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What Principles Drive (or Should Drive) European Criminal Law?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019


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The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has changed the framework and possibilities of the development of European Union (EU) criminal law. Gone is the long-lived and awkward cross-pillar character of EU criminal law, as mainly a third pillar EU ‘intergovernmental’ issue but also partly a first (EC) pillar question. The Lisbon Treaty marks a new era for the criminal law as it brings it within the core of the EU law project. Nevertheless, Article 10 of the transitional protocol as attached to the Lisbon Treaty stipulates a five-year transition period before former third pillar instruments will be treated in the same way as EU acts. This paper will focus on two issues in particular. The first question that will be addressed concerns what EU law principles drive or decide the EU's involvement in criminal law. After having identified these principles the second question is whether they should drive it and if so what implications will it have for the criminal law in the future.

Copyright © 2010 by German Law Journal GbR 


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