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A Sense of Déjà Vu? The FCC's Preliminary European Stability Mechanism Verdict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Susanne K. Schmidt

Extract

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Over the summer of 2012, the pending verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) was a topic of much speculation not only in Germany and in the European Union (EU), but also on the international level. Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was quoted as threatening to leave a meeting, were she to hear again “Bundesverfassungsgericht.” That decisions of a German non-majoritarian institution have such transnational repercussions while being guided by German laws and national considerations is nothing new. The Bundesbank's D-Mark rule was comparable and effectively pushed the introduction of the euro along. But also previous landmark rulings of the FCC on European integration raised cross-border attention, given that the Constitutional Court has the final say on German politics, and the biggest member state and economy of the EU can hardly be ignored. Moreover, being one of the most powerful constitutional courts in Europe, and certainly the one whose judgments receive most attention, rulings of the FCC are not only often cited but may also serve as a role model for other constitutional courts. Protest coming from this angle may therefore multiply.

Type
Special Section: The ESM Before the Courts
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 1: Special section - The ESM Before the Courts , 01 January 2013 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

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