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Parliamentary Elections and the Prospects for Political Pluralism in North Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Bradford L. Dillman
Bradford L. Dillman*
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul
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HAVE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S bolstered prospects for democratization and greater pluralism? This study argues that, with the possible exception of Algeria's 1991 elections, they have not been harbingers of democracy in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The elections can be viewed as public displays by the state or limited political barometers, rather than processes which create obligations for the government. They have been means through which regimes have sought to dampen reactions to political immobilism, structural adjustment and the death of a social contract. Some elections have been manipulative, exclusionary exercises of elites trying to roll back the liberalizations of the 1980s, while others have been pseudo-competitive instruments of regime maintenance. Most of the elections can be seen as mechanisms for a top-down ‘artificializing’ of pluralism in order to preserve the core of regime control. In Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, there seems to be no contradiction between fostering a selectively pluralistic atmosphere and simultaneously undermining the transition to democracy. In Morocco, pluralism and alternance seem to remain quite compatible with continued political domination by the Makhzen. Mona Makram-Ebeid's characterization of Egypt's 1995 elections could equally be applied to others in the region: ‘What has occurred is a pluralization of the political sphere, yet it has been liberal neither in intent nor outcome.’

Type
Original Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , April 2000 , pp. 211 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2000

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References

1 Only direct elections to lower houses of parliament are examined. Tunisia’s 1989parliamentary elections are also included.

2 Makram-Ebeid, Mona, ‘Egypt’s 1995 Elections: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’, Middle East Policy, 4:3 (1996), p. 135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Comparative studies of elections in the Arab Middle East have been rare. The democratization literature has largely ignored the region, perhaps out of a mistaken assumption that one can theorize about democratic transitions without examining ‘unsuccessful’ cases.

4 Cheikh, Slimane, ‘Les élections locales en Algérie à l’ère du multipartisme’, in Garcia, Bernabé López, Munoz, Gema Martin and De Larramendi, Miguel H. (eds), Elecciones, participation y Transciones politicas en el Norte de Africa, Madrid, Agenda Espanola de Cooperacion International, 1991, pp. 257–8.Google Scholar

5 Kienle, Eberhard, ‘More Than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s’, Middle East Journal, 52:2 (1998), pp. 231–32.Google Scholar

6 For detailed examinations of the violent struggle between Algeria’s Islamists and the regime, see Labat, Séverine, Les islamistes algériens: Entre les urnes et le maquis, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1995;Google Scholar Martinez, Luis, La guerre civile en Algérie, Paris, EditionsKarthala, 1998;Google Scholar and Roberts, Hugh, ‘Algeria’s Ruinous Impasse and the Honourable Way Out,’ International Affairs, 71:2 (1995), pp. 247–68.Google Scholar

7 See Burgat, Kienle, op. cit., and François, , L’islamisme en face, Paris, La Découverte, 1996.Google Scholar

8 See Manai, Ahmed, Supplice tunisien: Le jardin secret du général Ben Ali, Paris, LaDécouverte, 1995.Google Scholar

9 For a sociology of Islamist movements in Morocco, as well as an examination of political changes in the 1990s, see Tozy, Mohamed, Monarchie et Islam Politique auMaroc, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1999.Google Scholar

10 The Commissaire Tabet scandal and resulting national outrage intensified thispublic debate. See Eickelman, Dale F., ‘Re-Imagining Religion and Politics: Moroccan Elections in the 1990s’, in Ruedy, John (éd.), Islamism and Secularism in North Africa, Washington, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1994, p. 265.Google Scholar

11 Jordan provides the closest parallel to Morocco in the Arab world, even though the Muslim Brotherhood there has been much more important. Hanna Freij and Leonard Robinson view Jordan’s liberalization as a type of reform from above in which the opposition is allowed to share with the government ‘the function of maintaining the stability of the state’. See Freij, Hanna Y. and Robinson, Leonard C., ‘Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case Study,’ The Muslim World 86:1 (1996), pp. 3–5.Google Scholar Similarly, Glenn Robinson seesjordan’s ‘defensive democratization’ as a ‘series of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege … while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political change’. Robinson, Glenn, ‘Defensive Democratization in Jordan,’ International journal of Middle East Studies, 30:3 (1998), p. 387.Google Scholar

12 See Ismail, Salwa, ‘State-Society Relations in Egypt: Restructuring the Political’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 17:3 (1995), pp. 37–52.Google Scholar

13 Mustapha Sehimi, ‘Maroc: Partis politiques et stratégies électorales’, in López Garcia et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 225.

14 Royaume du Maroc, La Commission nationale chargée de superviser lesopérations électorales, Documents de la Commission nationale chargée de superviser lesopérations électorales, 1993, pp. 20, 23.

15 Royaume du Maroc, op. cit., p. 266 and Santucci, Jean-Claude, ‘Maroc —Chronique Intérieure 1993,’ in Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord 1993, Paris, Editions duCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique, pp. 512–13.Google Scholar

16 Muñoz, Gema Martin and Barreñada, Isaías, ‘Après les élections législatives: Emergence d’une transition démocratique ou alternance par le haut?’, Confluences Méditerranée, 31 (Autumn 1999).Google Scholar

17 Before 1993, Tunisia’s small opposition parties were penalized, because potentialparrains in many rural areas were afraid of government retribution if they sponsored candidacies. See Sraieb, Noureddine, ‘Tunisie — Chronique Intérieure 1993’, in Annuairede l’Afrique du Nord 1993, Paris, Editions du Centre National de la RechercheScientifique, p. 596.Google Scholar Algeria’s 1997 electoral code required independent lists to get 400 signatures of registered voters in a constituency (for each seat) in order to declare candidacy.

18 Moreover, the stakes in Egypt’s parliamentary elections are high since it is the parliament that elects the president. Any electoral system that produces significant parliamentary pluralism would potentially deprive President Mubarak of the two-thirds of votes needed for re-election as president.

19 There are special provisions in the system for guaranteeing that, by the end of the two rounds, at least one of the constituency seats is held by an (ostensible) worker or farmer.

20 The distortions discussed in the preceding paragraphs help to account for the weaknesses in political parties (and thus pluralism) in the region. As William Zartman has argued, Maghribi opposition parties have a seemingly structural incapacity to become credible alternatives to voters because of lack of finances, state neutrality and patronage power (which can only come from gaining power). Although underestimating the importance of state coercion in weakening parties, Zartman makes the point that ‘opening the political systems to competitive pluralism’ is not necessarily the key to democratization. See I. William Zartman, ‘The Challenge of Democratic Alternatives in the Maghrib’, in John Ruedy (éd.), op. cit., p. 201. With the exception of most Moroccan parties, many North African parties lack national implantation and thus have difficulty fielding candidates in all electoral districts.

21 Cherrad, Salah-Eddine, ‘Elections municipales et législatives en Algérie: Lesscrutins du 12juin 1990 et du 26 décembre 1991’, Espace rural, 29 (1992), pp. 36–37.Google Scholar With 15½ per cent of registered voters, coastal wilayas were only allotted 29 per cent of seats. With 15V2 per cent of voters, Algiers, Oran and Constantine had only 10 percent of seats. By contrast, with only 12 per cent of registered voters, southern wilayas and some plains provinces held 21 per cent of Assembly seats. Semi-urban and Berber regions were near the voter-seat national average.

22 Farrell, David M., Comparing Electoral Systems, London, Prentice-Hall, 1997, p. 9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 Sehimi, op. cit., p. 225.

24 Kienle, op. cit., p. 224.

25 Cherrad, op. cit., pp. 42–43.

26 ICER, op. cit., pp. 11–12. In one highly-politicized case before the 1995 elections, the Interior Ministry simply added 13,000 voters to the Cairo district of Nasr City in order to help an NDP candidate. An administrative court later declared the registration illegal.

27 Makram-Ebeid, op. cit. (footnote 2), p. 134, citing Middle East Times, 26 November1995.

28 Royaume du Maroc, op. cit., pp. 54–55. López Garcia estimated in 1991 that some one-third of potential Moroccan voters were not registered, particularly in urban areas with many recent immigrants. See Bernabé López Garcia, ‘Leyes électorales, artimanas légales’, in López Garcia et al. (eds), op. cit., p. 239.

29 Mona Makram-Ebeid, ‘From the Single Party Rule to the One Party Domination: Some Aspects of Pluralism without Democracy’, in López Garcia et al. (eds), op. cit.(footnote 4), p. 123.

30 ICER, op. cit., pp. 7–8, 15. More informal and traditional candidacy restrictions are also important. In Egypt’s 1995 elections, none of the NDP’s candidates were Copts. Mubarak has used his 10-seat appointment power to bring token Coptic and female representation into the People’s Assembly. Although gender bias is high everywhere in the region, the high number of female candidates in Tunisia’s 1999 election helped women gain 11½ per cent of the parliamentary seats.

31 For example, King Hassan postponed elections from November 1992 to April1993 and then June 1993. Mubarak announced the 1995 election date in October of that year and scheduled candidacy registration only one month before the election.

32 For example, during Egypt’s 1995 elections government administrations put pressure on employees to support the NDP. Public vehicles were used by NDP candidates; and state TV and radio were blatantly biased towards the NDP. See ICER, op. cit., pp. 12–20.

33 For example, Egypt’s 1995 campaign spending limit per candidate was a mereLE 5,000, although a newspaper estimated actual average spending per-candidate to beLE 100,000. See Makram-Ebeid, ‘Egypt’s 1995 Elections’, op. cit. (footnote 2), p. 130.

34 ICER, op. cit., pp. 16–18 and Campagna, Joel, ‘From Accommodation toConfrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years’ Journal of International Affairs, 50:1 (1996), p. 279.Google Scholar

35 Campagna, op. cit., p. 299.

36 ICER, op. cit., p. 18.

37 Ibid., p. 21.

38 Independent Commission for Electoral Review (ICER), ‘Egypt: Election Observations’, Civil Society, (January 1996), pp. 6–9, p. 8.

39 Election results are occasionally overturned by judicial bodies. Algeria’s ConseilConstitutional can annul election results. In 1991, 11.8 per cent of ballots were officially nullified for various reasons. See Cherrad, op. cit., pp. 42–43. In Egypt, the judiciary has a formal role in guaranteeing the fairness of elections. The Administrative Court nullified first-round election results in 1995 in half of all districts due to irregularities and suspended an Interior Ministry decision to hold run-offs in a large number of districts. Even though the Supreme Constitutional Court upheld these rulings, the government simply ignored them and proceeded with the second round, while the newly-elected parliament insisted that under Article 93 of the Constitution only it had the power to determine the ‘validity’ of the membership of its members.

40 In Egypt’s 1995 elections, only a few of the approximately 150 Muslim Brotherhood candidates running as independents or Islamist-leaning Socialist Labour Party candidates won seats.

41 Néfissa, Sarah Ben, ‘Les partis politiques égyptiens entre les contraintes dusystème politique et le renouvellement des élites’, in Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 81–82 (1996), pp. 61–64.Google Scholar

42 Mohamed Mouadda, ‘Lettre ouverte à Monsieur Le Président de la RépubliqueZine El Abdine Ben Ali’, 8 October 1995, photocopy, pp. 3–4.

43 Cubertafond, Bernard, Le système politique marocain, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997, pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

44 Jean Claude Santucci, ‘Processus électoraux et légitimation du pouvoir: réflexionssur l’expérience marocaine’, in López Garcia et al. (eds), op. cit., pp. 288, 290. For asimilar argument, see Joffé, George, ‘The Moroccan Political System after the Elections’, Mediterranean Politics, 3:3 (Winter 1998), pp. 118–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Moreover, the elections themselves did little to change the cultural foundations of authoritarianism, which Abdellah Hammoudi contends are based on deeply-rooted, master-disciple power relations. See Hammoudi, Abdellah, Master and Disciple: The Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997.Google Scholar

45 Santucci, op. cit., pp. 288–91.

46 Waterbury, John, Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite -A Study in Segmented Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.Google Scholar

47 See Lamchichi, Abderrahim, ‘Les spécificités de la transition marocaine: Islamisme et politique au Maghreb’, Confluences Méditerranée, 31 (Fall 1999).Google Scholar

48 In Morocco in 1993, one-third of the parliamentary seats were chosen by indirect elections that were manipulated so as to completely reverse the sense of the earlier direct vote. See Layachi, Azzedine, State, Society and Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life, Washington, DC, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1998, pp. 84–86.Google Scholar In the December 1997 elections to the new upper house, the Koutla won a paltry16 per cent of the seats, compared to 31 per cent in the lower house elections.

49 Michel Camau, ‘Démocratisation et changements des régimes au Maghreb’, in López Garcia et al. (eds), op. cit. (footnote 4), pp. 67–78.