Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2017
* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text appearing at the International Court of Justice website (visited February 14, 2006) <http://www.icj-cij.org>
1 Clark, John P., Associate Professor of International Relations, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39 (2001), p. 262.Google Scholar
2 See, i.a., Nulty, Mel Me, “The collapse of Zaire: implosion, revolution or external sabotage?”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (1999), pp. 53–82 Google Scholar; Prunier, Gerard, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-1999)”, African Affairs, 103/412, pp. 359–383 Google Scholar; John F. Clark’s article, cited in Note 1; Shearer, David, “Africa’s Great War”, Survival, 41 (1999), pp. 89–106 Google Scholar. See also the following reports of the International Crisis Group: “North Kivu, into the Quagmire?” (15 August 1998); “Congo at War, a Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict” (17November 1998); “How Kabila Lost his Way” (21 May 1999); “Africa’s Seven-Nation War” (21 May 1999); “The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo” (20 August 1999).
3 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd. ed., 2002, p. 216.
4 See Schachter, Oscar, “The Use of Force against Terrorists in Another Country”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 19 (1989), p. 225 ff.Google Scholar
5 Roberts, Adam, “What is Military Occupation?”, British Year Book of International Law 55 (1984), pp. 249–305, at p. 249.Google Scholar
6 Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, 1993, p. 212. Roberts also refers to this phenomenon: “To many, ‘occupation’ is almost synonymous with aggression and oppression”, op. cit., p. 301.
7 Eyal Benvenisti, op. cit, p. 5.
8 United States Manual on the Law of Land Warfare (1956) FM 27-10. See also, United Kingdom Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004), p. 275, 11.3
9 See also Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,International Law, 7th ed 1962, p. 435: “When the legitimate sovereign is prevented from exercising his Powers, and the occupant, being able to assert his authority, actually establishes an administration over a territory, it matters not with what means, and in what ways, his authority is exercised.” (Emphasis added.) See also H.P. Gasser, in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, 1995, p. 243 Even if the stated strategic goal of an invasion of foreign territory is not to gain control of the area or its inhabitants, but ‘merely’ to secure against attacks on the invader s own territory close to the border, the invading Power still bears responsibility for the parts of the territory actually controlled. Similarly, neither the claimed short duration of the occupation nor the absence of military administration for the occupied territory makes any difference”. (Emphasis added.)
10 Benvenisti, op. cit., p. 3,
11 F.Kalshoven (ed.), The Centennial of the First International Peace Conference, Reports and Conclusions 2000, p. 186.
12 See B. Broms, “The Definition of, Aggression“; Recueil des Cours 154 1977)’ P-348: “[I] could be argued in view of the way in whlch the Paraph has been construed that the military occupation or the annexation ”. presupposes the existence of an act of aggression in the form of an invasion or attack and that it would therefore not have been necessary to include them separately in this paragraph.
13 Op. cit., pp. 218-219.
1 Th. Bruha/Ch. Tams, Self-Defence Against Terrorist At-tacks. Considerations in the Light of the ICJ’s ‘Israeli Wall’ Opinion”, in: Dicke, K. et a/.(eds.), Weltinnenrecht. Liber Amicorum Jost Delbruck, Berlin 2005, pp. 84–112, at p. 97Google Scholar.
2 Refering to Y.Dinstein, war,Aggression,and self-Defence 3rd ed., 2002, p. 216.
3 This is not the first case giving me this impression; cf. My separate opinion in the Oil Platforms case, para. 36.
4 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann (eds.), Geneva, 1987, p. 869.
6 Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 57th Plenary Ses-sion, Venice, 12-13 December 2003, Opinion No. 245/2003, doc. No. CDL-AD (2003) 18, paras. 34 ff.
7 Ibid., para. 38
8 Ibid., para 85.
9 For a highly relevant reference in this regard (cf. supra, para 19)United states Army,Operational Law Handbook (2002), International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottes-ville, Virginia, issued 15 June 2001, Ch. 2 at p. 5. See also, more generally, Roberts, A., “The Laws of War in the War on Terror, Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, Vol. 32(2002), 192–245 Google Scholar
10 Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, J.S. Pictet (ed.), Geneva, 1958, p. 16
11 Report of the ILC on the work of its Fifty-third session Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Suppl. No. 10 (A/56/10), p. 56.
12 Op. cit. (footnote 10), p. 48.
13 Concerning the specific question of standing in case of breaches of obligations erga omnes the Institute of International Law, in a resolution on the topic of obligations of this nature adopted at its Krakow Session of 2005, accepted the following provisions: “Article 3 In the event of there being a jurisdictional link between a State alleged to have committed a breach of an obligation erga omnes and a State to which the obligation is owed, the latter State has standing to bring a claim to the International Court of Justice or other international judicial institution in relation to a dispute concerning compliance with that obligation. Article 4 The International Court of Justice or other international judicial institution should give a State to which an obligation erga omnes is owed the possibility to participate in proceedings pending before the Court or that institution and relating to that obligation. Specific rules should govern this participation.“
1 “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State, against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State.” (General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), Art. 1.)
2 D-Day is the date of the formal signing of the Ceasefire Agreement.
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