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Elizabeth Spelman, Gender Realism, and Women

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Abstract

Elizabeth Spelman has famously argued against gender realism (the view that women have some feature in common that makes them women). By and large, feminist philosophers have embraced Spelman's arguments and deemed gender realist positions counterproductive. To the contrary, Mikkola shows that Spelman's arguments do not in actual fact give good reason to reject gender realism in general. She then suggests a way to understand gender realism that does not have the adverse consequences feminist philosophers commonly think gender realist positions have.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by Hypatia, Inc.

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