¹ Vago, B., ‘The intelligence aspects of the Joel Brand mission’, Yad Vashem Studies, X (1974), 111–128Google Scholar. Bauer, Y., ‘The mission of Joel Brand’, in his The holocaust in historical perspective (Seattle, 1978), pp. 94–155Google Scholar. Idem, American jewry and the holocaust (Detroit, 1981), pp. 380–99. Braham, R., The politics of genocide. The holocaust in Hungary (New York, 1981), II, 941–51Google Scholar. Gilbert, M., Auschwitz and the allies (New York, 1981), pp. 201 f, 221 f, 226 f, 240 f, 243Google Scholar. See the collection of documents by Mendelsohn, J., Relief in Hungary and the failure of the Joel Brand mission (The Holocaust. Selected documents in eighteen volumes, vol. XV)(New York, 1982)Google Scholar.

Braham, R., ‘The rescue of the jews of Hungary in historical perspective’, in The Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Gutman, Y. and Greif, G. (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 447–66Google Scholar, especially pp. 461 ff, enters a sceptical dissent from Bauer's argument as to the seriousness of Himmler's intention of releasing large numbers of Jews. But if Himmler had no such intention, it is difficult to understand his actions from August 1944 onwards, including his authorization of negotiations in Switzerland, his continued suspension of the trains from Budapest to Auschwitz, and his order to stop the gassing in October or so.

² Braham, , Politics, p. 948Google Scholar (cf. pp. 957, 1015).

³ Bauer, , ‘Mission’, p. 126Google Scholar. Idem, American jewry, pp. 398, 416. The mistake may partly be due to the filing of the Protokoll with Bader's 10 June letter in the Moreshet Archives as D.1.720 rather than with the 5 July letter to Budapest with which it rightly belongs in D.1.748.

⁴ Copies in C.Z.A., S.25/1251 Aleph; M.A., D.1.720; K.B.L.G., Hungaria, VI, 229 (ex U. 278). Bader's letter of 10 June recounting the episode (M.A., D.1.720) states that the agreement was drawn up on the night of the 27 May, but I suspect that what he had actually in mind was the letter sent to the central council of Hungarian jews on 28 May, for which see below. Cf. Bader's, M. memoirs, Schlichuyot atzuvot (Merkhavia, 1954), pp. 104 fGoogle Scholar.

Brand's version, which he admits to having altered for the reader's benefit, appears in the memoirs edited by Weissberg, A., Advocate for the dead. The story of Joel Brand (London, 1958), pp. 131 fGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Telegrams in K.B.L.G., Hungaria, III, VII, VIII.

⁶ This hitherto uncited letter is in K.B.L.G., IV, no. 230 (ex U.279–282). Braham, , Politics, p. 948Google Scholar, states that a letter incorporating ‘the same basic ideas’ was sent to the Zentralrat (central council) of Hungarian jews on 28 May (C.Z.A. S.25/1251 Aleph; K.B.L.G., VI, no. 227 (ex U.275)); the letter is in fact very vague and contains no concrete proposals for an agreement except to suggest that the Germans be asked to send a plenipotentiary to Istanbul to negotiate.

⁷ Der Kastner-Bericht, ed. Landau, E. (Munich, 1961), p. 100Google Scholar.

⁸ Hansi Brand's testimony, Eichmann trial transcript (mimeographed, Jerusalem, 1961), Session 59, p. B.i.

⁹ Bauer, , ‘Mission’, p. 124Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 151.

^ll K.B.L.G., VIII.

¹² K.B.L.G., III, rejecting Pomerantz's suggestion to Hansi Brand (30 June, K.B.L.G., VIII) that an agreement (Abkommen) may be possible on a financial basis. See also Mendelsohn, , Relief in Hungary, Documents 45 and 52, pp. 224, 237Google Scholar.

¹³ Brand carefully kept quiet about the interim agreement during his interrogation by the British at Cairo between 16–30 June (Public Record Office, London (P.R.O.) F.O. 371/811, pp. 58–95 = Security intelligence Middle East P. 7769). At paragraph 187, Brand admitted that he had written several letters in Istanbul ‘and had left them to be sent to Budapest’, omitting to say that the agreement had been left with them.

¹⁴ K.B.L.G., VI, no. 231 (ex U. 283). (Also in M.A., D.1.748). The letter has not been cited before. It strongly implies that Shertok knew of the agreement, and indeed Ehud Avriel, who was present with Shertok at the Aleppo interview with Brand states: ‘During much of the interview a member of British security was present. When we were alone, Shertok…promised Brand that he would go to London immediately and do all he could to follow up the “interim agreement” by tangible diplomatic activity’ (Avriel, , Open the gates (New York, 1975), p. 185)Google Scholar. The agreement is not mentioned, however, in Shertok's Hebrew protocol of the conversation (C.Z.A., S.26/1488). (See below, note 22.) Nor is there, of course, any reference to it in the British record (P.R.O., F.O. 371/759. PP. 171–196).

¹⁵ Der Kastner-Bericht, pp. 148 f. It is clear from Brand's interrogation thateven a specific telegraphed acceptance (such as the interim agreement) would have been enough to satisfy his German contacts. Brand told his British questioner that Eichmann had agreed at a meeting of 25 May that ‘if Brand returned with an affirmative or telegraphed to that effect, [Eichmann] would put the first batch of deported jews over the frontier’. Brand stated that the plan was for him to inform the Germans of success either by returning to Budapest or by sending a telegram indicating that the ‘business would be concluded in such a town on such a date’. (P.R.O., F.O. 371/811, paragraphs 100 and 170.)

¹⁶ Akten zur deutschen auswäertigen Politik 1918–1945, series E, vol. VIII (Göttingen, 1979), p. 194Google Scholar. (Cf. Bauer, Y., ‘Rescue by negotiations. Jewish attempts to negotiate with the Nazis’, in his The jewish emergence from powerlessness (Toronto, 1979), pp. 7–25Google Scholar, especially pp. 19 ff, which does not, however, notice the significance of the interim agreement in this connexon).

Erez, T., ‘Hungary – six days in July 1944’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, III, (1988), 37–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, also ignores the interim agreement and attributes the Germans' continuing acceptance of Horthy's intervention merely to the fact that ‘the Nazis did not wish to turn Horthy into an adversary’.

¹⁷ Avriel, , Open the gates, p. 187Google Scholar. I have not been able to find this telegram. Bauer, , ‘Mission’, pp. 151 fGoogle Scholar, refers to Kastner's earlier telegrams of 23 June and ‘about 2 July’ inviting Bader to Budapest (though I suspect that the former of these is the telegram of 29 June in K.B.L.G., III).

¹⁸ Cf. Mendelsohn, pp. 211, 215, 225, 238. According to Ben-Gurion's telegram of 13 July to Shertok (C.Z.A., S.25/1678), the meeting took place in a German bookshop, not a public library (pace Bauer, , ‘Mission’, p. 152)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Biss, Andreas, A million jews to save (London, 1973), pp. 119 fGoogle Scholar. In his memoirs, P. de Freudiger states that when SS Major Dieter Wisliceny of Eichmann's staff heard of the British broadcast rejection of Brand, he first told his Jewish contacts at Bratislava that there was little sense in further negotiations, but was then reassured by Rabbi Weissmandel's explanation that the announcement was proof of Brand's success: ‘After two months of silence, the British now inform everyone, because they intend secretly to agree! Wisliceny accepted this more or less’ (‘Five months’, printed in The tragedy of Hungarian Jewry. Essays, documents, depositions, ed. Braham, R. L. (New York, 1986), pp. 237–287, especially pp. 258 f, 275Google Scholar. Freudiger also mentions, p. 276, that Becher went to Berlin in July to discuss the jews' fate.

²⁰ See above, notes 2 and 3.

²¹ Bauer, , ‘Mission’, p. 124Google Scholar.

²² See above, note 14.

²³ Brand's Memorandum of 23 January 1945, C.Z.A., S.26/1190 Bet, p. 28.

²⁴ The transcript of the 1961 discussion is in Yad Vashem Archives, Jerusalem, O. 15/44, p. 12.

²⁵ Joel, and Brand, Hansi, Ha Satan vehanefesh (Tel Aviv, 1960), pp. 51–3Google Scholar. (Cf. Weissberg, , Advocate for the dead, p. 218)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Biss, pp. 96, 98.

²⁷ Hansi Brand's testimony is in the English transcript of the Eichmann trial, Sessions 58 and 59, pp. Tt1, Zz1, A1, B1.

²⁸ C.Z.A., S.25/1682. See also Mendelsohn's introduction to Relief in Hungary(unpaginated): ‘Conceivably, the deportations could have been halted, at least temporarily, if one of the major organizations involved – perhaps the Jewish agency through its leaders Chaim Weizmann or Moshe Shertok – had at least indicated their willingness to accept conditionally the offer. Unfortunately, none of them did and the slaughter continued’. It seems that Shertok at least may have tried to do so.

²⁸ Bauer, Y., ‘The negotiations between Saly Mayer and the representatives of the SS in 1944–1945’, in Rescue attempts during the holocaust. Proceedings of the second Yad Vashem international historical conference, Jerusalem…1974 (Jerusalem, 1977), pp. 5–46Google Scholar. Idem, American Jewry, pp. 408–34. See Milton, S. (ed.), Rescue to Switzerland. The Musy and Saly Mayer affairs (The holocaust. Selected documents in eighteen volumes, vol. XVI) (New York, 1982)Google Scholar.

³⁰ See the hostile opinion of Musy held by Roswell McClelland in his report of July 1945 (Milton, , Rescue to Switzerland, pp. 79Google Scholar f.), accepted by Bauer, , American jewry, pp. 420 f.,431 fGoogle Scholar. More favourable are Penkower, M., The jews were expendable (Urbana/Chicago, 1983), pp.253–87Google Scholar, and Wyman, D. S., The abandonment of the jews. America and the holocaust, 1941–1845 (New York, 1984), pp. 248–51, 331, 394 fGoogle Scholar.

³¹ See ‘Rapport au comité suisse de l'union of orthodox rabbis of the United States and Canada concernant l'action entreprise en vue de la libération des Israélites dedans les camps de concentration allemands. Rapport par le Dr Jean-Marie Musy, Fribourg 1945’ printed in Rose, P. L. (ed.), The Hecht archive (Archives of the holocaust, vol. XII)(New York, 1990)Google Scholar.

The historiographical problems raised by Musy's claimed success at Ravensbruck and elsewhere are skated over by Bauer, Y., ‘The death marches, January–May 1945’, Modern Judaism, XII (1983), 1–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as well as in idem, American Jewry, p. 431. Nor is Marrus, M. R., The holocaust in history (Hanover, N. H., 1987), pp. 196 ffGoogle Scholar, helpful on this topic.

³² Copy in Yad Vashem Archives, 0–51/DN–39/2119. The German text and facsimile are given by Biss, A., Wir hielten die Vernichtung an (Herbstein, 1985), pp. 328–30Google Scholar.

³³ See the detailed introductory essay by Rose, in The Hecht archive, pp. ix–xxvGoogle Scholar.