1 Jackson, Vicki C., Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 Duke L.J. 223, 273, (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).Google Scholar

2 Id. Google Scholar

3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).Google Scholar

4 Id. at 274.Google Scholar

5 Lenaerts, Koen, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution—The Case of the European Union, 21 Fordham Int'l L.J. 746, 748 (1997).Google Scholar

6 For the purpose of this article, the differences between political autonomy and federal principle, as well as between regions and autonomous regions are set aside.Google Scholar

7 Mayer, Franz C., Die drei Dimensionen der europäischen Kompetenzebatte, 61 Zeitschrift für ausländiches öffentliche Recht und Volkerrecht [ZaöRV] 577, 580 (2001).Google Scholar

8 Nonetheless, it has been observed that objective competence norms usually refer to aims as well. See Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, The European Union's Vertical Order of Competences: The Current Law and Proposals for Its Reform, 39 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 227, 240 (2002).Google Scholar

9 S.T.C., Feb. 14, 2011 (B.O.E., No. 63, p. 37 (Spain) (originating from the Spanish Constitutional Court).Google Scholar

10 Comm'n v. Council, CJEU Case C-300/89, 1991 E.C.R. I-2867, para. 10. For further discussion, and an explanation of why the Data Retention Directive was adopted under the basis of Article 95 EC (Article 191 TFEU), see Ireland v. Parliament & Council, CJEU Case C-301/06, 2009 E.C.R I-593, para. 71–72.Google Scholar

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12 See Swenden, Wilfried, Is the European Union in Need of a Competence Catalogue? Insights from Comparative Federalism, 42 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 371, 375 (2004).Google Scholar

13 In fact, the reinforcement of the powers of the Component Entities relying on the pre-eminence of their autonomy before the Central State has failed. See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1612, 1724 (2002).Google Scholar

14 Jarass, Hans D., Allgemeine Probleme der Gesetzgebungskompetenz des Bundes, 19 Neue Zeitschrift Für Verwaltungsrecht [NZwV] 1089, 1092 (2000).Google Scholar

15 For a critical overview of the textualism approach, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 415–25 (1989).Google Scholar

16 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, art. 72(a) (Ger.) (“The Federation shall have the right to legislate if and to the extent that the establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory … renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest.”).Google Scholar

17 Constitución Española, B.O.E. n. 311, art. 149(1)(1), Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“The State holds exclusive competence over the following matters: Regulation of the basic conditions guaranteeing the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of their rights, and in the fulfillment of their constitutional duties.”).Google Scholar

18 Art. 117(a) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“The State has exclusive legislative powers in the following matters: … Determination of the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout the national territory.”).Google Scholar

19 The Spanish article refers to the basic conditions that guarantee the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of rights and the fulfillment of constitutional duties, while the Italian Constitution alludes to the basic level of benefits related to civil and social entitlements to be guaranteed throughout the national territory.Google Scholar

20 Actually, in the Italian and Spanish Constitutions these articles set a competence in literal terms. The German case is relatively different because the equivalence of living conditions is a requisite to empower the Federation to approve a rule concerning a limited number of areas. Hence, it is not a competence in itself, but a premise of several federal competences.Google Scholar

21 The Central State has been empowered to rule over the prices of medicine, the quality of public housing, the requirements to enter an occupation, to receive a medical treatment or to get several kinds of subsidies, the participation entitlements in educational institutions, etc.Google Scholar

22 In the Spanish and Italian cases, fundamental rights lead to the centralization of the system mainly because there is only one Constitution. In the German case, though, the Federal Constitutional Court has developed a doctrine so wide and detailed concerning fundamental rights that it has thoroughly restrained the legislative powers of Länder. See Konrad Hesse, Wandlungen der Bedeutung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit für die bundesstaatliche Ordnung, in Im Dienst an der Gemeinschaft. Festschrift für Dietrich Schindler zum 65. Geburtstag 723, 730–31 (Alfred Kölz, Georg Müller & Daniel Thürer, eds., 1989).Google Scholar

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24 In this regard, the competence of the Central State to achieve equality has been projected upon rules over environment, education, civil service, cinema, social security, consumer rights, public health system, the stock market, several kinds of fines, subsidies and registers, etc.Google Scholar

25 Maribel Gonzalez Pascual, El Proceso Autonómico Ante la Igualdad en el Ejercicio de los Derechos Constitucionales 83 (2007).Google Scholar

26 S.T.C., Mar. 20, 1997 (B.O.E., No. 99, p. 38) (Spain) (originating from the Spanish Constitutional Court).Google Scholar

27 The following are considered basic conditions (among others): The determination of land use, the guarantees of public engagement in landing policy, the duties of the owners to maintain and repair structures of the building as well as the facilities therein, the deadlines of the building licenses, the expropriation grounds, the fair distribution of burdens and profits during the planning.Google Scholar

28 Agustín de Asis Roig, El Artículo 149.1.1º de la Constitución como fundamento de la Intervención del Estado en materia urbanística, in El urbanismo, hoy. Reflexiones a proposito de la STC 61/1997 y el nuevo proyecto de Ley Estatal 103, 158, 166 (Luciano Parejo Alfonso et al. eds., 1997).Google Scholar

29 Ekelöf, Olof, Teleological Construction of Statutes, in 2 Legal Reasoning 359, 378–79 (Aulis Aarnio & D. Neil MacCormick eds., 1992).Google Scholar

30 Wahl, Rainer, Der Vorrang der Verfassung, 20 Der Staat 485, 507 (1981).Google Scholar

31 Indeed, whenever an authority is in charge of making the meaning of a disputed legal term concrete, a certain discretionary power is conferred on that authority. See Horst Emhke, “Ermessen” und “unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff” im Verwaltungsrecht 26–28 (1960).Google Scholar

32 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvF 760/57, 13 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 237, 239 (Nov. 29, 1960) (Ger.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 1/64, 26 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 338, 382, 383 (July 15, 1969); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 9/85, 78 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 249, 270 (June 8, 1988).Google Scholar

33 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvL 23/81, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 63, 65 (Jan. 12, 1983).Google Scholar

34 Stern, Klaus, 2 Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 278 (1976).Google Scholar

35 Corte Costituzionale, 26 June 2002, n. 282/2002, Giur. Cost. 2002, 2034, available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/index.html.Google Scholar

36 In the judgment 166/2008, the Italian Constitutional Court stated that the Central State is entrusted with the establishment of the minimum life standard “inherent in the core of human dignity.” The Constitutional Court has not yet drawn any guidelines from this general assertion, though. See Corte Costituzionale, 23 May 2008, n. 166/2008, available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/index.html.Google Scholar

37 Regarding standards of basic levels of health care, see Corte Costituzionale, 27 Mar. 2003, n. 88/2003, available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/index.html. See also, Corte Costituzionale, 31 Mar. 2006, n. 134/2006, available at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/index.html.Google Scholar

38 Art. 120 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“The Government can act for bodies of the regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and municipalities. … whenever such action is necessary … to guarantee the basic level of benefits relating to civil and social entitlements, regardless of the geographic borders of local authorities.”).Google Scholar

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42 See Sommermann, Karl Peter, Die Stärkung der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen der Länder durch die Grundgesetzreform von 1994, 17 Juristische Ausbildung [Jura] 393 (1995).Google Scholar

43 See Sannwald, Rüdiger, Art. 72, in Kommentar Zum Grundgesetz 74 (Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu & Franz Klein eds., 11th ed. 2011).Google Scholar

44 It is difficult to translate the reach of this reform into other languages because both Bedürfnis and Erforderlichkeit mean necessity. Nevertheless, according to the German Constitutional Federal Court, a measure is proportional whether it is geeignet, erforderlich und angemessen. That is why it was a very important change because it could mean that a kind of proportionality principle—at least the two first stages—should be applied, and, actually, this was the intention of the reform.Google Scholar

45 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 1/01, 106 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 61 (Oct. 24, 2002).Google Scholar

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48 Id. at 501.Google Scholar

49 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 2/01, 113 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 167 (July 18, 2005).Google Scholar

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52 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case. No. 2 BvF 2/02, 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 226 (July 27, 2004) (Osterloh, J. and Lübbe-Wolfe, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

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54 See Stettner, Rupert, Art. 72, in 2 Grundgesetz Kommentar 1345 (Horst Dreier ed., 2006).Google Scholar

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61 For comment on this case law, see Andrea Gratteri, La Faticosa Emersione del Principio Costituzionale di leale Collaborazione in La riforma del titolo V della Costituzione e la giurisprudenza costituzionale 416, 423—28 (E. Bettinelli & F. Rigano eds., 2004).Google Scholar

62 The dual federalism is based on the idea that the Central State and Component Entities operate independently in their respective sphere. Therefore, allocation of powers relies on a division of powers into two mutually exclusive spheres. See Robert Schutze, Dual Federalism Constitutionalised: The Emergence of Exclusive Competences in the EC Legal Order, 32 Eur. L. Rev. 3 (2007). It must be observed, though, that the share competences still play a key role in the Italian allocation of powers after the reform.Google Scholar

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70 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvF 2/01, 113 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 167 (July 18, 2005).Google Scholar

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72 Id. Google Scholar

73 Id. Google Scholar

74 In the German case, the achievement of the equivalence of living conditions is a premise of the federal competence.Google Scholar

75 For example, if the Central State is empowered to rule over the general principles of the health system (Art. 117.3 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.)), or over the basis of health matters (Art. 149.1.16 Constitución Espanola [C.E.] (Spain)), it should not need the powers conferred by Articles 149.1.1 (C.E.) and 117.2.m (Cost.) to guarantee an equal enjoyment of health care.Google Scholar

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77 Nonetheless, the Spanish Constitutional Court has established that the Central State must rule over the conditions to get European funding and grants to achieve the equality of a general life standard. See Rafael Bustos Gisbert, La Ejecución del Derecho Comunitario por el Gobierno Central, 2003 Revista Vasca de Administración Pública Sept.–Dec. 2003 163, 179.Google Scholar

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