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Meditating the Different Concepts of Corporate Criminal Liability in England and Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019


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Today's world has been deeply affected by globalization. Different cultures have deepened their knowledge of each other and are forced to create common solutions to worldwide problems. This has led to an increasing interest in comparing different nations’ approaches to common problems.

Copyright © 2010 by German Law Journal GbR 


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32 Named after the publications on this topic in the Utah Law Review (1997).Google Scholar

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