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Developments in AKP Policy Toward Religion and Homogeneity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

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Critics of the Turkish interpretation of secularism, laiklik, describe it as authoritarian and repressive. Indeed, rather than establish state neutrality toward religion, laiklik historically entailed state control of Islam, the religion of the vast majority of the Turkish population, and the exclusion of religion from the public sphere in an effort to control religious belief and identity. Many, including leaders in the ruling AKP, assert, though, that recent reforms herald a move away from this model of control toward a secularism defined by state neutrality toward religion. To determine whether this transformation is actually occurring, I evaluate, based on Turkish language sources, the recent reforms under the AKP using the framework of the secularized state described by the German legal scholar Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. Because of its significant role in implementing Turkish policies toward religion, I evaluate these reforms by analyzing developments in the programming and messaging of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) under the AKP. I find little evidence that laiklik is transitioning to a state neutrality toward religion. Rather, the AKP has coupled a greater presence of religion in the public sphere with expanding state authority in religious programming and messaging. Although these reforms reflect a transformation in Turkish nation-building policies, they maintain the state control of religion that separates laiklik from neutral secularism.

Type
Open Neutrality and Religion-State Relations
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by German Law Journal, Inc. 

References

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National sovereignty is grounded in the foundation of laicism. In the laicist system, sovereignty belongs to the nation; worldly affairs are organized by worldly principles; the affairs of religion and state are totally separated from each other; religion is sheltered in the sacred and private place of individuals' consciousness; and none of the political, social, legal, economic spheres of the state can be regulated by religious rules.

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76 “Bugün millet ve yaşadiğrimız coğrrafya olarak yine ağrır bir imtihandan geçiyoruz. Bizi birbirimize düşürmek, gücümüzü zayıflatmak isteyenler tarafından, ülkemiz, bir ateş çemberinin içerisine çekilmeye çalısılıyor… kardeşliğrimiz, birlik ve beraberliğrimiz, huzurumuz hedef alınıyor.” Id. Google Scholar

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83 “Kimilerinin, masum insanları hunharca katletmeyi cihat, kendisiyle beraber kadın, erkek, çoluk-çocuk demeden insanları öldürmeyi şehadet zannetmesidir.” Google Scholar

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86 “Nefsini, heva ve heveslerini ilahlaştıran zalimler.” Google Scholar

87 “Kurtuluş beratı vaat edenleri, hakikatin sadece kendi elinde olduğrunu iddia edenler.” Google Scholar

88 “Bu milletin arasına fitne ve fesat tohumları ekmek isteyen münafıklar, bozguncular.” Google Scholar

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90 “Kulluk sadece Allah'a Özgüdür.” Google Scholar

91 “Nitekim Peygamberimizin vefatına bir türlü inanmak istemeyen bazı sahabilere Hz. Ebu Bekir'in şu uyarısı son derece dikkat çekicidir: ‘Kim Muhammed'e tapıyorsa bilsin ki Muhammed ölmüştür. Kim Allah'a kulluk ediyorsa bilsin ki Allah diridir, asla ölmez.‘” Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Kulluk sadece Allah'a Özgüdür, Diyanet (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/.Google Scholar

92 Gülen movement is fake Mahdi, says Turkey's Religious Directorate head, Hürriyet Daily News (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gulen-movement-is-fake-mahdi-says-turkeys-religious-directorate-head-102487; FETÖ wolf in sheep's clothing, Gülen not a religious scholar, Daily Sabah (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2016/08/04/feto-wolf-in-sheeps-clothing-gulen-not-a-religious-scholar.Google Scholar

93 “Tevhit ve vahdet medeniyeti, insanları dil, renk, coğrrafya farklılıklarından dolayı ötekileştirmez. Bu medeniyetin mensupları, bütün insanları ya hilkatte eş ya dinde kardeş olarak kabul ederler.” Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Tehvid ve Vahdetin Medeniyeti, Diyanet (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/.Google Scholar

94 “Çevremize karşı hak ehli olmak, onlara karsı şefkat, merhamet, insaf ve adaletle davranmaktır. Dili, ırkı, mezhep ve meşrebine bakmaksızın hiç kimsenin can, mal, onur ve haysiyetine dil uzatmamaktır.” Diyanet İşleri Başkanliğrı, Hak ve Hakikat, Diyanet (Mar. 25, 2016), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/.Google Scholar

95 Diyanet İşleri Başkanliğrı, Hz. Peygamber, Tehvid ve Vahdet, Diyanet (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/.Google Scholar

96 “Rengi rengine, dili diline, sesi sesine, gönlü gönlüne karışmış bir milletiz”; Diyanet İsleri Başkanlığı, Çanakkale ve Birlik Ruhu, Diyanet (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/.Google Scholar

97 “Her türlü aşırılıktan uzak, mutedil bir ümmet.” Google Scholar

98 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Tehvid ve Vahdetin Öncüsü Müminler, Diyanet (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www2.diyanet.gov.tr/.Google Scholar

99 While imams trained in state-run religious schools lead Sunni congregations, Alevi communities are led by dedes who obtain their role through hereditary lineages of spiritual authority.Google Scholar

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