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Legal Protection Against the UN-Security Council Between European and International Law: A Kafkaesque Situation?

Report on the fall conference of the graduate program “Multi-level constitutionalism (Verfassung jenseits des Staates)” in Berlin, 8 December 2006

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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Constitutionalism beyond the state concerns itself with the relation among various legal levels and the position of the individual in a multilevel legal system. The question how human rights are protected against international organizations who increasingly take on executive powers cannot be thoroughly answered without confronting a fundamental debate in international law theory: the constitutionalism-fragmentation debate. The European Court of First Instance as well as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had to deal recently and are still dealing with this complex in a number of cases.

Type
Developments
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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38 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, delivered on 26 October 2006, Case C-354/04 P (Segi).Google Scholar