Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 September 2015
Global experimentalist governance has emerged within and across a number of international regulatory regimes, but its potential contribution to the global governance of climate change remains largely unexplored. This article investigates the opportunities and barriers to developing global experimentalist governance approaches in the international regulation of climate change technologies, focusing on the recent framework for marine geoengineering under the London Dumping Protocol. It argues that, in the face of the limits of international law in dealing with uncertainty, multilevel distribution of power and regulatory disconnection, global experimentalist governance is attractive to catalyse adaptability, iterative learning, participation and cooperation. Such approach can help rethink the way international law deals with technological development, by emphasizing its problem-solving function.
2 See eg RO Keohane and DG Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (January 2010) The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 10–33; Abbott, KW, ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2012) 30(4) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 571CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hale, T and Roges, C, ‘Orchestration and Transnational Climate Governance’ (2014) 9(1) The Review of International Organizations 59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Cottrell, MP and Trubek, DM, ‘Law as Problem Solving: Standards, Networks, Experimentation, and Deliberation in Global Space’ (2012) 21 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 359Google Scholar.
5 Cottrell and Trubek (n 4) 363 (defining ‘collective problem solving’ as ‘a dynamic process that involves the common identification of a problem, formation of a consensus that it ought to be solved, and the mobilization of appropriate expertise and resources to do so’).
7 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate – Science, Governance and Uncertainty (2009) xi.
8 ibid 57. See in general, WCG Burns and AL Strauss (eds), Climate Change Geoengineering – Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues, and Governance Frameworks (CUP 2013).
10 eg Lin, A, ‘Geoengineering Governance’ (2009) 8(3) Issues in Legal Scholarship (Supp. ‘Balancing the Risks: Managing Technology and Dangerous Climate Change’) 9Google Scholar; Redgwell, C, ‘Geoengineering the Climate: Technological Solutions to Mitigation – Failure or Continuing Carbon Addiction?’ (2011) 2 CCLR 178Google Scholar; Reynolds, J, ‘Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International Environmental Law’ (2014) 5 Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 417Google Scholar.
11 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London), 11 ILM (1972) 1294 (‘LC’); Protocol to the London Dumping Convention (London) 36 ILM (1996) (‘London Protocol’).
12 D Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 OhioNULRev 827.
13 J Rosenau and E-O Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge Studies in International Relations 1992).
14 Jayasuriya, K, ‘Globalization, Law and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergency of Global Regulatory Governance’ (1999) 6(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 425Google Scholar; Karkkainen, BC, ‘Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance’ (2004) 4(1) Global Environmental Politics 72CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also A McGrew and D Held (eds), Governing Global Transformations: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Polity Press 2002).
15 M Zürn, ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’ in D Levi-Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (OUP 2012) 730.
16 eg ML Djelic and K Sahlin Andersson (eds), Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (CUP 2008); Biermann, F et al. , ‘The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architecture: A Framework for Analysis’ (2009) 9(4) Global Environmental Politics 14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; K Abbott et al., ‘Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries' (Conference on International Organizations as Orchestrators, Munich, September 2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125452>; Gehring, T and Faude, B, ‘The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic Effects’ (2013) 19 Global Governance 119.Google Scholar
17 CF Sabel and J Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (OUP 2010) 9.
18 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 477.
19 G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (OUP 2006) 2.
20 de Búrca, G, Keohane, RO and Sabel, CF, ‘New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance’ (2013) 45(3) NYUJIntlLaw&Pol 723Google Scholar, 738.
21 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17) 9. Experimentalism is a main characteristic of wider ‘new governance’ approaches, at times resulting in an overlap in terminology between ‘new governance’ and ‘experimentalist governance’. See de Búrca and Scott (n 19); Scott, J and Trubek, DM, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Governance Approaches’ (2002) 8(1) ELJ 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 CF Sabel and J Zeitlin, ‘Experimentalist Governance’ in D Levi-Faur (n 15) 179.
24 N Walker, ‘EU Constitutionalism and New Governance’ in de Búrca and Scott (n 19) 23.
25 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 478.
26 Trubek, DM and Trubek, LG, ‘New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ (2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 539Google Scholar, 551.
27 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20) argue that, when all these five elements operate together, they constitute ‘a form of governance that fosters a normatively desirable form of deliberative and participatory problem-solving’ (‘ideal type’)’, but hybrid types also represent interesting governance practices.
28 Shackley, S and Wynne, B, ‘Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority’ (1996) 21(3) Science, Technology, & Human Values 275CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heyvaert, V, ‘Governing Climate Change: Towards a New Paradigm for Risk Regulation’ (2011) 76(6) MLR 817CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 GE Marchant, BR Allenby and JR Herkert (eds), The Growing Gap between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight (Springer 2011).
30 R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (OUP 2008) 165.
31 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 484.
32 See Stevenson and Dryzek (n 1) (analysing a constellation of discording climate discourses). On the possible convergence, Rajamani, L, ‘The Warsaw Climate Negotiations: Emerging Understandings and Battle Lines on the Road to the 2015 Climate Agreement’ (2014) 63(3) ICLQ 721CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
34 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 22) 176.
35 The idea of ‘penalty defaults’ originates from contract law to mean penalties ‘designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer. [They] are purposefully set at what the parties would not want in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts)’. Ayers, I and Gertner, R, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989) 99(1) YaleLJ 86Google Scholar. For a discussion of penalty defaults in experimentalist governance, BC Karkkainen, ‘Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance’ in de Búrca and Scott (n 19) 293.
36 Parker, RW, ‘The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna–Dolphin Conflict?’ (1999) 12(1) GeoIntlEnvtlLRev 1Google Scholar.
38 Charnovitz, S, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’ (1997) 18 MichJIntlL 183Google Scholar; A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007).
39 D Tolbert, ‘Global Climate Change and International Non-Governmental Organizations’ in R Churchill and D Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change: International Legal Issues and Implications, (Graham & Trotman 1991) 95; Gough, C and Shackley, S, ‘The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The Epistemic Communities and NGOs’ (2001) 77(2) International Affairs 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17) 12 define ‘dynamic accountability’ as the ‘accountability that anticipates the transformation of rules in use’.
42 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 23).
43 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 484.
45 On democratization of science in global risk decision-making and governance, J Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law (CUP 2010).
46 Cottrell and Trubek (n 4).
47 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20) 17.
48 Karkkainen, BC, ‘“New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping – Reply’ (2004) 89 MinnLRev 471Google Scholar.
49 eg Dorf, MC and Sabel, CF, ‘A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 (2) ColumLRev 267Google Scholar; de Búrca and Scott (n 19).
51 Among the few scholars developing this perspective, J Scott, ‘The MuIti-Level Governance of Climate Change’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 2012); I von Homeyer, ‘Emerging Experimentalism in EU Environmental Governance’ in Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17).
52 Rittel, H and Webber, M, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, (1973) 4 Policy Sciences 155CrossRefGoogle Scholar (first introducing the concept of ‘wicked’, as opposed to ‘tame’, problems). On the link with climate change, Lazarus, RJ, ‘Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future’ (2009) 94 CornellLRev 1153Google Scholar; Levin, K et al. , ‘Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change’ (2012) 45 Policy Sciences 123CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 I von Homeyer, ‘Emerging Experimentalism in EU Environmental Governance’ in Sabel and Zeitlin (n 17) 121, 127.
54 Sabel and Zeitlin (n 22) 179; de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3) 477.
57 Royal Society (n 7).
58 see IMO, Report of the First Meeting of the Intersessional Technical Working Group on Ocean Fertilization (LC/SG-CO2 3/5), 16 February 2009.
59 Royal Society (n 7).
62 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Fertilization on Marine Biodiversity’, Montreal, Technical Series No 45 (2009); BD Russell and SD Connell, ‘Honing the Geoengineering Strategy’ Science (8 January 2010) 144.
63 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Geoengineering in Relation to the Convention on Biological Diversity: Technical and Regulatory Matters, Montreal, Technical Series No 66 (2012) 74.
65 GC Hegerl and S Solomon, ‘Risks of Climate Engineering’ Science (21 August 2009) 955.
66 A Robock, et al (n 64).
67 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis - Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - Summary for Policymakers (CUP 2013) 27.
70 N Pidgeon and A Corner, ‘Geoengineering the Climate: the Social and Ethical Implications’ (2010) 52(1) Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 24.
71 SM Gardiner, ‘Is “Arming the Future” with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil? Some Doubts about the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System’ in S Gardiner et al. (eds), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (OUP 2010) 284.
72 Victor, DG, ‘On the regulation of geoengineering’ (2008) 24(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 322CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing that the threat of unilateral action makes existing international norms ineffective). cf Horton, J, ‘Geoengineering and the Myth of Unilateralism: Pressures and Prospects for Internation2al Cooperation’ (2011) 4 Stanford Journal of Law Science and Policy 56Google Scholar (noting that the fear of unilateral action is misplaced).
73 Pidgeon and Corner (n 70).
74 D Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Bloomsbury Publishing 1982).
75 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) COP Decision IX/16 (2008) C para 4; CBD COP Decision X/33 (2010) para 8(w). These decisions were endorsed in IMO Resolution LC/LP. 1 (2008) on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, 31 October 2008. See also EA Parson and D Keith, ‘End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research’ Science (13 March 2013) 339; S Rayner et al., Memorandum on draft principles for the conduct of geoengineering research. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Enquiry into the Regulation of Geoengineering (2009).
76 DG Victor, Global Warming Gridlock – Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (CUP 2011) 193.
77 See the ‘quarrel’ between Lobel and Karkkainen on new governance and the role of law. Lobel, O, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 MinnLRev 324Google Scholar; BC Karkkainen (n 48); Lobel, O, ‘Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research: Surreply’ (2004) 89 MinnLRev 498Google Scholar.
78 de Búrca and Scott (n 19) 4–10.
80 ‘Encapsulation’ refers to whether the method is modular and contained, such as is the case with air capture and space reflectors, or whether it involves material released into the wider environment, as is the case with sulphate aerosols or ocean fertilization (Royal Society (n 7) 38).
82 See, in general, N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002).
83 For a comprehensive analysis of the customary international law principles applicable to geoengineering, Scott, KN, ‘International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge (2013) 34 MichJIntlL 309Google Scholar.
84 1972 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm) UN Doc A/CONF/48/14 Rev.1, Principle 21; 1992 Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, Report of the UNCED, Vol 1 (New York), Principle 2.
85 eg Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, UNGA Res 3281, UN GAOR, 29th Sess Supp No 31, UN Doc A/9631 (1974) 50, art 30; International Law Commission, ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities)’ in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly covering the work of its fifty-third session, with commentaries, 2001’ (UN Doc A/56/10), Ch V, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol II, Pt Two (UN 2001) (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’).
86 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,  ICJ Rep 226 (Legality of Nuclear Weapons) para 29 (stating that this obligation is ‘now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment); Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)  ICJ Rep 14 (Pulp Mills) para 101.
87 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay) 21 ILM (1982) 1261. In force 16 November 1994 (‘LOSC’) arts 192–195; Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro) 31 ILM (1992) (‘CBD’) art 3.
88 See C Armeni and C Redgwell, ‘International Legal and Regulatory Issues of Climate Geoengineering Governance: Rethinking the Approach’ (2015) Climate Geoengineering Governance Working Paper No 21/2015 <http://geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper21armeniredgwelltheinternationalcontext-2.pdf>.
89 Pulp Mills (n 86) para 204. This obligation can also be also found in the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo) 30 ILM (1991) 801. In force 27 June 1997 art 2(1).
91 Draft Articles on Prevention (n 85) Commentary to art 7.
92 Pulp Mills (n 86) para 197 (defining the obligation of due diligence as entailing ‘the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party.’)
93 Armeni and Redgwell (n 88) 37.
94 eg Redgwell (n 10); Scott (n 83); Reynolds, J, ‘The Regulation of Climate Engineering’ (2011) 3 Law, Innovation and Technology 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuokkanen, T and Yamineva, Y, ‘Regulating Geoengineering in International Environmental Law’ (2013) 3 CCLR 161Google Scholar. See also: Reynolds, J and Fleurke, F, ‘Climate Engineering Research: A Precautionary Response to Climate Change?’ (2013) 2 CCLR 108Google Scholar; Tedsen, E and Homann, G ‘Implementing the Precautionary Principle for Climate Engineering’ (2013) 2 CCLR 90Google Scholar.
95 Armeni and Redgwell (n 88). cf J Reynolds, ‘Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International Environmental Law’ (2014) 5(2) Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 417 (stating that existing international treaties would enable geoengineering research).
96 PG Harris, ‘Reconceptualising Global Governance’ in JS Dryzek, RB Norgaard and D Schlosberg (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society (OUP 2012) 639 (making a similar point related to global climate governance).
97 For a discussion of this issue in the regulation of other technologies, see eg F Francioni and T Scovazzi (eds), Biotechnology and International Law (Hart Publishing, 2006); GE Marchant, BR Allenby and R Herkert (eds), The Growing Gap between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight: The Pacing Problem (Springer 2011).
98 As examples of specific adjustment mechanisms, see: Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena) 39 ILM (2000). In force 11 September 2003; ECE, Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in the Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’), Decision II/1 Genetically Modified Organisms (adopted at the second meeting of the Parties held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, 25–27 May 2005).
99 Reynolds, J, ‘The International Regulation of Climate Engineering: Lessons from Nuclear Power’ (2014) 26(2) JEL 269CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Long, JSC, ‘A Prognosis, and Perhaps a Plan, for Geoengineering Governance’ (2013) 3 CCLR 177Google Scholar; Hester, T, ‘A Matter of Scale: Regional Climate Engineering and the Shortfalls of Multinational Governance’ (2013) 3 CCLR 168Google Scholar.
100 Cottrell and Trubek (n 4) 1.
101 D Bodansky, ‘Governing Climate Engineering: Scenarios for Analysis’ (November 2011) The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 2011/47, 19–20 <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bodansky-dp-47-nov-final.pdf>.
102 eg Rayfuse, NR, Lawrence, M and Gjerde, K, ‘Ocean Fertilization and Climate Change: The Need to Regulate Emerging High Seas Uses’ (2008) 23(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 297CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rayfuse, R and Freestone, D, ‘Ocean Iron Fertilization and International Law’ (2008) 364 Marine Ecology Progress Series 277Google Scholar; Markus, T and Ginzky, H, ‘Regulating Climate Engineering: Paradigmatic Aspects of the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization’ (2011) 4 CCLR 477Google Scholar; R Rayfuse and R Warner, ‘Climate Change Mitigation Activities in the Ocean: Turning up the Regulatory Heat’ in R Warner and C Schofield (eds), Climate Change and The Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Currents in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012), Scott, KN, ‘Regulating Ocean Fertilization under International Law: The Risk’ (2013) 2 CCLR 108Google Scholar.
103 Rayfuse, R, ‘Drowning Our Sorrows to Create a Carbon Free Future? Some International Legal Considerations Relating to Sequestering Carbon by Fertilizing the Oceans’ (2008) 14(2) UNSWLJ Forum 54Google Scholar. Craik, N, Blackstock, J and Hubert, AM, ‘Regulating Geoengineering Research through Domestic Environmental Protection Frameworks: Reflections on the Recent Canadian Ocean Fertilization Case’ (2013) 2 CCLR 117Google Scholar.
104 The amendment will enter into force for those Parties which have accepted it on the 60th day after two-thirds of the Parties that have deposited their instrument of acceptance with the International Maritime Organization (art 21(3)). (The US is not a Party to the Protocol.)
105 LC, arts I and II and LP, art 2.
106 LC, art III(1)(b)(ii) and LP, art 126.96.36.199. Under the London Protocol, dumping also includes ‘any storage of wastes or other matter in the seabed and the subsoil thereof from vessels, aircraft and platforms or other man-made statures at sea and any abandoned or toppling at side of platforms or other man-made structures at sea for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal’. (London Protocol, art 1 (4(3) and (4)).
107 London Protocol, art 3.
108 IMO, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, 1972 and its 1996 Protocol, Statement of Concern Regarding Iron Fertilization of the Oceans to Sequester CO2 (LC-LP.1/Circ 14, 13 July 2007).
109 CBD COP Decision IX/16 (2008); CBD COP Decision X/33 (2010).
110 IMO (n 75) para 8.
114 IMO, Resolution LC-LP. 2(2010) on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research involving Ocean Fertilization, 14 October 2010.
115 IMO (n 114) para 7.
116 IMO, Resolution LP. 4(8) on the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of Matter for Ocean Fertilization and Other Marine Geoengineering Activities, 18 October 2013.
117 36th Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties (London Convention 1972) and 9th Meeting of Contracting Parties (London Protocol 1996), Opening address, 3 November 2014, delivered on behalf of the IMO Secretary-General by Mr Andy Winbow, Assistant Secretary-General and Director, Maritime Safety Division).
118 London Protocol, new art 1.5bis. The language in relation to ‘widespread, long-lasting and severe’ effects is borrowed from the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), New York 18 May 1977, in force 5 October 1978, 1108 UNTS 151. The Convention does not define these terms, but the Understandings attached to it provide the following interpretation: ‘a. “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometers; b. “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; c. “severe”: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets'. See Understandings Relating to art I of ENMOD, 31 GAOR Supp No (A/31/27), Annex I para 5.
119 IMO (n 116) new art 6bis ‘Marine Geoengineering Activities’.
120 ibid, new Annex 4 ‘Marine Geoengineering Activities’ para 1(3) Para 1(1) defines ocean fertilization as ‘any activity undertaken by humans with the principal intention of stimulating primary productivity in the oceans’. This definition expressly excludes other established legitimate uses of the sea, such as the direct harvesting of marine organisms; conventional aquaculture or mariculture; the creation of artificial reefs (para 1.2).
121 ibid, new Annex 5 ‘Assessment Framework for Matters that Might be Considered for Placement under Annex 4’.
123 IMO, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, 1972 and its 1996 Protocol, Guidance for Consideration of Marine Geoengineering Activities (LC-LP.1/Circ.67, 6 January 2015) Annex, para 2.
124 IMO, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, 1972 and its 1996 Protocol, Description of Arrangements for a Roster of Experts on Marine Geoengineering in the Consultation Process (with regard to para 12 of Annex 5 to the London Protocol) (LC-LP. 1/Circ. 66, 6 January 2015). (Parties can also consult experts outside the roster.)
125 UK Explanatory Memorandum on the Amendments to the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 (London Protocol) to Regulate Marine Geoengineering (Command Paper No 8965) (2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/376395/EM_Misc_9.2014.pdf>. For a detailed analysis of the UK position on geoengineering, C Armeni and C Redgwell, ‘Geoengineering Under National Law: A Case Study of the United Kingdom (2015) Climate Geoengineering Governance Working Paper No 23/2015 <http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper23armeniredgwelltheukcombine.pdf>.
126 See UK Explanatory Memorandum (n 125).
127 IMO (n 116) new Annex 5.
128 H Ginzky and R Frost, ‘Marine Geo-Engineering: Legally Binding Regulation under the London Protocol’ (2014) 2 CCLR 82.
129 Certainly Parties will always be able to prohibit previously permitted activities through an amending procedure, as it happened with other matters, most notably in 1993 with the adoption of a binding prohibition on dumping of low- and medium-level radioactive wastes under the London Convention Annex. (IMO, Resolution LC. 51 (16) Amendments to the Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 concerning Disposal at Sea of Radioactive Wastes and Other Radioactive Matter, 15 December 1993.)
130 IMO (n 116) new Annex 5, para 12.
132 IMO, Report of the Thirty-Third Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Convention and the Sixth Meeting of Parties to the London Protocol (2011) para 4.25–4.28
133 At the time of writing, a prototype web-based repository including scientific, policy and legal literature and other documents was available for unrestricted access <https://sites.google.com/site/lclpofdocs/home>.
134 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal) 26 ILM (1987). In force 1 January 1989, art 10; CBD, art 18.3.
135 eg Dorf and Sabel (n 49).
136 MC Dorf, ‘The Domain of Reflexive Law: A Review Essay’ (2003) 103 ColumLRev 384.
137 IMO (n 116) new Annex 5, para 29.
138 Scott (n 83) 351.
139 IMO (n 123).
140 LOSC, art 87 (1)(f) and 239 (recognizing marine scientific research as a high seas freedom) and Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection, 30 ILM (1991) 1461, in force 14 January 1998, arts 3 and 8, Annex I.
141 See other conditions in Section II above.
142 The London Protocol currently has 45 Contracting Parties (Status 20 August 2015).
143 eg IMO, Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Protocol and Seventh Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Protocol, Regulation of Ocean Fertilization and Other Activities – Information regarding the informal subgroup of experts examining questions under international law with regard to addressing ocean fertilization and other activities – Submitted by the United States (LC 34/4/5, 7 September 2012); IMO, Thirty-Fourth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Protocol and Seventh Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Protocol, Ocean Fertilization – Report of the Working Group on Ocean Iron Fertilization (LC 34/WP.4, 1 November 2012) (including a proposal by the United States).
144 On these selected examples: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington) 12 ILM (1973) 1085, art IX; International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL) (London) 12 ILM (1973) 1319, arts 6 and 17; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, (Vienna) Misc 3 25 ILM (1986) 1377, art 1. See P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, OUP 2009).
145 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20). See also R Reeve, ‘Wildlife Trade, Sanctions and Compliance: Lessons from the CITES Regime’ (2006) 82(5) International Affairs 881.
146 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20) 784.
147 The Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS), Greenpeace International and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) have been the most active observer organizations.
149 de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 20); de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 3).
150 eg J Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of Decision-making (OUP 2004); Steele, J, Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-Solving Approach’ (2001) 21 OJLS 415CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an international law perspective, Ebbesson, J, ‘The Notion of Public Participation in International Law’ (1997) 8(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law 51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
151 IMO (n 123).
152 M Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’ (2012) CLP 242.
153 See S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the US (Princeton University Press 2007); C Sustein, Risk and Reasons: Safety, Law and the Environment (CUP 2002). See also J Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 2004).
154 See UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (‘Aarhus Convention’) 38 ILM (1999) 517. In force 24 February 2004. However, the Aarhus Convention is also open for accession to Member States of the United Nations outside the ECE region (see ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.1 (Lucca Declaration), paras 32–33; ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.13 (decision II/9); ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/Add.16 (decision III/8), objective II.4; ECE/MP.PP/2011/2/Add.1 (decision IV/5).
155 Jasanoff (n 33).
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