¹ For a recent exploration of some of these themes see Kendall, Walter, The revolutionary movement in Britain, 1900–1921 (London, 1969)Google Scholar; Harrison, Royden, ‘The war emergency workers national committee, 1914–1920’ in Briggs, Asa and Saville, John, eds., Essays in Labour history, 1886–1923 (London, 1971)Google Scholar; Hinton, James, The first shop stewards movement (London, 1973)Google Scholar; Winter, J. M., Socialism and the challenge of war (London, 1974)Google Scholar; McKibbin, Ross, The evolution of the Labour party, 1910–1924 (Oxford, 1974).Google Scholar

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⁴ Sherriff, R. C., ‘The English public schools in the war’, in Panichas, G. A., ed., Promise of greatness (London, 1968), p. 152.Google Scholar

⁵ Montague, C. E., Disenchantment (London, 1968 edn). p. 142.Google Scholar

⁶ Foreword in Haigh, R. H. and Turner, P. W. (eds.), The long carry: the war diary of stretcher bearer Frank Dunham 1916–1918 (London, 1970), p. XIX.Google Scholar

⁷ Barnett, Correlli, The collapse of British power (London, 1972), pp. 430, 431.Google Scholar

⁸ Falls, Cyril, War books (London, 1930), pp. X–XIIGoogle Scholar; cf. Fussell, Paul, The great war and modern memory (London, 1975), pp. 25–8.Google Scholar

⁹ This figure under-estimates the extent of indiscipline in as much as summary field punishments for which no court-martial was required were not recorded. Moreover, the numbers tried, as with mutiny, are not an accurate reflection of the numbers of participants in such incidents; and, of course, the official figures omit arbitrary and unlawful punishments: see Statistics of the military effort of the British empire during the great war (H.M.S.O., 1922), p. 643.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Calculated from General annual reports on the British army, 1913–1919, Cmd. 1193, Parl, papers 1921, XX, 16Google Scholar, and Statistics of the military effort of the British empire, p. 642.Google Scholar

¹¹ Statistics of the military effort of the British empire, pp. 648–9Google Scholar, cf. Ahrenfeldt, Robert H., Psychiatry in the British army in the second world war (London, 1958), p. 273.Google Scholar It should be added that Dr Ahrenfeldt appears to adopt a definition of desertion which is at variance with that employed in official statistics.

¹² Although it was subsequently denied, Colonel J. C. F. Fuller, the distinguished military historian, a man of extreme right-wing disposition, unlikely to impugn the honour of the army, had ‘direct evidence’ that British troops deserted to the enemy ‘in considerable numbers’ during the battle of the Ancre in August 1916, as they were again to do the following October. The problem got worse as the war progressed. ‘During the present war a large number of surrenders have taken place, which if evidence could be produced, would be found to have been without any justification’, bemoaned the Army Council in March 1918. Worse still, it was a tendency which misguided patriots seemed likely to encourage: ‘The recent exchange of prisoners while the war is in progress and the campaign largely undertaken in the Press of this country, in order to influence the nation to look upon prisoners of war indiscriminantly as objects of sympathy, and indeed, almost as heroes, will in the opinion of the Army Council go far towards undermining the fighting discipline of the Army.’ Report of the war office committee of enquiry into ‘shell-shock’, Cmd. 1734, Parl, papers 1922, XII, 28Google Scholar; Guinn, Paul, British strategy and politics, 1914–1918 (Oxford, 1965), p. 162Google Scholar; ‘Prisoners of war’ memorandum by the Army Council, 31 May 1918, Public Record Office Cab. 24/53 G.T. 4715. Cf. official view, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for war relating to the army estimates for 1920–21, Cmd. 565, Pari, papers 1920, XXVIII, 10–11Google Scholar; Major-General SirChilds, Wyndham, Episodes and reflections (London, 1930), p. 163.Google Scholar

¹³ See the excellent volumes contributed by C. W. Bean to the Official history of Australia in the war of 1914–1918

¹⁴ The passing reference is not without interest: one of the earliest of the post-armistice mutinies broke out in eight battalions of the British West Indies regiment stationed at the port of Taranto. Having enlisted to fight, the men had been continuously employed on base details and on humping supplies at the docks. Whether they resented exclusion from active service or were simply ‘fed up, fucked up, and far from home’ is not clear: the relationship between the British army and its non-white recruits would, however, repay closer attention. Military operations, Italy 1915–1919 (H.M.S.O. 1949), pp. 386–7.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, for example, ‘Notes on the morale of British troops in France as disclosed by the censorship, 13 September 1917’, Cab. 24/26 G.T. 2052 and ‘The British armies in France as gathered from the censorship, 12 December 1917’,. Cab. 24/36 G.T. 3044.

¹⁶ Workers Dreadnought, 3 11 1917Google Scholar: a vivid account of the mutinies is presented by Mottram, R. H., The Spanish farm trilogy 1914–1918 (London, 1927), pp. 703–7, 713–14Google Scholar; but for a more adequate treatment see Gill, Douglas and Dallas, Gloden, ‘Mutiny at Etaples base in 1917’, Past and Present, LXIX (11 1975), 88–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This otherwise valuable article is flawed by a number of inaccuracies. For example, the authors wrongly state that ‘news of the Etaples incident never reached the press’ (p. 96); and from their pessimistic remarks on the availability of French public records, it is evident that they are unaware of the important study of Guy Pedroncini, Les Mutineries de 1917 (Paris, 1967) (cf. Gill and Dallas, p. 97 note 36).Google Scholar

¹⁷ H.C. Deb., 18 03 1907 (171), 583, 1087.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Childs, , Episodes and reflections, p. 137.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Moynihan, Michael, People at war 1914–1918 (Newton Abbot, 1973), p. 21.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ashworth, A. E., ‘The sociology of trench warfare’, British Journal of Sociology, No. 4 (12 1968), XIX, 407–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Only 1% of all courts-martial offences were due to self-mutilation, and it seems unlikely that this represents a low detection rate. Of the more than one million casualties analysed by the official medical historians 273, or less than 1%, fell within this category. Mitchell, T. J. and Smith, G. M., Casualties and medical statistics (London, 1931), Table 11, p. 279.Google Scholar

²² The following observations are derived from General annual reports on the British army (P.P. 1921, XX)Google Scholar; and Statistics of the military effort of the British empire.

²³ For shell-shock figures, Major-General SirMacpherson, W. G. et al. , Medical services: diseases of the great war (2 vols., London, 1922–1923), 11, 4Google Scholar; for hostility of the ranks towards medical officers, see Gladden, Norman, The Somme 1916 (London, 1974), p. 173Google Scholar and Ypres 1917 (London, 1967), pp. 26–7.Google Scholar The tendency to regard mental illness as a form of malingering, in the words of the official history, ‘often led to the development of a feeling of revenge in the patient rather than recovery’. Macpherson, Medical diseases, II, 62.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ahrenfeldt, , Psychiatry in the British army, p. 9Google Scholar; Fourth annual report of the ministry of pensions, Cmd. 244, Parl, papers 1922, XX, Appendix VIII, 29.Google Scholar

²⁵ Thomas, Alan, A life apart (London, 1968), p, 158.Google Scholar

²⁶ Webb, Beatrice, unpublished diaries, 22 02 1916, vol. XXXIIIGoogle Scholar (Passfield papers, British library of Political and Economic Science).

²⁷ Sale, M. O., ‘Army reform from the ranks’, National Review, 08 1919, vol. LXXIII, 890.Google Scholar

²⁸ War Cabinet minute 231 (12), 12 September 1917, Cab. 23/4.

²⁹ Repington, C. A. Court, The first world war 1914–1918 (2 vols., London, 1920), 1, 565Google Scholar; Beveridge, William, British food control (London, 1928), p. 204Google Scholar; ‘The effect of food queues at home on the men at the front’, 16 04 1918, M.A.F. 60/243Google Scholar; ‘Army rations’, memorandum by Lord Derby, 22 03 1918, Cab. 24/26 G.T. 4006.Google Scholar

³⁰ For comparative pay scales, see ‘Army pay’ memorandum by Derby, Lord. 31 07 1917, Cab. 24/21 G.T. 1562Google Scholar; for General Philipps, H.C. Deb., 21 03 1917 (XCI), 1961–2.Google Scholar

³¹ War Cabinet Minute 232 (14), 13 September 1917, Cab. 23/4. Leave was indeed an extremely sore point with the troops and their dependents. A month earlier, a letter appeared in a Middlesbrough newspaper calling for the formation of committees throughout the north of England to agitate for an immediate improvement in furlough arrangements. It was with some relief that Colonel Henry Williams told the House of Commons in October that nothing had so far been done to implement his aggrieved constituents' suggestion. At the same time, he counselled against complacency: there was, he said, ‘a very large quantity of very inflammable material lying about the question’ which ill-disposed persons could ‘by stirring up trouble’ concoct a ‘first class outcry’. In the absence of detailed man-power studies for the armed forces it is difficult to assess the extent of the problem. However, some fragmentary information disgorged by a reluctant War Office suggests that complaints of this sort were not unjustified. In June–July 1917 there were more than 107,000 men who had been without leave for 18 months, and more than 403,000 who had not seen home in 12 months. H.C. Deb., 31 10 1917 (XCVIII), 1553Google Scholar; Morning Post, 8 10 1917.Google Scholar

³² Quoted by Terraine, John, Douglas Haig, the educated soldier (London, 1963), pp. 217–18Google Scholar; even before the war British generals found Australian disciplinary practice enigmatic: see Report of the inspector-general of the overseas forces of the Commonwealth of Australia (London, 1914), pp. 555–6, W.O. 163/20.Google Scholar

³³ In an article, ‘Intelligence surveillance of British ex-servicemen 1918–20’, Mrwrites, Stephen R. Ward: ‘Responsibility for internal security during the war was delegated to the Home Office and its Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department’. Historical Journal, XVI 1 (London, 1975), 179.Google Scholar According to the head of Special Branch however, military intelligence had been responsible for dealing with unrest at home until the end of 1916 (SirThomson, Basil, The scene changes, New York, 1937, p. 399).Google Scholar In November 1919 the cabinet agreed to release the army from intelligence work connected with internal security, a responsibility it had reluctantly assumed a year earlier under the designation ‘Intelligence organisation, G.H.Q. Great Britain for dealing with industrial and revolutionary unrest in the UK’. For a hint of its activities, see W.O. 32/5533.

³⁴ See, for example, Haig, to Derby, Lord, 3 10 1917, Cab. 24/79 G-T. 6874.Google Scholar

³⁵ See, for example, Wintringham, T., Mutiny (London, 1936), pp. 311 ff.Google Scholar

³⁶ In the German and Austrian armies too, militant soldiers showed an equal concern for a rapid and orderly demobilization, but differed from the British mutineers in seeking to extend organization beyond this purpose. For a useful account, see Garsten, F. L., Revolution in central Europe 1918–1919 (London, 1972).Google Scholar

³⁷ Blatchford, for example, in the last week of October 1916 began a five-part series in the popular Sunday weeklies exposing the ‘stupid bestial-savagry’ of the disciplinary code in general and Field Punishment No. 1 in particular. His blistering attacks aroused a good deal of public unease and shook the War Office, but failed to elicit the kind of response from organized Labour which might have ensured a meaningful reform, there-and-then. Ironically, the principal beneficiaries of the campaign were those for whom it was least intended. In consequence of the public outcry against F.P. 1, it was considered unwise to proceed with proposed tougher measures against those persuading or assisting soldiers to go absent without leave: ‘The introduction of an amendment bill now’, the Army Council was advised, ‘might call undue attention to the Army Act.’ Minutes of the proceedings of the Army Council, 18 December 1916, Precis No. 847, W.O. 163/21; for public response to Blatchford's campaign, see W.O. 32/5460.

³⁸ For Cameronians, Terraine, John, ed., General Jack's diary 1914–1918 (London, 1964), p. 256Google Scholar; for Shoreham, bishop of Oxford to Curzon, Lord, 3 09 1917Google Scholar, Cab. 24/25 G.T. 2852; for Portsmouth riots, Adm. 116/1022.

³⁹ See Hinton, , First shop stewards movement, pp. 238–41Google Scholar; White, Stephen R., ‘Soviets in Britain: The Leeds convention of 1917’, International Review of Social History, XIX, pt. III (1974), 165–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Egan, David, ‘The Swansea conference of the British council of soldiers and workers delegates, July 1917: Reactions to the Russian revolution of February 1917 and the anti-war movement in South Wales’, Llafur, 1, No. 4 (1975), 12–37.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ W.O. 32/5455.

⁴¹ Here our scepticism is reinforced by what is known of the myopic tendencies of allied generals confronted with unrest. In France G.Q.C, wrongly attributed the mutinies of 1917 to the subversive activities of pacifists and socialists; in Russia too Order No. 1 was interpreted as the denial of discipline when it amounted to the eradication of a certain conception of discipline. But Russia had no Pétain; the collapse of the Russian armies was, in large measure, precipitated by the officer corps itself. For France see Pedroncini, , Les mutineries de 1917Google Scholar; for Ferro, Russia Marc, ‘Le soldat russe en 1917’, Annales E.S.C., I, 26 (1971), 14–39.Google Scholar

⁴² Yermoloff, N. to Buckley, Colonel, 9 02 1918Google Scholar, Cab. 24/41 G.T. 3585; ‘Pacifist revolutionary propaganda: extracts from a report by Basil Thomson’, 20 February 1918, Cab. 24/42 G.T. 3674; Thomson, Basil, Queer people (London, 1922), p. 288Google Scholar; ‘Bolshevist Propaganda’ memorandum by SirCave, George, 22 02 1918, Cab. 24/43 G.T. 3704.Google Scholar

⁴³ This Act empowered the British government to conscript Russian nationals resident in Britain and the Russians vice versa. A full account of its origins can be found in our forthcoming article ‘Aliens in Britain 1914–1918’, to appear elsewhere.

⁴⁴ Kemp, Peter, The British sailor: a social history of the lower deck (London, 1970), p. XIV.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ A valuable account is presented by Pursey, H., ‘From petitions to reviews: The presentation of lower deck grievances’, Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual (London, 1937), pp. 97–110.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Wintz, S. G., Our blue jackets (London, 1894)Google Scholar; Weston, Agnes, My life among the bluejackets (London, 1909)Google Scholar; Harrison, Brian, Drink and the Victorians (London, 1971), p. 333.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See, for example, Harris, S. F., Earnest young heroes (London, 1896), pp. 46–64Google Scholar; Boldero, H. S., A young heart of oak (London, 1891), passim.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Memorandum of I. C. B. Clifford, Metropolitan Police, H.M. Dockyard Station, Portsmouth Division to Admiralty, 19 July 1897, Adm. 116/83.

⁴⁹ Holsman, T., Life in the Royal Navy (London, 1892), p. 141Google Scholar; Capper, H. D., Aft – from Hawsehole (London, 1927), pp. 22–5, 166–7 and passim.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Freemantle to Rear-Admiral Gerard H. U. Noel, chairman of the Admiralty Committee on Sailors Homes, 5 August 1897, Adm. 116/83.

⁵¹ Labour Leader, 11 07 1912.Google Scholar

⁵² For the ‘Don't shoot’ incident, see Mann, Tom, Memoirs (London, 1923), chs. XX–XXI.Google Scholar

⁵³ Letter of Matthews, J. H., Labour Leader, 29 03 1912.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Cf. Weston, , My life among the bluejackets, pp. 257–60.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Antipathy towards the voluntary associations subsequently became more strongly pronounced: see Yexley, Lionel, Charity and the navy (London, 1911)Google Scholar; The Fleet, 03 1911.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Bluejacket and Coastguard Gazette, 05 1904Google Scholar; also see Capper, H. D., Aft – from the hawsehole, pp. 26–7, 48–9Google Scholar; and Marder, Arthur J., ed., Fear God and dread nought: the correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (3 vols., London, 1952–1959), 1, 257–8.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Reynolds, S., The lower deck, the Navy and the nation (London, 1912), p. 8.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Kemp, P. K., ed., The papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher (Navy records society, 1964), pp. 128, 255–6.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Shepherd, E. Colston, The fixing of wages in government employment (London, 1923), p. 27Google Scholar and passim; Clegg, H. A., Fox, Alan and Thompson, A. F., A history of British trades unions since 1889 (London, 1964), 1, 152.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Adm. 116/1129a.

⁶¹ Pursey, , ‘From petitions to reviews’, pp. 101–2.Google Scholar

⁶² A list of the societies is to be found in the Bluejacket, 04 1917Google Scholar, and The Fleet, 11 1918.Google Scholar Much to the admiralty's chagrin, they persisted into the inter-war years: see, for example, ‘Enclosure No. 7 to Rear-Admiral (S)'s No. 004 of 15 December 1931, Naval Welfare’, Adm. 116/2867.

⁶³ See for example, The Fleet, 05 1912Google Scholar, and Bluejacket and Soldier, 01 1913.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Pursey, , ‘From petitions to reviews’, pp. 98–9.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Minute of G.S. to Treasury solicitor, 6 March 1916, Adm. 116/1383.

⁶⁶ Magna Charta printed in Reynolds, , The lower deck, the Navy and the nation (London, 1912), pp. 105–13.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ A good deal of evidence on this and related matters is to be found in the ‘Report of the committee on petty officer ratings, substantive and non-substantive pay and instructional allowances with minutes of evidence’, 2 vols. (1905), Adm. 116/976. Also see report of the Hyde Parker committee 1918/19, Adm. 116/1692.

⁶⁸ Cf. Churchill, Randolph S., Winston S. Churchill, companion volume II, Part 2, 1907–1911 (London, 1969), p. 1302.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Capper, H. D., Aft – from the hawsehole, p. 131.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Marder, , Fear God and dread nought, 11, 21.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 258.

⁷² Wintringham, , Mutiny, p. 327.Google Scholar

⁷³ Churchill, Randolph S., Winston S. Churchill, companion volume II, Part 3, 1911–1914 (London, 1969), pp. 1932, 1645.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Yexley, Lionel, The inner life of the navy (London, 1908), p. 298.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Minute of the director of public prosecutions, 28 August 1916, Adm. 116/1383.

⁷⁶ Jellicoe, Admiral Viscount, The grand fleet 1914–1916: its creation, development and work (London, 1919), pp. 85–7.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Figures of naval man-power for the war are as follows:

15/7/14 15/11/18

Regulars (inc. Marines) 146,047 188,537

Hostilities only 74,437

Retired officers/pensioners 12,346

Fleet Reserve 19,180

Naval Reserve 23,453

Naval Reserve (trawler section) 37,145

Volunteer Reserve 50,218

Colonial Reserve 2,000

146,047 407,316

A total of 640,237 men served during the war, of whom 39,812 became casualties, Newbolt, H., Naval operations (London, 1931), v, Appendices I and K, 433–5.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Hampshire Telegraph, 17 01 1919Google Scholar; Baynham, Henry, Men from the dreadnoughts (London, 1976), p. 253Google Scholar; Roskill, S. W., Naval policy between the wars (2 vols., London, 1968–1976), 1, 152–3.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Marder, Arthur J., From the dreadnought to Scapa Flow: the Royal Navy in the Fisher era 1904–1919 (5 vols., London, 1961–1970), V, 212 (our italics: DE/JO).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Pursey, , ‘From petitions to reviews’, pp. 104–5.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Naval Warrant Officers Journal, 02 1919Google Scholar; for relative deprivation see Bluejacket, 07 1919Google Scholar: ‘Report of the welfare committee 1919–1920’, Adm. 167/61: Marder, , From the dreadnought to Scapa Flow, p. 215.Google Scholar

⁸² Memorandum of captain, H.M.S. Orion, to Vice-Admiral Commanding Second Battle Squadron, 15 October 1917 and Beatty to same, 4 November 1917, Adm. 116/1728; ‘Pacifist Propaganda’, Report by Basil Thomson, November 1917, Cab. 24/4 G.T. 2889; Pursey, , ‘From petitions ro reviews’, p. 106.Google Scholar

⁸³ Memorandum of captain, H.M.S. George, 9 10 1917, Adm. 116/1728.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Kenworthy, J. M., Soldiers, sailors and others (London, 1936), pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Pursey, , ‘From petitions to reviews’, p. 107.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ SirMacready, C. F. N., Annals of an active life (2 vols., London, 1924), I, 301.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Marder, , Fear God and dread nought, III, 550.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ The Fleet, 10 1918 and 02 1919.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See Marder, , From the dreadnought to the Scapa Flow, pp. 214–16.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Minutes of the Board of Admiralty, 17 February 1919, Adm. 167/56; for the police strike, see Allen, V. L., ‘The national union of police and prison officers’, Economic History Review (1958–1959), II, 133–143CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reynolds, G. W. and Judge, A., The night the police went on strike (London, 1968).Google Scholar

⁹¹ See memorandum of SirMurray, Oswyn, 30 10 1920Google Scholar, Adm. 116/1893; The Fleet, 03 1919Google Scholar; Bluejacket, 11 1919.Google Scholar

⁹² The Fleet, 04 1919.Google Scholar

⁹³ Admiralty minute, 16 January 1918, Adm. 116/1734.

⁹⁴ ‘Report of the welfare committee 1919–1920’, Adm. 167/61.

⁹⁵ For details see ‘Welfare committee representation of the lower deck 1919–1922’, Adm. 116/1132; also Board minutes 1919–1932, Adm. 167/54–85.

⁹⁶ Thurtle, Ernest, Military discipline and democracy (London, 1920), p. 28.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ An Act by which soldiers previously discharged as unfit for further duty were to be re-examined with a view to their re-call to active service.

⁹⁸ Speaking at Cardiff on 17 July 1917, ex-Sergeant-Major Blythe, who played a not insignificant part in organizing veterans, told an audience of about 200 ex-servicemen: ‘There were now 843,000 discharged soldiers and sailors, and none of them were going back until every available man had done his duty. There were thousands of malingerers in munitions factories, and they were going to see that these men were brought out. He urged them to defy the local military. He had, he said, thirty years in a Trade Union. In Sheffield anarchy is always mentioned with his name. They were all trained men and could use a rifle, and if they did not get what they wanted they had sufficient power, and Blythe would lead them to revolution.’ W.O. 32/5455.

⁹⁹ The object of the Comrades was frankly set forth by its moving spirit in the following letter to a highly placed friend at the War Office ‘…this…should act as a check to extremists and syndicalists in their efforts to try and capture the discharged soldier for their political ends. There are some 230 odd organisations working with this deplorable end in view, and I suggest it is up to all soldiers to make a sustained effort to fight this pernicious propaganda, and that we keep and work together for the good of the country by keeping soldiers clear of politics. Unless we do this in the true interests of the Army, I feel sure, as things are going now, that we shall soon be face to face with discontent and revolution.’ Lieut-Col. Sir John Norton-Griffiths, M.P., to Brigadier-General B. E. W. Childs, 20 July 1917, ibid; also Wootton, Graham, Official history of the British legion (London, 1956), pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, Labour Leader, 22 11 1917Google Scholar; Report of the 17th annual conference of the Labour Party (1918), p. 121.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Report of the annual conference of the I.L.P. (1915), pp. 93–4.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Moore, William, The thin yellow line (London, 1974).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Report of the Army and Air Force courts-martial committee, Cmd. 6200, Parl, papers (1939–1940). IV, 14–15.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Williams, Francis, A prime minister remembers (London, 1961), p. 10.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Communist party of Great Britain, The soldier's programme (London, 1925?)Google Scholar; H.C.Deb., 17 04 1928 (216), 64–5.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ The mutiny at Invergordon is one of those tales which has not improved with the telling. Captain Roskill provides the most recent scholarly assessment: see Naval policy between the wars II, ch. 4.