fataraman St on 18 January a rebel amputated and caused the death of a civilian. In January rebels led by Captain Blood killed a civilian who was set ablaze in his house. In January at the Good Shepherd Hospital RUF/AFRC forces under the command of Captain Blood executed 17 civilians. At Kissy Market and Low Cost Area in the third week of January rebels acting on the orders of commanders Gullit, Rambo Red Goat and Med Bajehjeh killed an unknown number of civilians they suspected of Supporting ECOMOG. On 22 January rebels under the command of Gullit, Five-Five, Rambo Red Goat and Med Bajehjeh killed over 60 civilians sheltering in Rogbalan mosque on suspicion that they were harbouring ECOMOG forces. At “Crazy Yard” on 22 January, after the massacre at Rogbalan mosque, a rebel acting on the orders of Gullit shot and killed four white nuns. The primary purpose of the murders in Kissy was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 789-808). At Good Shepherd Hospital on about 6 January 1999 RUF/AFRC fighters came in and accused staff of treating ECOMOG and Kamajors and then forced 200 patients outside and beat them. 15 people were shot dead and at least another four were wounded. A Nigerian patient whose wound and amputated ear was being treated was shot dead (paras 1274-1277). At Kissy Market during January 1999 two RUF/AFRC child soldiers on patrol amputated a hand each from two shopkeepers taking refuge in their shop (paras 1278-1279). Near Kissy Mental Hospital RUF/AFRC rebels amputated and mutilated the hands of three civilians (paras 1280-1285). In Kissy a civilian was lashed with a cable by a rebel. The same civilian was struck by the butt of a gun, hit on the back with the flat side of a machete and had his hand amputated by Captain Blood. Captain Blood or persons under his command amputated both hands of a civilian. Many civilians had their hands cut off (paras 1286-1293). RUF/AFRC member Changa Bulanga performed three amputations in Kissy and an unknown number in the Low Cost Area (paras 1294-1297). In Kissy on 20 January 1999 two civilians had their hands amputated by members of the RUF/AFRC. One was told to “go and tell Tejan Kabbah, no more politics, no more votes” and the other to go tell Kabbah that he was “a messenger” (paras 1298-1302). On Rowe St in Kissy in January 1999 an RUF/AFRC member amputated a civilian’s hand (paras 1303-1304). At the Samuels area of Kissy on 22 January 1999 RUF/AFRC commanders ordered three civilians’ hands cut off and that the victims should “go to Kabbah and ask for Kabbah to give him a hand.” RUF/AFRC members then amputated the hands of two civilians and the fingers of the other who was then shot and killed (paras 1305-1309). At Kissy on 19 January 1999 rebels under the command of “Rambo” asked civilians to queue for amputations. The first 13 civilians in the queue were killed and the 14th civilian’s hands were amputated. An unknown number of civilians were in Connaught Hospital because their hands and/or arms had been amputated in Freetown (paras 1310-1315). In Kissy in late January 1999 RUF/AFRC members amputated the limbs of 11 civilians. On 10 to 22 January a 13 year old girl had her hand amputated (paras 1316-1325). In January 1999 during the Freetown Invasion rebels brought young girls of about 12 to 13 years old to a house on Blackhall Rd and raped them (paras 986-989, 1016iv). In Kissy on or about 22 January 1999 RUF/AFRC members under the command of Captain Blood raped young girls aged 13-15 years old. The rebels brought the girls, laid them outside in the open and raped them (paras 991-992, 1016v). In Kissy RUF/AFRC members pillaged civilian property from two stores in Kissy and the civilians inside the stores who resisted the looting had a hand each amputated (paras 1931-1933). In the area of Falcon St RUF/AFRC forces pillaged a sheep and chickens as well as 50,000 Leones from civilians (paras 1934-1937). In Kissy on or about 6 January 1999 RUF/AFRC members pillaged a watch and 200 dollars from a civilian. Civilians were arrested by the rebels and searched, the rebels taking all they had, including money. In January 1999 on Rowe St RUF/AFRC members pillaged items including televisions and radios from civilians’ houses (paras 1938-1940). On Congress Rd in January 1999 RUF/AFRC members pillaged a civilian’s money and food (paras 1941-1943). RUF/AFRC members entered Rogbalan Mosque and fired indiscriminately into it. After the shooting rebels reached into the pocket of a civilian who had fallen to the floor during the shooting and took 15,000 Leones (paras 1944-1946). Burnings were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population. In Kissy rebels beat people, burned down houses and stole property. A hospital in Freetown received patients with burns caused by fleeing from torched homes. Members of the RUF/AFRC burned down property in Kissy and Fourah Bay. Civilians trapped inside houses died (paras 2090-2122).

Fourah Bay: At Ferry Junction in the second week of January three civilian government officials were killed on the orders of Gullit as punishment for being “collaborators” of the government. In the third week of January, rebels acting on the orders of commanders Gullit, Bazzy and Five-Five, killed an unknown number of civilians by burning them alive inside their homes, or forcing them outside their homes and killing them, in revenge for an RUF/AFRC fighter killed inthe area. At Fourah Bay Rd on about 21 January 1999 retreating rebels killed three civilian children. The primary purpose of the murders in Fourah Bay was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 809-814). On 21 January 1999 three sisters had their limbs amputated or mutilated. On 18 January 1999 RUF/AFRC members amputated the hands of seven civilians (paras 1327-1331).

Thunder Hill and Samuels Area: Three separate sets of RUF/AFRC rebels pillaged money and other possessions from a house at Thunder Hill in which civilians were staying. The civilians left and went to the Samuels Area where rebels pillaged their clothes and one civilian’s money (paras 1949-1952).

Upgun: RUF/AFRC member Five-Five instructed RUF/AFRC members to amputate limbs and said he was “going to demonstrate it.” He then performed a demonstration by amputating the arms of three civilians. Thereafter an unknown number of civilians had their arms amputated by RUF/AFRC members Major Mines and Kabila (paras 1332-1334).

Calaba Town: On about 18-22 January on the orders of commanders Gullit, Bazzy and Five-Five, fighters led by Bomb Blast, Rambo Red Goat, Med Bejehjeh and Alimamy Bobson Sesay massacred hundreds of civilians at Calaba Town by shooting, burning or hacking them to death, including a civilian nun shot dead by commander Tito, two civilians hacked to death with machetes, and a hors de combat ECOMOG soldier who was beheaded. The primary purpose of the murders in Calaba Town was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 815-831). In January 1999 RUF/AFRC members burned down civilian houses with the primary purpose of spreading terror amongst the civilian population. Gullit ordered Bomb Blast to organise a team to go as far as Calaba Town to investigate the situation and “ensure that anywhere civilians were and houses were they should burn down the area and that they should ensure that Freetown becomes ungovernable.” At Calaba Town the team killed civilians and burned down houses. If civilians attempted to run out they were shot and if they stayed inside they burned with the houses (paras 2153-2162). RUF/AFRC members forced captured civilians to carry bags filled with things rebels had taken from homes (paras 1953-1954). On 22 January nine civilians were abducted by RUF/AFRC members in Calaba Town and one of the civilians was told to carry a bag. The civilians moved with the rebels to Allen Town and were held there for three days with 100 other captured civilians guarded by armed SBUs to prevent them escaping (paras 1849-1864). Between 22 January and about March 1999 an RUF/AFRC member raped a civilian. The civilian was captured by a group of rebels in Calaba Town and taken to various places in Sierra Leone. She was handed over to a commander and told she should be his wife (paras 1008-1015, 1016viii). At Kola Tree in about the end of January 1999 RUF/AFRC members pillaged items of civilian property from a house as well as a civilian’s wedding ring and an unspecified amount of money (paras 1947-1948).

Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill areas: A group of rebels killed civilians as they moved from Wellington to Allen Town. In a church in Allen Town many “small girls” who were “not even adult” were killed by stabbing with bayonets for resisting rape. An old woman was shot and killed. In the second and third weeks of January 1999 on the orders of Gullit, rebels killed an unknown number of civilians suspected of collaborating with ECOMOG forces in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill. In Tower Hill a rebel commander named Junior Lion executed several civilians. On Guard St a rebel named “Captain Blood” beheaded seven young civilian men suspected of collaborating with ECOMOG. The primary purpose of the murders in Kingtom, Allen Town and Tower Hill was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 832-841). In Kingtom in January 1999 RUF/AFRC members burned down property, including houses with people locked inside who died. The burnings were committed with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population (paras 2134-2139). In Allen Town and Waterloo between late January and early April 1999 a fighter named James raped a girl multiple times. The girl was abducted from her house in Wellington and taken to a church where she was raped and lost consciousness. The girl saw other young girls being raped, beaten and killed there. James took the girl to Waterloo and continued to rape her (paras 1001-1007, 1016vii).

Tumbo or Tombo: On 23 December 1998 RUF/AFRC fighters led by Captain Blood killed six civilians including a 10 year old boy during an attack on Tombo. The primary purpose of the murders was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 842-844). Six houses were burnt down. Members of the RUF/AFRC burned civilian property to spread terror among the civilian population (paras 2084-2088). On the night of 23 December 1998 a member of the RUF/AFRC pillaged a civilian’s personal property including a tape recorder, bag and money (paras 1955-1956).

Waterloo: Between late December 1998 and February 1999 rebels attacked Waterloo and an unknown number of civilian men, women and children were indiscriminately killed. Those killed included the Secretary General of the YWCA and a man and an old woman summarily executed in Lumpa Village by commander Peleto. The primary purpose of the murders in Waterloo was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 845-854). In January 1999 rebels amputated the hands of an unknown number of men and women (paras 1349-1352). On about 22 December 1998 and in January 1999 RUF/AFRC forces burned civilian houses to spread terror among the civilian population. As a group of RUF/AFRC fighters went from Waterloo Junction to Freetown they burnt houses along the way. In Waterloo and Lumpa houses were burned and civilians killed (paras 2070-2082).

Wellington: Between late December 1998 and February 1999 rebels attacked Wellington and killed an unknown number of civilians, including a civilian who was shot simply because she was crying, a crippled teacher burnt to death in his house, and another man shot to death on the way to Calaba Town. In Loko Town in about mid-January 1999 rebels killed two civilians, one of them a six year old girl, by hacking them to death with machetes. The primary purpose of the murders in Wellington was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 855-860). On 6 January 1999 a civilian’s left hand was amputated and right hand mutilated by members of the RUF/AFRC. The civilian was told that she should go tell Kabbah that the rebels said they want peace. On the same day a separate group of rebels threw beer bottles at the civilian, kicked her into a gutter and kicked her in the thigh. On 6 January RUF/AFRC members under the command of Rocky amputated the hands of seven people. In late January the rebels amputated the arm of a three to four year old child and a civilian was badly beaten and left under a tree (paras 1335-1348). In January 1999 RUF/AFRC members burned down civilian houses and killed people, including a crippled teacher inside a burning house who died (paras 2145-2151). In January 1999 RUF/AFRC members pillaged food and money from civilians. On one occasion rebels beat some civilians and then forced one of them to show the rebels where she kept money. On another occasion a civilian whose husband had been killed and arm amputated was then captured by rebels who threw bottles at her, cut her and took money she had sewn into her underwear (paras 1957-1960). In Wellington, Calaba Town and Benguema between 22 January 1999 and 10 March 1999 Major Arif raped a civilian (paras 994-999, 1016vi).

Hastings: During an attack on Hastings on 3 January 1999 rebel forces killed three Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers who were hors de combat (paras 861-862).

Benguema: Between December 1998 and February 1999 rebels killed an unknown number of civilians including a woman who was buried alive with the body of SAJ Musa as a sacrifice, a young woman killed by a rebel called “Coal Boot” or “Gun Boot”, and babies travelling with the fighters killed because they were “making noise.” The primary purpose of the murders in Benguema was to instil terror in the civilian population (paras 863-868). In late December 1998 RUF/AFRC forces looted from shops in Benguema and Waterloo (paras 1961-1962).

786 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, para. 2108.

787 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, para. 2183.

788 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, para. 2114.

789 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, para. 2187.

790 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, para. 2126.

791 Trial Judgment, para. 64.

792 Trial Judgment, para. 64.

793 Trial Judgment, para. 64.

794 Trial Judgment, para. 6280.

795 The RUF experienced factional infighting during this time, as divisions within the RUF leadership arose over political and military strategy. The RUF leadership was divided between those who wanted to continue the armed struggle and those in favour of a political solution to the conflict. In late March/early April 1999, Superman and Gibril Massaquoi fought with Sam Bockarie and Issa Sesay, with Superman’s forces taking over Makeni. Around October 1999, fighting broke out again in Makeni between Superman, Issa Sesay and Brigadier Mani, with Issa Sesay taking over command of Makeni. Bockarie strongly opposed the disarmament of the RUF, and defied orders from Sankoh to disarm. The opposing camps engaged in violent clashes, ending in Bockarie resigning from the RUF and being summoned to Liberia by Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 66, 6760, 6763, 6779, 6782. Following Bockarie’s departure, a reconciliation meeting was convened, although there continued to be infighting. Trial Judgment, para. 6764.

796 Trial Judgment, para. 66.

797 Trial Judgment, para. 69. The two parties affirmed their commitment to the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999, agreed to an immediate ceasefire and agreed to continue with the disarmament process.

798 Trial Judgment, para. 69.

799 Trial Judgment, para. 69.

800 Trial Judgment, para. 70.

801 Trial Judgment, para. 70.

802 Trial Judgment, para. 70.

803 18 January 2002.

804 Trial Judgment, para. 557.

805 Trial Judgment, para. 542.

806 Trial Judgment, para. 543.

807 Trial Judgment, para. 543.

808 Trial Judgment, para. 544.

809 Trial Judgment, paras 521-523, 1800, 1803, 1805, 1807.

810 Trial Judgment, para. 1694.

811 Trial Judgment, paras 546, 1738, 1747.

812 Trial Judgment, para. 1738.

813 Trial Judgment, paras 673-675.

814 In Pendumbu in Kailahun District until July 2001. Trial Judgment, paras 1039-1043. In Buedu in Kailahun District from March 1998 to December 1999. Trial Judgment, para. 1066.

815 Trial Judgment, paras 1409, 1438, 1445, 1449, 1598, 1605.

816 Trial Judgment, para. 1495.

817 Trial Judgment, para. 1438.

818 Trial Judgment, paras 547-559.

819 Trial Judgment, paras 529, 534, 536, 539, 541, 542, 543, 544, 546, 548, 555, 556, 557.

820 Trial Judgment, paras 548 (during the Junta period, “the evidence demonstrated that there were large numbers of civilian victims.”), 555 (“From February 1998 to December 1998, human rights abuses intensified, leaving thousands of civilians killed or mutilated by RUF and AFRC fighters. Hundreds of civilians were abducted, raped and the burning of houses and looting continued to occur.”), 556 (“the evidence shows that thousands of civilians were killed during the attack on Freetown . . . and that thousands of others were abducted, burnt, beaten, mutilated and/or sexual abused”), 557 (“[a]ttacks continued to occur against the civilian population at all times relevant to the Indictment, affecting large numbers of civilians throughout the north and east of Sierra Leone”).

821 See supra paras 46-252.

822 See supra paras 253-302.

823 The Trial Chamber considered evidence falling outside the temporal scope of the Indictment and made findings on that evidence only to: (i) clarify a given context; (ii) establish by inference the elements, in particular the mens rea, of criminal conduct occurring during the material period; and/or (iii) demonstrate a deliberate pattern of conduct. (See Trial Judgment, para. 101). Taylor was only convicted and sentenced for the crimes he planned or aided and abetted that were committed during the Indictment Period.

824 Trial Judgment, para. 2335. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2261-2339 (Pre-Indictment Period: Camp Naama), 2563-2569 (Pre-Indictment Period: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). See also Trial Judgment, para. 2377.

825 While Taylor testified that “no human being on this planet that heard in these words that Sierra Leone would taste the bitterness of war[,] [i]t’s a fabrication,” the Trial Chamber found that the overwhelming evidence of both Prosecution and Defence witnesses established that Sierra Leoneans heard and remembered the broadcast and understood Taylor was threatening Sierra Leone. Trial Judgment, para. 2335, fn. 5082.

826 Trial Judgment, para. 6878. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused). During the invasion, Taylor’s NPFL soldiers committed crimes against Sierra Leonean civilians including looting, abduction, rape and killing, while Sankoh’s RUF soldiers captured diamonds from civilians and companies and Sankoh gave the diamonds to Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 2383, 2445-2449. After the invasion, the Taylor’s NPFL opened training camps in which they trained abducted civilians, including children. During two operations named Top 20 and Top 40, NPFL soldiers led attacks against Sierra Leonean civilians as well as junior RUF commandos. In around April/May 1992 Sankoh met Taylor in Gbarnga, Liberia and complained that Taylor’s men were murdering and raping civilians and not respecting Sankoh as the leader. Trial Judgment, para. 2384. See also Trial Judgment, paras 2390, 2391, 2563(x). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2374-2391 (Pre-Indictment Period: The Invasion of Sierra Leone), 2563-2569 (Pre-Indictment Period: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

827 Trial Judgment, para. 6878. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused).

828 Trial Judgment, paras 2526, 2563(xvii). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2494-2526 (Pre-Indictment Period: Sierra Rutile), 2563-2569 (Pre-Indictment Period: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). See also Trial Judgment, para. 6773. By 1994, following military and political defeats and faced with difficult conditions surviving in the jungles of Sierra Leone, Sankoh and his RUF officers decided to change their strategy, to capture the attention of the international community. Taylor advised Sankoh that the way to gain international attention was to attack a major place in Sierra Leone. Trial Judgment, paras 2520, 2524, 2526, 6790.

829 Trial Judgment, para. 2524.

830 Trial Judgment, para. 2520.

831 Trial Judgment, paras 2524, 2526, 2563(xvii).

832 Trial Judgment, para. 2526. Subsequently, Sankoh entered into negotiations with the ICRC and the hostages were released in Guinea. Following the attack on Sierra Rutile, Taylor further advised Sankoh to send an External Delegation to Côte d’Ivoire. Sankoh acted on Taylor’s advice, and around December 1994 sent an RUF group called the External Delegation to Côte d’Ivoire in order to establish RUF political representation there. Trial Judgment, paras 2518, 6183, 6191.

833 Trial Judgment, para. 6879, fn. 15463. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused).

834 Trial Judgment, para. 2553.

835 Trial Judgment, para. 2554, 2561, 2563(xviii). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2527-2561 (Pre-Indictment Period: Operation Stop Election (1996)), 2563-2569 (Pre-Indictment Period: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). In the Trial Chamber’s view “this operation marked a clear change in the RUF’s strategy. After Operation Stop Election, and during the remainder of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF continued to deliberately use terror against the Sierra Leonean population as a primary modus operandi of their political and military strategy.” Trial Judgment, para. 6790. The Trial Chamber established that Sankoh’s objective in launching “Operation Stop Election” in early 1996 was to “disrupt the elections by instilling terror in the civilian population and preventing them from voting, while at the same time raising concern of the Sierra Leone Government and international community about holding the said elections before the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement.” Trial Judgment, para. 2554. See also supra para. 275.

836 Trial Judgment, para. 2560.

837 Trial Judgment, para. 2553.

838 Trial Judgment, para. 39.

839 Trial Judgment, para. 6790. See also supra paras 275-278, 299-300.

840 Trial Judgment, para. 6880. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused).

841 Trial Judgment, para. 6880, citing Exhibit P-297, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June 1997, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, paras 1, 2, 5, ERN 21395-21396.

842 Trial Judgment, para. 6818.

843 Trial Judgment, para. 6819.

844 Trial Judgment, para. 6821.

845 Trial Judgment, paras 6879, 6885, 6886. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused). Taylor was elected President of Liberia on 19 July 1997. Trial Judgment, para. 45.

846 Trial Judgment, para. 6879. Taylor was elected President of Liberia on 19 July 1997. Trial Judgment, para. 45. The Trial Chamber found that “when he had been inaugurated President of Liberia, [Taylor] was undoubtedly informed of the crimes committed by the RUF during the past years of the Sierra Leonean civil war and of the ongoing crimes committed by the Junta Government.”

847 After his election, ECOWAS invited Taylor to join the ECOWAS Committee of Four for Sierra Leone, thereby transforming it into a Committee of Five. The ECOWAS Committee of Four had been composed of Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Trial Judgment, paras 44, 45.

848 Trial Judgment, paras 6879, 6882.

849 Trial Judgment, para. 6950.

850 Trial Judgment, para. 6880, citing Exhibit D-136 , ECOWAS Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWAS Chiefs of State, Abuja, Nigeria, dated 26-27 August 1997, DCT 76. A 26 August 1997 report by the ECOWAS Committee of Four described the “massive looting of property, murder and rapes” following the 25 May 1997 coup d’état. Trial Judgment, para. 6880, citing Exhibit D-135, ECOWAS Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, dated 26 August 1997, DCT 32.

851 Trial Judgment, para. 6827, citing Exhibit D-140, ECOWAS, Communiqué, Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, dated 10-11 October 1997.

852 Trial Judgment, para. 45.

853 Trial Judgment, para. 6881.

854 Trial Judgment, para. 6881, citing Exhibit P-069, UN Security Council Resolution 1132, dated 8 October 1997, p. 2. See also Trial Judgment, para. 6825. The Security Council expressed deep concern “at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and the consequences for neighbouring countries.” Article 5 of the Resolution decided that “all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, or petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territory.”

855 Trial Judgment, para. 6881.

856 Trial Judgment, para. 6898.

857 Trial Judgment, paras 6497, 6517, 6520, 6767(ii), 6776. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6481-6520 (Leadership and Command Structure: Junta Period), 6767-6787 (Leadership and Command Structure: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

858 Trial Judgment, para. 6520, 6767(ii).

859 Trial Judgment, paras 6768, 6775, 6945.

860 Trial Judgment, para. 6480, 6767(i). This was confirmation of a prior instruction in late 1996/early 1997, where prior to his departure for a political tour, Sankoh instructed Bockarie to take instructions from Taylor. Trial Judgment, para. 6480. See also Trial Judgment, para. 3834. During this period, the RUF/AFRC used the NPFL communications network to facilitate communications between Sankoh and Bockarie. Trial Judgment, para. 3804.

861 Trial Judgment, para. 6775. See generally 6767-6787 (Leadership and Command Structure: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

862 Trial Judgment, para. 4792. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4630-4733 (Arms and Ammunition: Closure of the Border/Arms Embargo), 4735-4802 (Arms and Ammunition: Shortage of Materiel in Liberia).

863 Trial Judgment, paras 4802, 5835(ii), 5836. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4735-4802 (Arms and Ammunition: Shortage of Materiel in Liberia), 5835-5842 (Arms and Ammunition: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

864 Trial Judgment, para. 4713.

865 Trial Judgment, paras 4734, 5835(i), 5836. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4630-4733 (Arms and Ammunition: Closure of the Border/Arms Embargo), 5835-5842 (Arms and Ammunition: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

866 See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2570-2753 (Role of Intermediaries).

867 From 1995 to 1997 Yeaten served as Deputy Director of the SSS of the Government of Liberia. After Taylor’s election as President, Yeaten became Director of the SSS. He was promoted to Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in around 2000, putting him in charge of the generals of the Liberian armed forces for combat taking place in Liberia. Trial Judgment, para. 2571. Yeaten had a close relationship with Taylor, which bypassed the line of reporting to the Minister of State and emboldened Yeaten to take action without prior direction from Taylor. Trial Judgment, para. 2623. There was substantial evidence that Yeaten was representing, and was perceived to be representing, Taylor. Trial Judgment, para. 2626. The Defence submitted at trial that Yeaten was acting independently of Taylor in a “private enterprise”, trading arms and ammunition for diamonds with the RUF/AFRC without Taylor’s knowledge and approval. The Trial Chamber rejected this theory. See Trial Judgment, paras 2621-2629, 2710, 4953-4958. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2571-2609 (Role of Intermediaries: Benjamin Yeaten). See also supra paras 169-172, 174-176.

868 Tamba was a member of the NPFL until about 1992, and then joined the RUF and remained with them until about 1994. Throughout the Indictment Period, Tamba worked for the SSS as a subordinate of Yeaten and Taylor and served as a courier of arms, diamonds and messages back and forth between the RUF/AFRC and Taylor. Evidence suggests that Tamba was killed. Trial Judgment, paras 154, 2702, 2718. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2630-2718 (Role of Intermediaries: Daniel Tamba). See also supra paras 171, 172, 175, 176.

869 In the early 1990s Ibrahim Bah was a member of the NPFL. Trial Judgment, para. 2744. He was a trusted emissary who represented the RUF/AFRC at times and Taylor at times, and served as a liaison between them at times. He was a businessman who helped arrange arms and diamond transactions, and did not maintain an ongoing affiliation as a subordinate or agent with either the RUF/AFRC or Taylor. At times, however, he did represent the RUF/AFRC and Taylor in specific transactions or on specific missions. Trial Judgment, para. 2752. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2719-2753 (Role of Intermediaries: Ibrahim Bah). See also supra paras 171, 172, 175, 176.

870 Marzah was a member of the SSS. Trial Judgment, para. 263. He testified as a witness.

871 The evidence indicated that Weah was a member of the SSS working under the direction of Yeaten. Trial Judgment, para. 4943, fn. 10951.

872 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 4958, 5163, 5873, 5948.

873 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, para. 2951.

874 The evidence supported the finding of the UN Panel of Experts that diamond smuggling to Liberia was the bulk of the RUF/AFRC trade in diamonds and the primary source of income for the RUF/AFRC. Trial Judgment, para. 6143. See Trial Judgment, paras 5916, 5917 (summarising Exhibit P-018, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established by Resolution 1306-S/2000/1195, Adopted on 20 December 2000”).

875 The Trial Chamber accepted the evidence that export of diamonds from Liberia was far greater than Liberian diamond production, due to diamonds from Sierra Leone being smuggled through Liberia. It also accepted the evidence that Liberian diamonds are generally known to be of a significantly lesser quality than diamonds from Sierra Leone. The Trial Chamber found that this evidence refuted Taylor’s contention that he would have had no reason to trade diamonds with the RUF/AFRC because Liberia had its own diamonds. Trial Judgment, paras 6054, 6146. See Trial Judgment, paras 6030-6035 (summarising Exhibit P-019, “Diamonds, the RUF and the Liberian Connection-a Report for the Office of the Prosecutor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Ian Smillie, 21 April 2007”).

876 Trial Judgment, paras 5874, 6139(i), 6141. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5846-5874 (Diamonds: Junta Period), 6139-6149 (Diamonds: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). The Trial Chamber found that mining by ECOMOG or other forces at times during this period did not raise doubt that Taylor received RUF /AFRC diamonds mined in Kono and Tongo Fields during the Junta Period. Trial Judgment, para. 5872.

877 Trial Judgment, para. 641. See also paras 261-263, 278.

878 Trial Judgment, para. 5864.

879 In February/March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces “deliberately targeted civilians in Koidu Town in order to prevent them from staying in or returning to Koidu Town and in order to maintain the diamond-rich Kono District as a strong Junta base from which the AFRC/RUF fighters would finance and mount further attacks upon their enemies including ECOMOG and the CDF or Kamajors.” From at least January 1998 through the remainder of the Indictment Period, members of the RUF/AFRC forces engaged in widespread and large scale abductions of civilians in Kono District and used them as forced labour to work in diamond mines as well as to carry loads, perform domestic chores, go on foodfinding missions and undergo military training. Trial Judgment, paras 663, 1726, 1753.

880 Trial Judgment, paras 5921-5930.

881 Trial Judgment, paras 5937, 5938. Eddie Kanneh was a senior AFRC commander and served as Secretary of State East during the Junta Period, stationed in Kenema with Bockarie. Trial Judgment, para. 585.

882 Trial Judgment, para. 5939.

883 Trial Judgment, paras 5948, 6139(ii), 6142. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5875-5948 (Diamonds: February 1998–July 1999), 6139-6149 (Diamonds: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). The Trial Chamber found that while the evidence did not establish that every delivery of diamonds to Taylor was matched by a delivery of arms and ammunition to the RUF/AFRC, it did clearly establish that the diamonds were given to Taylor to get materiel from him. Trial Judgment, para. 5936.

884 Trial Judgment, para. 5944, 6143. See Trial Judgment, paras 5920-5947. The Trial Chamber accepted evidence that the trade of diamonds between Liberia and Sierra Leone could not be conducted in Liberia without the permission and the involvement of Liberian Government officials at the highest level. The Trial Chamber found that the facts that the RUF/AFRC transacted diamonds with other entities and that diamond smuggling occurred before Taylor became the President of Liberia did not raise doubt that Taylor was involved in the smuggling with the RUF/AFRC. Trial Judgment, paras 5942-5944, 6143.

885 Trial Judgment, paras 5811, 5835(xxxviii). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel).

886 Trial Judgment, para. 5812.

887 Trial Judgment, paras 5390-5394, 5406, 5408, 5812, 5835(xxii), 5840, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5349-5409 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies: Magburaka Shipment). In Freetown, Bah met with Sam Bockarie and Johnny Paul Koroma. When Bockarie expressed concern about attacks by ECOMOG forces and the RUF/AFRC’s lack of ammunition, Bah told Bockarie that he had been sent by Taylor to assist the RUF/AFRC to get arms and ammunition. Bah also told senior AFRC officials who expressed their need for ammunition that he would be able to help them. Trial Judgment, paras 5390, 5394. The Magburaka Shipment was one of the three main sources of arms and ammunition for the RUF/AFRC during the Indictment Period.

888 Trial Judgment, paras 5386-5388.

889 Trial Judgment, paras 5395, 5396, 5406, 5408, 5835(xxiv).

890 Trial Judgment, paras 5400-5404, 5408, 5835(xxiv).

891 Trial Judgment, paras 5397-5399, 5409, 5835(xxv).

892 Trial Judgment, para. 5397.

893 Trial Judgment, para. 5397.

894 Trial Judgment, paras 5546-5552, 5559, 5835(xxvii), 5840, 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5531-5560 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: The AFRC Coup in May 1997 to the Retreat from Freetown in February 1998).

895 Trial Judgment, paras 4845, 5835(iii), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4803-4854 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: Alleged Ammunition Supply from Daniel Tamba).

896 Trial Judgment, paras 3915, 4248(xvi), 4256, 6934, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3915-3918 (Operational Support: Logistical Support).

897 Trial Judgment, paras 5553-5558, 5560, 5835(xxviii), 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5531-5560 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: The AFRC Coup in May 1997 to the Retreat from Freetown in February 1998). From their base in Kenema Town, “RUF and AFRC forces committed crimes in various locations in the Kenema District, including but not limited to a number of unlawful killings in Kenema Town and Tongo Fields, the enslavement of an unspecified number of civilians in the mining operations at Tongo Fields, and use of children to actively participate in hostilities at Tongo Fields.” Trial Judgment, para. 5557.

898 Trial Judgment, paras 4840-4842.

899 Trial Judgment, paras 5819, 5823, 5828-5833, 5835(xxxviii)(xxxix), 5842, 6913. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel).

900 Trial Judgment, para. 5812.

901 Trial Judgment, para. 5814.

902 Trial Judgment, paras 5814, 5819. The Trial Chamber also noted that the quality of the materiel obtained from ULIMO was questionable. Trial Judgment, para. 5821.

903 Trial Judgment, para. 5820.

904 Trial Judgment, para. 5822.

905 See supra paras 279-284.

906 Trial Judgment, para. 555.

907 Trial Judgment, para. 6883 and accompanying footnotes with extensive citations therein. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused).

908 Trial Judgment, para. 6883 and accompanying notes with extensive citations therein.

909 Trial Judgment, paras 6834, 6838, 6842-6844. The First Progress Report of UNOMSIL highlighted evidence of the “systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population, including rape.” Women and children were reported to be held captive and used as porters, human shields and for forced sexual activity. The rebels’ “campaign of terror and their military activities have resulted in the displacement of at least 350,000 people since February [1998].” The Second Progress Report explained that, following the arrest of Sankoh, the RUF “announced on 17 August 1998 a terror campaign against civilians, CDF and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)” if the Government failed to release Sankoh. The Third Progress Report explained that: “Attacks and forms of abuse of civilians exhibited a characteristic modus operandi: amputation of limbs, mutilation, actual or attempted decapitation, rape, burning alive of men, women and children, destruction of homes, abduction and looting.”

910 Trial Judgment, paras 6828, 6829.

911 Trial Judgment, para. 6840 (emphasis in original). Amnesty International also raised attention regarding the situation of children, highlighting that “[c]hildren have been particular victims of the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced to fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and forced into sexual slavery.” Trial Judgment, para. 6841.

912 Trial Judgment, para. 6837. The Security Council adopted a number of measures aimed at prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related materiel to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. The Security Council further decided that “all States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). . . .”, Exhibit P-070, UN SC Res. 1171 (1998).

913 Trial Judgment, para. 6884. This joint condemnation was reiterated at a subsequent meeting of the two Presidents held in Monrovia on 20 July 1998. Trial Judgment, para. 6846. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused).

914 Trial Judgment, para. 6884 (emphasis added), fn. 15843. See also Trial Judgment, para. 6805, quoting Transcript, Charles Ghankay Taylor, 25 November 2009, p. 32395.

915 Trial Judgment, para. 6884, fn. 15844. See also Trial Judgment, para. 6805.

916 Trial Judgment, para. 6806.

917 Trial Judgment, para. 6806.

918 Trial Judgment, para. 1459. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6139-6149 (Diamonds: Summary of Findings and Conclusion)

919 Trial Judgment, paras 3613-3615, 6942. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3611-3618 (Military Operations: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). See also Trial Judgment, para. 6778 (“[T]he Trial Chamber notes that the advice and instruction of [Taylor] to the AFRC/RUF mainly focused on directing their attention to the diamondiferous area of Kono in order to ensure the continuation of trade, diamonds in exchange for arms and ammunition.”).

920 Trial Judgment, paras 2769, 3611(i), 3613. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2754-2769 (Military Operations: Alleged Message from Base 1 to Troops Retreating from Kono).

921 Trial Judgment, paras 2863, 3611(ii), 3613, 6942. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2770-2864 (Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998)).

922 Trial Judgment, para. 52.

923 Trial Judgment, para. 53.

924 Trial Judgment, paras 3856, 4248(xi), 6543.

925 Trial Judgment, paras 2864, 3611(iii), 3613, 6942. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2770-2864 (Military Operations: Operations in Kono (Early 1998)).

926 Trial Judgment, para. 54. See also Trial Judgment, para. 2927.

927 Trial Judgment, paras 2951, 3611(v), 3614, 6942. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2865-2951 (Military Operations: Operation Fitti-Fatta).

928 Trial Judgment, paras 5632, 5835(xxx). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5594-5632 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Operation Fitti-Fatta).

929 Trial Judgment, paras 4094, 4248(xxxii), 4258. Several witnesses testified that the RUF/AFRC used such individuals throughout the conflict on the basis that the fighters believed in their powers. Trial Judgment, para. 4090. The provision of the herbalists and the rites they performed bolstered some fighters’ confidence, as intended. Trial Judgment, para. 4092. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4069-4094 (Operational Support: Provision of Herbalists), 4248-4262 (Operational Support: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

930 Trial Judgment, paras 5829-5831, 5834, 5835(xl), 5842, 6914. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5561-5721 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: February 1998 to the Freetown Invasion in January 1999), 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel), 5835-5842 (Arms and Ammunition: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

931 Trial Judgment, paras 5550-5552, 5559, 5829, 5835(xxvii), 5840, 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5531-5560 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: The AFRC Coup in May 1997 to the Retreat from Freetown in February 1998).

932 Trial Judgment, paras 5591-5593, 5829, 5835(xxix), 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5561-5593 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Operations in Kono in early 1998).

933 Trial Judgment, paras 5629, 5632, 5835(xxx). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5594-5632 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Fitti-Fatta in mid-1998).

934 Trial Judgment, paras 5657, 5659, 5667, 5829, 5835(xxxii), 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5633-5667 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Operations in the North).

935 Trial Judgment, paras 5664-5666, 5829, 5835(xxxi), 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5633-5667 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Operations in the North).

936 Trial Judgment, paras 5829-5831, 5834, 5835 (xl), 5842, 6914.

937 Trial Judgment, paras 4943, 5829, 6914.

938 Trial Judgment, para. 5030, 5835(vi), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4966-5031 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie’s Leadership: Alleged Trips by Bockarie to Liberia in 1998).

939 Trial Judgment, paras 4965, 5835(v), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4855-4965 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie’s Leadership: Alleged Deliveries of Materiel from Taylor to Sierra Leone).

940 Trial Judgment, paras 5329, 5819, 5835(xix), 5839. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5294-5330 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies: Supplies from ULIMO: Alleged Facilitation through Varmuyan Sherif).

941 Trial Judgment, paras 5330, 5819, 5835(xx). As a result, members of ULIMO who were supposed to disarm and surrender their arms to the UN instead sold or bartered them to the RUF/AFRC. Trial Judgment, para. 5329.

942 Trial Judgment, paras 5948, 6139(ii), 6142. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5875-5948 (Diamonds: February 1998–July 1999), 6139-6149 (Diamonds: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

943 Trial Judgment, paras 3915-3918, 4248(xvi), 4256, 4262, 6934, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4248-4262 (Operational Support: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

944 Trial Judgment, paras 3915-3918, 4248(xvi), 4256, 4262, 6934, 6936.

945 Trial Judgment, paras 3848, 4248(x), 4254, 6929, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3843-3848 (Operational Support: Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF: Communications relating to Eddie Kanneh in Liberia in 1998), 4248-4262 (Operational Support: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

946 Trial Judgment, paras 4149, 4150, 4152, 4248(xxxvi), 4259, 6943. See further Trial Judgment, paras 4127-4152 (Operational Support: Order to Build an Airfield in Buedu), 4248-4262 (Operational Support: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

947 Trial Judgment, paras 5823-5826, 5828-5833, 5835 (xxxviii)(xxxix), 5842, 6913. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel), 5835-5842 (Arms and Ammunition: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

948 Trial Judgment, para. 5551. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5531-5560 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: The AFRC Coup in May 1997 to the Retreat from Freetown in February 1998). Witness Issa Sesay also testified that “the only arms and ammunition that came to Sierra Leone during the Junta regime was the flight that landed in Magburaka . . . [which] was also the only stock of ammunition Issa Sesay was aware of that the RUF would have had access to.” Trial Judgment, para. 5541.

949 Trial Judgment, paras 5813-5823. Arms purchases from ULIMO were a minor enterprise, and by June 1998, during a period of heightened military action for the RUF/AFRC, the small amounts of arms brought from ULIMO were not sufficient to fight off Guinean and ECOMOG attacks. Materiel obtained by trade with the Guineans was minor. Trial Judgment, para. 5819. Materiel purchased or traded from AFL and ECOMOG commanders was also minor, and there was little indication that the RUF/AFRC had continuing arrangements with ECOMOG for arms and ammunition. Trial Judgment, para. 5822.

950 Trial Judgment, paras 5329, 5819, 5835(xix), 5839. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5294-5330 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies: Supplies from ULIMO: Alleged Facilitation through Varmuyan Sherif)

951 Trial Judgment, para. 5825.

952 Trial Judgment, para. 5830, 5834, 6914. In general, through 1998 there was little evidence that the RUF/AFRC was able to capture much by way of arms and ammunition. Trial Judgment, para. 5826. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5824-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel: Captured Materiel).

953 Trial Judgment, para. 6543.

954 Trial Judgment paras 4105, 4109, 4248(xxxiii), 4259, 6943. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4095-4109 (Operational Support: Bunumbu Training Camp).

955 See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 1368-1378, 1473-1482, 1782-1789.

956 Trial Judgment, paras 1377-1379.

957 Trial Judgment, paras 4579, 4618(vi), 4621. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4496-4583 (Military Personnel: Repatriation of Sierra Leoneans), 4618-4623 (Provision of Military Personnel: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

958 Trial Judgment, paras 4252-4255, 4248, 4262, 6928-6931, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3622-3914 (Operational Support: Communications), 4248-4262 (Operational Support: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

959 Trial Judgment, paras 3730, 4248(iv), 4252, 4262, 6928. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3667-3731 (Operational Support: Communications: Satellite Phones).

960 Trial Judgment, paras 4254, 4262, 6929, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3806-3914 (Operational Support: Communications: Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF).

961 Trial Judgment, paras 3856, 4248(xi), 4254, 6929, 6936. During this period the RUF/AFRC forces were engaged in heavy fighting with ECOMOG and CDF forces, and crimes were committed during these attacks. Trial Judgment, para. 5551. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3849-3856 (Operational Support: Communications: Use of Liberian Communication by the RUF: Communications between Dauda Aruna Fornie and Sierra Leone in 1998).

962 Trial Judgment, paras 3914, 4248(xv), 4255, 4262, 6930, 6936. See also Trial Judgment, paras 3889, 3890, 3892, 3894, 3896 (“448 warnings” issued in 1998). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3887-3914 (Operational Support: Communications: Use of Liberian Communication by the RUF: “448” Warnings).

963 Trial Judgment, para. 3889.

964 Trial Judgment, paras 5514, 6959. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5410-5527 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies: Burkina Faso Shipment).

965 Trial Judgment, para. 3109.

966 Trial Judgment, paras 3117, 3129, 3611(vi), 3615, 5514, 6958, 6961. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 2952-3130 (Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion: The Plan), 3611-3618 (Military Operations: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

967 Trial Judgment, para. 3130, 3611(vii), 3615, 6958, 6959.

968 Trial Judgment, para. 3112, 3129, 3611(vi), 3615, 6958, 6959.

969 Trial Judgment, paras 5525, 5527, 5835(xxvi), 5841, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5410-5527 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations that the Accused Facilitated Supplies: Burkina Faso Shipment).

970 Trial Judgment, para. 5524, 5481.

971 Trial Judgment, paras 3112, 3611(vii), 3615 (briefed on the meeting). See also Trial Judgment, para. 3722 (provision of the satellite phone).

972 Trial Judgment, paras 3117, 3130, 3611(vii), 3615, 6958, 6959.

973 Trial Judgment, para. 3130, 3611(vii), 3615.

974 Trial Judgment, paras 4365, 4394-4396, 4618(i)(iii), 4619 6918, 6923. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4266-4396 (Provision of Military Personnel: Red Lion Battalion), 4618-4623 (Provision of Military Personnel: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

975 Trial Judgment, paras 4581, 4618(viii), 4621, 6920. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4496-4583 (Military Personnel: Repatriation of Sierra Leoneans).

976 Abu Keita was a former deputy chief of staff and general of ULIMO-K. He was then sent by Taylor to the RUF/AFRC in 1998, where he remained until 2002. He possessed highlevel military expertise and was sent by Taylor to Sierra Leone to command the Scorpion Unit. Trial Judgment, paras 213, 4491, 6922.

977 Trial Judgment, paras 4491, 4492, 4618(iv), 4620, 6919. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4397-4495 (Military Personnel: Scorpion Unit).

978 Trial Judgment, paras 4480, 4493, 4618(v), 4620, 6919.

979 The Burkina Faso Shipment was distributed to RUF/AFRC commanders to attack Kono, Kenema, Makeni and Tongo. Trial Judgment, paras 5702, 5719.

980 Trial Judgment, paras 56, 3369. See also supra paras 285-292. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3131-3486 (Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion: Implementation of the Plan). The second prong of the RUF/AFRC attack in accordance with the Bockarie/Taylor Plan, the attack on the Segbwema-Daru axis towards Kenema, was unsuccessful. Trial Judgment, para. 3369.

981 Trial Judgment, paras 5824, 5830, 5835(xxxiii), 6914. See further Trial Judgment, paras 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel), 5835-5842 (Arms and Ammunition: Summary of Findings and Conclusion). The Magburaka Shipment, the Burkina Faso Shipment and this captured materiel from ECOMOG were the three main sources of arms and ammunition for the RUF/AFRC during the Indictment Period. Trial Judgment, para. 5809.

982 Trial Judgment, para. 3369.

983 Trial Judgment, para. 3371.

984 Trial Judgment, paras 57, 3370.

985 Trial Judgment, paras 57, 3370.

986 Trial Judgment, para. 3394, 3481, 3611(viii), 3617, 6965. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3379-3393 (Relationship between Bockarie and Gullit prior to the death of SAJ Musa), 3394-3401 (Resumption of communications after the death of SAJ Musa). The Defence conceded that Gullit resumed contact with Bockarie after SAJ Musa’s death. Trial Judgment, para. 3394. While Gullit was with SAJ Musa, he maintained contact with Bockarie and would update Bockarie and Bockarie’s commanders on operational matters. Trial Judgment, paras 3385, 3386, 6755. The Trial Chamber was “satisfied that nothing suggests that the relationship between Bockarie and Gullit had broken down so irretrievably that it prevented Bockarie and Gullit from working together after the death of SAJ Musa. Trial Judgment, para. 3393.

987 Trial Judgment, para. 3478. The Trial Chamber considered that Taylor’s planning liability for the crimes committed in Freetown depended on whether, following SAJ Musa’s death and Gullit’s assumption of command, Bockarie was effectively in command of a concerted and coordinated effort to capture Freetown, with Gullit as his subordinate. It concluded that this was the case. Trial Judgment, para. 3479. See also Trial Judgment, paras 3481-3486, 3617. This issue is addressed in Section VIII of the Appeal Judgment in relation to the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that the actus reus of planning liability was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra paras 550-561.

988 Trial Judgment, paras 3435, 3482, 3486, 3611(ix)(xii)(xiii), 3617, 6965. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3419-3435 (Attempts at coordination and the entry into Freetown of Rambo Red Goat). While Gullit proceeded into Freetown before Bockarie’s reinforcements arrived, the Trial Chamber was satisfied that Gullit did so due to military exigencies and because the reinforcements were unduly delayed, and noted the evidence that Gullit proceeded into Freetown only once he knew that Issa Sesay’s forces were on their way from Makeni and were in a position to block ECOMOG reinforcements to Freetown. Trial Judgment, paras 3409, 3410, 3413, 3414. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3402-3418 (Gullit’s failure to heed Bockarie’s instruction to wait for reinforcements).

989 Trial Judgment, paras 3428-3433, 3435. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3419-3435 (Attempts at coordination and the entry into Freetown of Rambo Red Goat).

990 Trial Judgment, paras 3483, 3611(x), 6962. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3419-3435 (Attempts at coordination and the entry into Freetown of Rambo Red Goat). See supra paras 191-196.

991 Trial Judgment, paras 3401, 3481, 3611(viii), 3617, 6965. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3394-3401 (Resumption of communications after the death of SAJ Musa), 3419-3435 (Attempts at coordination and the entry into Freetown of Rambo Red Goat), 3436-3464 (Whether fighters in Freetown took orders from Bockarie). The Trial Chamber noted that the “bulk of the supporting evidence was adduced from radio operators and fighters stationed with Gullit, Bockarie and commanders under Bockarie’s authority whose role it was to monitor the relevant communications.” Trial Judgment, para. 3400.

992 Trial Judgment, paras 3464, 3485, 3611(xii), 3617, 6965. See Trial Judgment, paras 3445-3452 (instruction to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the retreat from Freetown), 3453-3457 (instruction to send high-profile political detainees released from Pademba Road Prison to RUF-controlled territory), 3458-3463 (instructions to execute Martin Moinama and a group of captured ECOMOG soldiers near the State House).

993 Trial Judgment, paras 3464, 3485, 3611(xii), 3617, 6965. See Trial Judgment, paras 3452 (“The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the strength of the Prosecution evidence, that Bockarie did direct Gullit to use terror tactics against the civilian population on the retreat from Freetown, and that Gullit complied.”), 3457 (“The Trial Chamber is satisfied . . . that Bockarie did direct Gullit to send high-profile political detainees released from Pademba Road Prison to RUFcontrolled territory and Gullit complied with that instruction.”), 3463 (“The Trial Chamber is satisfied, on the Prosecution evidence, that Bockarie gave Gullit orders to execute Martin Moinama, and a group of captured ECOMOG soldiers near the State House, and both of which orders were carried out by Gullit.”).

994 Trial Judgment, para. 61.

995 Trial Judgment, paras 3394, 3464.

996 Trial Judgment, para. 61.

997 Trial Judgment, paras 3445-3452, 3485, 3611(xii), 3617, 6965. See also supra paras 285-292.

998 Trial Judgment, para. 3471, 3484, 3611(xi). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3465-3471 (Whether Bockarie assisted the retreat of Gullit’s forces from Freetown).

999 Trial Judgment, para. 3477, 3484, 3611(xi). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3472-3477 (Joint RUF/AFRC attempts to re-enter Freetown).

1000 Trial Judgment, paras 3564, 3606, 3611(xiv), 3729, 4248(iii), 4252, 6928, 6966. See generally Trial Judgment, paras paras 3554-3578 (Contact between Bockarie and the Accused, or the Accused’s subordinates), 3581-3601 (Specific directions from the Accused), 3667-3731 (Operational Support: Communications: Satellite Phones).

1001 Trial Judgment, para. 6928.

1002 Trial Judgment, paras 3564, 3606, 3611(xiv), 3618, 6966. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3554-3564 (Radio or Satellite phone contact between Bockarie and Yeaten, Bockarie and the Accused during the Operation).

1003 Trial Judgment, paras 3564, 3606, 3611(xiv), 3618, 6966.

1004 Trial Judgment, paras 3591, 3609, 3611(xvii), 3618. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3586-3591 (Specific directions from the Accused: To send prisoners released from Pademba Road Prison to RUF controlled areas).

1005 Trial Judgment, paras 3572, 3606, 3611(xiv), 3618, 6966. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3568-3572 (Visits by Benjamin Yeaten to Buedu in December 1998 and January 1999).

1006 Trial Judgment, para. 3596, 3606, 3611 (xiv), 3618. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3592-3596 (Specific directions from the Accused: In relation to military strategy/sending reinforcements).

1007 Trial Judgment, para. 3899, 3914, 4248(xv), 4255, 4262, 6930, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3887-3914 (Operational Support: Communications: Use of Liberian Communication by the RUF: “448” Warnings).

1008 Trial Judgment, para. 3897.

1009 Trial Judgment, paras 5130, 5835(xi), 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5111-5130 (Arms and Ammunition: During Sam Bockarie’s Leadership: Alleged Shipment from Niger on 22 December 1998 brought back by Dauda Aruna Fornie). While in Freetown, Gullit requested additional ammunition from Bockarie, who then sent a request to Benjamin Yeaten. Fornie then went on Bockarie’s behalf to White Flower, where he obtained ammunition, RPGs and grenades. After Fornie’s return to Buedu, the ammunition was then sent to RUF/AFRC forces in Waterloo via Issa Sesay in Makeni. Trial Judgment, paras 5113, 5114, 5123-5129.

1010 Trial Judgment, para. 5702, 5705, 5708, 5711, 5713-5716, 5719-5721, 5835(xxxiii)(xxxiv)(xxxv), 5481. See generally Trial Judgment, para. 5668-5721 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: The December 1998 Offensives and the Freetown Invasion). The Burkina Faso Shipment was distributed to RUF/AFRC commanders to attack Kono, Kenema, Makeni and Tongo in accordance with the Bockarie/Taylor Plan. Trial Judgment, para. 5702. The materiel Taylor supplied to Fornie was sent to RUF/AFRC forces in Waterloo after their successful attacks on Kono and Makeni towards Freetown. Trial Judgment, para. 5705. The Prosecution did not contend and the Trial Chamber did not find that the materiel from the Burkina Faso Shipment was supplied to Gullit’s forces before their entry into Freetown. Trial Judgment, para. 5704. However, Rambo Red Goat brought materiel from the Burkina Faso Shipment into Freetown to re-supply Gullit’s forces during the operations in Freetown itself. Trial Judgment, para. 5708. Rambo Red Goat’s forces were predominately charged with carrying out Taylor’s and Bockarie’s instruction to “make Freetown fearful” after Gullit withdrew. Trial Judgment, para. 5718. Issa Sesay also provided Gullit’s forces with materiel after their retreat from Freetown when the combined RUF/AFRC forces were attempting to re-attack Freetown. Trial Judgment, para. 5711. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3472-3477 (Joint RUF/AFRC attempts to re-enter Freetown). In respect of the materiel Issa Sesay provided after the retreat from Freetown, the Trial Chamber found that it was not possible to determine whether this materiel was from the Burkina Faso Shipment, Dauda Aruna Fornie or the captured ECOMOG supplies. Trial Judgment, paras 5713, 5714. However, the Trial Chamber further found that it was not necessary to make such a determination, as all three of these possible sources were causally attributable to Taylor. Trial Judgment, para. 5715. It thus considered that all this materiel formed “an amalgamate of fungible resources” for the purposes of determining whether the materiel provided by Taylor was used in and had an effect on the commission of crimes following the retreat from Freetown. Trial Judgment, para. 5716.

1011 Trial Judgment, para. 5715, citing Transcript, Issa Sesay, 12 August 2010, p. 46169, Transcript, Issa Sesay, 18 August 2010, pp. 46661-46662.

1012 Trial Judgment, paras 5715, 5830, citing Transcript, Issa Sesay, 12 August 2010, p. 46169.

1013 Trial Judgment, paras 5817-5820, fns 12980-12984, 5822, 5823, 5825(xxxix).

1014 Trial Judgment, para. 6968. See also supra paras 285-292.

1015 Trial Judgment, para. 556.

1016 Trial Judgment, paras 6850-6858, 6861. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused).

1017 Trial Judgment, paras 5094, 5096, 5835(ix), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5044-5096 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie’s Leadership: Alleged Trip by Bockarie in March 1999).

1018 Trial Judgment, para. 5084.

1019 Trial Judgment, para. 6863. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused). In March 1999, the Secretary-General documented that in response to allegations that they were supporting the Sierra Leonean rebels, the Liberian Government issued a statement that they recognised the Kabbah Government as the legitimate government and that they did not, and would not, support any attempt to destabilise Sierra Leone or any other country. Trial Judgment, para. 6858.

1020 Trial Judgment, para. 64.

1021 Trial Judgment, paras 6284-6288, 6451(vii), 6455, 6781, 6940, 6941. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6233-6288 (Peace Process: Lomé). See also Trial Judgment, paras 6194-6232 (Peace Process: Abidjan), 6451(iv), 6941. Taylor also advised Foday Sankoh to participate in the Abidjan peace talks in order to obtain arms and ammunition, and the RUF did obtain arms and ammunition in Abidjan. While pre-Indictment, the Trial Chamber found that this incident showed a consistent pattern of conduct by Taylor that continued into and during the Indictment Period.

1022 Trial Judgment, paras 6451(vi), 6455.

1023 Trial Judgment, para. 66.

1024 See supra paras 293-296.

1025 See Trial Judgment, paras 6863-6875. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6794-6886 (Knowledge of the Accused). For example, Exhibit P-334 documents that since 2000, the RUF continued to abduct and forcibly recruit child combatants, while Exhibit D-248 documents the RUF taking UNAMSIL peacekeepers as hostages in early 2000.

1026 Trial Judgment, paras 6455-6458, 6781-6785. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6289-6345 (Peace Process: Release of UN Peacekeepers (1999)), 6346-6415 (Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000)), 6416-6450 (Communication with Issa Sesay on Disarmament), 6451-6458 (Peace Process: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

1027 Taylor promoted Yeaten to Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in around 2000, putting him in charge o f the generals of the Liberian armed forces for combat taking place in Liberia. Trial Judgment, para. 2571

1028 Trial Judgment, paras 3882, 6658, 6661-6663, 6767(viii), 6786. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6617-6663 (Leadership and Command Structure: Operations Outside Sierra Leone: RUF/AFRC against Mosquito Spray/LURD in Liberia, 1999). On 21 April 1999, Liberian dissidents in Guinea, mainly former members of ULIMO, led by a person known as “Mosquito Spray”, launched an attack on Voinjama, Liberia. A second attack occurred on 10 August 1999 and a third on 8 July 2000. Responsibility for the attacks was claimed by a group called LURD, which had the objective of removing Taylor from power as President of Liberia. Following LURD’s attack, Sam Bockarie gave the order to RUF/AFRC troops to move to Lofa County in Liberia in order to support the Liberian Government forces against Mosquito Spray’s forces. Trial Judgment, paras 6656, 6658. The Trial Chamber considered evidence of acts outside the geographic scope of the Indictment and the jurisdiction of the Special Court only for contextual purposes or as evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct. Trial Judgment, para. 6655.

1029 Trial Judgment, paras 3883, 3884, 4248(xiii). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3872-3884 (Operational Support: Communications Support: Use of Liberian Communications by the RUF: Communications during Mosquito Spray Incident).

1030 Trial Judgment, para. 66.

1031 Trial Judgment, paras 6564, 6565, 6782. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6553-6567 (Leadership and Command Structure: Sam Bockarie: Allegations that in December 1999 the Accused ordered Sam Bockarie to leave Sierra Leone and come to Liberia). It was undisputed by the Parties that Bockarie left Sierra Leone and went to Liberia on Taylor ’s instructions. Trial Judgment, para. 6464.

1032 Trial Judgment, paras 67, 6399. RUF commanders including Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao captured the peacekeepers following a dispute over the disarmament process in or around Makeni.

1033 Trial Judgment, paras 67, 6458, 6784. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6568-6616 (Leadership and Command Structure: Issa Sesay). The ECOWAS Heads of State collectively decided that Issa Sesay should become interim leader of the RUF, and advised Issa Sesay to cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL. Trial Judgment, paras 6608, 6611-6614.

1034 Trial Judgment, paras 6400, 6451(ix), 6457. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6346-6415 (Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000)).

1035 Trial Judgment, paras 6405, 6411, 6414, 6451(ix), 6457, 6783, 6945. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6451-6458 (Peace Process: Summary of Findings and Conclusion), 6767-6787 (Leadership and Command Structure: Summary of Findings and Conclusions). The Trial Chamber accepted Issa Sesay’s testimony that Taylor “made him understand” that the RUF had to release the peacekeepers and that he felt he “had to accept” Taylor’s instructions. Trial Judgment, paras 6404, 6405, 6411. The Trial Chamber found that while instructing Issa Sesay to release the peacekeepers, Taylor also promised assistance “in the struggle.” Trial Judgment, paras 6412, 6457, 6783.

1036 Trial Judgment, para. 67. See also Trial Judgment, para. 6421 (TF1–338 testified that in 2001 Sesay complained that Taylor and Liberians were now living in peace and that Sesay wanted to allow disarmament to take place so that he would also “be able to give peace to his own people in Sierra Leone.”).

1037 Trial Judgment, para. 6443.

1038 Trial Judgment, paras 6442, 6444, 6447, 6449, 6450, 6451(xi), 6458, 6785. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6416-6450 (Peace Process: Communication with Issa Sesay on Disarmament). ECOWAS and the United Nations supported Taylor’s instruction to Bockarie to leave Sierra Leone because this would assist the disarmament and peace process in Sierra Leone. Trial Judgment, paras 6564, 6566, 6782.

1039 Trial Judgment, paras 6419, 6442, 6443, 6451(xi), 6458, 6785.

1040 Trial Judgment, paras 3993, 3996-3998, 4248(xxvii), 6419. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3991-3998 (Operational Support: Financial Support: Allegation that the Accused gave Issa Sesay $USD 15,000).

1041 Trial Judgment, paras 6421, 6447, 6449, 6450, 6451(xi).

1042 Trial Judgment, paras 6420, 6444, 6449, 6458, 6785. The trade of diamonds for arms and ammunition between Taylor and the RUF/AFRC also continued throughout this time. See Trial Judgment, paras 5835-5842 (Arms and Ammunition: Summary of Findings and Conclusion), 6139-6149 (Diamonds: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

1043 Trial Judgment, paras 6458, 6726-6728, 6767(ix), 6785, 6786. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6664-6728 (Leadership and Command Structure: Operations Outside Sierra Leone: Operations in Liberia and Guinea during Issa Sesay’s leadership). From 1999 to 2001, confronted by an army of Liberian dissidents attacking Lofa County, Liberia from Guinea, Taylor sent troops to oppose the incursion, which created a “push-back” situation with the hostile sides engaged in fluctuating battle. AFL and RUF/AFRC forces fought LURD forces in both Liberia and Guinea. Trial Judgment, paras 6722, 6728.

1044 Trial Judgment, paras 6725, 6728, 6767(ix), 6786.

1045 Trial Judgment, para. 6786.

1046 Trial Judgment, paras 5110, 5835(x), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5097-5110 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie’s Leadership: Alleged Trip by Bockarie in August to October 1999).

1047 Trial Judgment, paras 4965, 5835(v), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4855-4965 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Sam Bockarie’s Leadership: Alleged Deliveries of Materiel from Taylor to Sierra Leone).

1048 Trial Judgment, paras 5195, 5835(xiii), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5164-5195 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Issa Sesay’s Leadership: Alleged Trip by Issa Sesay in May 2000).

1049 Trial Judgment, paras 5224, 5835(xiv), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5196-5224 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Issa Sesay’s Leadership: Alleged Trips by Issa Sesay in Second Half of 2000 to 2001).

1050 Trial Judgment, paras 5251, 5835(xvi), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5225-5252 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Issa Sesay’s Leadership: Alleged Trips by Issa Sesay’s Subordinates).

1051 Trial Judgment, paras 5250, 5835(xv), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5225-5252 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Issa Sesay’s Leadership: Alleged Trips by Issa Sesay’s Subordinates).

1052 Trial Judgment, paras 5163, 5835(xii), 5837, 6910. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5131-5163 (Arms and Ammunition: Allegations of Direct Supply by the Accused: During Issa Sesay’s Leadership: Alleged Deliveries from Taylor).

1053 Trial Judgment, paras 3915-3918, 4248(xvi), 4256, 4262, 6934, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4248-4262 (Operational Support: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

1054 Trial Judgment, para. 3915.

1055 Trial Judgment, para. 3916.

1056 Trial Judgment, para. 3916. See, e.g., Trial Judgment, paras 5110 (Sam Bockarie), 5194 (Issa Sesay). See also Trial Judgment, paras 5103-5108, 5193 (use of Liberian Government helicopters).

1057 Trial Judgment, paras 4943, 5154, 5167, 5194, 5198, 5199, 5219, 5226, 5227, 5244, 5247, 5829, 6914.

1058 Trial Judgment, paras 5819, 5820, 5827, 5833, 5835(xxxix). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel).

1059 Trial Judgment, paras 5743-5745, 5750-5753. See also supra paras 293-296. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5722-5753 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Post-Freetown Invasion to January 2002).

1060 The West Side Boys were a splinter group formed in May 1999 by Bazzy, an AFRC member, and included a mixed group of AFRC, RUF and NPFL fighters. Bockarie and Bazzy continued to cooperate during military operations. Trial Judgment, para. 6759. Issa Sesay testified that the RUF faced attacks from the West Side Boys during March and April 1999. Trial Judgment, para. 5742.

1061 Trial Judgment, paras 5743-5745, 5750-5753, 5835(xxxvi)(xxxvii), 6911. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5722-5753 (Arms and Ammunition: Use of Materiel Supplied or Facilitated by the Accused: Post-Freetown Invasion to January 2002), paras 5754-5834 (Arms and Ammunition: Other Sources of Materiel).

1062 Trial Judgment, para. 5825.

1063 Trial Judgment, paras 5824-5827. The RUF/AFRC also had recourse to the ECOMOG materiel captured in Kono during the Freetown Invasion, which had been captured with the materiel provided by Taylor. Trial Judgment, paras 5784, 5824, 5830.

1064 Trial Judgment, paras 4247, 4248(xl), 4261, 4262, 6933, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 4194-4247 (Operational Support: Provision of RUF Guesthouse in Monrovia).

1065 Trial Judgment, paras 4247, 4248(xl), 4261, 4262, 6933, 6936.

1066 Trial Judgment, paras 3727, 4248(iv), 4252, 4262, 6928, 6931, 6936. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3667-3731 (Operational Support: Communications Support: Satellite Phones). Sesay was unable to use the phone he had received from Foday Sankoh, which did not have any credit.

1067 Trial Judgment, paras 3727, 4248(iv), 4252, 4262, 6928, 6931, 6936.

1068 Trial Judgment, paras 5930, 5937, 5941, 6139(ii), 6142. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5875-5948 (Diamonds: February 1998–July 1999), 6139-6149 (Diamonds: Summary of Findings and Conclusion).

1069 Trial Judgment, paras 5990, 6139(iv), 6144. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5979-5990 (Diamonds: July 1999– May 2000).

1070 Trial Judgment, paras 6036-6047. Including on one occasion a 36 carat diamond. Trial Judgment, paras 6045, 6145.

1071 Trial Judgment, paras 6048-6050.

1072 Trial Judgment, paras 6057, 6058, 6139(v)(vi), 6145. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5991-6058 (Diamonds: June 2000-2002).

1073 Trial Judgment, paras 6057, 6139(v), 6145. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 5991-6058 (Diamonds: June 2000-2002).

1074 Trial Judgment, paras 6103, 6139(vii), 6147. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6059-6103 (Diamonds: Alleged Facilitation of Diamond Trading by the Accused). The Trial Chamber accepted the evidence of TF1-338, who testified that Taylor told Issa Sesay that because the UN and the international community were investigating Taylor’s connection to the RUF/AFRC, Sesay should not bring Taylor diamonds as often as before. TF1-338 further testified that Taylor told Sesay that he would arrange for Sesay to sell the “small diamonds” to someone else so that Sesay could buy materials to use on the front line. Trial Judgment, paras 6062, 6092.

1075 Trial Judgment, paras 6136, 6139(viii), 6148. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6104-6138 (Diamonds: Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining Experts).

1076 Trial Judgment, para. 6137, 6139(ix), 6148. See generally Trial Judgment, paras 6104-6138 (Diamonds: Provision of Mining Equipment and Mining Experts). While “there may have been multiple sources of mining equipment and fuel entering Sierra Leone during the Indictment period,” Taylor was amongst those sources. Trial Judgment, para. 6132.

1077 Trial Judgment, paras 4009, 4010, 4022, 4248(xxviii). See generally Trial Judgment, paras 3999-4022 (Operational Support: Financial Support: Allegations that Issa Sesay sent delegations to Monrovia to collect money from Taylor).

1078 Taylor Notice of Appeal, Grounds 21 and 34. Ground 21 is captioned: “The Trial Chamber erred, or misdirected itself, in law and fact in finding that any alleged military assistance to the RUF or AFRC constituted assistance to crimes.”

1079 Taylor Appeal, paras 448, 449, 459 (Ground 21); Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49913.

1080 Taylor Appeal, paras 457, 458, 459 (Ground 21). See also Taylor Appeal, para. 361.

1081 Taylor Appeal, paras 455, 456, 459 (Ground 21).

1082 Taylor Appeal, paras 327-367 (Ground 16).

1083 See infra paras 466-471.

1084 Taylor Appeal, paras 209-211 (Ground 11).

1085 Agreement, Art. 1(2). As such, interpretation of the constitutive documents is subject to Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, recognized as customary international law for treaty interpretation. See ICJ Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, para. 48 (“These principles are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary international law on the point.”).

1086 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 74, citing Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 190. See also Secretary-General’s Report on the ICTY, para. 54 (“The Secretary-General believes that all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia contribute to the commission of the violation and are, therefore, individually responsible.”). In this regard, note should also be made of the Moscow Declaration: Statement on Atrocities and London Agreement. The Moscow Declaration provided: “Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of free governments which will be erected therein. . . . Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusors in order that justice may be done. The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the government of the Allies.” The London Agreement provided: “WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made declarations of their intention that War Criminals shall be brought to justice; AND WHEREAS the Moscow Declaration of the 30th October 1943 on German atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German Officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and crimes will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free Governments that will be created therein; AND WHEREAS this Declaration was stated to be without prejudice to the case of major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical location and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.”

1087 Agreement, Preamble.

1088 Agreement, Preamble (“WHEREAS, the Security Council, in its resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000, expressed deep concern at the very serious crimes committed within the territory of Sierra Leone against the people of Sierra Leone . . . .”).

1089 Agreement, Art. 1(1); Statute, Art. 1(1).

1090 Secretary-General’s Report on SCSL, para. 16. See Kallon, Norman and Kamara Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, paras 40-42; Fofana Nature of The Armed Conflict Appeal Decision, paras 18-19 (both discussing Secretary-General’s Report on SCSL).

1091 Articles 51(1) of Additional Protocol I and 13(1) of Additional Protocol II provide: “The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, [which are additional to other applicable rules of international law,] shall be observed in all circumstances.” Articles 51(2) of Additional Protocol I and 13(2) of Additional Protocol II provide: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” These provisions are incorporated and made criminal in Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute. In addition, Article 2 of the Statute concerns situations where the civilian population is further made the object of a widespread or systematic attack. It is wellestablished that “there exists a corpus of general principles and norms on internal armed conflict embracing common Article 3 but having a much greater scope.” Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 116 (emphasis in original). The International Court of Justice has held that the principles of distinction and of the protection of the civilian population are “the cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law.” ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, para. 78. It further held that “these fundamental rules are to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.” ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, para. 79.

1092 Article 2 of the Statute (“Crimes against humanity”) provides: “The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population:

  • a.

    a. Murder;

  • b.

    b. Extermination;

  • c.

    c. Enslavement;

  • d.

    d. Deportation;

  • e.

    e. Imprisonment;

  • f.

    f. Torture;

  • g.

    g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence;

  • h.

    h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds;

  • i.

    i. Other inhumane acts.”

    Article 3 of the Statute (“Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II”) provides: “The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission of serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include:

  • a.

    a. Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;

  • b.

    b. Collective punishments;

  • c.

    c. Taking of hostages; d. Acts of terrorism;

  • e.

    e. Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

  • f.

    f. Pillage;

  • g.

    g. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized by civilized peoples;

  • h.

    h. Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.” Article 4 of the Statute (“Other serious violations of international humanitarian law”) provides: “The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute those persons who committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

  • a.

    a. Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;

  • b.

    b. Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;

  • c.

    c. Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”

1093 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 72 (emphasis added).

1094 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 72, 74, citing Tadić Appeal Judgment, paras 186, 189-193. By its plain language, “otherwise aided and abetted” ensures that all those who are individually criminally liable under customary international law may be held personally culpable under the Statute.

1095 Rule 72bis provides: “The applicable laws of the Special Court include:

  • (i)

    (i) the Statute, the Agreement, and the Rules;

  • (ii)

    (ii) where appropriate, other applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international customary law;

  • (iii)

    (iii) general principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of the Republic of Sierra Leone, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with the Statute, the Agreement and with international customary law and internationally recognized norms and standards.”

1096 Consistent with the principle of legality. Kallon, Norman and Kamara Appeal Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, paras 80-84; Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 888-891. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, paras 9 and 12 (which provided that the “applicable law [of the Special Court] includes international as well as Sierra Leonean law” and in relation to the crimes under international law specifically noted that: “[i]n recognition of the principle of legality, in particular nullum crimen sine lege, and the prohibition on retroactive criminal legislation, the international crimes enumerated, are crimes considered to have the character of customary international law at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.”).

1097 Statute, Art. 20 (“The judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.”).

1098 Trial Judgment, paras 482-485 (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).

1099 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 97 (Ground 34); Taylor Appeal, para. 452.

1100 Taylor Appeal, paras 448, 449, 459; Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49913

1101 Taylor Appeal, paras 457, 458, 459. See also Taylor Appeal, para. 361.

1102 Taylor Appeal, paras 455, 456, 459.

1103 Taylor Notice of Appeal, Ground 34.

1104 Taylor Appeal, para. 318, fn. 642.

1105 Prosecution Response, para. 639.

1106 Oral Hearing Scheduling Order (“(iv) Whether acts of assistance not to the crime “as such” can substantially contribute to the commission of the crime for aiding and abetting liability. Whether the Trial Chamber’s findings meet the “as such” standard.”).

1107 Taylor Appeal, para. 452 (emphasis in original) The Defence does not challenge the actus reus elements as articulated by the Trial Chamber; rather, it submits that “the standard articulated was not erroneous but the standard applied was erroneous.” Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp. 49900, 49901.

1108 The Appeals Chamber adopts the term “physical actor” to describe the person or persons who physically perform(s) the actus reus of the crime. Children under the age of 15 years performed the actus reus of some of the crimes found by the Trial Chamber, including the most horrific of atrocities. Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute, the Special Court does not have jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Terms such as “principal” or “perpetrator” connote individual criminal liability for the commission of the crime.

1109 See, e.g., Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49913 (“Now, your Honours, this reasoning is not sufficient. It does not reflect the requirements of aiding and abetting. It does not reflect the requirement of substantial contribution that’s been applied in previous cases at the ICTY. There’s no finding as to the identity of the perpetrators. That’s the first question mark. There’s no finding as to the instrumentalities used. There’s no finding that those instrumentalities came from Charles Taylor. There’s no finding that those instrumentalities had any impact, much less a substantial impact, on the decision of these three unidentified perpetrators to commit the crime.”).

1110 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 97 (Ground 34). See also Taylor Appeal, para. 453 (the “‘substantial contribution’ must be to the criminal conduct itself”), 691 (“what is required in such circumstances is that the aider and abettor has provided assistance to the crime, and to the individuals perpetrating that crime”); Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49902 (“[T]he support or the aiding, whatever it may be, must be to the perpetration of a specific crime . . . .”).

1111 Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp. 49900-49903 (comparing the Trial Chamber’s articulation of the actus reus and that provided by the Trial Chamber in Mrksić et al.: “Aiding and abetting is a form of accomplice liability which has been defined as the act of rendering practical assistance, encouragement or moral support, which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of a certain crime”) (Mrksić et al. Trial Judgment, para. 551) (emphasis added); Taylor Appeal, para. 453 (“the inquiry must always be framed properly: did the assistance encourage the crime in particular?”). See also, for example, Taylor Appeal, paras 658, 665 (“the Chamber failed to identify and specify which precise crimes were aided and abetted in consequence of the Guesthouse”), 666 (“all without any pronouncement of the specific crimes that were aided and abetted by virtue of the Guesthouse”), 682, 694 (both arguing that the assistance must be to the perpetration of a certain crime) (emphasis added); Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49917 (arguing that the Trial Chamber’s reasoning is “the antithesis of making a finding that there has been a substantial contribution to a specific crime”).

1112 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 57 (Ground 21).

1113 Taylor Appeal, para. 691. See, e.g., Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49917, 49918 (“[A]ccording to the Trial Chamber, if you further—if you do anything to perpetuate the existence of an organisation that you know in part, aside from many other activities, you know in part engages in criminal actions, then that alone is sufficient to find you guilty of assisting any and all crimes committed by that organisation. This is the liability crucible applied by the Chamber.”).

1114 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 57 (Ground 21), referencing Trial Judgment, paras 4262, 6936

1115 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 57 (Ground 21), referencing Trial Judgment, paras 5835(xl), 5842, 6914.

1116 Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49923, referencing Trial Judgment, para. 6949.

1117 Taylor Appeal, paras 646, 649, 651, 652, 653, 654, 656, 658 (Ground 27—Communications Support), 665, 666 (Ground 28—RUF Guesthouse), 674, 682 (Ground 29—Herbalists), 682 (Ground 30—Medical Support), 690, 691-694, 706-708 (Ground 31—Financial Support), 706-708 (Ground 32—Diamonds).

1118 Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49903-49907, citing Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgment, Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment. It submits that in Blagojević and Jokić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber relied on the finding that “Jokić’s acts of assistance concerned co-ordinating, sending and monitoring resources to actually go and commit the crime.” It further argues that in Ndindabahizi, the ICTR Appeals Chamber found that “in the absence of specific evidence connecting [the accused’s] words specifically to the crime against the victim, that there was no aiding and abetting.” Finally, it submits that in Nahimana et al., the ICTR Appeals Chamber found that acts did not substantially contribute to later crimes in part because of the length of time between the act and the crime.

1119 See, e.g., Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49903 (“In other words, JCE is being described as ‘The form of liability that deals with assistance to an organisation, and aiding and abetting deals with the form of liability concerning direct assistance or abetting, encouragement towards a specific crime.’”).

1120 Taylor Appeal, paras 453, 456; Taylor Reply, para. 71; Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49903, 49918.

1121 Prosecution Response, para. 402, citing Blaškić Appeal Judgment, paras 43, 48, Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 187, Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 232; Appeal transcript, 23 January 2013, p. 49961.

1122 Prosecution Response, paras 401-403. See also Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp. 49853, 49854.

1123 Appeal transcript, 23 January 2013, p. 49961-49964.

1124 Appeal transcript, 23 January 2013, p. 49968.

1125 Taylor Reply, para. 71.

1126 Taylor Reply, para. 71.

1127 Taylor Reply, para. 71.

1128 The facts of a case may involve multiple acts or conduct which, considered cumulatively, can be found to substantially contribute to the crime charged. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber has held, it is not necessary to show that “each given act constituted substantial assistance in order to satisfy the actus reus requirement of aiding and abetting.” Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 284. This is common-sense. As this Appeals Chamber has held, a trier of fact is called upon to determine whether the accused’s acts and conduct, not each individual act, had a substantial effect on the commission of the charged crime. Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 545. See, e.g., Renzaho Appeal Judgment, paras 336, 337 (Renzaho was responsible for aiding and abetting the killings of Tutsi civilians at roadblocks on the basis that he ordered the establishment of roadblocks, sanctioned “the conduct at them” and provided “continued material support for the killings through the distribution of weapons.” The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Renzaho affirmed the accused’s conviction notwithstanding its finding that “there was only scant evidence as to how the weapons were used”, reasoning that the accused encouraged the physical actors to commit the charged crimes by his acts and conduct); Kamuhanda Appeal Judgment, para. 72 (although the Appeals Chamber concluded at para. 77 that ordering liability fully encapsulated the accused’s criminal conduct). Contra Taylor Appeal, Grounds 23-32. The Appeals Chamber accordingly rejects submissions that particular acts of assistance, encouragement, moral support or facilitation did not individually substantially contribute to the commission of crimes, as these submissions, even if accepted, fail to demonstrate an error.

1129 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 545 (“The question, then, is whether Gbao’s presence outside the camp can be said to have had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”), 1170 (“Aiding and abetting . . . require[s] that the accused contribute to the crimes, to an even higher degree. [This] form of liability only attach[es] where the accused ‘substantially’ contributed to the crimes.”). Accord Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 52, 71, 72 (the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability is having a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime). See also Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 305 (applying actus reus of aiding and abetting liability established at Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 775 (“The actus reus of ‘aiding and abetting’ requires that the accused gave practical assistance, encouragement or moral support which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of a crime. ‘Aiding and abetting’ may be constituted by contribution to the planning, preparation or execution of a finally completed crime.”)). In the Trial Judgment, the jurisprudence of this Court and the jurisprudence of other international tribunals, “substantial contribution” and “substantial effect” are used interchangeably and are synonymous. For clarity, the Appeals Chamber prefers and will use the formulation “substantial effect”.

1130 Supra para. 353. The Parties agreed that the Trial Chamber properly articulated the law. Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp. 49900, 49901; Prosecution Response, paras 401, 402.

1131 See Taylor Appeal, paras 453, 658, 665, 666, 691.

1132 Trial Judgment, para. 482.

1133 The Trial Chamber thus directed itself to determine whether Taylor’s acts and conduct had a substantial effect on the commission of each crime with which he was charged. The Defence contends that the Trial Chamber should have directed itself to determine the manner of such assistance, that it was to the physical actor and used in the commission of the specific crime.

1134 Article 6(3) reads: “The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.” (emphasis added).

1135 Provided that the other elements of individual criminal liability having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra paras 413-437.

1136 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 545, 1170; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 52, 71, 72. Accord Furundžija Trial Judgment (having extensively reviewed sources of customary international law regarding the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability (paras 192-235), the Trial Chamber concluded: “In sum, the Trial Chamber holds that the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”) (confirmed by Furundžija Appeal Judgment, para. 126; Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, para. 162; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 46); Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 692 (having extensively reviewed sources of customary international law regarding the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability (paras 678-692), the Trial Chamber concluded: “In sum, the accused will be found criminally culpable for any conduct where it is determined that he knowingly participated in the commission of an offence that violates international humanitarian law and his participation directly and substantially affected the commission of that offence through supporting the actual commission before, during, or after the incident.”) (adopted by Čelibići Trial Judgment, paras 326, 327; Aleksovski Trial Judgment, paras 61, 62 and confirmed by Čelibići Appeal Judgment, para. 352 (“The Trial Chamber had earlier defined aiding and abetting as: ‘[including] all acts of assistance that lend encouragement or support to the perpetration of an offence and which are accompanied by the requisite mens rea. Subject to the caveat that it be found to have contributed to, or have had an effect on, the commission of the crime, the relevant act of assistance may be removed both in time and place from the actual commission of the offence.’ The Prosecution does not challenge that definition. Subject to the observation that the acts of assistance, encouragement or support must have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, the Appeals Chamber also accepts the statement as accurate.”) (emphasis added); Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, para. 164); Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 186 (“The Appeals Chamber finds that [the Trial Chamber’s] statement [of the law] corresponds to the elements of individual criminal responsibility as set out, as follows, by the jurisprudence of this Tribunal and that of ICTY: (1) The requisite actus reus for such responsibility [under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute] is constituted by an act of participation which in fact contributes to, or has an effect on, the commission of the crime. Hence, this participation must have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act.”), 198 (“In line with the relevant international case law, referred to in the foregoing analysis, a person may be held criminally liable for any conduct, where it is determined that he participated knowingly in the commission of a crime, if his participation directly and substantially contributed to the perpetration of the crime.”) (citing Tadić Trial Judgment, paras. 674 and 689, Čelebići Trial Judgment, para. 326). See also Brđanin Appeal Judgment, paras 348, 349 (“What is required is that the support of the aider and abettor has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. . . . The Appeals Chamber finds that Brđanin has not shown that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding beyond reasonable doubt that Brđanin rendered practical assistance and a substantial contribution to the Bosnian Serb forces carrying out the attacks during which destruction occurred.”); Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 193 (“The Appeals Chamber considers that Jokić’s characterization of his conduct as the mere performance of routine duties in an organized structure is irrelevant to the principal question of whether his impugned conduct had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”); Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 672 (“The Appeals Chamber would begin by recalling that, in order to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime, it is unnecessary to prove that he had authority over that other person; it is sufficient to prove that the defendant’s acts or omissions substantially contributed to the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator.”), 934 (“Nonetheless, those publications, broadcasts and activities could have substantially contributed to the commission of crimes against humanity after 6 April 1994, for which a defendant could be held liable under other modes of responsibility pleaded, such as planning, instigation or aiding and abetting. . . . The Appeals Chamber will consider below whether it has been established that the Kangura issues, RTLM broadcasts and activities of the CDR between 1 January and 6 April 1994 substantially contributed to the commission of crimes against humanity after 6 April 1994.”). Cf. Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 282 (“In this context, the Appeals Chamber cannot accept that the drafters of Protocol I and the Statute intended to limit a superior’s obligation to prevent or punish violations of international humanitarian law to only those individuals physically committing the material elements of a crime and to somehow exclude subordinates who as accomplices substantially contributed to the completion of the crime.”) (emphasis added).

1137 Accord Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 492 (“Where a person is accused of having planned, instigated, ordered or aided and abetted the commission of genocide by one or more other persons pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute, the Prosecutor must establish that the accused’s acts or omissions substantially contributed to the commission of acts of genocide.”); Renzaho Appeal Judgment, para. 315; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgment, para. 75; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 186, 198; Trial Judgment, para. 477; Milutinović et al. Trial Judgment, para. 88; Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 332. See also Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, paras 25-35.

1138 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 687, 1170; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 301. Accord Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 492, 934; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 26; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 186, 198.

1139 Accord Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 492, 502, 934; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 27; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 186, 198.

1140 Furundžija Trial and Appeal Judgments.

1141 Sesay et al. Trial and Appeal Judgments.

1142 Simić et al. Trial and Appeal Judgments.

1143 Brđanin Trial and Appeal Judgments.

1144 Justice Case. See, e.g. Justice Case, p. 1118 (“The defendant Rothenberger is guilty of taking a minor but consenting part in the Night and Fog program. He aided and abetted in the program of racial persecution, and notwithstanding his many protestations to the contrary he materially contributed toward the prostitution of the Ministry of Justice and the courts and their subordination to the arbitrary will of Hitler, the Party minions, and the police.”).

1145 Krstić Appeal Judgment; Blagojević and Jokić Trial and Appeal Judgment.

1146 See, e.g., Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. (Kamara provided machetes to troops who committed crimes during “Operation Cut Hand”); Renzaho Appeal Judgment, paras 336, 337 (The Appeals Chamber found: “the only reasonable conclusion was that Renzaho’s instructions to erect roadblocks and to distribute weapons encouraged the people manning the roadblocks to kill Tutsis and therefore substantially contributed to the killings at them.”) (emphasis added); Bagaragaza Sentencing Judgment, para. 25 (Bagaragaza provided heavy weapons which he had been concealing in his factories for the Army Chief of Staff, authorised personnel from his factories to participate in the attacks and provided vehicles and fuel which were used to transport members of the Interahamwe to crime sites); Krstić Appeal Judgment, paras 137, 144 (Krstić, as Chief of Staff and Commander of the Drina Corps of the VRS, allowed Drina Corps buses to be used to transport prisoners to execution sites); Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para. 536 (Gérard Ntakirutimana aided and abetted genocide by procuring gendarmes and ammunition for the attack).

1147 See, e.g., Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgment, para. 438 (Lukić by his “armed presence” aided and abetted the crimes of murder, other inhumane acts and cruel treatment); Rohde Case, p. 56; Almelo Trial, p. 35; Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment, para. 532 (Elizaphan Ntakirutimana aided and abetted genocide by, inter alia, transporting armed attackers to crime sites); Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 672, 965 (Ngeze “set up, manned and supervised roadblocks in Gisenyi in 1994 that identified targeted Tutsi civilians who were subsequently taken to and killed at the Commune Rouge.”); Renzaho Appeal Judgment, para. 336; Limaj et al. Trial Judgment, para. 658 (Bala blindfolded L12, brought him to a barn where he was beaten and was present during the incident); Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, paras 81, 87 (Kalimanzira falsely encouraged Tutsis to take refuge at Kabuye hill).

1148 See, e.g., Flick Case; Bagaragaza Sentencing Judgment, para. 25 (Bagaragaza provided a substantial amount of money for the purpose of buying alcohol to motivate the Interahamwe to continue with the killings); Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 124 (Gacumbitsi, by expelling his tenants who were subsequently killed, and “knowing that by so doing he was exposing them to the risk of being targeted by Hutu attackers on grounds of their ethnic origin” aided and abetted murder.); Seromba Appeal Judgment, para. 183 (Seromba fired Tutsi employees and turned away victims who were seeking refuge); Karera Appeal Judgment, para. 322 (“By instructing the Interahamwe to arrest Gakuru and telling them that Gakuru was an “Inyenzi”, it was reasonable to conclude that the Appellant substantially contributed to the commission of his murder through specifically assisting and providing moral support to the principal perpetrators.”); Rukundo Appeal Judgment, para. 176 (Rukundo “identified Tutsi refugees to soldiers and Interahamwe who subsequently removed and then killed them.”); Einsatzgruppen Case, p. 569 (Klingelhoefer located and turned over lists of Communists).

1149 See, e.g., Ministries Case, pp. 620-621, 702, 706, 715 (Puhl was the managing director and vice president of the Reich Bank and was found guilty for having directed and supervised the execution of an agreement between Funk and Himmler for the receipt, classification, deposit, conversion, and disposal of stolen properties and loot taken by the SS from victims exterminated in concentration camps. The Tribunal established that “[h]is part in this transaction was not that of a mere messenger or businessman. He went beyond the ordinary range of his duties to give directions that the matter be handled secretly by the appropriate departments of the bank. . . . He had no part in the actual extermination of Jews and other concentration camp inmates, and we have no doubt that he would not, even under orders, have participated in that part of the program. But without doubt he was a consenting participant in part of the execution of the entire plan, although his participation was not a major one.”); IMT Judgment, pp 300 (“Frick drafted, signed, and administered many laws designed to eliminate Jews from German life and economy. His work formed the basis of the Nuremberg Decrees, and he was active in enforcing them.”), 331-332 (Speer was held responsible under Counts Three and Four for his participation in the slave labor program. Speer transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of workers needed. Sauckel obtained the labour and allocated it to the various industries in accordance with instructions supplied by Speer. The IMT found that “Speer’s position was such that he was not directly concerned with the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program, although he was aware of its existence. For example, at meetings of the Central Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labor were so large as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting.”); Justice Case, pp 1095 (Klemm was State Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and “took part in drafting the law to make treason retroactive and applying it to annexed territories”), 1099 (“The defendant Klemm was familiar with the entire correspondence on this matter. He specifically directed the witness Mitzschke to obtain reports. His own testimony shows that he knew of the failure to take effective action in the case cited, and it is the judgment of this Tribunal that he knowingly was connected with the part of the Ministry of Justice in the suppression of the punishment of those persons who participated in the murder of Allied airmen.”) (emphasis added); Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 663-670 (Brđanin was responsible for ARK Crisis Staff decisions to disarm Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats throughout the ARK, which created an imbalance of arms and weapons favouring the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Krajina); Krstić Appeal Judgment, paras 137, 144; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 134; Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 116 (Simić, as President of the Crisis Staff, worked together with the police, paramilitaries and JNA to maintain the system of arrests and detention of non-Serb civilians, and that he had an important influence on the unlawful arrests and detention); Simić Appeal Judgment, paras 132-134 (Simić, as President of the Crisis Staff, was responsible for the health, safety and welfare of all citizens in the area administered by the Crisis Staff, and he had an obligation to provide for appropriate detention facilities. His deliberate denial of adequate medical care to the detainees in these detention facilities lent substantial assistance to the confinement under inhumane conditions prevailing therein.).

1150 See, e.g., Fofana and Kondewa Trial Judgment, para. 722 ( Fofana, ’s speech at the passing out parade in December 1997 was clearly an encouragement and support of Norman’s instructions to kill captured enemy combatants and “collaborators”, to inflict physical suffering or injury upon them and to destroy their houses); Ministries Case, pp. 575, 576 ( Dietrich, , as chief of the press department, fostered and directed a persistent campaign to arouse the hatred of the German people against Jews); IMT Judgment, pp 302-303 ( Streicher, was held responsible for Crimes against Humanity in that “[i]n his speeches and articles, week after week, month after month, he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and incited the German People to active persecution.” The IMT found that “[w]ith knowledge of the extermination of the Jews in the Occupied Eastern Territory, this defendant continued to write and publish his propaganda of death.”); Brima et al. Trial Judgment, paras 775, 1786, 1940 (Brima and Kamara were present during the commission of crimes, and the Trial Chamber found that given the authority of the accused their presence gave moral support to the principal perpetrators); Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgment, paras 201, 202; Aleksovski Trial Judgment, para. 87 (“By being present during the mistreatment, and yet not objecting to it notwithstanding its systematic nature and the authority he had over its perpetrators, the accused was necessarily aware that such tacit approval would be construed as a sign of his support and encouragement. He thus contributed substantially to the mistreatment.”); Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 209; Synagogue Case, pp. 53, 56 (the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime, combined with his status as an “alter Kämpfer”, a long-time militant of the Nazi party, and his knowledge of the criminal enterprise, were deemed sufficient for a conviction).

1151 See, e.g., Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 134; Rohde Case (an accused was convicted of being concerned in the killing of four women because he worked the oven in the prison crematorium); Pohl Case, para. 989 (Pohl was convicted as an accessory in relation to Action Reinhardt because his role was to “conserve and account for the loot” in the “after-phases” of the operation); Ministries Case, paras 620, 621 (Puhl, a senior Reichbank official, was convicted as an accessory for knowingly participating in the disposal of property stolen from concentration camp inmates).

1152 See, e.g., Pohl Case, pp. 1000, 1021, 1036.

1153 See, e.g., Justice Case; Hisakasu and Others Case; Isayama and Others Case; Swada and Others Case.

1154 See, e.g., Fofana and Kondewa Trial Judgment, paras 735, 736 (Kondewa addressed the fighters at the passing out parade and effectively gave his blessings for the criminal acts as the High Priest. The Trial Chamber noted that “no fighter would go to war without Kondewa’s blessings because they believed that Kondewa transferred his mystical powers to them and made them immune to bullets.”); Seromba Trial Judgment, para. 269 (Seromba, a priest, advised a bulldozer operator that he could destroy the church in which Tutsi refugees were hiding; on appeal, the Appeals Chamber found that this satisfied the actus reus of commission liability, but did not suggest that it did not satisfy the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability as a matter of law or fact).

1155 Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49903-49907, citing Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, Ndindabahizi Appeal Judgment, Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment.

1156 This and other Appeals Chambers have consistently rejected submissions mistaking factual considerations concerning the manner in which assistance was provided for legal requirements applicable in all cases, as discussed in this paragraph and the citations therein.

1157 Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 72. Accord Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, para. 87, fn 238; Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 372; Mrkšić and Sljivančanin Appeal Judgment, para. 81; Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 85; Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 48; Čelebići Appeal Judgment, para. 352.

1158 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 541. Likewise, where the accused was outside a building in which a crime was being committed, the Appeals Chamber held “it is within the discretion of a reasonable trier of fact to hold that such presence did have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the offence.” Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 545.

1159 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, para. 355. Accord Krstić Appeal Judgment, para. 143. See also Karera Appeal Judgment, para. 318 (instigating liability).

1160 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, para. 349. Accord Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, para. 87; STL Applicable Law Decision, para. 227; Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, para. 102; Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 229.

1161 Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 103. Accord Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 672, 966; Rukundo Appeal Judgment, para. 92; Muhimana Appeal Judgment, para. 189 (“For an accused to be convicted of abetting an offence, it is not necessary to prove that he had authority over the principal perpetrator.”); Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, para. 170.

1162 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 769; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 75. Accord Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgment, para. 214; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgment, para. 468; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, para. 86; Rukundo Appeal Judgment, para. 52; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 134. This principle applies to all forms of criminal participation in crimes. See Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 1140.

1163 Taylor Reply, para. 71.

1164 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 57 (Ground 21), referencing Trial Judgment, paras 4262, 6936

1165 Taylor Notice of Appeal, para. 57 (Ground 21), referencing Trial Judgment, paras 5835(xl), 5842, 6914.

1166 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 305.

1167 The Appeals Chamber declined to enter a conviction on appeal, as Kanu had already been convicted for planning the commission of the crimes. Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 306. The Appeals Chamber notes that the actus reus of the planning convictions and the actus reus of aiding and abetting in this case were distinct acts.

1168 Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 65. Following the commencement of the armed conflict, crimes against the non-Serb civilian population were committed in the implementation of the Strategic Plan. Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 100.

1169 Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 118. The Trial Chamber found that attacks by Bosnian Serb forces against non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods, which involved the commission of the crimes of killings, torture, destruction of homes and religious buildings, appropriation and humiliation and degradation, were essential to the implementation of the Strategic Plan in the ARK. Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 471, 530, 665, 673, 1055.

1170 The Trial Chamber found that Brđanin, a civilian leader, knew that crimes were being committed in the execution of the Strategic Plan. Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 333, 349, 350. Brđanin was President of the ARK Crisis Staff and War Presidency. Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 289. The Trial Chamber found that he was “one of the most significant political figures in the ARK.” Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 291-304.

1171 Notably, the Trial Chamber did not convict Brđanin of killings, torture and destruction of homes and religious buildings that were not committed “in context of the armed attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces on non-Serb towns, villages and neighbourhoods.” See, e.g., Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 471, 530, 665, 673.

1172 Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 469, 528, 663, 673, 1056.

1173 The accused largely did not have de jure or de facto authority over the Bosnian Serb forces, although there was close cooperation between civilian authorities and these forces. Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 211-229 (the ARK Crisis staff was found to have de facto authority over the police, but not over the VRS (army) or paramilitary units).

1174 Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 470, 529, 664, 673, 1056.

1175 Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 471, 530, 665, 673, 1057.

1176 Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 1073, 1074.

1177 Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 1069.

1178 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, paras 240, 259, 344, 349. While Brđanin argued that “it must be shown that the physical perpetrators were assisted by, encouraged by, or received moral support from him,” the Appeals Chamber noted that Brđanin failed to show it was unreasonable for the Trial Chamber to find that he made “a substantial contribution to [the Bosnian Serb] forces.” Brđanin Appeal Judgment, paras 346, 347. See also Brđanin Appeal Judgment, paras 240, 259-264, 290-303, 344-350. The ICTY Appeals Chamber emphasised that there was no requirement of an agreement or plan between the aider and abettor and the physical actor, that the physical actor need not know of the aider and abettor’s contribution and that it is not necessary as a matter of law to identify the physical actors in order to establish that the accused’s acts and conduct had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes. Brđanin Appeal Judgment, paras 263, 349, 355.

1179 See Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 400-465.

1180 See, e.g., Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 476 (all crimes found proved beyond a reasonable doubt).

1181 Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 1069, 1073, 1074.

1182 The Defence incorrectly submits that Jokić’s “acts of assistance concerned co-ordinating, sending and monitoring resources to actually go and commit the crime.” Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49904 (emphasis added). Jokić provided assistance to the crimes by sending personnel and equipment to dig mass graves for the killed victims. See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, paras 764, 767, 769, 770, 772. In rejecting Jokić’s submission on appeal that he did not directly assist the commission of the crimes, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that “[a]iding and abetting generally involves a lesser degree of directness of participation in the commission of the crime than that required to establish primary liability for an offence. Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 192.

1183 Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 729. The ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s findings. Blagojević argued on appeal that personnel from his unit were not direct participants in many crimes and were only a small part of the total number of participants. The ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected that submission, holding that “the question of whether a given act constitutes substantial assistance to a crime requires a fact-based inquiry” and recalling that in the Krstić Appeal Judgment it entered convictions based on similar findings. Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, paras 132-134, citing Krstić Appeal Judgment, paras 135-138.

1184 Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 747. With respect to acts of persecution for which Blagojević was convicted, the personnel attributable to Blagojević did not participate in the perpetration of all those crimes and their participation was more limited in scope than other forces. Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, paras 755-757; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 134, citing, e.g., Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, paras 191, 835. The Appeals Chamber understands that the Blagojević and Jokić Trial Chamber relied on a causal attribution to establish that Blagojević’s acts and conduct had a substantial effect on the crimes.

1185 Krstić Appeal Judgment, para. 137.

1186 Blagojević did not share a common purpose to commit killings or persecution. Krstić did not share a common purpose to commit genocide.

1187 Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 118.

1188 Simić Appeal Judgment, paras 106, 107, citing Simić et al. Trial Judgment, paras 994-996. See also Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 114. The police were responsible for arrests and detention, and while Simić did not have authority over the police, his position of President of the Crisis Staff gave him strong influence. Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 114, citing Simić et al. Trial Judgment, paras 994, 995.

1189 Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 110 (internal alterations omitted).

1190 Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 114 (emphasis added).

1191 Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 116.

1192 Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 116 (“The Appeals Chamber finds that a reasonable trier of fact would be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the fact that the Appellant, as President of the Crisis Staff, worked together with the police, paramilitaries, and JNA to maintain the system of arrests and detention of non-Serb civilians, and that he had an important influence on the unlawful arrests and detention, show that the Appellant lent substantial assistance to the perpetration of these underlying acts of persecutions. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that the Appellant did not heed his responsibility, as the President of the Crisis Staff, to ensure the safety of the population in Bosanski Samac Municipality, which responsibility the Appellant does not dispute as such.”).

1193 Like other tribunals (see infra paras 417, 417 (and citations therein)), in reviewing the Post-Second World War caselaw as indicative of customary international law, the Appeals Chamber has carefully and thoroughly considered the applicable legal instruments (in particular the London Charter, Control Council Law No. 10 and the British Royal Warrant), the tribunals’ holdings and articulations of law (including statements by Judge Advocates before British tribunals), and, as importantly, the tribunals’ findings of fact, application of the law to the facts and ultimate conclusions. The Appeals Chamber is cognisant that “[f]or a correct appraisal of this case law, it is important to bear in mind, with each of the cases to be examined, the forum in which the case was heard, as well as the law applied, as these factors determine its authoritative value.” Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 194. At the same time, the Appeals Chamber firmly rejects facile characterisations of the holdings in this caselaw, as well as any suggestion that this jurisprudence is irrelevant to identifying the actus reus and mens rea elements of individual criminal liability under Article 6(1) of the Statute and customary international law. In the discussion of this caselaw and the accompanying footnotes in this Section of the Judgment, the Appeals Chamber has set out holdings of law and findings on liability from the post-Second World War caselaw that have informed this Appeals Chamber’s analysis. In summary, the Appeals Chamber recalls the object and purpose of the Statute (supra paras 350, 351), and notes the Moscow Declaration: Statement on Atrocities and the London Agreement, pursuant to which the IMT Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 were enacted. In the Appeals Chamber’s view, the object and purpose of the Statute is similar to the object and purpose of the IMT Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. The Appeals Chamber is satisfied that Article 6(1) of the Statute is substantially consonant with Article II(2)(a) to (d) of Control Council Law No. 10, as applied by tribunals operating under that law. More specifically, in this Chamber’s view liability for “otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime” under Article 6(1) of the Statute generally corresponds to individual criminal liability under Article II(2)(b) to (d) of Control Council Law No. 10, again as applied by the tribunals. The Appeals Chamber notes that tribunals applying Article II(2) often did not differentiate between the forms of criminal participation provided for in subsections (b) to (d) in their holdings and conclusions on guilt. See e.g., Ministries Case, pp 337, 436, 475, 478; Justice Case, pp 985, 1063, 1118, 1128, 1132; Einsatzgruppen Case, p. 539; Pohl Case, pp 962, 965. In other instances, tribunals applying that law found the accused liable as accomplices or participants in the organised and systematic commission of crimes on a widespread scale, without specifying a particular subsection of Article II(2). See, e.g., Flick Case, p. 1217; Farben Case, pp 1141, 1142, 1155; Einsatzgruppen Case p. 569; Roechling Appeal Judgment, p. 1123. British military tribunals described the liability of those who did not perform the actus reus of the crime in terms of “aiding and abetting”, being an “accessory” to and/or “being concerned in” the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Schonfeld Case; Rhode Case; Almelo Trial; Stalag Luft III Case; Zyklon B Case. Having reviewed the caselaw, the Appeals Chamber concludes that the tribunals applying the IMT Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, as well as the British tribunals applying the Royal Warrant, found that individual criminal liability was established by an accused’s knowing participation in and substantial effect on the commission of the crimes charged. Accord Furundžija Trial Judgment, paras 235, 245; Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 692. For the reasons stated in this Section of the Judgment, the Appeals Chamber is satisfied that this articulation of the law of individual criminal liability is fully in accordance with the holdings of this Appeals Chamber and the Appeals Chambers of other international tribunals applying customary international law. The Appeals Chamber is further satisfied that the cases cited and discussed applied aiding and abetting liability by holding accused liable only for their own acts and conduct, and not common purpose or enterprise liability, although reference was made in some reasoning to criminal plans and programs as a matter of fact. The Appeals Chamber notes that the tribunals acquitted some accused on the merits of common purpose charges and were acquitted of individual criminal liability for crimes committed pursuant to a common plan. Furthermore, in a number of instances the tribunals explicitly found that accused did not directly intend that the crimes be committed and did not share the common purpose that the crimes be committed. The Appeals Chamber does not accept that this caselaw supports the position that joint criminal enterprise liability extends to all those who knowingly, without sharing the common purpose, participate in the implementation of any plan or enterprise to commit crimes. Further, the holdings of law and conclusions on liability discussed are distinct from and do not relate to any charges under Article II(1)(d) or (2)(e), which the Appeals Chamber emphasises are not the law of the Special Court. Finally, the Appeals Chamber endorses the view of Judge Meron: “I hesitate to repeat the commonly used term ‘victors’ court’ because this would imply an arbitrary, perhaps unjust tribunal. . . . Nuremberg was neither arbitrary nor unjust. It tempered the Charter’s harsh rules to protect the accused, it assessed the evidence according to accepted and fair legal standards, and was even ready to acquit outright some defendants. . . . That victors sat in judgment did not corrupt the essential fairness of the proceedings.” T. Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, pg. 198. The Appeals Chamber notes the numerous acquittals entered by the IMT and NMTs in particular, as well as other post-Second World War tribunals, ranging from senior officials of the Nazi Third Reich, to business and industrial leaders, to mid-level officials, to low-ranking soldiers and bureaucrats. The Appeals Chamber also notes that the IMT did not find that German organisations and groups were “criminal organisations”, with the exception of the S.S., that the NMTs consistently articulated and applied the principle of personal culpability in the context of organisations, companies and other collectives and that the tribunals applying Control Council Law No. 10 applied Article II(2)(e) strictly by requiring proof of the accused’s high-ranking membership, knowledge and positive acts.

1194 Becker, Weber and 18 Others Case, pp 67, 70. The accused participated in the illegal arrest and deportation of the victims to Germany, where three of the victims then died as a result of ill-treatment, and were thus convicted as accomplices to those deaths. The Commentary noted that the Prosecution “apparently demonstrated that the accused had caused the victims’ death by contributing to and making possible their deportation to Germany, where they died from further ill-treatment committed by other individuals. Theirs was, thus, the guilt of accomplices . . . .”

1195 Roechling Appeal Judgment, p. 1136 (emphasis added). See also Roechling Appeal Judgment, p. 1123 (“Ernst Roechling’s role in the operation of the so-called Lorsar purchasing office is of decisive importance, for he was the delegated administrator of this company. Its criminal character was discussed in connection with the statements on the acts with which Hermann Roechling was charged. Thus, Ernst Roechling is an accessory to the war crimes proved against Hermann Roechling.”). Compare Roechling Appeal Judgment, pp 1124, 1125 (“Von Gemmingen-Hornberg, Hermann Roechling’s son-in-law and president of the Directorate of the Roechling Stahlwerke in Voelklingen does not, according to the evidence of the case, appear to be guilty as an accessory or accomplice of Hermann Roechling, of the criminal acts of an economic nature. In fact, there can be no question of his personal responsibility as a result of specific action; it is not permissible under criminal law to deduce his responsibility solely from the office which he held. Accordingly, the contested judgment must, in this respect, be wholly and completely confirmed.”) (consistent with Farben Case, p. 1142).

1196 Ministries Case, pp 547, 548 (emphasis added). See also Ministries Case, p. 337 (reviewing Article II(2) of Control Council Law No. 10 and concluding “[t]herefore, all those who were either principals or accessories before or after the fact, are criminally responsible, although the degree of criminal responsibility may vary in accordance with the nature of his acts.”), 475 (“All those who implemented, aided, assisted, or consciously participated in these things bear part of the responsibility for the criminal program.”).

1197 Flick Case, p. 1217 (emphasis added).

1198 Flick Case, p. 1221 (emphasis added).

1199 Justice Case, p. 1063 (emphasis added). The accused Barnickel, Petersen, Nebelung and Cuhorst were acquitted of the charges. Justice Case, pp 1156, 1157. As to Cuhorst, the Tribunal found: “As to count three the problem is considerably more complicated. There are many affidavits and much testimony in the record as to the defendant’s character as a fanatical Nazi and a ruthless judge. There is also much evidence as to the arbitrary, unfair, and unjudicial manner in which he conducted his trials. Some of the evidence against him was weakened on cross-examination, but the general picture given of him as such a judge is one which the Tribunal accepts. . . . [However], [t]his Tribunal does not consider itself commissioned to try the conscience of a man or to condemn a man merely for a course of conduct foreign to its own conception of the law, it is limited to the evidence before if as to the commission of certain alleged offenses. Upon the evidence before it, it is the judgment of this Tribunal that the defendant Cuhorst has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes alleged and that he be, therefore, acquitted on the charges against him.”

1200 The different programs were charged as the particulars of Counts 2 and 3; findings on liability were made with respect to the particulars, although convictions were entered on the counts charged. See Justice Case, pp 985, 1055 (“The foregoing documents and the undisputed facts show that Hitler and the high ranking officials of the armed forces and of the Nazi Party, including several Reich Ministers of Justice and other high officials in the Ministry of Justice, judges of the Nazi regime’s courts, the public prosecutors at such courts, either agreed upon, consented to, took a consenting part in, ordered, or abetted, were connected with the Hitler NN plan, scheme, or enterprise involving the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the waging of the recent war against the Allied nations and other neighboring nations of Germany.”).

1201 See, e.g., Justice Case, p. 1081 (“The evidence conclusively establishes the adoption and application of systematic government-organized and approved procedures amounting to atrocities and offenses of the kind made punishable by C.C. Law 10 and committed against ‘populations’ and amounting to persecution on racial grounds. . . . The pattern and plan of racial persecution has been made clear. General knowledge of the broad outlines thereof in all its immensity has been brought home to the defendants. The remaining question is whether or not the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt in the case of the individual defendants that they each consciously participated in the plan or took a consenting part therein.”)

1202 “The defendant Rothenberger is guilty of taking a minor but consenting part in the Night and Fog program. He aided and abetted in the program of racial persecution . . . .” Justice Case, p. 1118. “[Lautz] was an accessory to, and took a consenting part in, the crime of genocide.” Justice Case, p. 1128. “We find defendant Mettgenberg to be guilty under counts two and three of the indictment. The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted as a principal, aided, abetted, and was connected with the execution and carrying out of the Hitler Night and Fog decree . . . .” Justice Case, p. 1132.

1203 Farben Case, p. 1142 (“We have used the term ‘Farben’ as descriptive of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of which the enumerated acts of spoliation were committed. But corporations act through individuals and, under the conception of personal individual guilt to which previous reference has been made, the prosecution, to discharge the burden imposed upon it in this case, must establish by competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual defendant was either a participant in the illegal act or that, being aware thereof, he authorized or approved it. Responsibility does not automatically attach to an act proved to be criminal merely by virtue of a defendant’s membership in the Vorstand. Conversely, one may not utilize the corporate structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for illegal acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets.”).

1204 Taylor Appeal, paras 453, 456; Taylor Reply, para. 71; Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49903, 49918.

1205 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 312-319, 475.

1206 Brđanin Appeal Judgment, para. 431.

1207 See supra para. 362.

1208 Statute, Art. 6(1); ICTY Statute, Art. 7(1); ICTR Statute, Art. 6(1); Rome Statute, Art. 25(3); Genocide Convention, Art. 3; Torture Convention, Art. 4(1); Nuremberg Principles, Principle VII. Accord Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 235, adopted by Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 46; Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, para. 170 (“But Article 7(1) deals not only with individual responsibility by way of direct or personal participation in the criminal act but also with individual participation by way of aiding and abetting in the criminal acts of others.”); Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 192; STL Decision on Applicable Law, para. 225. See also ILC 1996 Draft Code, Art. 2(3); Secretary-General’s Report on the ICTY, para. 54 (“The Secretary-General believes that all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia contribute to the commission of the violation and are, therefore, individually responsible.”).

1209 See Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, Separate and Concurring Opinion of Justice Ayoola, para. 9, quoting Kupreškić et al. Trial Judgment, para. 543.

1210 See Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 191 (“Most of the time these crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality.”).

1211 See Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 277-285.

1212 See Brđanin Appeal Judgment, paras 235, 236. Brđanin was held liable for aiding and abetting crimes that were committed on a large-scale in the implementation of the Strategic Plan of the Bosnian Serb leadership. Krstić, Blagojević and Jokić aided and abetted widespread and systematic crimes committed in furtherance of the common criminal purpose of a plurality of persons.

1213 In Blagojević and Jokić, the Trial Chamber found a plurality of persons sharing a common purpose to commit forcible transfer and persecution, but considered that neither accused shared the intent of those crimes and that both accused’s participation in the crimes was more properly described as aiding and abetting. Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, paras 704-714 (Blagojević), 715-725 (Jokić). In Krstić, the Trial Chamber found, and the Appeals Chamber confirmed, a plurality of persons sharing a common purpose to commit genocide. The Appeals Chamber concluded that Krstić did not share the common purpose, but entered convictions for aiding and abetting the crimes that were committed in furtherance of the common purpose, as Krstić had a substantial effect on the commission of those crimes. Krstić Appeal Judgment, paras 79-137. In Simić et al., the Trial Chamber found a plurality of persons sharing a common purpose to commit crimes, and convicted the accused Zarić and Tadić for aiding and abetting crimes committed in furtherance of that common purpose, although it found that neither shared the common criminal purpose. It also convicted Simić as a participant in that joint criminal enterprise. On appeal, the Appeals Chamber reversed that conviction as defectively pleaded, finding that Simić did not have notice that he was being charged with commission through JCE. The Appeals Chamber then convicted Simić for aiding and abetting crimes. While it did not expressly take into consideration the Trial Chamber’s finding that there was a plurality of persons sharing a common purpose to commit crimes, it accepted and relied on the factual findings underlying the Trial Chamber’s conclusion. See Simić Appeal Judgment, paras 15-74 (pleading of JCE), 92-95. The Brima et al. Trial Chamber did not make findings on the existence of a plurality of persons sharing a common purpose to commit crimes, as it found, like the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Simić, that JCE was defectively pleaded. Brima et al. Trial Judgment, paras 66-85.

1214 Ministries Case, pp 435, 436 (“The Tribunal is of the opinion that no evidence has been offered to substantiate a conviction of the defendants in a common plan and conspiracy, and all the defendants charged therein are hereby acquitted.”). Accused were convicted for aiding and abetting the crimes. See further infra paras 423, 424 (and citations therein).

1215 Hostage Case, pp 1260, 1261.

1216 See Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 677 (“The tribunal saw as essential proof that he had knowledge of others’ acts that were done in furtherance of the Nacht und Nebel plan, as well as evidence of deliberate action. However, it did not require proof that Joel was party to a prior arrangement or agreement to take part in any particular behaviour.”). In convicting Lautz, the Tribunal found “There is much to be said in mitigation of punishment. Lautz was not active in Party matters. He resisted all efforts of Party officials to influence his conduct but yielded to influence and guidance from Hitler through the Reich Ministry of Justice, believing that to be required under German law. He was a stern man and a relentless prosecutor, but it may be said in his favor that if German law were a defense, which it is not, many of his acts would be excusable.” Justice Case, p. 1128. In convicting Schlegelberger, the Tribunal stated: “We are under no misapprehension. Schlegelberger is a tragic character. He loved the life of an intellect, the work of the scholar. We believe that he loathed the evil that he did, but he sold that intellect and that scholarship to Hitler for a mess of political pottage and for the vain hope of personal security. He is guilty under counts two and three of the indictment.” Justice Case, p. 1087. In comparison, the Tribunal found regarding Klemm: “When Rothenberger was ousted as State Secretary because he was not brutal enough, it was Klemm who was chosen to carry on the Thierack program in closest cooperation with the heads of the Nazi conspiracy. Klemm was in the inner circle of the Nazi war criminals. He must share with his dead friend, Thierack, (with whom he had lived), and his missing friend, Bormann, the responsibility, at a high policy level, for the crimes committed in the name of justice which fill the pages of this record. We find no evidence warranting mitigation of his punishment.” Justice Case, p. 1094. But see Separate Opinion of Judge Blair, pp 1195-1199 (suggesting that aiding and abetting a plan makes one a co-conspirator in the plan and liable for all crimes in accordance with the conspiracy).

1217 For example, Jokić was acquitted of aiding and abetting some murders committed pursuant to a common purpose on the ground that either the actus reus or mens rea of aiding and abetting liability was not established. See Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, paras 762, 765. See also Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 774. Krstić was found to have had a substantial effect on all crimes of genocide, extermination, persecution and murder committed pursuant to the common purpose. While the Trial Chamber in Brđanin did not find a plurality of persons sharing a common criminal purpose on legal grounds (Brđanin Trial Judgment, para. 345), it is notable that the Trial Chamber acquitted Brđanin of crimes it was satisfied were committed in the ARK in the implementation of the Strategic Plan. See Brđanin Trial Judgment, paras 159 (camps in implementation of Strategic Plan), 538, fn.

1375 (Brđanin not found guilty of killings committed in camps as he did not have knowledge of such killings). In the Ministries Case, Von Weizsaecker was acquitted of crimes committed in the implementation of the “Final Solution”.

1218 In some trials held before United States military courts, the Prosecution charged that the accused “acted in pursuance of a common design to commit” certain crimes. See, e.g., Dachau Case; Hadamar Case (“acting in pursuance of a common interest”); Flossenburg Case (the Prosecution submitted that “each of the accused was capable of and did entertain the common intent or design to subject the inmates of Flossenburg to beatings, killings, tortures, starvation, and other indignities.”); Mauthausen Case. In the Belsen Case, the Judge Advocate stated that: “The case for the Prosecution was that all the accused employed on the staff at Auschwitz knew that a system and a course of conduct was in force, and that, in one way or another in furtherance of a common agreement to run the camp in a brutal way, all those people were taking part in that course of conduct.”).

1219 Taylor Appeal, Grounds 14, 16, 19, and 21. See generally, Taylor Appeal, para. 317. See also Appeal transcript, 22 and 23 January 2013.

1220 Taylor Appeal, paras 448, 449, 459; Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49913.

1221 Taylor Appeal, paras 457, 458, 459. See also Taylor Appeal, para. 361.

1222 Taylor Appeal, paras 455, 456, 459.

1223 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 312, quoting Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 72.

1224 See Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 312-319.

1225 Taylor Appeal, para. 448.

1226 Taylor Appeal, para. 448, 449; Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, p. 49913.

1227 Taylor Appeal, para. 459.

1228 Prosecution Response, paras 397, 398.

1229 Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 312; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 72, quoting Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 186. See also Deronjić Sentencing Appeal, para. 124; Brđanin Appeal Judgment, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 3; Čelibići Appeal Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judges Hunt and Bennouna, para. 27.

1230 See supra paras 362-385.

1231 See, e.g., Ministries Case, pp 499, 507, 528, 577, 578, 631, 694; Pohl Case, pp 1001, 1002, 1004; Farben Case, p. 1153, 1157, 1158; Roechling Appeal Judgment, pp 1124, 1125; IMT Judgment, p. 284 (“There is evidence showing the participation of the Party Chancellery, under Hess, in the distribution of orders connected with the commission of War Crimes; that Hess may have had knowledge of, even if he did not participate in, the crimes that were being committed in the East, and proposed laws discriminating against Jews and Poles; and that he signed decrees forcing certain groups of Poles to accept German citizenship. The Tribunal, however, does not find that the evidence sufficiently connects Hess with those crimes to sustain a finding of guilt.”); Zyklon B Case, para. 9; Einsatzgruppen Case, p. 581 (Ruehl was not in “a position where his lack of objection in any way contributed to the success of any executive operation.”); Simić et al. Trial Judgment, paras 999 (“While Miroslav Tadić had knowledge of the discriminatory intent of the joint criminal enterprise, the actions or omissions of Miroslav Tadić cannot be considered to have had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the offence of unlawful arrests and detention, and as such did not aid and abet the joint criminal enterprise.”) (emphasis added), 1000 (The Trial Chamber was “not satisfied that Simo Zarić aided and abetted the joint criminal enterprise to commit acts of unlawful arrest or detention as persecution. In his position as Assistant Commander for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Morale and Information in the 4th Detachment, he was responsible for conducting interrogations of some detainees at the SUP and in Brčko. The Trial Chamber does not find that these acts gave substantial assistance to the commission of acts of unlawful arrest, detention and confinement of non-Serbs, committed by the joint criminal enterprise.”) (emphasis added); Blagojević and Jokić Trial Judgment, para. 774 (In relation to Dragan Jokić’s responsibility for aiding and abetting persecution, the Trial Chamber found that “no evidence has been presented which would enable it to conclude that Dragan Jokić rendered practical assistance, encouragement or moral support, which had a substantial effect on the cruel and inhumane treatment or the terrorising of the civilian population. The Trial Chamber therefore concludes that Dragan Jokić does not bear any liability for these underlying acts.”).

1232 See, e.g., Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 97, 102 (in respect of the Prosecution’s appeal against acquittal at trial (para. 99), holding that the fact that the accused provided arms, ammunition and a vehicle to support a military attack is not sufficient to eliminate all reasonable doubt as to whether the accused’s acts and conduct had a substantial effect on crimes that were later committed).

1233 See Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 233 (“Having a role in a system without influence would not be enough to attract criminal responsibility.”) (and cases discussed therein).

1234 Taylor Appeal, paras 457, 458. See also Taylor Appeal, para. 361, citing German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Case No. 4 StR 453/00, Judgement of 8 March 2001, p. 10 (Germany).

1235 Taylor Appeal, para. 459.

1236 Prosecution Response, para. 405.

1237 Prosecution Response, para. 406.

1238 The Defence contrasts the law articulated by the Trial Chamber for aiding and abetting liability with the law for ordering and instigating liability, submitting that the key distinction is that ordering and instigating both involve acts that in themselves reflect a criminal objective, while aiding and abetting liability involves acts of assistance that are not intrinsically criminal. Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49897, 49899. The Appeals Chamber does not accept the Defence submission, which has no basis in law. The acts and conduct constituting the actus reus of planning, instigating, ordering and aiding and abetting liability may take a variety of forms, whether innocuous or apparently criminal. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber that ordering liability is incurred when the accused ordered an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order. Accord Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 481; Galić Appeal Judgment, paras 152, 157; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, para. 30; Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 42. See also Trial Judgment, para. 474; Milutinović et al. Trial Judgment, para. 85. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber held, “an order does not necessarily need to be explicit in relation to the consequences it will have.” D. Milošević Appeal Judgment, para. 267. Likewise, as the Trial Chamber correctly stated for instigating liability, “[t]he accused need only prompt another to ‘act in a particular way’-and not necessarily to commit a crime or underlying offence.” Trial Judgment, para. 471, fn. 1109. In conjunction with the requirement that the accused’s acts and conduct must have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime, the Appeals Chamber accepts the Trial Chamber’s formulation as an accurate statement of the actus reus of instigating liability and adopts it. See also Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgment, paras 27, 32; Milutinović et al. Trial Judgment, para. 83; Kvočka et al. Trial Judgment, para. 252.

1239 Trial Judgment, paras 6914, 6949.

1240 Taylor Appeal, paras 455, 456, 459.

1241 Taylor Appeal, paras 456, 459.

1242 Prosecution Response, para. 404.

1243 Prosecution Response, para. 404.

1244 Prosecution Response, para. 404.

1245 Trial Judgment, para. 6788.

1246 Trial Judgment, paras 558, 559.

1247 Trial Judgment, paras 6790, 6793, 6905.

1248 See supra paras 253-302. The Trial Judgment is further replete with findings regarding Taylor’s acts and conduct and knowledge. The Trial Chamber only entered convictions once it was satisfied that the actus reus and mens rea elements of aiding and abetting and planning liability were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

1249 Trial Judgment, para. 486.

1250 Trial Judgment, para. 487.

1251 Taylor Notice of Appeal, Ground 18.

1252 Taylor Appeal, para. 318, fn. 641.

1253 Taylor Appeal, paras 327-367.

1254 Taylor Appeal, para. 319.

1255 Taylor Appeal, paras 338-346. The Defence emphasises that “[t]he salient issue, it must be recalled, is not whether Article 25(3)(c) declares customary international law; the issue, rather, is whether there is any evidence to justify the Chamber’s pronouncement that the knowledge standard reflected customary international law as of the date of the alleged criminal activity.” Taylor Appeal, para. 339.

1256 Taylor Appeal, para. 348.

1257 Taylor Appeal, paras 350-357, discussing the ILC 1996 Draft Code of Crimes (para. 347), Art. 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute (para. 351) and the post-Second World War military tribunals’ jurisprudence (paras 352, 353).

1258 Taylor Appeal, paras 352, 353, citing Einsatzgruppen, Zyklon B, Schonfeld, Hechingen and Ministries cases.

1259 Taylor Appeal, paras 360-364.

1260 Taylor Appeal, paras 361-364, citing German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Case No. 4 StR 453/00, Judgement of 8 March 2001, p. 10 (Germany); Stefani, G. et al., Droit pénal génénal, Dalloz (Paris, 2000), p. 290 (France); Cass. pen., sez. VI 12-06-2003 (21-03-2003), n. 25705 (Italy); Rejman Genowefa (ed.) Kodeks karny część ogŏlna—Komentarz, Wydawnictwo, C.H. Beck (Warszawa 1999) (Poland); United States Model Penal Code, § 2.06(4) and United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2nd Cir 1938) (United States); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 21(b) (Canada); Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech A.H.A., [1986] AC 112 (England); R. v. Lam Kit, [1988] 1 HKC 679, 680 and R. v. Leung Tak-yin [1987] 2 HKC 250 (Hong Kong) and Yeo, S., “India”, in Heller, K. and Dubber, M., eds. The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, Stanford University Press (Stanford: 2011), p. 296 , citing Mohd Jamal v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1953 All 668 (India).

1261 Taylor Appeal, para. 365.

1262 Prosecution Reponse, paras 282-290, discussing the United Nations General Assembly “Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nu¨rnberg Tribunal”, the UNWCC Report XV, p. xvi., Flick Case, Roechling Case, Einsatzgruppen Case, Furundžija Trial Judgment, Ministries Case, Tadić Trial Judgment.

1263 Prosecution Reponse, paras 300-305.

1264 Prosecution Reponse, para. 301, citing Orić Appeal Judgment, Judge Shomburg Opinion, para. 20, Exxon Mobil, p. 42.

1265 Prosecution Reponse, para. 302.

1266 Prosecution Reponse, para. 303.

1267 Prosecution Reponse, paras 303, 304.

1268 Taylor Reply, para. 46, discussing Roechling and Ministries Cases.

1269 Taylor Reply, para. 50.

1270 Taylor Appeal, paras 368-376. See also Taylor Appeal, para. 385.

1271 Taylor Appeal, paras 369-372, citing Haradinaj Appeal Judgment, para. 58, Vasiljević Appeal Judgment, para. 102, Blaskic Appeal Judgment, para. 49.

1272 Prosecution Reponse, para. 306.

1273 Prosecution Response, para. 313.

1274 Prosecution Response, para. 313.

1275 Taylor Appeal, para 395.

1276 Taylor Appeal, paras 394-396. See also Taylor Appeal, para. 441.

1277 Prosecution Response, para. 319 (emphasis added).

1278 Taylor Reply, paras 55-58.

1279 Taylor Appeal, para. 348.

1280 Taylor Appeal, para. 337.

1281 See, e.g., Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 546; Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, paras 242, 243; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, para. 366.

1282 See Tadić Appeal Judgment, para. 229(iv); Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, para. 163; Vasiljevic Appeal Judgment para. 102; Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, paras 33, 51; Blaskic Appeal Judgment, para. 49 (affirming Vasiljevic Appeal Judgment definition that mens rea of aiding and abetting does not require anything more than “knowledge on the part of the aider and abettor that his acts assist in the commission of the principal perpetrator’s crime”); Simić Appeal Judgment, para. 86; Brđanin Appeal Judgment, para. 484; Blagojević and Jokić Appeal Judgment, para. 127 (reiterating that “[t]he requisite mental element of aiding and abetting is knowledge that the acts performed assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal perpetrator”); Orić Appeal Judgment, para. 43; Mrksić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgment, paras 49, 159; Haradinaj et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 58; Lukić and Lukić Appeal Judgment, para. 428.

1283 See Ntagerura et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 370; Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 482; Rukundo Appeal Judgment, para. 53; Ntawukulilyayo Appeal Judgment, para. 222; Kalimanzira Appeal Judgment, para. 86; Karera Appeal Judgment, para. 321; Muvunyi Appeal Judgment, para. 79; Seromba Appeal Judgment, para. 56.

1284 Brima et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 242, quoting Brima et al. Trial Judgment, para. 776. See also Sesay et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 546; Fofana and Kondewa Appeal Judgment, paras 366-367. Subsequently, the STL Appeals Chamber and an ECCC Trial Chamber articulated similar mens rea standards for aiding and abetting. See STL Applicable Law Decision, para. 227 (“[t]he subjective element of aiding and abetting resides in the accessory having knowledge that ‘his actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.’”) (emphasis in original); Duch Trial Judgment, para. 535 (“[l]iability for aiding and abetting a crime requires proof that the accused knew that a crime would probably be committed, that the crime was in fact committed, and that the accused was aware that his conduct assisted the commission of that crime. This knowledge can be inferred from the circumstances.”)

1285 Mens rea relates, inter alia, to the conduct, the consequence and the context or factual circumstances forming part of the crime. The Appeals Chamber notes that certain civil law jurisdictions conceptualise mens rea as comprising a cognitive (“knowledge”, “rappresentazione”, “Wissen”) and a volitional component (“intention”, “volonta”, “Wiele”). The Appeals Chamber further notes that Article 30(1) of the Rome Statute provides: “Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.” (emphasis added). For a detailed comparative discussion of the subjective element in domestic legal systems and international criminal law, see E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law.

1286 The Appeals Chamber notes the Trial Chamber’s holding, consistent with the jurisprudence of other international tribunals, that for specific-intent crimes or underlying offences such as persecution as a crime against humanity, aiding and abetting liability can attach even where an accused does not have the requisite specific intent. The Defence does not challenge this holding, nor does it challenge in this regard Taylor’s convictions for acts of terror under Count 1. As the Parties have not raised the issue, the Appeals Chamber does not address it. In respect of this issue, see, inter alia, R. v. Woollin, [1999] AC 82; Williams, G., Oblique Intention ; Stewart, J., The End of Modes of Liability ; Hechingen Case (the Appeals Court acquitted the accused of aiding and abetting persecutions because the accused did not have the specific intent for the crime, noting that Control Council Law No. 10 established personal culpability for the crime); Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-based Interpretation; Ambos, K., Some Preliminary Reflections on the Mens rea Requirements of the Crimes of the ICC Statute and of the Elements of Crimes .

1287 Trial Judgment, para. 6949.

1288 See Appeal transcript, 22 January 2013, pp 49919, 49920 (“So what is purpose, at least as it is applied in some systems? Well, purpose in some systems is defined as intent to assist a crime. The intention to assist a crime, that’s not the same as direct intent in respect of the crime of the perpetrator. It is dolus directus in respect of the assistance, not in respect of the ultimate crime. Now, whether or not those two might be very hard to distinguish in any particular case is not for me to say. There may be cases indeed where they are different, but in terms of topology, it’s very clear what ‘purpose’ means. ‘Purpose’ means intent to assist.”).

1289 The Appeals Chamber has noted in its review of the jurisprudence, legal sources and the Parties’ submissions that a variety of terminology is used to describe the standards for an accused’s mental state regarding the consequence of his acts and conduct, as a component of mens rea. Jurisprudence on mens rea under customary international law recognises and discusses three such standards: direct intent, knowledge and awareness of the substantial likelihood. Collectively, these standards may be described as “dolus” or “Wille”, and the ICRC has persuasively commented that these three standards are incorporated in the term “wilfully” as used in some international instruments. See ICRC Commentary, Additional Protocol I, para. 3474. The Appeals Chamber adopts the term “dolus” to describe the mental state regarding the consequence of acts or conduct that is generally required in customary international law. The Appeals Chamber uses the term “direct intent”—also described as “purpose”, “dol general”, “dolo intenzionale” and “dolus directus in the first degree”—to describe an accused’s “will”, “desire” or “conscious object” that his acts or conduct have an effect on the commission of a crime. This is the standard put forward by the Defence for aiding and abetting liability. The Appeals Chamber uses the term “knowledge”—also described as “general intent”, “dol special”, “dolo diretto” and “dolus directus in the second degree”—to describe the accused’s knowledge that his acts or conduct have an effect on the commission of the crime. This is a standard articulated in this Court’s jurisprudence, applied by the Trial Chamber here and the subject of the Defence’s primary challenge. The Appeals Chamber uses the term “awareness of the substantial likelihood”—which generally corresponds to terms such as “conditional intent”, “advertent recklessness”, “indirect intent”, “bedingte Vorsatz” and “dolus eventualis”—to describe an accused’s awareness and acceptance of the substantial likelihood that his acts or conduct have an effect on the commission of the crime. This is a standard articulated in this Court’s jurisprudence and the subject of the Defence’s second challenge. These standards are framed as appropriate for aiding and abetting liability. Recalling that the issue is an accused’s mental state in relation to the consequence of his acts or conduct, which in turn relates to the relevant actus reus, for commission liability the consequence of an accused’s acts or conduct is to commit the crime. For planning, instigating, ordering and aiding and abetting liability, the consequence of the accused’s acts or conduct is to have an effect on the commission of the crime. See further, U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC), section 2.02; Bell, J.S., Principles of French Law ; Marinucci—E, G.. Dolcini, Manuale di Diritto Penale, Parte Generale, pp. 188-191 ; van Sliedregt, E., Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law, pp. 40-41 ; Williams, G., Oblique Intention ; A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, pp 60-69 .

1290 At the ICTY, see, e.g., Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 128, 138; Tadić Appeal Judgment, paras 194, 197-202, 205-220, 256-269; Tadić Trial Judgment, paras 661-692; Hadžihasanović et al. Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Juri