1 On the background and further development of this sanctions regime, see Jochen Abr. Frowein, The UN Anti-Terrorism Administration and the Rule of Law, in Völkerrecht als Wertordnung. Common Values in International Law. Festschrift für/Essays in Honour of Christian Tomuschat 785 et seq. (Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Bardo Fassbender, Malcolm N. Shaw & Karl-Peter Sommermann eds., 2006); Rosand, Eric, The Security Council's Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions, 98 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 745 (2004); Gowland-Debbas, Vera, Sanctions Regimes Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, in National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions, 3 et seq. (on sanctions in general) and 15 (on the sanctions regime under Resolution 1267) (Vera Gowland-Debbas ed., 2004); Luca Radicati di Brozolo & Megliani, Mauro, Freezing the Assets of International Terrorist Organisations, in Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism 377, 381 et seq. (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004); Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council 170 et seq. (2004).Google Scholar

2 SC Res. 1267 of 15 October 1999, fifth recital.Google Scholar

3 On the exercise of international public authority as the focus of the research project of which this contribution forms part, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, , Developing the Publicness of Public International Law, in this issue.Google Scholar

4 Art. 1(1) UN Charter.Google Scholar

5 Randelzhofer, Albrecht, Art. 51, in I The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, paras. 1–3 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002).Google Scholar

6 Jochen Abr. Frowein & Krisch, Nico, Art. 39, in I The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, para. 4 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002).Google Scholar

7 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 2(a).Google Scholar

8 Id. at para. 2(b) and (c).Google Scholar

9 Id. at para. 2(d).Google Scholar

10 This Monitoring Team was first established by SC Res. 1526 of 30 January 2004, para. 6 and was the successor of the Monitoring Group established by SC Res. 1363 of 30 July 2001, para. 4(a).Google Scholar

11 Art. 249 (2) EC.Google Scholar

12 See UN Res. 1390 of 16 January 2002, para. 5(d).Google Scholar

13 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 4(a).Google Scholar

14 See Reinisch, August, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AJIL 851 (2001) (also citing the different positions).Google Scholar

15 See Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 294 (1951).Google Scholar

16 See Vradenburgh, Anna M., The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Charter: Do They “Trump” Human Rights Law?,14 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal 175, 177, 180, 183 (1991). See also Oosthuizen, Gabriel H., Playing the Devil's Advocate: the United Nations Security Council is Unbound by Law, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 549 (1999).Google Scholar

17 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 8, The relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights (Seventeenth session, 1997), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (1997); De Wet (note 1), at 199; Gasser, Hans-Peter, Collective Economic Sanctions and International Humanitarian Law, 56 ZaöRV 871, 880 (1996); see International Law Association Berlin Conference (2004), Accountability of International Organisations, 1 International Organizations Law Review (IOLR) 221, 250 (2004).Google Scholar

18 De Wet (note 1), at 199; Fassbender, Bardo, Targeted Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights, 3 IOLR 437, 449 (2006).Google Scholar

20 Fassbender (note 18); De Wet, & Nollkaemper, , Review of Security Council Decisions by National Courts, 45 German Yearbook of International Law 166, 173 (2002).Google Scholar

21 See Reinisch (note 14), at 858 (“… the assumption that the UN member states could have succeeded in collectively “opting out” of customary law and general principles of law by creating an international organization that would cease to be bound by those very obligations appears rather unconvincing.”).Google Scholar

22 SC Res. 1333 of 19 December 2000, para. 8(c); SC Res. 1617 of 29 July 2005, para. 2.Google Scholar

23 See for details of the listing procedure, infra, B. III.1.Google Scholar

24 The Consolidated List was first introduced by SC Res. 1333 of 19 December 2000, para. 16(b).Google Scholar

25 See http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml.Google Scholar

26 Id. Google Scholar

27 A document on the “Guidance for Searching the Consolidated List” of 18 October 2006 is available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/sguidance.pdf.Google Scholar

28 SC Res. 1333 of 19 December 2000, para. 2.Google Scholar

29 The “Verwaltungsakt“ requires by definition that there is a measure by an administrative body regulating a concrete, singular case with an effect on an individual outside this administration (Art. 35 of the German Administrative Procedure Act). With the “international administrative act” of the sanctions regime, the measure would be the listing and the administrative body would be the Committee. The Committee regulates because the listing triggers the legal consequence of the imposition of the sanctions. The listing concerns a concrete, singular case because the listing identifies and individualizes the targeted person. This listing has an impact on the individual outside the administration since it concerns not merely UN internal matters but imposes on UN Member States an obligation to subject – without further discretion of the UN Member States – a specific individual or entity to the sanctions. On the different instruments of international public authorities see Goldmann, in this issue.Google Scholar

30 Directly comparable to the German “Verwaltungsakt“ is WIPO's international registration of trademarks, see Kaiser, in this issue.Google Scholar

31 Alluding to the classical period of international law with the States as the sole actors.Google Scholar

32 As in the case of WIPO, see Kaiser, in this issue.Google Scholar

33 See Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 1.Google Scholar

34 That is the difference to the general fight against terrorism that was started with SC Res. 1373 of 28 September 2001. This resolution provides for sanctions similar to the 1267 sanctions regime but does not foresee the maintenance of a Consolidated List at the UN level. That gives discretion to the States, which decide themselves whom to subject to the sanctions.Google Scholar

35 See on this standard, infra, B.III.1.b.Google Scholar

36 SC Res. 1333 of 19 December 2000, para. 8(c).Google Scholar

37 Hartmut Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht 135 (2006, 16th ed.).Google Scholar

38 Paper “Arms Embargo: Explanation of Terms” of 1 November 2006, available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/ArmsEmbargo.ExplanationTermsEng.pdf. It is the only explanation of this kind so far.Google Scholar

39 Generally on procedures in international institutions von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

40 Committee Guidelines in the revised version of 21 December 2005, para. 6(a).Google Scholar

41 Id. at para. 6(b).Google Scholar

42 Id. at para. 6(c).Google Scholar

43 Id. at para. 4(a).Google Scholar

44 Id. at para. 6(d) and (e).Google Scholar

45 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 6(a).Google Scholar

46 Id. at para. 6(b).Google Scholar

47 Id. at para. 6(c).Google Scholar

48 Id. at para. 6(d).Google Scholar

49 Annex I to SC Res. 1735 of 22 December 2006.Google Scholar

50 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 6(e).Google Scholar

51 See, infra, in this section.Google Scholar

52 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 4(a).Google Scholar

53 Id. at para. 6(g).Google Scholar

54 Id. at para. 6(d).Google Scholar

55 Id. at para. 6(h).Google Scholar

56 Id. Google Scholar

57 This requirement can be seen as the principle of stating reasons as an element of the rule of law, see von Bernstorff, in this issue.Google Scholar

58 This requirement can be seen as an element of good governance, specifically transparency, see von Bernstorff, in this issue.; International Law Association Berlin Conference (note 17),221, 229.Google Scholar

59 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 6(g).Google Scholar

60 SC Res. 1735 of 22 December 2006, para. 7.Google Scholar

61 Annex I to SC Res. 1735 of 22 December 2006.Google Scholar

62 Section 39 of the German Administrative Procedure Act.Google Scholar

63 The latest version to be found in the Guidelines of the Committee at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf.Google Scholar

64 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 29 November 2006, para. 8(a).Google Scholar

65 Id. at para. 8(a).Google Scholar

66 Id. at para. 8(b).Google Scholar

67 Id. at para. 8(c).Google Scholar

68 Id. at para. 8(d).Google Scholar

69 Id. at para. 8(e).Google Scholar

70 SC Res. 1730 of 19 December 2006, para. 1.Google Scholar

71 SC Res. 1730 of 19 December 2006, 5th recital; see also the statement of the President of the Security Council of 22 June 2006 (S/PRST/2006/28) and the respective call upon the Security Council of the Heads of State and Government in the World Summit Outcome Document of 16 September 2005 (GA Res. 60/1 of 16 September 2005, para.109).Google Scholar

72 SC Res. 1730 of 19 December 2006, para. 1.Google Scholar

73 See SC Res. 1730 of 19 December 2006, para. 2.Google Scholar

74 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 8(d)(i).Google Scholar

75 Id. at para. 8(d)(iv).Google Scholar

76 Id. at para. 8(d)(v).Google Scholar

77 Id. at para. 8(d)(viii).Google Scholar

78 Id. at para. 8(b).Google Scholar

79 Id. at para. 8(d)(v).Google Scholar

80 Id. at para. 8(d)(vi)(a).Google Scholar

81 Id. at para. 8(f).Google Scholar

82 Id. at para. 8(d)(vi)(b).Google Scholar

83 Id. at para. 8(d)(vi)(c).Google Scholar

84 Id. Google Scholar

85 Id. at para. 8(d)(viii).Google Scholar

86 See Geck, Wilhelm K., Diplomatic Protection, in I Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1045, 1051 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).Google Scholar

87 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, paras. 4(d), 5(b), 5(f), 7, 11(a), 6(i).Google Scholar

88 Martenczuk, Bernd, The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 European Journal of International Law 520 (1999) (with references to further opinions on the topic in footnote 5).Google Scholar

89 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 5(h). The guidelines may, however, also be influenced by resolutions of the Security Council, see the annex to SC Res. 1730 of 19 December 2006. Before the Security Council influenced the procedure here by prescribing details of the procedure, the former de-listing procedure regulated solely by the Committee was applied for more than four years, cf. the adoption of the Guidelines on 7 November 2002. This internal review of the guidelines must be distinguished from judicial review which will meet the same difficulties as the judicial review of the Security Council whose subsidiary organ the Committee is.Google Scholar

90 See e.g. Frowein (note 1), at 793 et seq.; Merhdad Payandeh, Rechtskontrolle des UN-Sicherheitsrats durch staatliche und überstaatliche Gerichte, 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 41 (2006); Fassbender (note 18), at 477 (with further references in footnote 88).Google Scholar

91 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 8(f). For the details of the de-listing procedure see, supra., B.III.2.Google Scholar

92 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 8(f).Google Scholar

93 As described above, B.III.1.b.Google Scholar

94 SC Res. 1735 of 22 December 2006, para. 14.Google Scholar

95 Committee Guidelines in the amended version of 12 February 2007, para. 8(a).Google Scholar

96 See B. I. 3.Google Scholar

97 Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 2005 ECR-II 3533 (appealed to the ECJ, C-415/05); Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission, 2005 ECR-II 3649 (appealed to the ECJ, C-402/05); Case T-253/02, Chafiq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, 2006 ECR-II 2139 (appealed to the ECJ, C-403/06) and Case T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 2006 ECR-II 52 (appealed to the ECJ, C-399/06).Google Scholar

98 See Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (note 97), at para. 243.Google Scholar

99 Id. at para. 276.Google Scholar

100 Id. at para. 277.Google Scholar

101 Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (note 97); Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission (note 97).Google Scholar

102 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission (note 97), appealed to the ECJ, C-402/05, para. 56, and Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (note 97), appealed as Case C-415/05, Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, para. 56.Google Scholar

103 Case T-253/02, Chafiq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union (note 97); Case T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (note 97).Google Scholar

104 Case T-253/02, Chafiq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union (note 97), at paras. 147–149.Google Scholar

105 Case T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (note 97), at paras. 115, 122.Google Scholar

106 It must be kept in mind here, however, that these rights are based on European law and do not form part of an independent international administrative law, although they might inspire discussion on it. See Case T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (note 97), at paras. 115, 122.Google Scholar

107 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which also had to decide on a case on UN sanctions (see Eur. Court H. R., Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticdaret Anonim Sirketi (Bosphorus Airways) v. Ireland, Judgment of 30 June 2005, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI, not yet reported) could also be surveyed when examining external reviews of listings by regional courts.Google Scholar

108 See B. I. 3.Google Scholar

109 On the discussion of due process standards in the context of decisions on the Refugee status, see Smrkolj, in this issue.Google Scholar

110 Fassbender (note 18), at 480.Google Scholar

111 Id. Google Scholar

112 Id. at 483–484.Google Scholar

113 Id. at 484.Google Scholar

114 See White Paper “Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Prcedures,” prepared by the Watson Institute Targeted Sanctions Project, Brown University of 30 March 2006, 55 note 94. The paper is available at: http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf.Google Scholar

115 Fassbender (note 18), at 484–485.Google Scholar

116 On the enforcement authority of international institutions see Röben, in this issue.Google Scholar

117 SC Res. 1267 of 15 October 1999, paras. 6(a), 6(d) and 12.Google Scholar

118 SC Res. 1333 of 19 December 2000, para. 15(a).Google Scholar

119 SC Res. 1363 of 30 July 2001, para. 4(a).Google Scholar

120 SC Res. 1526 of 30 January 2004, para. 6 and Annex to the resolution.Google Scholar

121 SC Res. 1735 of 22 December 2006, para. 32 and Annex to the resolution.Google Scholar

122 See B. I. 3.Google Scholar

123 This overlaps with the enabling principle of cooperation seen above.Google Scholar

124 See de Wet, Holding International Bureaucracies Accountable, in this issue.Google Scholar

125 As stipulated by the International Law Association (note 17 _Ref201509351 \h \* MERGEFORMAT 17), 238.Google Scholar

126 See von Bogdandy & Dann, International Composite Administration, in this issue.Google Scholar