1 Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, Du principe federatif et la necessite de reconstituer le parti de la revolution (1863).Google Scholar

2 Schulze, Hagen, Die Identität Europas und die Wiederkehr der Antike (BONN: ZENTRUM FÜR EUROPÄISCHE Integrationsforschung, discussion paper C34, 2009) available at http://aei.pitt.edu/310/01/dp_c34_schulze.pdf. With aurea aetas Schulze is referring to the “Four Ages” in Ovid's Metamorphoses. Google Scholar

3 Ladeur, Karl-Heinz, 'We, the European People …'—Relâche?, 14 European Law Journal 147–167 (2008). See also Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).Google Scholar

4 For an unorthodox approach see Thompson, Norma, The Ship of States. Statecraft and Politics from Ancient Greece to Democratic America (2001), especially pp. 167–172.Google Scholar

5 http://www.nisk.k12.ny.us/fdr/FDRnewdeal.html Google Scholar

6 Leibfried, Stephan, Die Galerie des Staatsschiffs – ein Grub ins Neue Jahr (Bremen: University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center Transformations of the State 2008), at 22–23, 44–53.Google Scholar

7 First Place winner of the Marshall Plan Contest, Fall 1950; George C. Marshall Foundation (GCMF), Lexington, Virginia, Catalog ID 1020; German Historical Museum, Berlin, inventory no. 1988/1442.3.Google Scholar

8 See, supra, note 7; and Staat und Souveränität, in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 6, 4–154 (Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck, eds. 1990), in particular, Werner Conze, Ständegesellschaft und Staat, 4–25, at 8. Reinhart Koselleck, Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt (1973) = Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society (1998), chapters 1 and 2Google Scholar

9 For other visual conceptions of Europe see: Deutsches Historisches Museum, Idee Europa: Entwürfe zum “Ewigen Frieden”; Ordnungen und Utopien für die Gestaltung Europas von der pax romana zur Europäischen Union; eine Ausstellung als historische Topographie (Katalogbuch zur gleichnamigen Ausstellung des Deutschen Historischen Museums, Berlin, zur Neueröffnung der Ausstellungshalle von I. M. Pei, 25. Mai bis 25. August 2003) (Marie-Louise von Plessen, ed., 2003); Schulze, Hagen, Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte 318–341 (2004), at 327 presents the historical context in a nutshell.Google Scholar

10 On the Marshall Plan see the literature review by Niall Ferguson, Dollar Diplomacy. How much did the Marshall Plan really matter?, New Yorker, August 27, 2007 (with Reijn Dirksen's poster as illustration) available at: http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2007/08/27/070827crbo_books_ferguson.Google Scholar

11 The OEEC started with 18 members: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Western Germany (originally as two members, the Bizone—the American and British occupation zone—and the French occupation zone). In 1949 West Germany became a full member. The Anglo-American Zone of the Free Territory of Trieste was also admitted in October 1949.Google Scholar

12 The Marshall plan was undoubtedly a foreign policy instrument but the extent of its economic impact has been a matter of debate: Werner Abelshauser cites decisive factors that predated the Marshall Plan (Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshallplan. Westeuropas Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnung der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre, 29 Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 545–578 (1981). Alan S. Milward maintained that economic recovery would have gone forward with or without U.S. funding (The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951 (1984), at 90–125. Michael Hogan stressed its significance for economic reconstruction (The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (1987)). Charles S. Maier, The Two Post-War Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth Century Western Europe, in: In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy 153–184 (Charles S. Maier ed., 1987). For an overview of the debate see Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Special Forum: The Marshall Plan and the Origins of the Cold War Reassessed, 7 Journal of Cold War Studies 97–134 (2005). Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Powstwar Reconstruction Today (2007); The Marshall Plan: Lessons Learned from the 21st Century (Eliot Sorel & Pier Carlo Padoan, eds., 2008). The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After (Martin A. Schain ed., 2001). The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective (Stanley Hoffmann & Charles Maier, eds., 1984).Google Scholar

13 Reyn (Reijn) Dirksen was born in Haarlem, Netherlands on May 29, 1924, and died in the same city on September 29, 1999. He studied at the Amsterdam Design Academy (Kunstnijverheidsschool) and was briefly employed by the advertisement agency Kühn en Zoon in Rotterdam before going to work as a freelance graphic artist. Dirksen became interested in ship motifs in the late 1940s, and did a lot of work for the Holland America Line, including advertisements for the passenger ships Maasdam, Ryndam, Nieuw Amsterdam, and Statendam. He did a lot of illustrations for other shipping lines as well, including the Europe-Canada Line, Royal Interocean Lines, Nederland Line-Royal Dutch Mail, Rotterdam Lloyd Royal Mail Line, and the Holland Africa Line. He also did advertisements for the Dutch tourist industry, including a classic illustration of a windmill, each blade with a different Dutch landscape, for Verkade Drops, for various beverage companies (e.g. Hellebrekers Genever & Likeuren, Oranjeboom beer) and the apparel industry (Bontweek, i.e. fur week). He won several prizes with his posters, including one from the Turkish Red Cross. A number of his posters are on display at the Dutch Poster Museum in Hoorn, and others can be found on auction websites. He also illustrated the children's book Toos Vros, Het poppenkastboek (195-?). The Marshall Plan prize was Dirksen's most important award. According to his wife, Loes Dirksen, in 2009, “He had no particular European outlook or affiliation. At that time, after the war, people were, of course, very positive about the Marshall Plan. So we were too.” Thanks are due to Karen van Elderen in Amsterdam for her help in tracking down this biographical information and to Loes Dirksen for providing details.Google Scholar

14 Second prize went to Pierre Gauchat (1902-1956; see Helmhaus Zürich, Pierre Gauchat, der Graphiker, 23.1.-28.2. 1960 (1960)), whose poster shows a poppy growing out of a tree stump that is wrapped in European flags.Google Scholar

15 Twenty of the twenty-five prize-winning posters from 1950 are available at the GCMF Library in Lexington, Virginia http://library.marshallfoundation.org/posters/library/posters/marshall.php. In a brochure about the posters, ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration), Intra-European Cooperation for a Better Standard of Living (1950), it is noted that “Full color reproductions of the twenty-five prize posters have been distributed throughout Western Europe, and it is anticipated that 10,000,000 Europeans will see these graphic expressions of European recovery and aspirations under the Marshall Plan.” Records of the Economic Cooperation Administration are available at http://www.archives.gov/publications/record/1998/09/marshall-plan.html?template=print Google Scholar

16 Marshall Plan Posters from left to right: by Alfred Lutz (b. 1919 Villingen; see Charlotte Fergg-Frowein, ed., Kürschners Graphiker Handbuch (Berlin: de Gruyter 1959), at 111), from Germany, GCMF Catalog ID 1006; by les Spreekmeester, from The Netherlands, GCMF Catalog ID 1011; and, by Kenan Temizan, from Turkey, GCMF Catalog ID 1017. Temizan worked as a graphic artist in Germany from the 1920s until the Second World War (for magazines, movie makers and the automobile industry), and later taught at the State Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul.Google Scholar

17 Sails are mounted as followed, top to bottom. Fore-sails: Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Foremast: Austria, [West] Germany, France, and U.K. Main-mast: Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Italy. Mizzen-mast: Iceland, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark. Switzerland joined the OECC and participated in the Marshall Plan, but did not need or receive funds. Sweden's participation in the Marshall Plan was nominal, limited to a few small loans.Google Scholar

18 Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are among the few former European Free Trade Association countries that are still members of the European Economic Area, but have not joined the EU; this means that the European acquis communautaire obtains but they have no voice in law-making and other decisions at the European level.Google Scholar

19 Passerini, Luisa, Il mito d'Europa. Radici antiche per nuovi simboli (2007).Google Scholar

20 There is some confusion about use of the terms federation and federal state. The latter is an ambiguous English construction, as it may refer either to an individual member state in a federal system or to the system as a whole. In this essay, we employ “federal state” only in the latter sense. In some contexts federation and federal state are used interchangeably, but in discussions about the EU, the two terms are often distinguished, with federation referring to a less centralized, less nation-state emulating version of federalism than federal state. In this essay, we will avoid use of the word federation so as to minimize the confusion.Google Scholar

21 When asked about his choice of the image Moravcsik says: “I chose it because I liked the design aesthetically, because since I was a kid I've loved flags, and because, as you note, it described a project propelled forward by the dynamic power of the member states—which remain the legitimate authors of the project—hence they are the elements in the picture that are colored, bright, and on which you focus your attention. The fact it came from the Marshall Plan is happenstance—a distraction. I don't deal with that period—nor do I particularly subscribe to the theory that the US is responsible for the EU, though there may be some small truth in it.” (personal communication)Google Scholar

Dirksen's poster is, in fact, often used as a symbol of American post-war aid, but it contains no reference to the Marshall plan or the U.S. The significance of the figurehead or billet-head, if any, is unclear, though we might speculate that it represents the winged cap of Hermes or Mercury, messenger of the gods and patron of trade and commerce. Moravcsik says he removed the billet-head from his book cover image because he thought it was a stylized representation of a bald eagle, the American national emblem, used on the Great Seal of the United States. For figurehead traditions see: L. G. Carr Laughton, Old Ship Figure-heads & Sterns: With which are associated galleries, hancing-pieces, catheads and divers other matters that concern the “grace and countenance” of old sailing-ships (1991); Costa, Giancarlo, Carving on Ships from Ancient Times to Twentieth Century (1981); Hans Jürgen Hansen, ed., Art and the Seafarer: A Historical Survey of the Arts and Crafts of Sailors and Shipwrights (Faber 1968).Google Scholar

22 For early reflections down these lines see: Stanley Hoffmann, Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today, 21 Journal of Common Market Studies 21–37 (1982).Google Scholar

23 This formulation (Zweckverband in German) comes from Hans-Peter Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (1972), at 196, 1055.Google Scholar

24 The Quango Debate (Frederick F. Ridley & David Wilson, eds., 1995).Google Scholar

25 Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience (Mauro Cappeletti, Monica Secombe & Joseph H.H. Weiler, eds., 1985–1988; 8 vols.).Google Scholar

26 Delors (born 1925) was Commission President from 1985 to 1995. EU legitimacy has been an issue since this time: see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, 39 British Journal of Political Science 1–23 (2009).Google Scholar

27 See Armin von Bogdandy, The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System, 36 Common Market Law Review 887–910 (1999).Google Scholar

28 Giandomenico Majone later suggested that this unit of general political rule was no more than a glorified, extremely comprehensive regulatory agency in the American style; see Giandomenico Majone, The rise of the regulatory state in Europe, 17 West European Politics 77–101 (1994). Today Majone sees the EU as a pure confederation; see his Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (2005).Google Scholar

29 For a general overview of legal perspectives see: Stefan Oeter, Federalism and Democracy, in: Principles of European Constitutional Law (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, eds., 2009, 2^nd ed., in print); Bogdandy, Armin von, Founding Principles, in: Federalism and Democracy, in Principles of European Constitutional Law (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, eds., 2009, 2^nd ed., in print); Franzius, Claudio, Gewährleistung im Recht: Grundlagen einer europäischen Regulierungmodells öffentlicher Dienstleistungen (2009), at 157–169; Rainer Wahl, Erklären staatstheoretische Leitbegriffe die Europäische Union?, in: Rechts- und staatstheoretische Schlüsselbegriffe: Legitimität – Repräsentation – Freiheit. Symposion fuer Hasso Hofmann zum 70. Geburstag (Horst Dreier, ed., 2005); Id., Der Einzelne in der Welt jenseits des Staates, 40 Der Staat 45–72 (2001); Schütze, Robert, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (2009; in press). For the political science perspectives see: Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union (2005); Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson, European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration 5, 432–465 (1995), at 5–19, 432–465; Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, European Integration and Supranational Governance, 4 Journal of European Public Policy 297–317 (1997); European Integration and Supranational Governance (Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, eds., 1998); European Integration Theory (Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez, eds., 2004, 1^st edn.). For a historical look at the concept of “federation” (Bund): Reinhart Koselleck, Bund, in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 1, 582–671 (Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck, eds., 1972).Google Scholar

30 “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” Speech available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107332 Google Scholar

31 The ship of state, long used as a metaphor for the unitary state, was first adopted as metaphor for a federal state during the development of the U.S. federation; see Charles A. Miller, Ship of State. The Nautical Metaphors of Thomas Jefferson: With Numerous Examples from other Writers, from Classical Antiquity to the Present (2003). The metaphor was not used as an explicit expression of federalism that might call to question the structure of the union, as in Dirksen's image, but rather as a general call to unity during the revolution and founding of the federation and in the face of civil war. The ship of state was later used to symbolize unity versus division between the branches of the central government level itself.Google Scholar

One wonders if the Dutch ever used the ship of state as rallying cry in their long trajectory from the confederation of The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands (1581-1795) to the unitary Batavian Republic and Napoleon's contraptions (1795-1815), and finally the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815 ff.). We have, to date, found no examples.

32 American scholars with the federal vision in mind have been taking a fresh look at the European Union. The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse, eds., 2002). R. Daniel Kelemann, The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond (2004). For an earlier synthesis, Alberta M. Sbragia, The European Community: A Balancing Act, 23 Publius 23–28 (1993). Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison, in: Euro-Politics. Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community 257–291 (Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., 1991).Google Scholar

33 Karl-Albrecht Schachtschneider, Verfassungsrechtliche Argumente gegen den Vertrag von Lissabon, 36 Leviathan 317–343 (2008). The legal brief is available at http://www.KASchachtschneider.de Google Scholar

34 For a mild “Masters’ “ approach, see Peter M. Huber, Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, in Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 194–245 (2001).Google Scholar

35 Kirchhof, Paul, Der deutsche Staat im Prozess der europäischen Integration, in: Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vol. 7: Normativität und Schutz der Verfassung – Internationale Beziehungen 855–887 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof, eds., 1992); Id., The balance of powers between national and European institutions, 5 European Law Journal 225–242 (1999). Kirchhof (born 1943), then a justice on the constitutional court and the rapporteur for the Maastricht case, is generally considered responsible for the Maastricht decision of October 12, 1993 (BVerfGE 89, 155), but he most likely made a number of concessions to achieve it. Udo di Fabio (born 1954), the rapporteur for the current Lisbon case, is also well published on issues of European integration: see his The European Constitutional Treaty: An Analysis, 5 German Law Journal 1121–1132 (2004); The allocation of competences between the European Union and its member states, in: The Treaty of Nice and beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform 107–119 (Mads Andenas & John A. Usher, eds., 2003).Google Scholar

36 May 29, 1974 (BVerfGE 37, 271) and October 22, 1986 (BVerfGE 73, 339).Google Scholar

37 Walter Hallstein, Der unvollendete Bundesstaat (1969), 228 (“Bundesstaat im Werden”) = United Europe. Challenge and Opportunity (1962). Hallstein (1901-1982) was Commission President from 1958 to 1967.Google Scholar

38 See Oeter 2009 (supra, note 29) and Schönberger 2004 (infra, note 47). See also Stefan Oeter, Integration und Subsidiarität im deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht: Untersuchungen zu Bundesstaatstheorie unter dem Grundgesetz (1998).Google Scholar

39 Zürn, Michael, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung als Chance (1998).Google Scholar

40 See Weiler, Joseph H. H., In defence of the status quo: Europe's constitutional Sonderweg, in: European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 7–26 (Joseph H. H. Weiler & Marlene Wind, eds., 2003).Google Scholar

41 Wind, Marlene, The European Union as a polycentric polity: returning to a neo-medieval Europe?, in: Weiler & Wind eds. 2003 (supra, note 40), 103–134.Google Scholar

42 Schönberger 2005. (infra, note 47), at 81–88Google Scholar

43 For an empirical treatment of the Europeanization of the public sphere see: Hartmut Weßler, ed., Public Deliberation and Public Culture. The Writings of Bernhard Peters, 1993 – 2006 (2008); Webler, Hartmut, Bernhard Peters, Michael Brüggemann, Katharina Kleinen von Königslöw and Stefanie Sifft, The Transnationalization of Public Spheres (2008).Google Scholar

44 Ingo Pernice is born in 1950; see his Europäisches und nationales Verfassungsrecht, in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 149–193 (2001); Pernice, , Comments on Art. 23 Grundgesetz, in: Grundgesetz: Kommentar (Horst Dreier, ed.; loose leaf, since 1996, 1998); see also his Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited, 36 Common Market Law Review 703–750 (1999) (http://www.whi-berlin.de/pernice-cmlrev.htm); Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 2 European Law Review 511–529 (2002); and European v. national Constitutions, European Constitutional Law Review 99–103 (2005).Google Scholar

45 Schmitt, Carl, Verfassungslehre (1993, 8^th ed.; reprint of the 1928 1^st ed.), at 371 = Constitutional Theory (2008), at 388–9. What Schmitt has to say about Schwebezustand is enlightening: “The collective existence of the federation must not subsume the individual existence of the member states, nor can the existence of the member states subsume that of the federation. The member states are not simply subordinated, subjects of the federation, nor is the federation subordinated and subject to them. The federation exists only in this existential connection and in this balance. From both directions, various levels of association are possible, the most extreme case of which always leads to the fact that either the federation dissolves itself and only individual states still exist or the individual states cease to exist, and there remains only a single state. The essence of the federation resides in a dualism of political existence, in a connection between federalist togetherness and political unity, on the one hand, and the persistence of a majority, a pluralism of political unities, on the other. Such an intermediary condition [Schwebezustand] necessarily leads to many conflicts, which must be decided.” (Our emphasis)Google Scholar

46 On a current Swiss perspective see Greber, Anton R., Die vorpositiven Grundlagen des Bundesstaates (2000); Kölz, Alfred, Der Weg der Schweiz zum modernen Bundesstaat: 1789–1798-1848-1998. Historische Abhandlungen (1998).Google Scholar

47 Schönberger, Christoph, Die Europäische Union als Bund: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Verabschiedung des Staatenbund-Bundesstaat-Schemas, 129 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 81–120 (2004); Ulrich K. Preuß 2005 (supra, note 23); Beaud, Olivier, Theorie de la fédération (2007; Series Léviathan). Schönberger also cites a number of similar interpretations from scholars in other EU member states.Google Scholar

48 Bund is often translated as “federation” which creates some ambiguity, as federation is often used interchangeably with federal state. Here we will use the term “union” for this newly defined form of EU governance. See also footnote 20.Google Scholar

49 By Fabien Vienne (born 1925; see http://www.fabienvienne.com/en_biography.Html); GCMF Catalog ID 1005.Google Scholar

50 The European integration process is so huge and incomprehensible that Donald Puchala used the old story of the blind men and the elephant to describe the arguments about its nature—and that was back in 1972, before it really grew out of hand and the arguments heated up. Donald Puchala, Of Blind Men, Elephants, and International Integration, 10 Journal of Common Market Studies 267–285 (1972).Google Scholar

51 For a discussion of U.S. support for European integration based on American government records see: Beate Neuss, Geburtshelfer Europas? Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten im europäischen Integrationsprozeb 1945–1958 (2000); Lundestad, Geir, The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From ‘Empire by Invitation’ to ‘Transatlantic Drift’ (2003).Google Scholar

52 For a socio-political history see: Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Mortens Rasmussen, eds., The History of the European Union: Origins of a Supranational Polity 1950–72 (2009); Kaiser, Wolfram, Christian Democracy and the Origins of the European Union (2007). For a short version, see Wolfram Kaiser, Transnational Europe since 1945: Integration as Political Formation, in: Transnational European Union: Toward a Political Space 17–35 (Wolfram Kaiser and Peter Starie, eds., 2005). For a more state-oriented history see: Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State (1992; 2000 2^nd ed.).Google Scholar

53 At the Bremen TranState Research Center we call this the “hazard of dichotomies”; see Sonderforschungsbereich (Collaborative Research Centre) 597, Staatlichkeit im Wandel. Transformations of the State (Bremen: University of Bremen 2002), Vol. 1, 13, 16–18 et seq., also published as Michael Zürn, Stephan Leibfried, Bernhard Zangl, and Bernhard Peters, Transformations of the State? (Bremen: University of Bremen, Working Paper no. 1/2004), 3 et seq. (see http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/pages/pubAp.php?SPRACHE=de).Google Scholar

54 See: Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s, in: The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change 1–39 (Robert O. Keohane & Stanley Hoffmann, eds., 1991). Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, European Union?, 31 West European Politics 108–129 (2008), on the starting pages; Simon Hix, The EU as a New Political System, in: Comparative Politics 573–601 (Daniele Caramani, ed., 2008); Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising, eds., The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (1999); Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch, Governance and Institutional Development, in: Diez and Wiener 2004 eds. (supra, note 29), 97–115; Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic (2001). For an early classic see: Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, 66 Public Administration 239–278 (1988; the original article had appeared in German in Politische Vierteljahresschrift in 1985).Google Scholar

55 Moravcsik began his state-focused analysis in The Choice for Europe with the Messina negotiations for the EEC Treaty in 1956. By ignoring its antecedent, the ECSC, which formed in 1951, he fails to fully take into account the EC's path dependence. Despite the fact that the president of the ECSC, Jean Monnet, was against the founding of the EEC (François Duchěne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (1994)), the transatlantic networks that had formed during and after WWII, with activists like Oiere Uri and Hans von der Groeben, were crucial to EEC institution building and responsible, among other things, for the 1956 Spaak Report.Google Scholar

56 Pierson, Paul, The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis, 29 Comparative Political Studies 123–163 (1996), at 124–5; for the preceding period see Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy, 12 Journal of European Public Policy 349–386 (2005), at 354. One might expect such a conclusion from European scholars of integration. It comes as some surprise, however, that scholars of comparative politics have come to similar conclusions, as thinking in comparative politics has traditionally taken the nation state as the central unit of comparison and neglected the growing interdependence between states. In the past, comparativists have even been accused of “methodological nationalism.” Andrew Moravcsik, however, says that such divisions are arbitrary: “No one of my generation believes in a firm distinction between Comparative Politics and International Relations. There are just theories of politics, e.g. delegation, institutions, endogenous preferences, with varied assumptions. So, l don't like the dichotomizing.” (personal communication)Google Scholar

57 Two essays characterize the debate well: Pierson 1996 (supra, note 56) and Moravcsik 2005 (supra, note 56). The authors have been friends since childhood and came of professional age with European integration themes in the 1990s, when the EU was heading into troubled waters.Google Scholar

58 Pierson 1996, supra, note 56, at 123.Google Scholar

59 Moravcsik later places his 1998 analysis within the framework of multilevel governance, though the historical institutionalists claim that terrain as their own; see Moravcsik 2005 (supra, note 56), at 384, note 69. In Moravcsik's view, the “dichotomy between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism is based on a complete misunderstanding.” The real dichotomy, he maintains, is between Pierson's approach and one that is dominant in the sub-discipline of American Politics, in particular that of Ken Shepsle (Studying institutions: Lessons from the rational choice approach, 1 Journal of Theoretical Politics 131–147 (1989)). (personal communication)Google Scholar

60 Ross, George W., After Maastricht: Hard Choices for Europe, 9 World Policy Journal 487–513 (1992), at 501, as quoted by Joseph M. Grieco, The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme, 21 Review of International Studies 21–40 (1995), at 22, note 3.Google Scholar

61 On the EFTA see: Helen Wallace, ed., The Wider Western Europe: Reshaping the EC/EFTA Relationship (1991); Pedersen, Thomas, European Union and the EFTA countries: enlargement and integration (1994).Google Scholar

62 Historically, Charles de Gaulle's 1965–66 empty-chair politics comes to mind as the strongest action of that sort.Google Scholar

63 Karl-Heinz Ladeur 2008 and 2004 (supra, note 3).Google Scholar

64 Merkel, Angela (born 1954) was attending the dedication of the GMF's newly renovated headquarters in Washington. See http://www.gmfus.org/event/detail.cfm?id=210&parent_type=E. For the official German report see: http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/nn_5292/Content/DE/Artikel/2001-2006/2006/01/2006-01-12-europa-und-amerika-sind-unverzichtbare-partner.html.Google Scholar

65 For a short portrait of Guido Goldman (born 1937) see: http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/people/p15.html Google Scholar

66 The poster also hangs in a window at the German Historical Museum in Berlin as part of a display promoting the museum's permanent collection.Google Scholar

67 “L'Europe est un géant économique, un nain politique et, pire encore, un ver de terre lorsqu'il s'agit d'élaborer une capacité de défense.” (Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and, even worse, a worm until it concerns itself with elaborating a defence capability.) See: http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/sep1999/belg-s13.shtml Google Scholar

68 Checkel, Jeffrey J. & Katzenstein, Peter J., The politicization of European identities, in: European Identity 1–25 (Jeffrey J. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein, eds., 2009), at 1.Google Scholar

69 Europe's welfare state dimension taken per se is explored in: Herbert Obinger and Stephan Leibfried, Nationale Sozialstaaten in der Europäischen Version: Zukünfte eines ‘sozialen Europas', in: Die politische Ökonomie der europäischen Integration 335–365 (Martin Höpner & Achim Schäfer, eds., 2008); an earlier English version appeared as: Herbert Obinger, Stephan Leibfried, and Frank Castles, Bypasses to a social Europe? Lessons from federal experience, 12 Journal of European Public Policy 545–571 (2005).Google Scholar

70 For an overview see: Brinkley, Alan, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (1996). “Worrying about the problems of production and the structure of the economy” (at 271) has now returned with a vengeance, and we read Brinkley's epilogue, “The Reconstruction of New Deal Liberalism,” (at 265–271) in a radically different light than we did when it was published in the nineties.Google Scholar

71 Scharpf, Fritz W., Community and Autonomy: Multi-level Policy-Making in the European Union, 1 Journal of European Public Policy 219–242 (1994), at 219.Google Scholar

72 One must keep in mind that the New Deal didn't just create a vast alphabet soup of regulatory agencies. In May 1933 it created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a multi-faceted water and power distribution project that was the first special purpose administrative association or “quango.” The TVA was the world's first organisational model for region-wide socio-economic development, and it's quite likely that the EC founders had it in view. See: David Ekbladh, 'Mr. TVA': Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933–1973, 26 Diplomatic History 335–374 (2002). The TVA, like the EU, was a top-down bureaucracy that had problems with democratic deficit: see Philipp Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of Politics and Organization (1949; 1984 1^st pb. reprint). In recognition of this pioneering project, the national memorial to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (located along the Cherry Tree Walk in Washington's Constitution Gardens) is built around many pools and cascades of water—Ekbladh dubbed it the “hydraulic monument.”Google Scholar

73 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (born 1951), who pioneered the comparison between American federalism and the EEC/EU in the mid-1980s (see supra, note 25), has turned away from such a comparison in recent years, but a number of American scholars have picked up the comparison in the meantime (see supra, note 32). Weiler has now suggested an alternative vision of an EU structure that is comprised of opened container states and geared toward the EU citizens and individual rights, something akin to a Verfassungsverbund. See his: The Constitution of Europe: “do the new clothes have an emperor?” and other essays on European integration (2000); Joseph H. H. Weiler, Iain Begg and John Peterson, eds., Integration in an expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals (2003).Google Scholar