Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2013
Two attempts at grand compromise have underpinned global order since the end of the Second World War. The first, a compromise between laissez-faire liberalism and domestic interventionism, famously described by John Ruggie as ‘embedded liberalism’, legitimated and stabilized a multilateral order for 50 years. A second attempt, this time between North and South at the end of the Cold War around a discourse of ‘sustainable development’, remains uneasy, conflict prone and much less institutionalized. They are compared and contrasted by asking whether they are truly compromises or reflect domination and hegemony, what conditions led to them, and what drivers of change have limited and challenged them. Ultimately, differences in their bases of legitimacy offer lessons for the prospects of building a new grand compromise in the wake of contemporary strains on global governance.
4 While climate change – and the related challenge of increasing energy demand – has received the most attention among planetary pressures, a variety of other environmental and resource concerns have also risen to what some argue are crisis proportions, including fresh water, fisheries and ocean health more generally, and food security.
5 Steven Bernstein and Louis W. Pauly (eds), Global Liberalism and Political Order: Toward a New Grand Compromise? Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2007; and John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring Challenge, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008.
6 On this distinction, see Matthew J. Hoffmann and Alice D. Ba, ‘Introduction: Coherence and Contestation’, in Matthew J. Hoffmann and Alice D. Ba, Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation and World Order, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 8–10.
9 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’.
10 Richard Bellamy, Markus Kornprobst and Christine Reh, ‘Introduction: Meeting in the Middle’, in this volume.
13 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond, Power in Global Governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005 Google Scholar.
14 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’.
15 Ibid., p. 383.
16 Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1944 Google Scholar.
17 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’, p. 387.
18 Ibid., p. 394.
19 Ibid., pp. 394–7.
20 John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.
21 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’, p. 394.
22 Ibid., p. 397.
23 See ibid., pp. 395–6; and Pauly, Louis, Who Elected the Bankers: Surveillance and Control in the World Economy, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, pp. 82–6Google Scholar.
24 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Trade’, p. 405.
26 Ikenberry, G. John, ‘Is American Multilateralism in Decline?’, Perspectives on Politics, 1: 3 (2003), pp. 533–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ikenberry, G. John, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order’, Perspectives on Politics, 7: 1 (2009), pp. 71–87 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 Jeremy Rabkin, Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005; and Bolton, John R., ‘Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 1: 2 (2000), pp. 205–22Google Scholar.
28 Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO, New York, New Press, 2004; and Robin Broad (ed.), Global Backlash: Citizen Initiatives for a Just World Economy, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, are exemplars of the argument on the left.
29 Wolfe, Robert and Mendelsohn, Matthew, ‘Values and Interests in Attitudes Towards Trade and Globalization: The Continuing Compromise of Embedded Liberalism’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 38: 1 (2005), pp. 45–68 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hays, Jude C., Ehrlich, Sean D. and Peinhardt, Clint, ‘Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD’, International Organization, 59: 2 (2005), pp. 473–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
30 Steven Bernstein and Maria Ivanova, ‘Fragmentation and Compromise in Global Environmental Governance: What Prospects for Re-Embedding?’, in Bernstein and Pauly (eds), Global Liberalism and Political Order, pp. 161–85.
31 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.
32 Ibid., p. 43.
33 Ibid., pp. 50–1, 89.
34 Ibid., pp. 67–91.
35 Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism.
36 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change’, p. 394.
37 Thomas Biersteker, ‘The “Triumph” of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World: Policy Convergence and Bases of Governance in the International Economic Order’, in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 102–31.
38 United Nations, ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio De Janeiro, June 3–14. Annex 1, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1), New York, United Nations, 12 August 1992.
39 The full story is slightly more complex. The norm is repeated in the Cancun agreements, and continues to be invoked in a wide number of negotiations and agreements, but a more fluid understanding of differentiation seems to have replaced the either/or interpretation in the Kyoto Protocol (see http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/6005.php). The lack of legally binding commitments may also be temporary, but so far only the European Union has indicated a willingness to take on legally binding commitments following the expiry of Kyoto's first commitment period 2012. Negotiations continue on the exact form of a subsequent agreement.
40 Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 2nd edition, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996, p. 117.
41 The United States released ‘interpretive statements’, including on its long-standing opposition to a ‘right’ to development on the grounds that a ‘right’ might override other rights, such as human rights. According to the statement, the United States does not oppose Principle 3, understood as the promotion of development ‘in a way that the development and environmental needs of present and future generations are taken into account’.
42 Sand, Peter, ‘Kaleidoscope: International Environmental Law After Rio’, European Journal of International Law, 4 (1993), pp. 377–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bertram I. Spector et al. (eds), Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), London, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994; Pallemaerts, Marc, ‘International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process’, Journal of Law and Commerce, 15 (1996), pp. 623–76Google Scholar.
43 See for example: Chatterjee, Pratap and Finger, Matthias, The Earth Brokers, New York, Routledge, 1994 Google Scholar.
45 World Trade Organization (WTO), ‘Decision on Trade and the Environment’, adopted by ministers at the meeting of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakech, 15 April 1994, from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu5_e.htm.
46 On the history of UN, WTO and Bretton Woods coordination in the follow-up to the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development, see Louis W. Pauly, ‘The United Nations in a Changing Global Economy’, in Bernstein and Pauly, Global Liberalism and Political Order, pp. 91–108.
47 UN, ‘The Future We Want’, Zero Draft of the Outcome Document for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development’, submitted by the co-chairs, 10 January 2012.
48 Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
49 UN, ‘The Future We Want’, paragraph 7.
50 Bernstein, Steven, ‘Legitimacy in Global Environmental Governance’, Journal of International Law and International Relations, 1: 1/2 (2005), pp. 139–66Google Scholar.
51 Margalit, Avishai, On Compromise and Rotten Compromise, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 4–5, 54Google Scholar.
52 Martin Benjamin, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics, Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1990, pp. 24–38.
53 Bellamy, Kornprobst and Reh, ‘Introduction: Meeting in the Middle’.
54 Devetak and Higgott, ‘Justice Unbound?’.
56 Others (Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995; and Devetak and Higgott, ‘Justice Unbound?’) argue that conditions under globalization have sufficiently changed that justice and legitimacy may be linked globally as they are within the state.
57 Margalit, On Compromise and Rotten Compromise, pp. 4–5, 54.
60 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 104.
61 Krasner, Stephen D., Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985 Google Scholar.
62 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism, pp. 102–11.
63 Newell and Paterson, Climate Capitalism.
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