Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism

  • Gareth Davies

Extract

This Article starts from two premises. The first is that power—particularly regulatory power—is increasingly exercised across and between jurisdictions, in particular as a result of the intertwining of economies via trade. The well-being of those involved in the production and trade in goods and services is determined by rules made in multiple jurisdictions, not just their own. Concern about the environmental and social impact of economic activity is a particular reason for jurisdictions to try and impose norms upon each other. The second premise is that the essence of constitutionalism is constitutional values and principles rather than particular institutional forms. Such forms are contingent and instrumental, in the service of the values and principles. Many of those constitutional values and principles are concerned with the exercise of power (e.g., accountability, due process, and non-oppression).

    • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism
      Available formats
      ×

      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism
      Available formats
      ×

      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism
      Available formats
      ×

Copyright

References

Hide All

1 Wiener, Antje, Global Constitutionalism: Mapping an Emerging Field 2-3 (Conference Constitutionalism in a New Key? Cosmopolitan, Pluralist and Public Reason-Oriented, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://cosmopolis.wzb.eu/content/program/conkey_Wiener_Mapping-Field.pdf. See also Ester H. Karnell, The EU as a Promoter of Values and the European Global Project, 13 GERMAN L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2012).

2 Walker, Neil, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 317, 320-21 (2002).

3 For a similar argument, see the third claim in Miguel P. Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 67 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012).

4 Id.

5 See generally Gareth Davies, 'Process and Production Method’ Based Trade Restrictions in the EU, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 69 (Catherine Barnard ed., 2008); Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 36 J. World Trade 353 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “ppms” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 59 (2002); Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction: An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 249 (2000); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (2004); Gabrielle Marceau & Joel Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. World Trade 811 (2002).

6 For a discussion on the use of the private sector in constructing regulation, see generally Michelle Egan, Constructing a European Market (2001).

7 The phrase is also used where some or most of the regulators are private. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Private Regulation in European Private Law, in Towards a European Civil Code 91 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010).

8 See, e.g., Waddington, Lisa, The Internal Market and Disability Accessibility: Using EC Law to Establish an Internal Market in Disability Accessible Goods and Services 7 (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Papers, No. 3, 2008).

9 Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-000. See also Laurens Ankersmit, Jessica Lawrence & Gareth Davies, Diverging EU and WTO Perspectives on Extraterritorial Process Regulation, 21 Minn. J. Int'l L. 14 (2012) (specifically discussing the extraterritorial aspects of the case). See the other papers in this special edition for discussion of its wider implications.

10 Erich Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issue in International Law, WTO Law, and Legal Theory 166 (2009).

11 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity 19-24 (1992).

12 See supra text accompanying note 5.

13 For other examples, see Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.

14 See supra text accompanying note 5.

15 Miguel P. Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 69-175 (1998); Joanne Scott, On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO (The Jean Monnet Working Papers, No. 3/99, 1999).

16 See, e.g., Sunstein, Cass, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (2005).

17 See Ankersmit et al., supra note 9; Bartels, supra note 5; Philippe Sands, 'Unilateralism', Values, and International Law, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 291, 293 (2000).

18 See Schoenbaum, Thomas J., International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 268, 291 (1997). See also Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules 95-116 (2005); Jansen, Bernhard, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 309, 310 (2000); John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 Eur. J. Int'l L. 303, 306-307 (2000).

19 See Bartels, supra note 5; Sands, supra note 17, at 300.

20 See Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 70; Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.

21 See Davies, Gareth, Morality Clauses and Decision Making in Situations of Scientific Uncertainty, 6 World Trade Rev. 249 (2007). See also Charnovitz, Steve, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 689, 695 (1998); Diebold, Nicolas F., The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless Tiger and the Undermining Mole, 11 J. Int'l Econ. L. 43, 69 (2008).

22 Jackson, John H., The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited, 4 J. Int'l Econ. L. 67 (2001).

23 Follesdal, Andreas, Global Distributive Justice? State Boundaries as a Normative Problem, 1 Global Constitutionalism 261, 270-71 (2012).

24 Jackson, supra note 18, at 306-07.

25 C.f. Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty 107 (1999).

26 Davies, supra note 5; Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.

27 Scott, supra note 15; Maduro, supra note 15, at 173.

28 Howse & Regan, supra note 5, at 275-76; Jason Potts, The Legality of PPMs Under the GATT 35-36 (2008), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/ppms_gatt.pdf.

29 See Follesdal, supra note 23, at 265-68.

30 See Davies, Gareth, Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization? Lessons in Tolerance and Trade from the European Union for the WTO and other RTAs, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System 265, 274 (Federico Ortino & Lorand Bartels eds., 2006); Sands, supra note 17, at 302.

31 Such conditionality may also come from multinational corporations acting out of a sense of corporate social responsibility.

32 See, e.g., Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy 329 (Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman eds., 2008); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779, 794-95 (1994); Jenia I. Turner, The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal Law, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 555, 579-82 (2012).

33 For more examples, see Ankersmit et al., supra note 9.

34 See, e.g., Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (1996); Giandomenico Majone, Europe's ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, 4 Eur. L. J. 5 (1998).

35 See, e.g., MacCormick, supra note 25; Miguel P. Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in Sovereignty in Transition 501 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 11 Eur. L.J. 262 (2005); Walker, supra note 2; Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Pluralism and Integrity, 23 Ratio Juris 365, 377-78 (2010); Joseph Weiler, Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism: Some Doubts, in The Worlds of European Constitutionalism 8 (2011).

36 Cruz, Julio B., The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, 14 Eur. L.J. 389 (2008).

37 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.

38 Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca, EU Law 268-97 (5th ed., 2011). See also Jan Komarek, Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court's Ultra Vires Revolution, Verfassungblog (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.verfassungsblog.de/playing-matches-czech-constitutional-courts-ultra-vires-revolution/#.UJ6QZYfAcpZ (discussing the recent decision of the Czech Constitutional Court).

39 Kumm, Mattias, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, 36 Common Market L. Rev. 351, 351-52 (1999); Kumm, supra note 35.

40 Weiler, Joseph H.H. & Haltern, Ulrich R., The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order—Through the Looking Glass, 37 Harv. Int'l L.J 411, 445-446 (1996); Arthur Dyevre, Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hierarchical Legal Order: Isolated Incident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon? 18-20 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2084639.

41 Dyevre, supra note 40, at 41.

42 For further comments, see Komarek, supra note 38; Dyevre, supra note 40, at 20-27; Jan Komarek, European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual Principles in Disharmony 6-17 (Jean Monnet Work Papers, No. 10/05, 2005).

43 See Kumm, Mattias, Constitutionalism and the Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism: Institutional Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection, in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 163 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012); Maduro, supra note 3.

44 See the ongoing jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court on this point, especially Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155; BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, June 30, 2009, 143 BVerfGE 2. See also Craig & de Burca, supra note 38, at 272-283.

45 Walker, supra note 2, at 320.

46 Davies, Gareth, Constitutional disagreement in Europe and the search for pluralism, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 269 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012); Eleftheriadis, supra note 35, at 377-378.

47 The collection of articles found in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds. 2012) demonstrate this range of viewpoints. See also Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek, Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism (EUI Working Paper Law, No. 2008/21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334219.

48 Both claims are similar to the first two of Maduro's three claims. See Maduro, supra note 3.

49 Tamanaha, Brian Z., Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 Sydney L. Rev. 375, 390-91 (2008).

50 Davies, supra note 46.

51 See Walker, supra note 2, at 341 (regarding the institutional aspect of constitutionalism as necessary). See also Nico Krisch, The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law 40-42 (Law, Society, and Economy, Working Paper 12/2009) (preferring not to call such a state of affairs constitutional); Matej Avbelj, Can European Integration be Constitutional and Pluralist—Both at the Same Time?, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 381 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012). But see Maduro, surpa note 3. Maduro is prepared to leave institutionalized hierarchy behind. See also Wiener, supra note 1, at 2-3; Jan Komarek, Institutional Dimension of Constitutional Pluralism, in Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond 231 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komarek eds., 2012).

52 See Maduro, supra note 3; Daniel Halberstam, Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational, and Global Governance 22-23 (University of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 229, 2011).

53 Walker, supra note 2, at 320.

54 The idea has also been referred to as constitutional tolerance. See Joseph Weiler, Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg, in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union 54 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2002).

55 Maduro, supra note 3.

56 Weiler, Joseph H., In Defense of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State 7 (Joseph Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003); Maduro, supra note 35.

57 Kumm, supra note 35.

58 Id. See also Maduro, supra note 35.

59 Wiener, supra note 1, at 12.

60 See Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); Wiener, supra note 1, at 7-11. See also Halberstam, supra note 52, at 4-5.

61 Halberstam, supra note 52; Peer Zumbansen, Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational Legal-Pluralist Order, 1 Global Constitutionalism 16, 50 (2012).

62 Halberstam, supra note 52, at 37.

63 Walker, supra note 2, at 336.

64 Ladeur, Karl-Heinz, Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality—The Viability of the Network Concept, 3 Eur. L.J. 33 (1997).

* Department of Transnational Legal Studies and Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam. The research for this paper was part of a project funded by the Netherlands Scientific Organisation (NWO), “Minding other states' business: free trade, fair trade and clean trade in the EU.”

Related content

Powered by UNSILO

International Trade, Extraterritorial Power, and Global Constitutionalism: A Perspective from Constitutional Pluralism

  • Gareth Davies

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.