¹ As is well known, Carl Schmitt was among the first to make real contributions in this field. See Schmitt, Carl, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität (1922). After his seminal works various phases have followed. See Lazar, Nomi Claire, States of Emergency in Liberal Democracies (2009) (discussing various phases of emergency concepts and attitudes); see e.g., Scheuerman, William E., Survey Article: Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law after 9/11, 14 J. Pol. Phil. 61, 61–62 (2006); Karin Loevy, Emergencies in Public Law: The Legal Politics of Containment (2016).Google Scholar

² See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Repressed State of Emergency: The Exercise of State Authority in Extraordinary Circumstances [1978], in 1 Constitutional and Political Theory: Selected Writings 128 (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017) on why constitutional silence on regulating emergencies may undermine the rule of law and how the use of ordinary laws to regulate state of emergencies may slowly become the new norm. See also Loevy, Karin, Emergencies in Public Law: The Legal Politics of Containment (2016); see also Agamben, Giorgio, State of Exception 2–3 (2005).Google Scholar

³ See, e.g., Husa, Jaakko, Kimmo Nuotio & Heikki Pihlajamäki, Nordic Law – Between Tradition and Dynamism, in Nordic Law – Between Tradition and Dynamism (Jaakko Husa, Kimmo Nuotio & Heikki Pihlajamäki eds., 2007); R. Kari West, Nordic Constitutional Judicial Review: A Comparative Study of Scandinavian Judicial Review and Judicial Reasoning (2013).Google Scholar

⁴ See, e.g., Sejersted, Fredrik, Grunnlovens funksjon i de nordiske land, 127 Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap 535–62 (2014).Google Scholar

⁵ If the law is silent, a different set of questions will need to be posed. We will return to them below (see the section below on Böckenförde and constitutional silence).Google Scholar

⁶ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Repressed State of Emergency: The Exercise of State Authority in Extraordinary Circumstances [1978], in 1 Constitutional and Political Theory: Selected Writings 128 (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017).Google Scholar

⁷ The different forms that these decisions may take include administrative measures, laws, etc.Google Scholar

⁸ On political review, see Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 130.Google Scholar

⁹ These jurisdictions include South Africa and the Philippines.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Oren Gross, Constitutional and Emergency Regimes, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 342 (Michael Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012).Google Scholar

¹¹ Id. at 348.Google Scholar

¹² Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 108–33.Google Scholar

¹³ Id. at 110–11.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Id. at 112. In the German context read out from § 34 of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) and § 228 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 113.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Id.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. at 114.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id. at 121.Google Scholar

²⁰ Id. at 119–20.Google Scholar

²¹ Id. at 120.Google Scholar

²² Id. at 126.Google Scholar

²³ See the growing literature on preventionism within criminal law and how it is at odds with general theories of criminal law. Using criminal law measures prevent threats to national security such as terrorist acts. Furthermore, national security and criminal policy are intertwined.Google Scholar

²⁴ IG 1:6. The Swedish Constitution consists of four fundamental laws: The Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act, and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression.Google Scholar

²⁵ IG 12:1.Google Scholar

²⁶ IG 7:3.Google Scholar

²⁷ IG 12:2. For an elaborate account for what this means in an emergency see, RiR 2008:09, 92.Google Scholar

²⁸ Compare to the responsibility of ministers to be proactive (principen om ministeransvar), Anna Jonsson, Förvaltningens självständighet och förbudet mot ministerstyre: en analys av konstitutionsutskottets betänkanden från 2000 till 2005, in God förvaltning – ideal och Praktik 163–90, 183 (Lena Marcusson ed., 2006).Google Scholar

²⁹ RiR 2008:09, 34, 103.Google Scholar

³⁰ IG 8:7.Google Scholar

³¹ IG 8:3–5.Google Scholar

³² IG 1:1, 13:4.Google Scholar

³³ 2005/06:KU8.Google Scholar

³⁴ RiR 2008:09, 100. See Jermsten, Henrik, Konstitutionell Nödrätt 42–43 (1992) for an account of the discussion involving a more generous approach to what the government can do during an internal emergency, including governmental decisions on operative matters. This proposition is, however, challenged by Thomas Bull in RiR 2008:09.Google Scholar

³⁵ See e.g., Hirschfeldt, Johan, Mänskliga rättigheter och andra konstitutionella kärnvärden när krisen slår till, in Mänskliga rättigheter i det offentliga Sverige 194 (Anna-Sara Lind, Elena Namli & Studentlitteratur eds., 2017).Google Scholar

³⁶ IG Chapter 15.Google Scholar

³⁷ For example, the law (2006:544) om kommuners och landstings åtgärder inför och vid extraordinära händelser i fredstid och höjd beredskap defines what is an extraordinary circumstance in the meaning of the law. For an overview and analysis of relevant statutes and regulations, see Per Bergling et al., Krisen, myndigheterna och lagen: Krishantering i rättens gränsland (2015).Google Scholar

³⁸ A large terrorist attack could be considered an act of war and hence trigger the application of Ch. 15 IG.Google Scholar

³⁹ SOU 2008:61, p. 21.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See prop. 2009/10:80, p. 207.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Hirschfeldt, supra note 35, at 200–04.Google Scholar

⁴² See, e.g., 2008:125, 503.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf. Wennerström who categorizes the Swedish system as utomkonstitutionell and systembevarande. Erik Wennerström, Inget undantag utan regel – den konstitutionella nödrätten och Sverige, in Vänbok till Sten Hecksher 364 (2012).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Id. at 367. See also SOU 2008:125, 525–526. Notably, measures and decisions do not include provisions.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Bergling et al., supra note 37, argues that this it is a political, not a constitutional, custom. More on this below. See also RiR 2008:9, 96 with reference to Jermsten, supra note 34.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See e.g., SOU 2003:32, 96. SOU 2008:125, 525.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The Committee on the Constitution is one of the most important and influential parliamentary committees in Sweden. Aside from preparing future decisions by the parliament, the Committee on the Constitution exercises parliamentary control over how the government may exercise its powers.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Infra Part IV.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ KU 1973:20, 16–17. Uppenbar nödsituation. Google Scholar

⁵⁰ KU 1974:22, 17–20. Additional emergencies include the terrorist attack on the 1975 West German Embassy in Stockholm, where one of the terrorist was expelled from the county as a result of a government decision; the 1981 U 137 case; and the 2004 Tsunami (2004). For an extensive list, see Bergling, supra note 37, and Hirschfeldt, supra note 35.Google Scholar

⁵¹ For a more extensive list of extraordinary circumstances and emergencies within the 21^st Century, see Wennerström, supra note 43, at 365–66.Google Scholar

⁵² See, e.g., 2005/06:KU8.Google Scholar

⁵³ See, e.g., prop. 2009/10:80 s 202 ff, and SOU 2008:61, 81–83 n. 12–13.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See SOU 2008:61, 100.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ For example, the rise of the Swedish Democrats and their possibility to become a coalition partner in the future.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Wennerström, supra note 43, at 360. See also RiR 2008:09, 95 and Bergling et. al., supra note 37, at 77. See also Jermsten, supra note 34, at 84, concluding that the decisions by the Committee on the Constitution up to the 1980s do not adequately indicate Committee precedent, but that these decisions certainly provide guidance. He concludes that konstitutionella nödrätten potentially could be considered an unwritten constitutional emergency rule. Id. at 91–92. He goes so far as to extend the supralegal state of emergency to include the legislative powers of the parliament.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Bergling et. al., supra note 37, at 80, 81.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Id. at 81–82. In this context, custom refers to practice or a number of decisions taken by relevant authorities that taken together may guide the understanding of the law.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Id. Cf. RiR 2008:9.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ If deemed an emergency according to these rules, a nominally illegal act might be considered legal due to an emergency.“ 1973:90, 423. Compare Böckenförde's illustration of and argument on the connection between the German regulation on exception civil and criminal liability and the German doctrine of a supralegal state of emergency, Böckenförde, supra note 6.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See the Swedish Penal Code, Brottsbalken (BrB) 24:4. Jermsten, supra note 34, at 89; RiR 2008:9, 96. See also Id. at 93–94, where Bull argues that the criminal liability of ministers as laid down in IG 13:3 might be affected by the recognition of supralegal state of emergency as a constitutional principle that gives competence and authority to act. IG 13:3 is only applicable to acts and decisions that typically fall under the responsibility of a minister. The main question here would then be whether a decision during a supralegal state of emergency is typical? If IG 13:3 is not applicable to actions taken under supralegal state of emergency to begin with, it cannot constitute the constitutional foundation for such a principle. “De gärningar som bör bli föremål för en särskild prövning är endast sådana som ingår som led i själva utövningen av statsrådstjänsten och som alltså kan tänkas vara styrda av politiska motiv och värderingar.” 1973:90, 423.Google Scholar

⁶² Cf. BrB 20:1. See RiR 2008:9, 93–94, and Bergling et al., supra note 37, at 82. The issues that arises in this context gives additional strength to the argument put forward several times by the Committee on the Constitution that documentation during an emergency is key to a successful post fact review.Google Scholar

⁶³ Hirschfeldt, supra note 35, at 200, n. 17.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Bergling et al., supra note 37, at 82.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Hirschfeldt, supra note 35, at 197. See for example lagen (2003:778) om skydd mot olyckor, 4:10, para. 1, according to which the government can appoint and decide on one state agency to take responsibility for larger extraordinary circumstances. The government cannot however decide on what specific measures that agency should take. Although not explicit from the wording of the law this paragraph allows for the government itself to take the overall responsibility for the operation. See SOU 2005:104, 313. See also smittskyddslagen (2004:168) 9:6, and lagen (2006:544) om kommuners och landstings åtgärder inför och vid extraordinära händelser i fredstid och höjd beredskap.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Compare Böckenförde's argument against this approach, Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 125–27, with the German argument for this approach, Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 125.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ On legality in this context, see Bergling et al., supra note 37, at 67.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ This concern expressed in SOU 2008:125, 525. Since it is difficult to predict what kind of regulation is necessary and in order to protect the integrity of the rule of law state, the constitution, and the principle of legality it is argued that the Government should be granted emergency powers to adopt a provision (föreskrift) when there is a danger in delaying. A time limit of 12 days was suggested, and the norm should, as soon as possible, be put before the Parliament. Id. at 527.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Bergling et al., supra note 37, at 66.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ The report documented the deaths of hundreds of Swedish citizens during the tsunami in Thailand.Google Scholar

⁷¹ IG 7:3 (laying down the collective decision principle).Google Scholar

⁷² SOU 2005:104, 305.Google Scholar

⁷³ The Expert Inquiry formed a part of the Constitutional Reform Inquiry (Grundlagsutredningen).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Prop 2009/10:80, 207.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ RiR 2008:9.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Id. at 8.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ SOU 2008:61, 109. For an account of a similar argument in the German debate, see Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 121.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Cf. IG 15.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ SOU 2008:61, 109.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ SOU 2008:61, 100.Google Scholar

⁸¹ For an analysis of the Swedish terror laws from this point of view see, Cameron, Iain & Anna Cornell, Jonsson, Terroristbrott – en Översikt, Svensk juristtidning 709–34 (2017).Google Scholar

⁸² Jaakko Husa, The Constitution of Finland: A Contextual Analysis 3 (2011).Google Scholar

⁸³ Id. at 30–32.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Section 23.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Husa, supra note 82, at 9–10.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Id. Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Id. at 46–49.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See Tiihonen, Seppo, Sotatilalainsäädäntö ja hätäoikeus autonomian lopulta toiseen maailmansotaan, in Lukeeko hätä lakia 85–94 (Kaarlo Tuori & Martin Scheinin eds., 1988).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Martial Law.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Cf. the Swedish principle of anticipatory statutorification (författningsberedskap), infra Part C, Section V.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Legislation for Salvage and Rescue includes some competences for handling disasters. Only very serious catastrophes might cause a need for emergency competences. Legislation for serious infectious disease includes provisions for protection from communicable disease. only in pandemics might there be need for emergency powers based on the Emergency Powers Act. Even legislation on police covers some of these situations.Google Scholar

⁹² See Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 115, 120–21.Google Scholar

⁹³ Id. at 119–20.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Id. Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Hallituksen esitys 60/2010 vp, 36.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Emergency Powers Act (1552/2011), Chapter 2.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Emergency Powers Act (1552/2011).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991), https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1991/en19911080.pdf.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See PeVL 20/2011 vp on LJL 1/2011 vp (Lepäämässä oleva ehdotus valmiuslaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi), and PeVL 6/2009 vp on HE 3/2008 vp valmiuslaiksi ja eräiksi siihen liittyviksi laeiksi.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ According to Section 73 of the Constitution of Finland, which provides:Google Scholar

Enactment of limited derogation of the Constitution does not change the wording of the Constitution and does not proclaim to be the Constitution. It can be amended in case the original limited derogation still holds after the amendment, in the order of enacting ordinary parliamentary laws.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Poikkeuslakien välttämisen periaate, 6–7 Lakimies 961 (1999).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Eduskunnan kirjelmä 28/2011 vp.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 119.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Id. at 128–29.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Id. at 119–20.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ According to Section 80.1 of the Constitution:Google Scholar

The practice concerning issues of “the rights and obligations of private individuals and the other matters that under this Constitution are of a legislative nature,” which have to be enacted by Parliamentary Acts, is wide and deep. This practice has strengthened the position of Parliament after the reform of the Constitution. See Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Onko eduskunnan asema lainsäädäntövallan käyttäjänä muuttunut?, 7–8 Lakimies 1050 (2005).Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁸ See e.g., Hallituksen esitys 60/2010 vp, 37; see also Statement of the Constitutional Law Committee, PeVL 6/2009 vp.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Section 23.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Statement of the Constitutional Law Committee, PeVL 6/2009 vp.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See Hallituksen esitys 60/2010 vp, 23.Google Scholar

¹¹² See Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 129–30, 131.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Amendment Nr 1112/2011 (entry into force: Mar. 1, 2012).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ See for example the so called Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (July 1, 1984), para. 41 stating that economic difficulties per se cannot justify derogation measures. Available at https://www.icj.org/wpcontent/uploads/1984/07/Siracusa-principles-ICCPR-legal-submission-1985-eng.pdf.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ See Hallituksen esitys 60/2010 vp, 23, 36.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See Hallituksen esitys 60/2010 vp, 37.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 130.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ IG Chapter 2.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Böckenförde, supra note 6, at 121.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Id. at 119–20.Google Scholar