1 The gradually accepted necessity of UN reform is manifestly reflected in Section VIII of the Millennium Declaration, entitled “Strengthening the United Nations.” G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (Sept. 18, 2000).Google Scholar

2 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Address to the General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.Google Scholar

3 A more secure world: Our shared responsibility: Report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 83-4, paras. 261-64, A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/.Google Scholar

4 Id. at para. 261 (emphasis added). The High-level Panel detected an omission within the UN institutions when it comes to peacebuilding. The notion of peacebuilding as such was of course not novel to the UN in 2003-4, but appeared prominently on its agenda after the end of the Cold War. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, Report by the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, G.A. Res. 45/277, Section VI on post-conflict peace-building, paras. 55-59, U N. Doc. A/47/277 – S/24111 (June 17, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.Google Scholar

5 A more secure world, supra note 3, at 83-84, para. 264. Pursuant to the High-level Panel, this silence on peacebuilding in the Charter resulted from the fact that UN involvement in largely internal conflicts was not initially envisaged by the Member States. A more secure world, supra note 3, at 83, para. 261. See Peter Huber, The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission – closing a gap in the UN system?, in Transitional Constitutionalism: Proceedings of the 2nd Vienna Workshop on International Constitutional Law 157, 158-59 (Konrad Lachmayer, Harald Eberhard, and Gerhard Thallinger, eds., Nomos/facultas.wuv 2007), who points towards the changing nature of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, thereby alluding to the reference to the emerging “responsibility to protect” in both the High-level Panel report and the Secretary-General's report, In larger freedom (see infra note 7). In this context, the question arises whether the work of the PBC ought to be limited only to countries that have overcome internal conflicts or shall also encompass entire regions in transition from inter-State conflict to peace.Google Scholar

6 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy 7 (2003).Google Scholar

7 The Secretary-General, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 31, para. 114, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm.Google Scholar

8 In larger freedom, supra note 7, at 31-32, paras. 114-5.Google Scholar

9 Id. at para. 115.Google Scholar

10 A more secure world, supra note 3, at 83-84, paras. 261-64. Such an interpretation is particularly tenable when one considers the establishment of the PBC as a lesson learned from the UN failure in Rwanda in 1994, where the absence of a proper UN early warning mechanism was considered as the major reason for the UN's failure to act to prevent the country's relapse into violence.Google Scholar

11 Addendum 2 to In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary-General, 4, para. 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm. The Secretary-General is alluding to the pertinent power of the Security Council but also, though in fact almost never used, to his own competence according to Article 99 of the UN Charter “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”Google Scholar

12 See Chesterman, Simon, From State Failure to State-Building: Problems and Prospects for a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, 2 Journal of International Law and International Relations 155, 169 (2005).Google Scholar

13 For the Commission's functions, see in detail infra II.Google Scholar

14 Addendum 2 to In larger freedom, supra note 11, at 3, para. 12, at 6, para. 28.Google Scholar

15 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A. Res. 60/1, 24, para. 97, (Oct. 24, 2005).Google Scholar

16 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A. Res. 60/1, 25, paras. 103-04.Google Scholar

17 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A. Res. 60/1, 24-25, paras. 100-01.Google Scholar

18 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645 (Dec. 20, 2005); Warren Hoge, U.N. Creates Commission to Assist Nations Recovering from Wars, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2005, at A25.Google Scholar

19 As established in Security Council Resolution 1646, para. 2, the annual report submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security Council Resolution 1645, para. 15 must also be submitted to the Security Council for an annual debate. S.C. Res. 1645, para. 2, (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

20 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, paras. 4, 7, 12, (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

21 That the P-5 will automatically be members of the Organizational Committee ensues from neither General Assembly Resolution 60/180 nor Security Council Resolution 1645, but was decided by the Security Council on the same day, 20 December 2005 (against the will of the General Assembly), in its separate Resolution 1646.Google Scholar

22 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 4 (Dec. 20, 2005). The long-awaited election of the members of the Organizational Committee took place in May 2006. For the first 31 members of the Organizational Committee, see http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/membership.htm. Mr. Ismael Gaspar Martins of Angola was elected by acclamation as the Committee's chairman during its inaugural session on 23 June 2006.Google Scholar

23 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, paras. 7-9 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

24 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 23 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

25 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 24 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

26 Addendum 2 to In larger freedom, supra note 11, at 5, para. 21.Google Scholar

27 Id. at 7, para. 29. See also Huber, supra note 5, at 164-65.Google Scholar

28 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 24 (Dec. 20, 2005); UN News Service, Secretary-General launches Peacebuilding Fund to ‘kick-start’ efforts to rebuild after conflict, Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/news.shtml. As of October 2006, Member States had already contributed and pledged around $140 million to the Fund, out of a target of $250 million.Google Scholar

29 The lack of early funding ensues from the fact that it is usually time-consuming to mobilize donors and frequently there remain gaps in funding for activities that donors consider sensitive, such as those linked to political reform or to a country's security architecture. See Putting decisions into practice: How will the UN Peacebuilding Commission fulfil its mandate?, para. 2, Report on the Wilton Park Conference (Feb. 10, 2006).Google Scholar

30 Huber, , Peacebuilding Commission, supra note 5, at 166-67.Google Scholar

31 UN News Service, supra note 28.Google Scholar

32 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 1 (Dec. 20, 2005) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

33 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 2 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

34 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 1 (Dec. 20, 2005), para. 5 and e contrario from para. 22 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

35 See infra III.2.Google Scholar

36 On the implied powers of the PBC, see also infra II.3.Google Scholar

37 For a definition of peacebuilding, see infra II.2.a.i.Google Scholar

38 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 12 (Dec. 20, 2005)Google Scholar

39 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 2(c) (Dec. 20, 2005); Chesterman, supra note 12, at 169.Google Scholar

40 In larger freedom, supra note 7, at 32, para. 115; Addendum 2 to In larger freedom, supra note 11, at 4, para. 17.Google Scholar

41 In larger freedom, supra note 7, at 5-6, paras. 12-17.Google Scholar

42 The Security Council, Security Council Report, Peacebuilding Commission, no. 3, p. 9 (June 23, 2006). To put it another way, the PBC should not have an early warning function in stricto sensu, meaning that it could not bring countries/regions to the attention of the international community on its own motion.Google Scholar

43 Nicholas Leddy, United Nations Update, 13 Human Rights Brief 35, 36 (2005).Google Scholar

44 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 12 (2005). The urgent need for better coordination in post-conflict peacebuilding was bluntly pointed out by the High-level Panel report, which concluded: “Post-conflict operations…have too often been characterized by countless illcoordinated and overlapping bilateral and United Nations programmes, with inter-agency competition preventing the best use of scarce resources.” A more secure world, supra note 3, at 18, para. 38.Google Scholar

45 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, paras. 9-11 (2005).Google Scholar

46 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 21 (2005).Google Scholar

47 Putting decisions into practice, supra note 29, at para. 29 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

48 Jan Klabbers, Two Concepts of International Organization, 2 International Organizations Law Review 277, 280-284 (2005).Google Scholar

49 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 24 (2005) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

50 See Chesterman, supra note 12, at 171.Google Scholar

51 See Haiti – Cadre de Cooperation Interimaire, http://haiticci.undg.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=introduction.Google Scholar

52 In a much narrower sense, the PBC could for instance only address the important question of poor donor behavior and provide incentives for donors to meet the real needs of the target country in order to make the aid system more effective and enable a better sequential timing of donor money and programs built thereupon. See Putting decisions into practice, supra note 29, at para. 17.Google Scholar

53 Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, What Difference Would the Peacebuilding Commission Make: The Case of Burundi, Address to EPC/IRRI Workshop on Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council (Jan. 20, 2006) (available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3903&l=1).Google Scholar

54 See infra III.2.Google Scholar

55 See infra II.2.b.Google Scholar

56 See U.N. Doc. PBC/10 (Feb. 21, 2007).Google Scholar

57 Report of the Peacebuilding Commission mission to Sierra Leone (19 – 25 March 2007), annexed to Identical letters dated 10 May 2007 from the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/61/901-S/2007/269 (May 14, 2007).Google Scholar

58 For the requirements of sequencing, see Putting decisions into practice: “The process must be broken down into manageable phases, with a credible set of actions where results can be demonstrated and trust created. Once goals are agreed, there needs to be consensus on strategy and detailed negotiation of rules. Designation of critical tasks becomes hugely important; and leaders and managers must be mandated to perform these tasks. A ‘living’ strategy requires constant reflexive monitoring so that adjustments can be made as contexts shift. This requires a degree of flexibility in decision-making. The PBC can help to build a coalition of international interests around a country, and play a mediating role to ensure that goals are realistic and that progress is well understood.” Putting decisions into practice, supra note 29, at para. 22.Google Scholar

59 Putting decisions into practice, supra note 29, at para. 29.Google Scholar

60 In this respect, the agora will be constituted by both the Organizational Committee and the country-specific meetings of the Commission.Google Scholar

61 Klabbers, supra note 48, at 287.Google Scholar

62 As regards the term “post-conflict peace-building,” which is used for instance in the Secretary-General's Report, An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building (see An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building, supra note 4), it must be indicated that it will be used in this paper interchangeably with peacebuilding.Google Scholar

63 An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building, supra note 4, at paras. 20-21.Google Scholar

64 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations 10-11 (2006), in particular note 16.Google Scholar

65 The language on these terms varies – State-building in general focuses more on the functioning of States as the highest institutions of governance in a certain territory. See Chesterman, supra note 12, at 169. On the – in particular towards the end of the 1990s remarkably increasing – UN efforts on post-conflict reconstruction through assuming some or all governmental powers on a temporary basis in the form of transitional administrations. See generally Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (2004). For a description of the pertinent UN activity in the language of nation-building, see, e.g., Jones, Seth G. and Dobbins, James, The UN's Record in Nation Building, 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 703 (2006).Google Scholar

66 To put it in other words, peacebuilding denotes the support in making the transition from conflict to lasting peace. See Llewellyn, Huw, The Optional Protocol to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 718, 723 (2006).Google Scholar

67 Morris, Catherine, What is Peacebuilding? One Definition, Peacemakers Trust http://www.peacemakers.ca/publications/peacebuildingdefinition.html.Google Scholar

68 Almqvist, Jessica, In Larger Freedom: A Second Call for a Peacebuilding Commission, Fundación para les Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Apr. 2005, http://www.fride.org/eng/Publications/Publication.aspx?Item=759.Google Scholar

69 Chesterman, , supra note 12, at 156-57.Google Scholar

70 See Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict 68 (2004).Google Scholar

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72 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice 3 (2000).Google Scholar

73 See Kritz, Neil J., The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in Transitional Justice – How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vol. I xxi (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).Google Scholar

74 Crocker, David A., Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13 Ethics and International Affairs 43, 43-44 (1999).Google Scholar

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76 Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 98 (1992).Google Scholar

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79 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 2 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

80 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 7 (Dec. 20, 2005).Google Scholar

81 Putting decisions into practice, supra note 29, at paras. 12-13.Google Scholar

82 Id. at 14.Google Scholar

83 The Afghanistan Compact, Jan. 31, 2006, available at www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1134650705195.Google Scholar

84 Another initiative, though different and predominantly development aid-focused, is the Interim Cooperation Framework for Haïti. See http://haiticci.undg.org/index.cfm?Module=ActiveWeb&Page=WebPage&s=introduction.Google Scholar

85 Putting decisions into practice, supra note 29, at para. 11.Google Scholar

86 Id.Google Scholar

87 See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000); Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html. See also Lisa Danish, Internationalizing Post-Conflict Justice: The “Hybrid” Special Court of Sierra Leone, 11 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 89 (2005); Marissa Miraldi, Overcoming Obstacles of Justice: The Special Court of Sierra Leone, 19 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 849 (2003).Google Scholar

88 See Strohmeyer, Hansjoerg, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The UN and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 107 (2001); Stahn, Carsten, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 American Journal of International Law 952 (2001).Google Scholar

89 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 21 (Dec. 20, 2005). On the opportunities for civil society engagement, see Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung New York, Report of the Working Conference “Getting the Peacebuilding Commission off the Ground — How to Include Civil Society on the Ground,” (Sept. 5 2006), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/conferencereports.htm.Google Scholar

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91 For more detail, see infra III.2.Google Scholar

92 See Kritz, , supra note 73, at xxix. The author shows that in light of the lack of financial means to establish transitional justice efforts, foreign governmental or private funding is an option, pointing out that the Truth Commission for El Salvador received $1 million, which amounted to some forty percent of the Commission's total budget, from the United States government.Google Scholar

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96 The UN had unsuccessfully sought to amend the agreement on the establishment of the chambers to provide for a majority of international judges in both chambers, recognizing that the composition of the Extraordinary Chambers failed to protect the tribunal against political interference and intimidation. Given the precarious state of the judiciary in Cambodia, this risk was perceived as significant. However, the Cambodian government refused to accept an amendment that would remove the Cambodian majority. See Williams, Sarah, The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers – A Dangerous Precedent for International Justice?, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2004) 227, 234.Google Scholar

97 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 12 (2005).Google Scholar

98 G.A. Res. 60/180 and S.C. Res. 1645, para. 12 (2005).Google Scholar

99 See Questions and Answers on the UN Peacebuilding Commission, #6, http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm.Google Scholar

100 Irrespective of the fact that the provisions do not call for the consent of the affected States in the case of a request by the Security Council or the Secretary General, such a consent is in practical terms highly desirable and de facto always required. Otherwise, the work of the PBC in its country-specific meetings either in New York or on-site in the selected country will be substantially inhibited.Google Scholar

101 Renske Heemskerk, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York and Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Background paper for “Getting the Peacebuilding Commission off the Ground – How to Include Civil Society on the Ground” (Sept. 5, 2006), available at www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/process/UN_Peacebuilding_Commission/Seminar_PBC_position_RH_29082006.doc.Google Scholar

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103 U.N. Doc. PBC/1/OC/2 (June 21, 2006).Google Scholar

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107 In July 1999, after close to a decade of civil war, the government of Sierra Leone and the leadership of the main rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), signed a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi dates from 28 August 2000.Google Scholar

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112 Report of the assessment mission on the establishment of an international judicial commission of inquiry for Burundi, U.N. Doc. S/2005/158 (Mar. 11 2005). See also Matthias Goldmann, Returning Order to Postconflict Societies: State-Building, Constitution-Making, and Justice, 30 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 137, 142 – 143 (2006).Google Scholar

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121 For a critical account on this technical specialization of international law, see Koskenniemi, Martti, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 The Modern Law Review 1, 1-30 (2007).Google Scholar

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